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The acknowledgment that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Committee 
of Ministers are flooded with repetitive cases has brought increasing attention to the issue of full and 
timely execution of the Court’s judgments. Efforts have been made to render the system of 
supervision of the execution more transparent, independent, and participatory. The involvement of 
actors other than the intergovernmental Committee of Ministers appears particularly significant. This 
dissertation focuses on specific entities that, while somewhat neglected in the literature, would seem 
to be ideally situated to promote the execution of ECtHR judgments – i.e., National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs), which are commonly portrayed as “bridges” between the State and civil society, 
and between the national and international levels.  
The dissertation provides a comprehensive examination of the current level of engagement by 
NHRIs with the Committee of Ministers for furthering the execution of ECtHR judgments. 
Participating NHRIs have generally provided detailed information on the state of legislation, 
administrative practice, and case-law in their respective countries, and they have proposed measures 
to prevent future human rights violations. Nonetheless, the findings show that a relatively low number 
of NHRIs have submitted communications to the Committee of Ministers to date and that the impact 
of these communications on the actions undertaken by States and the decisions adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers is often difficult to assess. The activities carried out by NHRIs at the domestic 
level to encourage the execution of ECtHR judgments are also systematically identified with a view 
to illustrating the multifarious ways in which NHRIs can contribute to the execution process.   
On the basis of these findings, the dissertation highlights and accounts for the unfulfilled 
potential of NHRIs in promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments; it further puts forward proposals 
to strengthen the involvement of NHRIs in the process.
 i 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
It is not mere rhetoric to say that this dissertation would not have been possible without the 
contribution and support from many people that crossed my PhD path, to a greater or lesser extent.  
My thanks go, first of all, to my supervisor, Prof. Giuseppe Nesi, who has constantly supported 
me throughout the years, encouraged me to develop my own arguments and be able to defend them, 
and provided me along the way with opportunities that have greatly enriched my PhD experience. I 
must also thank the School of International Studies of the University of Trento, in both its academic 
and administrative components, for the supportive while stimulating environment that it managed to 
create, and for keeping us PhD candidates on track. I am especially thankful to Prof. Mark Steven 
Beittel, who did much more than improving my academic writing skills. 
My research stays at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights at Utrecht University and at the 
Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Lund have been most 
conducive for my research, and I am thankful to all the people that I met there with whom I exchanged 
views on my research as well as on many other topics. 
I am particularly grateful to the representatives from National Human Rights Institutions that 
agreed to be interviewed for this dissertation and found the time to answer my questions in their very 
busy schedules. Their insights have been most valuable for my work.  
Moral support has been equally important to complete this PhD. For that I need to thank my 
partner, family, and the extended family of my PhD colleagues, with whom I have shared the ups and 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1. SETTING THE SCENE 1 
1.1. THE OVERLOAD OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ISSUE OF DOMESTIC 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS JUDGMENTS AND OF THE CONVENTION 4 
1.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP AND THE ROLE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 15 
1.3. RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS 23 
1.4. RESEARCH METHODS 25 
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 30 
CHAPTER 2. SUPERVISING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: MULTIPLE ACTORS AT WORK 32 
2.1. NON-EXECUTION AND DELAYED EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS: CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED REMEDIES 33 
2.2. STATES SUPERVISING STATES: THE ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS 39 
2.3. THE ROLE OF THE COURT 52 
2.4. THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
DEPARTMENT FOR THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS 64 
2.5. THE INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL ACTORS: NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND COURTS 73 
2.6. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 77 
CHAPTER 3. PROMOTING AND PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS 80 
3.1. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES AND FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS 81 
3.2. CATEGORIES OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 87 
3.3. THE PROLIFERATION OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND PATTERNS 92 
3.4. THE ACCREDITATION OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 97 
3.5. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS 107 
3.6. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 128 
3.7. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 145 
CHAPTER 4. PROMOTING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AT THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
LEVEL 149 
4.1. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS FROM NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 
(RULE 9(2) COMMUNICATIONS) 150 
4.2. WHO: WHICH INSTITUTIONS HAVE SUBMITTED COMMUNICATIONS AND TO WHAT EXTENT 153 
4.3. WHEN: THE SELECTION OF CASES 165 
4.4. WHAT: THE CONTENT OF COMMUNICATIONS 184 
4.5. HOW: THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATIONS 208 
4.6. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 233 
 iii 
CHAPTER 5. PROMOTING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 237 
5.1. SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION 237 
5.2. ADVISING 240 
5.3. INFORMING AND RAISING AWARENESS 245 
5.4. EDUCATING AND TRAINING 248 
5.5. MONITORING, INQUIRING AND REPORTING 250 
5.6. HANDLING INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINTS 254 
5.7. APPROACHING NATIONAL COURTS 258 
5.8. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 262 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUDING 265 
6.1. RESEARCH FINDINGS 266 
6.2. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 285 
6.3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE AND PRACTICE 287 
6.4. FUTURE LINES OF INQUIRY 289 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 293 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 294 
LIST OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS AND OFFICIAL REPORTS 316 
INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 316 
United Nations 316 
International Coordinating Committee / Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 319 
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 320 
Committee of Ministers: communications received 320 
Committee of Ministers: other documents concerning the execution of judgments (decisions, resolutions, 
notes on the agenda and information documents) 326 
European Court of Human Rights: judgments, decisions and communicated cases 329 
Other documents and reports of the Council of Europe 332 
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 340 
OTHER DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 345 
 iv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
CNCDH Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme 
CoE Council of Europe 
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  
CRPD 
Committee 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
ENNHRI European Network of National Human Rights Institutions 
GANHRI Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 
ICC International Coordinating Committee for National Human Rights Institutions 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NHRI National Human Rights Institution 
NPM National Preventive Mechanism 
OHCHR (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
OPCAT Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture  
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
SPT Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
UN United Nations 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
















CHAPTER 1. SETTING THE SCENE 
 
Dark clouds were floating over Copenhagen in April 2018, when the latest High-level 
Conference was held by Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE) to discuss the future of the 
system of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or “the Convention”). Some bellicose 
statements from members of the Danish Government ahead of the Conference and a controversial 
Draft Declaration had raised fears of a blow to the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR or “the Court”),1 after years of mounting criticism from various quarters on both legal and 
political grounds.2  
In the end, however, the outcome of the Conference was essentially in line with the final 
declarations of previous meetings and emphasised the need to strengthen the domestic 
implementation of the Convention – in its dual meaning of ex ante fulfilment of the Convention’s 
rights and ex post execution of the ECtHR judgments at the national level. Domestic implementation 
has become a sort of mantra in the debate on the reform of the ECHR system; especially after the 
amendments introduced by Protocol no. 14 to broaden the scope of inadmissibility criteria and deal 
with inadmissible applications more expeditiously, tackling repetitive cases and improving domestic 
implementation have been considered the main priorities to ensure the sustainability of the system by 
both institutional actors and scholars.3  
                                                        
1 Jacques Hartmann, “A Danish Crusade for the Reform of the European Court of Human Rights”, EJIL: Talk!, 14 
November 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-danish-crusade-for-the-reform-of-the-european-
court-of-human-rights/. For a critical appraisal of the Draft Declaration, cf. AIRE Centre et al., Joint NGO Response to 
the Draft Copenhagen Declaration, 13 February 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.amnesty.eu/news/joint-
ngo-response-to-the-draft-copenhagen-declaration/. The most controversial elements of the Draft Declaration were 
nonetheless deleted from the final version of the document: Antoine Buyse, “The Copenhagen Declaration on the ECHR 
– Final Version Adopted”, ECHR Blog, 16 April 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/the-copenhagen-declaration-on-echr.html.  
2 Not all of which ill-founded. Cf., for a comprehensive overview of the main criticisms addressed to the ECtHR (and 
some responses): Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom Zwart, and Julie Fraser, The European Court of Human Rights and its 
Discontents: Turning Criticism into Strength (Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013); and 
Sébastien Touzé, ed., La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Une confiance necessaire pour une autorité renforcée 
(Paris: Pedone 2016). 
3 On the importance of the execution of ECtHR judgments, and of the Convention’s national implementation more 
generally, for the sustainability of the system, cf., inter alia, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)2 
of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on efficient domestic capacity for rapid execution of judgments of the 
 2 
Indeed, there is little doubt that the effective application of the Convention domestically or, at 
the latest, the full and timely execution of the Court’s judgments (particularly of those requiring 
structural changes to national laws or practices) would lighten the docket of the Court, reduce the 
number of future applications, strengthen the legitimacy and credibility of the Convention’s system, 
and, ultimately, ensure greater and lasting respect for human rights within States Parties.4 How to 
achieve this outcome in practice is, however, disputed, and official documents are often vague when 
it comes to putting forward solutions, thus running the risk that references to the need for better 
domestic implementation become empty words – an ideal, distant goal with little practical 
significance. 
                                                        
European Court of Human Rights, 1017th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 6 February 2008. Cf. also the High-level 
Conferences convened, starting from 2010, to discuss the future of the ECHR system and referred to in Section 1.1 infra. 
Even before Protocol no. 14, many CoE bodies had taken up the issue and attempted to put forward solutions – cf. 
footnotes 4 and 28 infra.  
In the literature, cf., among others: Wouter Vandenhole, “The Execution of Judgments”, in Protocol No. 14 and the 
Reform of the European Court of Human Rights, eds. Paul Lemmens and Wouter Vandenhole (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 
2005), 105-121; Marinella Marmo, “The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – A Political 
Battle”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 15, no. 2 (2008): 235-258; and Laurence R. Helfer, 
“Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European 
Human Rights Regime”, European Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (2008): 125-159. 
The impact of the ECHR and ECtHR judgments on national systems, as well as the issues surrounding the implementation 
process, have been studied extensively by both lawyers and political scientists. Cf., among others: Elisabeth Lambert 
Abdelgawad, “L’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l’homme, no. 71 (2007): 669-705; Theodora Christou and Juan Pablo Raymond, eds., European Court of Human Rights: 
Remedies and Execution of Judgments (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2005); 
Dia Anagnostou and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Domestic Implementation of Human Rights Judgments in Europe: Legal 
Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter”, European Journal of International Law 25, no. 1 (2014): 205-227; 
Courtney Hillebrecht, “Implementing International Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics and the European 
Court of Human Rights”, Human Rights Review 13, no. 3 (2012): 279-301; Jonas Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen, 
eds., The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2013); Helen 
Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, eds., A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Robert Blackburn and Joerg Polakiewicz, eds., Fundamental Rights in 
Europe: The European Convention on Human Rights and its Member States, 1950-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). 
4 As put it by the Group of Wise Persons, tasked with submitting proposals for the long-term effectiveness of the ECHR 
system following the adoption of Protocol no. 14, “the credibility of the human rights protection system depends to a 
great extent on execution of the Court’s judgments. Full execution of judgments helps to enhance the Court’s prestige 
and the effectiveness of its action and has the effect of limiting the number of applications submitted to it” (Committee 
of Ministers, Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, 979bis meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies, 15 November 2006, CM(2006)203, para. 25. In CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, 13 May 
2004, Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 19, para. 16, it is stated that “rapid and adequate execution has, of course, 
an effect on the influx of new cases: the more rapidly general measures are taken by States Parties to execute judgments 
which point to a structural problem, the fewer repetitive applications there will be”. Cf. also Lord Woolf, Review of the 
Working Methods of the European Court of Human Rights, December 2005, 66. 
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This dissertation tests the role that National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), bodies that are 
seldom considered in connection with the ECHR system, are playing and can play in facilitating the 
implementation of the Convention within Member States. For the reasons specified in the next 
sections, the dissertation is particularly concerned with the role of NHRIs in promoting the execution 
of ECtHR judgments at the domestic level – i.e., in promoting the adoption of all the measures 
required from Member States to give effect to the ECtHR judgments issued against them, rather than 
the general conformity of national legal orders with the ECHR or the observance of ECtHR judgments 
issued against other States.5 
The first section of this chapter outlines the reforms enacted with a view to ensuring the long-
term effectiveness of the ECHR system, with a focus on the more effective implementation of the 
Convention’s standards and of the Court’s judgments at the domestic level. Obstacles to these 
processes and gaps in their outcomes are highlighted. The second section puts these challenges into 
the broader context of the so-called implementation gap that affects international human rights law 
and international law more generally; it then refers to the role that NHRIs, as peculiar bodies at the 
crossroads between the domestic and international levels of human rights promotion and protection, 
are expected to play to fill this gap. It is thus shown how the activities by NHRIs are also relevant to 
the ECHR system and to the effective execution of ECtHR judgments. The following sections 




                                                        
5 A similar distinction is made in Alexandra Huneeus, “Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s 
Struggle to Enforce Human Rights”, University of Wisconsin Law School – Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 1168, 18 August 2011, 117 (footnote 56), accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911405. Cf. also Elizabeth Mottershaw and Rachel Murray, 
“National responses to human rights judgments: the need for government co-ordination and implementation”, European 
Human Rights Law Review, no. 6 (2012): 639-653 (which, in turn, mentions on the point Open Society Justice Initiative, 
From Judgment to Justice: Implementing International and Regional Human Rights Decisions (New York: Open Society 
Foundations, 2010), 13). 
 
 4 
1.1. The overload of the European Court of Human Rights and the issue of domestic 
implementation of its judgments and of the Convention 
At the end of the 1990s, two phenomena triggered a spiralling increase of the number of cases 
lodged with the ECtHR: Central and Eastern European States joined the CoE en masse;6 and Protocol 
no. 11 to the Convention, which entered into force on 1 November 1998, established the right of all 
individuals to have access to the Court.7 The greater publicity surrounding the Court and increased 
familiarity with the functioning of the system are also considered to have fuelled the number of 
applications.8 The figures speak for themselves: while in the first forty years of operation of the Court 
(1958-1998) 45,000 applications were allocated to a judicial formation, 60,900 were allocated in the 
four-year period 1999-2002 (i.e., in a tenth of the time).9 In 2013, a record number of 65,800 new 
applications were submitted to the Court.10 
Moreover, while the attention of commentators and institutional actors has mainly focused until 
recently on the overburdening of the Court, recurrently described as a “victim of its own success”,11 
the Court is not the only body of the Convention’s system that is overloaded: the Committee of 
Ministers, namely the intergovernmental body responsible for the supervision of the execution of 
ECtHR judgments by States Parties, has also witnessed a massive increase of cases over time.12 While 
                                                        
6 On the consequences of the enlargement of the CoE membership, cf. Wojciech Sadurski, “Partnering with Strasbourg: 
Constitutionalisation of the European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the 
Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments”, Human Rights Law Review 9, no. 3 (2009): 397-453. 
7 Protocol no. 11 introduced several important changes to the Convention’s system. The most significant ones consist in 
the elimination of the Commission, which used to act as a filter between individuals and the Court, and the obligation for 
all States Parties to the Convention to accept the jurisdiction of the Court over individual applications. For all innovations 
brought by Protocol no. 11, cf. CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby, 11 May 1994, 
European Treaty Series – No. 155. 
8 Cf., among others, Marie-Aude Beernaert, “Protocol 14 and new Strasbourg procedures: towards greater efficiency? 
And at what price?”, European Human Rights Law Review, no. 5 (2004): 544. 
9 ECtHR, 50 Years of Activity – The European Court of Human Rights: Some Facts and Figures (Strasbourg: Public 
Relations Unit of the Court, April 2010), 4. 
10 ECtHR, Analysis of statistics 2017 (Strasbourg: January 2018), 7.  
11 Cf., among others, Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, “La «réforme de la réforme» du système de protection de la CEDH”, 
Annuaire français de droit international 49 (2003): 611; and Helfer, supra n 3, 125-126. 
12 Among the scholarly works that have highlighted this phenomenon, cf. Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, “L’exécution 
des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (2006)”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 71 (2007): 
672; and Andrew Drzemczewski, “The Parliamentary Assembly’s involvement in the supervision of the judgments of the 
Strasbourg Court”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 28, no. 2 (2010): 166.  
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in 1998 there were 1,435 cases pending before the Committee, these amounted to 11,099 in 2012.13 
The number has since started to slowly decrease thanks to the grouping and closure of a considerable 
amount of “clone” cases,14 but 7,584 cases were still under the supervision of the Committee at the 
end of 2017.15  
The overload of the Committee of Ministers is first of all a consequence of the overload of the 
Court: quite straightforwardly, the more cases the Court deals with, the more judgments whose 
execution the Committee has to supervise. However, the increase in the workload of the Committee 
is also the result of trends that are specific to the execution process. In 2016, the CoE Commissioner 
for Human Rights pointed to two main challenges for the future of the Convention’s system: the 
“prolonged non-implementation of a number of judgments” and the “direct attacks on the Court’s 
authority”.16 In other words, judgments take longer to be executed and respondent States even openly 
refuse at times to execute the judgments, thus directly challenging the Court’s role.  
At any rate, the need to tackle the overload of the Court was considered a priority and was at 
the heart of a reform process of the Convention’s system which already started in 2000, shortly after 
the entry into force of Protocol no. 11, with a Ministerial Conference held in Rome where the call for 
an “in-depth reflection” on the best means to guarantee the “effectiveness” of the Court was made.17 
The main outcome of this intensive process was Protocol no. 14, which opened for signature in May 
2004 but entered into force only in June 2010 at the end of a troubled path.  
                                                        
13 Department for the Execution of Judgments, Overview 1998-2017, 1, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://rm.coe.int/overview-1998-2017-eng/16807b81c9.  
14 The decrease in the number of pending cases was particularly pronounced in 2017, when a record number of 3,691 
cases were closed, including 1,975 repetitive cases against Italy; cf. Department for the Execution of Judgments, Closed 
cases – State by State. 2017 (compared to 2016), accessed 4 January 2019, https://rm.coe.int/6-closed-cases-2017-state-
by-state/16807b8684. 
15 Department for Execution, supra n 13, 1.  
16 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, “Non-implementation of the Court’s judgments: our shared responsibility”, 
Human rights comment, 23 August 2016, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/non-
implementation-of-the-court-s-judgments-our-shared-responsibility.  
17 Committee of Ministers, Declaration. The European Convention on Human Rights at 50: What Future for the 
Protection of Human Rights in Europe?, European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights (Rome, 3-4 November 
2000), 729th meeting, 15 November 2000. 
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The Protocol was the result of constant consultations which were based on the proposals by an 
Evaluation Group and the Steering Committee for Human Rights and involved all major CoE actors, 
including the Parliamentary Assembly, as well as the Court and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).18 The amendments introduced by the Protocol essentially aimed, on the one hand, to allow 
for a swifter disposal of inadmissible applications by the Court, and, on the other, to reduce the 
number of incoming applications to the Court by tightening the admissibility criteria.19  
Under the former tier, the Protocol added the single-judge formation, entrusted with the disposal 
of manifestly inadmissible applications, whereas committees of three judges (to whom manifestly 
inadmissible applications were previously allocated) were “upgraded” and given the competence to 
rule on the merits on admissible applications whose “underlying question … is already the subject of 
well-established case-law of the Court” (new Article 28 ECHR).  
The operation of single judges has indeed been crucial, as inadmissible applications are now 
dealt with far more rapidly – a huge progress for the Court, considering that inadmissible applications 
regularly account for over 90% of the ECtHR yearly output.20 Thanks to the work undertaken by 
single judges, already in 2015 the Court could assert that “the backlog of inadmissible cases ha[d] 
been eliminated”.21 The impact of the committees’ new competence as regards repetitive applications 
is also considerable: in the last years, between 50% and 75% of the applications decided by judgment 
were dealt with by the committees.22 The fact remains that, whether delivered by three-judge 
                                                        
18 Beernaert, supra n 8, 545-546. On the reform process that led to the drafting of Protocol no. 14, cf. also Martin Eaton 
and Jeroen Schokkenbroek, “Reforming the Human Rights Protection System Established by the European Convention 
on Human Rights”, Human Rights Law Journal 26, nos. 1-4 (October 2005): 2-4. It should be noted here that NHRIs as 
well took part in the reform process: cf. Section 3.6 of this dissertation.  
19 For commentaries on the amendments introduced by Protocol no. 14, cf. Beernaert, supra n 8, 544-557; Eaton and 
Schokkenbroek, supra n 18, 1-17; Sicilianos, supra n 11, 611-640; and Lucius Caflisch, “The Reform of the European 
Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14 and Beyond”, Human Rights Law Review 6, no. 2 (2006): 403-415. See also 
CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14, supra n 4. 
20 Cf. the Analyses of statistics that have been published by the ECtHR every year since 2006. The percentage of 
inadmissible applications dropped to 82% in 2017 because of the judgment in Burmych and others v. Ukraine, nos. 
46852/13 et al., 12 October 2017, whereby the Grand Chamber struck out more than 12,000 applications (ECtHR, 
Analysis of statistics 2017, supra n 10, 4-5). 
21 ECtHR, Analysis of statistics 2015 (Strasbourg: January 2016), 4. 
22 The data refer to the period 2013-2016. For the years 2011 and 2012 no data on the number of applications decided by 
three-judge committees are available, whereas in 2017 the percentage of applications decided by the committees 
exceptionally decreased to 17% due to the Burmych and others v. Ukraine judgment, mentioned supra n 20.  
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committees, seven-judge chambers, or the Grand Chamber, all rulings ascertaining a violation of the 
Convention must be supervised by the Committee of Ministers for their execution.  
As to the latter tier, Protocol no. 14 introduced a new admissibility criterion, the so-called 
“significant disadvantage” clause, by which applications are declared inadmissible if the violations 
suffered by the applicants do not pass a threshold of seriousness.23 Between 2011 and 2012, when 
chambers exclusively could apply the criterion, twenty-six cases only were declared inadmissible on 
this basis, whereas in other sixteen instances the application of the new clause was argued by the 
respondent governments but rejected by the Court.24 The number of applications declared 
inadmissible on this ground rose in the following two years (2013-2014), when the clause was applied 
by single judges in 1,350 instances.25 
Finally, while focusing on how to reduce the workload of the Court and of its chambers 
especially, Protocol no. 14 also intervened in the execution phase. Whereas problems with the 
execution of ECtHR judgments had already emerged in the “old system”,26 the rapid increase of new 
applications following the entry into force of Protocol no. 11 and the CoE membership’s enlargement 
made the issue more pressing. In 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE issued a well-known 
resolution on the causes of and possible solutions to implementation issues.27 The matter was 
                                                        
23 Article 35(3) ECHR now reads: “The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under 
Article 34 if it considers that: … (b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human 
rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and 
provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal”. 
24 ECtHR, Research Report – The new admissibility criterion under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention: case-law 
principles two years on (Strasbourg: 2012), Appendices A and B. 
25 Open Society Justice Initiative, Legal Update – The Application of the ‘Significant Disadvantage’ Criterion by the 
European Court of Human Rights (New York: November 2015), 3, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/briefing-echr-significant-disadvantage-20151120.pdf. No 
data on the following years could be found. 
Concerns have been raised in various quarters regarding the appropriateness of this criterion, in light of the already high 
number of applications declared inadmissible by the ECtHR on other grounds and of the risks for the right to individual 
application before the Court: Beernaert, supra n 8, 551-554 and 556. For critical appraisals in the literature, cf., among 
others: Nikos Vogiatzis, “The Admissibility Criterion under Article 35(3)(B) ECHR: A ‘Significant Disadvantage’ to 
Human Rights Protection?”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2016): 185-211. 
26 The strenuous political opposition by Turkey to the implementation of the Loizidou judgment is recalled by Marmo, 
supra n 3. Cf. also, for other examples of “difficulties” in the previous system, Ronald St. John Macdonald, “Supervision 
of the Execution of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights”, in Mélanges en l'honneur de Nicolas 
Valticos: droit et justice, ed. René-Jean Dupuy (Paris: Pedone, 1999), 423 et seqq. 
27 Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1226 (2000). Execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 
30th sitting, 28 September 2000. 
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thereafter considered by the Court, the Committee of Ministers, the Steering Committee for Human 
Rights, the Evaluation Group, and the Venice Commission.28 Various proposals were put forward 
and discussed and one of them was incorporated in Protocol no. 14 – i.e., the attribution of new 
powers to the Committee of Ministers. This body can now initiate both “interpretation proceedings” 
(Article 46(3) ECHR), by way of which the Committee can ask the Court to solve interpretive issues 
affecting its judgments, and “infringement proceedings” (Articles 46(4) and 46(5) ECHR), by way 
of which the Committee can refer to the Court instances of non-execution of judgments by States.29 
However, only one set of infringement proceedings and no interpretation proceedings have been 
brought to date by the Committee.30 Thus, the ability of these novel instruments to improve the 
execution process appears – so far – very limited. 
 
Protocol no. 14 was, in a sense, born incomplete – namely, in the awareness that it would not 
be sufficient in itself to remedy the issues identified as threatening the long-term effectiveness of the 
Convention’s system. Significantly, the Explanatory Report to the Protocol pointed to the 
strengthening of the national implementation of the Convention and of the execution of the ECtHR 
judgments as the main areas where further interventions were needed to ensure the survival of the 
system.31  
                                                        
28 Letter of 28 March 2000 from the Mr Luzius Wildhaber, President of the European Court of Human Rights, to Mr 
Gunnar Jansson, Chairperson of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, included as Appendix II to 
Parliamentary Assembly – Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Execution of judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights – Report, 12 July 2000; Evaluation Group, Report of the Evaluation Group to the Committee of 
Ministers on the European Court of Human Rights, 27 September 2001, EG Court(2001)1, paras. 48 et seqq.; Committee 
of Ministers, Declaration on the Court of Human Rights for Europe, 111th Ministerial Session, November 2002, para. 14; 
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Implementation of the Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Opinion No. 209/2002, 53rd Plenary Session, 18 December 2002; and Committee of 
Ministers/Steering Committee for Human Rights, Guaranteeing the long-term effectiveness of the control system of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Addendum to the final report containing CDDH proposals (long version), 14 
April 2003, CM(2003)55-Add 2, Section C. 
29 For an examination of these new mechanisms, cf. Vandenhole, supra n 3, 113 et seqq.; and Elisabeth Lambert 
Abdelgawad, “L’exècution des jugements: les requêtes en manquement et en interprétation”, in La Cour européenne des 
droits de l'homme après le protocole 14, ed. Samantha Besson (Zürich: Schulthess, 2011), 93-113. Cf. also further Section 
2.3 of this dissertation.  
30 The Committee of Ministers passed the following Resolution to initiate infringement proceedings against Azerbaijan: 
“Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2017)429. Execution of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights: Ilgar 
Mammadov against Azerbaijan”, Resolutions, 1302nd meeting, 5 December 2017, CM/ResDH(2017)429. 
31 CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14, supra n 4, at para. 14 states: “Measures required to ensure the long-term 
effectiveness of the control system established by the Convention in the broad sense are not restricted to Protocol No. 14. 
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To this end, some measures were already taken in conjunction with the adoption of Protocol 
no. 14, even though they were not included in the text of the Protocol. In order to ensure the 
entrenchment of the Convention in national legal orders and cultures, the Committee of Ministers 
addressed a number of recommendations to Member States regarding the place of the Convention in 
national university curricula and professional training, the ascertainment of the compatibility of 
national laws and administrative practices with the ECHR, and the improvement of domestic 
remedies.32 While the Committee of Ministers asked the Deputies to “undertake a review, on a regular 
and transparent basis, of the implementation” of these recommendations and of two previous ones 
regarding the reopening of cases at the national level and the dissemination of the Convention and of 
ECtHR judgments,33 these remain non-binding instruments and the review of at least some them does 
not appear so regular and effective.  
More concrete results have already been yielded by Resolution Res(2004)3 of the Committee of 
Ministers on judgments revealing an underlying systemic problem, which was passed during the same 
meeting and authorised the Court to deliver – under certain conditions – so-called pilot judgments.34 
                                                        
Measures must also be taken to prevent violations at national level and improve domestic remedies, and also to enhance 
and expedite execution of the Court’s judgments. Only a comprehensive set of interdependent measures tackling the 
problem from different angles will make it possible to overcome the Court’s present overload”. 
32 These Recommendations were all adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 May 2004, at its 114th session: 
Recommendation Rec(2004)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Convention on Human 
Rights in university education and professional training; Recommendation Rec(2004)5 of the Committee of Ministers on 
the verification of the compatibility of draft laws, existing laws and administrative practice with the standards laid down 
by the European Convention on Human Rights; and Recommendation Rec(2004)6 of the Committee of Ministers on the 
improvement of domestic remedies.  
33 Committee of Ministers, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers: Ensuring the effectiveness of the implementation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights at national and European levels, 114th session, 12 May 2004. The two 
previous recommendations, which are also directed at promoting the national implementation of the Convention and of 
ECtHR judgments, are Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of the Committee of Ministers on the re-examination or reopening 
of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 694th meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies, 19 January 2000; and Recommendation Rec(2002)13 of the Committee of Ministers on the 
publication and dissemination in the member states of the text of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, 822nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 18 December 2002 (the latter 
Recommendation was accompanied by Resolution Res(2002)58 of the Committee of Ministers on the publication and 
dissemination of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, adopted during the same meeting). 
34 The Resolution was adopted on the same day as the above-mentioned recommendations, namely on 12 May 2004, at 
the 114th session of the Committee of Ministers. The Resolution invites the Court “to identify […] what it considers to be 
an underlying systemic problem and the source of this problem […], so as to assist States in finding the appropriate 
solution and the Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of judgments”.  
In fact, the pilot judgment procedure was firstly proposed by the Court itself within the debate on the drafting of Protocol 
no. 14: ECtHR, Position paper of the European Court of Human Rights, 12 September 2003, CDDH-GDR(2003)024, 
paras. 43 et seqq. in particular. While the proposal was not included in the Protocol, the Committee of Ministers adopted 
the above-mentioned Resolution and thus legitimised the practice of pilot judgments. Cf., on the point, Markus Fyrnys, 
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In essence, faced with a case arising from a systemic deficiency of the national system, the Court may 
issue a judgment through which it does not only declare a violation of the Convention, but it also 
“identif[ies] the systemic problem and … give[s] the Government clear indications of the type of 
remedial measures needed to resolve it”.35 These rulings have considerably innovated the system of 
the supervision of execution by allowing for a greater role of the Court in the post-judgment phase 
and facilitating the processing and resolution of large numbers of repetitive cases.  
Other innovations aimed at strengthening the ability of the ECHR system to deal with repetitive 
cases and optimise the (supervision of) execution of ECtHR judgments have been brought by 
amendments to the rules and working methods of the Court and of the Committee of Ministers 
especially. These changes, which have rarely been examined in-depth in the literature but are of great 
interest to this dissertation, will be analysed in detail in Chapter 2. 
 
Following the entry into force of Protocol no. 14, two more Protocols were drafted in the context 
of the ongoing reform efforts of the Convention’s system: Protocols nos. 15 and 16. The former one, 
which is awaiting ratification by the last two CoE Member States to enter into force,36 deals with a 
variety of aspects without introducing major changes. First of all, it aims to further reduce the number 
of incoming applications by shortening the term to submit an application (from six months from the 
final domestic decision to four months) and broadening the scope of the “significant disadvantage” 
clause.37  
                                                        
“Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human 
Rights”, German Law Journal 12, no. 5 (2011): 1231-1260. 
35 ECtHR/Press Unit, Factsheet – Pilot judgments (Strasbourg: September 2016), 1.   
36 The CoE Member States that have not yet ratified the Protocol, as of December 2018, are Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Italy. Ratification by all forty-seven Member States is necessary for the Protocol to enter into force. An updated list of 
signatures and ratifications is available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/213/signatures?p_auth=KfD3MVvg, accessed 4 January 2019. 
37 CoE, Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 24 
June 2013, Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 213, Articles 4 and 5. For the main changes introduced by Protocol no. 
15, cf. CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 24 June 2013, Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 213. 
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Furthermore, as far as the issue of domestic implementation is concerned, amending Protocol 
no. 15 will add a new recital in the preamble to the Convention recalling the principle of subsidiarity, 
which places on Member States “the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined 
in [the] Convention”, while attributing them “a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights”.38 Beside the fact that such a reference appears 
to have been inserted more as a reminder to the Court of the prerogatives of States Parties in the 
implementation of the Convention and of ECtHR judgments than a reminder to States themselves of 
their responsibilities in the area,39 it does not seem that the recent insistence on the principle of 
subsidiarity (which can also be found in all latest High-level Conferences on the reform of the Court) 
has had major practical effects to date. Indeed, while references to this principle in the judgments of 
the ECtHR have increased over the last years, subsidiarity has been used by the Court not only as a 
self-restraint mechanism, but also to highlight the obligations that rest upon States.40 
Additional Protocol no. 16, on the other hand, is more closely concerned with domestic 
implementation insofar as it innovates the advisory function of the Court by allowing national 
                                                        
38 CoE, Protocol No. 15, supra n 37, Article 1.  
39 The diverging interpretations of the principle of subsidiarity and of the margin of appreciation doctrine have recently 
been highlighted within the debate following the publication of the draft Copenhagen Declaration. Cf., among others, the 
opposing views of Alice Donald and Philip Leach, “A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Why the Draft Copenhagen Declaration 
Must be Rewritten”, EJIL: Talk!, 21 February 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-wolf-in-sheeps-
clothing-why-the-draft-copenhagen-declaration-must-be-rewritten/; and Mikael Rask Madsen and Jonas Christoffersen, 
“The European Court of Human Rights’ View of the Draft Copenhagen Declaration”, EJIL: Talk!, 23 February 2018, 
accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-european-court-of-human-rights-view-of-the-draft-copenhagen-
declaration/.  
Cf. further on subsidiarity in the ECHR system, among many: Robert Spano, “The Future of the European Court of 
Human Rights – Subsidiarity, Process-Based Review and the Rule of Law”, Human Rights Law Review 18 (2018):473-
494; Alastair Mowbray, “Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights”, Human Rights Law Review 15, 
no. 2 (2015): 313–341; Dean Spielmann, “Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and The 
National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?”, Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 14 (2012): 381-418; Gérard Gonzalez, “Bénie soit la subsidiarité! À propos du rapport d'activités 
2017 de la Cour EDH”, La Semaine juridique: édition générale 92, special issue (June 2018): 22-26 (containing some 
critical remarks on the use of the subsidiarity principle by the Court); Samantha Besson, “L’évolution du contrôle 
européen: vers une subsidiarité toujours plus subsidiaire”, in Touzé, supra n 2, 57-82 (which also criticises some recent 
trends in the application of the subsidiarity principle in the ECHR system); Paolo G. Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a Structural 
Principle of International Human Rights Law”, American Journal of International Law 97, no. 1 (2003): 38-79; and 
Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Human rights files No. 17 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2000). 
40 Mowbray, supra n 39. Moreover, it is significant that mentions of the principle of subsidiarity by governments in their 
submissions to the Court have not increased (ibid.). For a different evaluation, based on a quantitative analysis of the 
ECtHR case-law following the Brighton Declaration, cf. Mikael Rask Madsen, “Rebalancing European Human Rights: 
Has the Brighton Declaration Engendered a New Deal on Human Rights in Europe?”, Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 9 (2018): 199-222.  
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supreme courts to ask for the opinion of the Court on the interpretation and application of any 
Convention’s provisions.41 The purpose of this new procedure is to cut down the number of 
complaints lodged with the Court by ensuring respect for the Convention’s rights domestically 
through national courts. While aimed at strengthening the domestic implementation of the 
Convention, the reform will unlikely have an immediate and significant impact on the caseload of the 
Court and the Committee of Ministers, also considering that national courts are not obliged to submit 
requests (Article 1(1) of the Protocol), that the Court’s opinions are not binding on them (Article 5), 
and that Protocol no. 16 has been ratified by only ten Member States to date.42 
 
In parallel with the drafting of the above-mentioned Protocols, the debate about strengthening 
domestic implementation has continued and has been increasingly emphasised at the CoE level. There 
is wide agreement, among academics and CoE bodies alike, that the inadequate implementation of 
the Convention and of the Court’s judgments is the root cause of the repetitive cases which keep 
flooding the Court, and that the high number of repetitive cases constitutes one of the main issues 
plaguing the Court and questioning the effectiveness of the CoE supervision system.43 This also 
means that the formal incorporation of the Convention into national legal systems, which has by now 
been effected by all CoE Member States,44 is not in itself sufficient, while representing a step towards 
its more effective domestic implementation.  
The statistics reflect the persistent significance of the issue of repetitive applications: in the last 
years, repetitive or clone cases have regularly accounted for between 40 and 50% of the applications 
                                                        
41 For an illustration of the changes introduced by Protocol no. 16, cf. CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2 October 2013, Council of Europe Treaty 
Series – No. 214.  
42 The tenth ratification allowed the entry into force of the Protocol on 1 August 2018. As of December 2018, ratifying 
States include Albania, Armenia, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Lithuania, San Marino, Slovenia, and Ukraine. An 
updated list of signatures and ratifications of Protocol no. 16 is available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/-/conventions/treaty/214/signatures?p_auth=KfD3MVvg, accessed 4 January 2019. 
43 Cf., on the part of institutions, the sources mentioned supra n 4. In the literature, cf., among others, Marmo, supra n 3; 
and, on the connection between repetitive cases and failures in the execution of ECtHR judgments, Philip Leach, “On 
Reform of the European Court of Human Rights”, European Human Rights Law Review, no. 6 (2009): 729 et seqq. in 
particular. 
44 Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2004)6, supra n 32, para. 7. 
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pending before the ECtHR.45 Moreover, after a decline in 2014 and 2015, in 2016 and 2017 the 
number of new applications submitted to the ECtHR has started to increase again compared to the 
previous year.46 From 40,650 new applications allocated to a judicial formation in 2015, the number 
rose to 50,400 in 2016 and 63,350 in 2017.47  
That is why the latest five High-level Conferences convened to discuss the way forward for the 
Convention’s system, which were held between 2010 and 2018 and attended by representatives from 
Member States and relevant CoE bodies as well as from NGOs, consistently put the issue of domestic 
implementation at the core of their debates. However, the declarations made at the end of these 
Conferences mostly consist of rather vague recommendations for States to ensure the application of 
the Convention in their jurisdictions, promote synergies between the competent national authorities, 
enhance domestic remedies against ECHR violations, and fully execute the ECtHR judgments.48 The 
principle of subsidiarity is frequently reiterated.49 These statements of principle are rarely specific 
                                                        
45 Cf. the Analyses of Statistics for the years 2013-2016 by the ECtHR. Exceptionally, in 2017, the percentage fell to 
25.4%, again because of the above-mentioned Burmych and others judgment (supra n 20); in 2012, the number of 
repetitive applications was also relatively low (32%). No statistical data by the Court are currently available for the 
previous years, but some estimates can be found in the literature: e.g., Leach, supra n 43, 727, reports that “repetitive or 
clone cases” accounted for 70% of the ECtHR judgments delivered in 2008.  
46 ECtHR, The European Court of Human Rights in Facts & Figures 2017, March 2018, 5. 
47 Ibid.  
48 High-level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, 19 February 
2010, Section B of the Action Plan; High-level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Izmir 
Declaration, 27 April 2011, Section B of the Follow-up Plan; High-level Conference on the Future of the European Court 
of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, 20 April 2012, Section A; High-level Conference on the “Implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, our shared responsibility”, Brussels Declaration, 27 March 2015, Section B of 
the Action Plan; and High-level Conference, Copenhagen Declaration, 13 April 2018, Sections “Effective national 
implementation – the responsibility of States” (paras. 12 et seqq.) and “Execution of judgments – a key obligation” (paras. 
19 et seqq.).   
49 Cf. especially Copenhagen Declaration, supra n 48, paras. 6 et seqq. Cf. also Interlaken Declaration, points 2) and 3), 
as well as Section E; Izmir Declaration, preamble, paras. 5 and 6, and section F; Brighton Declaration, Sections A, B and 
C; and Brussels Declaration, preamble (all mentioned supra n 48).  
On the prominent role played by the subsidiarity principle in the ongoing reform debate, cf. Derek Walton, “Subsidiarity 
and the Brighton Declaration”, in Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights - Effects and Implementation, eds. 
Anja Seibert-Fohr and Mark E. Villiger (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 193-206; and Martin Kuijer, “The Margin-of-
Appreciation Doctrine and the Strengthening of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the Recent Reform Negotiations”, Human 
Rights Law Journal 36, nos. 7-12 (2016): 339-347. Walton, at 198, maintains that “the Brighton Declaration … went 
further than mere exhortation to follow the principle of subsidiarity more closely” by providing for the principle to be 
inserted in the preamble of the Convention and by putting forward a number of specific measures to implement the 
principle. Kuijer, on the other hand, argues that a shift occurred with the Brussels Declaration from subsidiarity as a 
means to allow for a margin of appreciation for States to subsidiarity as a means to place greater responsibilities on States. 
Nevertheless, the Brussels Declaration mentions the “margin of appreciation” twice and, while the wording of the 
Copenhagen Declaration has been changed significantly and ample space has been given to the responsibilities of States, 
the political context in which it was drafted should caution against too optimistic readings (besides, the sections devoted 
to “Effective national implementation – the responsibility of States” and “Execution of judgments – a key obligation” are 
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and have seldom translated into clear precepts for Member States. Moreover, as mentioned, the 
principle of subsidiarity in particular is often used ambiguously, to say the least.50 
The Court and the Committee of Ministers have also been the addressees of recommendations 
by these Conferences as regards the execution of judgments and the reduction of repetitive cases; the 
former especially by making appropriate use of the pilot-judgment procedure and promoting recourse 
to friendly settlements and unilateral declarations by States, the latter by rendering its supervision of 
the execution of judgments more effective and cooperating with national authorities to help them 
remedy structural shortcomings.51 Again, the operational means to achieve these objectives are rarely 
set out. 
At any rate, the declarations concluding the above-mentioned High-level Conferences make 
clear that States Parties are not willing to introduce radical changes to the Convention’s system, at 
least for the time being. Bolder proposals to reform the system have been rejected thus far,52 so that 
solutions to the issues of overburdening of the Court and of the Committee of Ministers need to be 
found, realistically, within the existing system.  
In this context, the level of domestic implementation appears an essential part of the problem 
but can potentially play a central role in its solution. This dissertation is particularly concerned with 
the full and prompt execution of ECtHR judgments, as the first step that States can make towards 
aligning their legal orders with the Convention (as interpreted by the Court) and preventing the 
recurrence of violations similar to those ascertained by the Court. The execution of judgments is also 
exemplary of the need for cooperation between international bodies (in this case, the ECtHR and the 
Committee of Ministers in particular) and national authorities and thus provides an interesting testing 
                                                        
somewhat offset by the following sections on “European supervision – the role of the Court” and “Interaction between 
the national and European level – the need for dialogue”). 
50 Cf. supra n 39. 
51 Cf. Interlaken Declaration, Sections D and F; Izmir Declaration, Sections B and E; Brighton Declaration, Sections D 
and F; Brussels Declaration, Section C; and Copenhagen Declaration, Section “The caseload challenge – the need for 
further action”, paras. 42 et seqq. (all mentioned supra n 48). 
52 Cf. Section 2.1 of this dissertation for more details. 
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ground for the ability of these two kinds of actors to interact constructively and for the potentialities 
of NHRIs.  
 
1.2 The implementation gap and the role of National Human Rights Institutions 
The issue of domestic implementation of international standards and decisions is as old as 
international law itself; the latter relies on States for its realisation and the problems deriving from 
the general lack of higher centralised powers that are able to ascertain and enforce the norms is one 
of the main reasons why doubts were raised as to the very qualification of international law as “law”.53 
This is not the place to examine in-depth a controversy which, while considered settled by 
international lawyers, might not have completely died away.54 Nonetheless, it has long been argued 
convincingly by numerous authors and on various bases, and it is accepted here, that States (the main 
addressees of international law) regard international law as binding, that they comply with it most of 
the time and that, while the typical means of enforcement of domestic norms admittedly differ from 
those of international norms, this does not mean that international law cannot be and is not routinely 
enforced through international as well as domestic mechanisms.55  
                                                        
53 Famously, Austin rejected the notion of “international law”, “being rules set and enforced by mere opinion” and not 
“by sovereigns as political superiors”: John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832; repr., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 20 and 120 et seqq.  
54 Anthony D’Amato, “Is International Law Really ‘Law’?”, Northwestern University Law Review 79 (1985): 1293-1314; 
and John R. Bolton, “Is There Really ‘Law’ in International Affairs?”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 
10 (2000): 1-48. In a more nuanced way, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005) does not deny the legal nature of international law, but radically reviews its characteristics. 
With regard to human rights, cf. J. Shand Watson, Theory and Reality in the International Protection of Human Rights 
(Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1999), 15, which disputes the qualification of the “basic norms of international 
human rights” as “valid norms of international law”.  
55 Cf., among others, Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, 5th ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1985), 1-11; James Leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 6th ed., edited 
by Humphrey Waldock (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 68-78; and Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s 
International Law, 9th ed., edited by Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (Harlow: Longman, 1992), 8-16. 
More specifically on enforcement, cf. Niels Blokker and Sam Muller, eds., Towards More Effective Supervision by 
International Organizations (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994); Madeleine K. Albright, “Enforcing International Law”, 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 89 (1995): 574-580; Frederic L. Kirgis, 
“Enforcing International Law”, ASIL Insights 1, no. 1, 22 January 1996, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-international-law; and Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, 
“Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law”, Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 3850 (2011), accessed 
4 January 2019, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3850. 
With regard to enforcement in the area of human rights, cf. John P. Humphrey, “The Implementation of International 
Human Rights Law”, New York Law School Law Review 24 (1978): 31-61 (which prefers “implementation” over 
“enforcement” because of the non-coercive nature of most mechanisms); Manfred Nowak, Introduction to the 
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This notwithstanding, the expression “implementation gap” is commonplace when referring to 
the discrepancy between the theory and the practice of international law, namely to “the extent to 
which deeds lag behind words, or compliance falls short of commitment”.56 International human 
rights law is particularly subject to these problems, as it imposes broad obligations on States vis-à-
vis individual rights holders. 
In the international human rights context, increasing attention to the issue of implementation 
has been paid since the impetus for standard-setting has started to decline and the focus has shifted 
towards the actual realisation of the numerous standards produced – i.e., since the early 1990s. The 
landmark World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in June 1993, while reiterating the 
substantive components of the human rights obligations of States, put emphasis on the 
implementation stage. In his opening statement, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
identified “the three imperatives of the Vienna Conference” as universality, guarantees, and 
democratisation.57 “Guarantees” precisely referred to the “suitable machinery and structures to ensure 
[human rights’] effectiveness, both internally and internationally”.58 Leading human rights lawyer 
Manfred Nowak has defined the “implementation gap” in the human rights area as “the big challenge 
of the 21st century”.59  
Notwithstanding the pervasiveness of many international human rights obligations, States have 
accepted an increasing number of them as well as the refinement of their monitoring mechanisms. 
                                                        
International Human Rights Regime (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003); and Janusz Symonides, Human Rights: 
International Protection, Monitoring, Enforcement (Aldershot: Ashgate and UNESCO Publishing, 2003). 
56 Xinyuan Dai, “The ‘compliance gap’ and the efficacy of international human rights institutions”, in The Persistent 
Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, eds. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 88. 
57 World Conference on Human Rights, World Conference on Human Rights: The Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action, June 1993, with the Opening Statement of United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (New 
York: United Nations, 1993), 10. 
58 Ibid., 12.  
59 Manfred Nowak, “Challenges to National Implementation of International Human Rights Standards – Background 
Paper WG I”, in Global standards – Local action. 15 years Vienna World Conference in Human Rights: Conference 
Proceedings of the International Expert Conference held in Vienna on 28 and 29 August 2008, eds. Wolfgang Benedek 
et al. (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2009), 123. Nowak adds that “we urgently have to move from standard-setting and 
monitoring to genuine protection, implementation, and enforcement of human rights, and finally to the effective 
prevention of human rights violations” (ibid.) and points to the potential role of a multiplicity of national actors (judges, 
NHRIs and other non-judicial mechanisms, national bodies provided for in international treaties, parliaments, and civil 
society) to this end.  
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While regional human rights systems are particularly incisive by providing for courts whose rulings 
are binding on those States that have accepted their jurisdiction, at the UN level too an increasingly 
sophisticated machinery has been put into place through the drafting of optional protocols as well as 
an ample reform of the rules of procedures and working methods of the bodies responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of treaties negotiated at the UN level.60  
The fact remains that, while a right of individual petition is recognised by some of these treaties 
and optional protocols, most of the monitoring activities carried out by the UN treaty bodies, as well 
as by the UN Human Rights Council, are based on the periodic reporting by States themselves and 
culminate in (mere) recommendations to governments. The dissemination of these recommendations 
is nonetheless expected to prompt reactions by the public opinions of the States concerned as well as 
by other States.61 This kind of monitoring approach has increasingly complemented the cooperative 
approach also pursued by the UN, consisting of technical and financial assistance programmes in the 
area of human rights. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is primarily engaged 
in these efforts, in partnership with other UN agencies and programmes such as the UN Development 
Programme.  
                                                        
60 For a list of the optional protocols to the “core” human rights treaties at the UN level, cf. the following webpage: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/coreinstruments.aspx (accessed 1 March 2019). On the monitoring 
carried out by UN human rights bodies and its evolution, cf. Gudmundur S. Alfredsson, International Human Rights 
Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, 2nd rev. ed. (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009); 
Suzanne Egan, The United Nations Human Rights Treaty System: Law and Procedure (Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury 
Professional, 2011); and Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein, UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
61 On the non-binding nature of the control exercised by the UN human rights machinery, cf., among others, Conseil 
d’État, Les rapports du Conseil d’État: Le droit souple (Paris: La Documentation française, 2013), 26; nonetheless, the 
same study describes these recommendations and decisions as “droit souple bénéficiant sous diverses formes d’une 
reconnaissance par le droit dur … n’allant pas jusqu’à leur conférer une portée obligatoire” (70). Cf. also Michael 
O’Flaherty, “The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies”, Human Rights Law Review 
6, no. 1 (2006): 27-52, which, while reiterating the non-binding nature of the concluding observations by UN human 
rights treaty bodies, maintains that they “are not without some special status, at least to the extent that they purport to 
interpret the treaty or consider the treaty obligations of the State Party” (34; on the legal nature of concluding observations 
cf., more generally, 32-37).   
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A vast body of literature has dealt with the reasons why States bind themselves to human rights 
obligations,62 as well as to what extent and why they comply with these obligations.63 This literature 
will not be dissected here; it is however worthy of note that a not insignificant part of the scholarly 
production on States’ commitment to and compliance with international obligations has long tended 
and still tends to consider States as “wholes” on the international plane and thus identify them with 
their governments.64  
Even in relation to the domestic implementation of international obligations, while it is common 
knowledge that all State organs must abide by the country’s human rights obligations and contribute 
to the implementation of these obligations within the limits of their mandates, this recognition has – 
until more recently – rarely translated into a careful examination of the roles played by the different 
national authorities (parliament, government, courts, local authorities) in the implementation process. 
This trend can be attributed both to the reality on the ground – many national parliaments and courts 
have long deferred to their governments on the interpretation and implementation of international 
                                                        
62 Cf., among others: Jay Goodliffe and Darren G. Hawkins, “Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against 
Torture”, Journal of Politics 68, no. 2 (2006): 358-371; Oona A. Hathaway, “Why Do Countries Commit to Human 
Rights Treaties?”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 4 (2007): 588-621; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, 
and John W. Meyer, “International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human 
Rights Treaties”, International Sociology 23, no. 1 (2008): 115–141; and Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: 
International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 57-111 in particular.  
63 Cf., among others: Andrew Moravscik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe”, International Organization 54 (2000): 217-252; Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?”, Yale Law Journal 111, no. 8 (2002): 1935-2042; Goldsmith and Posner, supra n 54, 107-134; Eric 
Neumayer, “Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49, no. 6 (2005): 925-953; and Simmons, supra n 62, 112 et seqq.  
Observance of international rulings is dealt with, among others, by Courtney Hillebrecht, “The Domestic Mechanisms of 
Compliance with International Human Rights Law: Case Studies from the Inter-American Human Rights System”, 
Human Rights Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2012): 959-985; and Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby, “Partial Compliance: A 
Comparison of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights”, Journal of International Law and 
International Relations 6, no. 1 (2010): 35-85. 
Cf. also, on the challenges of measuring States’ compliance with international human rights treaties and rulings: Ryan 
Goodman and Derek Jinks, “Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties”, European Journal of International Law 
14, no. 1 (2003): 171-183; Todd Landman, “Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy”, Human Rights 
Quarterly 26 (2004): 906-931; Hans-Otto Sano, “Implementing Human Rights. What Kind of Record?”, in Implementing 
Human Rights. Essays in Honour of Morten Kjaerum, eds. Rikke F. Jorgensen and Klaus Slavensky (Copenhagen: Danish 
Institute for Human Rights, 2007); Hawkins and Jacoby, above in this footnote; and Courtney Hillebrecht, “Rethinking 
Compliance: The Challenges and Prospects of Measuring Compliance with International Human Rights Tribunals”, 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 1, no. 3 (2009): 362–379.  
64 For an important contribution to a change of course and a conceptual shift towards “disaggregated States” on the 
international plane, cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
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law;65 and to the traditional doctrinal conception of international law as the law of inter-State 
relations.  
Nonetheless, to the extent that international law regulates an increasing number of aspects 
relating to the internal life of States, including the relationship between the State and its citizens, a 
wider range of national bodies have engaged directly in the implementation process. National 
parliaments have devised increasingly systematic mechanisms for the review of their governments’ 
international commitments and of the human rights compatibility of their initiatives;66 domestic 
judiciaries are also much more sensitive to the existence and impact of international standards and 
have developed significant experience in their interpretation and application as well as multiplying 
links with international courts.67 These phenomena have triggered a more attentive analysis of the 
national dynamics of the implementation process in the literature, which has highlighted the role that 
national authorities other than the government can play in facilitating the implementation of 
international law, while acknowledging that the relationship with their international partners is not 
always idyllic.68 
                                                        
65 Cf., for the attitude of national courts, Eyal Benvenisti, “Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International 
Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts”, European Journal of International Law 4, no. 1 (1993): 159-183. 
66 Cf., among others, Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper, and Paul Yowell, Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the 
Democratic Deficit (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015); and Matthew Saul, Andreas Follesdal, and Geir Ulfstein, The 
International Human Rights Judiciary and National Parliaments. Europe and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, October 2017). 
67 Cf. Julia Iliopoulos-Strangas, ed., Cours suprêmes nationales et cours européennes: concurrence ou collaboration? 
(Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas; Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007); Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, “National Courts, 
Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law”, European Journal of International Law 20, no. 1 (2009): 
59–72; André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); 
and Thomas Buergenthal, “International Tribunals and National Courts: The Internationalization of Domestic 
Adjudication”, in Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung: Völkerrecht, Europarecht, Staatsrecht: Festschrift für 
Rudolf Bernhardt, eds. Ulrich Beyerlin et al. (Berlin: Springer, 1995), 687-703.  
68 Cf. Xinyuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
Chapter 4 especially; Hillebrecht, “The Domestic Mechanisms of Compliance with International Human Rights Law”, 
supra n 63; and Helfer, supra n 3. Cf. also Huneeus, supra n 5, which interestingly finds “against prevailing theories, that 
the varying institutional politics of state actors besides the executive, and in particular of justice system actors, are the 
main contributors to low compliance in the [Inter-American system]” (118); and Alexandra Huneeus, “Rejecting the 
Inter-American Court: Judicialization, National Courts, and Regional Human Rights”, in Cultures of Legality. 
Judicialization and Political Activism in Latin America, eds. Javier Couso et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 112-138. An in-depth analysis of the role played by different UK public authorities in implementing international 
human rights standards, and ECtHR judgments in particular, is provided by David Feldman, “Confrontation and Co-
operation between Institutions in the Protection of Human Rights”, in Human Rights Protection: Methods and 
Effectiveness, ed. Frances Butler (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 1-28. 
Greater attention is also being paid to broader social phenomena boosted by the penetration of international law into 
domestic constituencies, such as the mobilisation of civil society, the human rights education of the population, and the 
empowerment of victims of human rights violations: e.g., James L. Cavallaro and Stephanie Erin Brewer, “Reevaluating 
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Similar trends can also be detected in the CoE context, and specifically with respect to the 
execution of ECtHR judgments. While the execution of these judgments might raise specific issues, 
which partly differ from those related to the implementation of other international norms and rulings, 
it is widely believed that the closer involvement of all relevant domestic authorities would benefit the 
execution process. Accordingly, multiplying calls have been made, by both scholars and institutional 
actors, including the Court itself, for a closer collaboration between the ECtHR and national courts, 
as well as for a more prominent role for national parliaments.69 The High-level Conferences 
mentioned in the previous section have repeatedly stressed the importance of involving all national 
authorities, including parliaments and courts, in the implementation of the Convention’s standards 
and the execution of the Court’s judgments.70 Meanwhile, Protocol no. 16 has institutionalised the 
relationship between the ECtHR and the highest national courts through new advisory opinions. 
While the pursuance of these avenues appears crucial for an effective execution process, not 
insignificant challenges to their full use exist. A first one is an information problem: it is often the 
case that neither parliaments nor courts are systematically informed of the outcome of ECtHR cases 
against their countries, let alone others. A second one is a competence problem: on each occasion, 
the body responsible for the execution of a certain judgment might be a different one, depending on 
the measures required by the Court or the Committee of Ministers (individual measures only, or a 
change in the legislation, administrative practice or case-law). Also, more often than not, the 
                                                        
Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court”, American 
Journal of International Law 102, no. 4 (2008): 768- 827; Janet E. Lord and Michael Ashely Stein, “The Domestic 
Incorporation of Human Rights Law and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, 
Washington Law Review 83 (2008): 449-479; and Simmons, supra n 62. A central role in this respect is certainly played 
by domestic and international NGOs and the transnational networks that they form: Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (London: Cornell University Press, 
1998); and Ann M. Florini, The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Washington: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2000). This section and the dissertation more generally, however, focus on legal and institutional 
reforms in domestic systems, as a consequence of the execution of specific judgments, which is typically less concerned 
with social change. Reference will thus be made to the role of NGOs as far as their contribution to change the domestic 
legal orders and institutional structures is concerned (cf. especially Chapter 4). 
69 Cf. Section 2.5 of this dissertation.   
70 Interlaken Declaration, para. 6 of the preamble; Brighton Declaration, Section A, para. 9 in particular; Brussels 
Declaration, preamble and Section B; and Copenhagen Declaration, paras. 14 and 16 (all mentioned supra n 48). 
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execution of a judgment is a complex matter that requires the coordinated intervention of a 
multiplicity of national actors.71   
Governments – which are constantly informed on the developments and outcomes of ECtHR 
cases, generally represent States at the international level, and specifically interact with the 
Committee of Ministers on the measures needed to execute the judgments – are expected to involve 
and coordinate all of the domestic bodies concerned (from the legislature to the various administrative 
branches and the judiciary) and ensure that these bodies give effect to their States’ international 
obligations.72 In this connection, in 2008, the Committee of Ministers recommended that States 
“designate a co-ordinator – individual or body – of execution of judgments at the national level, with 
reference contacts in the relevant national authorities involved in the execution process”;73 in most 
cases, the government agents at the CoE have been appointed to this role.74 Since this practice is not 
without its problems and there is room for improvement as far as the involvement of all relevant 
national authorities is concerned,75 while recognising that governments are well-placed to carry out a 
coordinating function, it is appropriate to consider whether there exist any actors which could support 
governments in this function as well as monitor governments’ actions in the area of execution and 
report on them to the international level.  
 
                                                        
71 Hillebrecht, “The Domestic Mechanisms of Compliance with International Human Rights Law”, supra n 63, 964 et 
seqq.; also in relation to the Inter-American system, Huneeus, supra n 5, finds that “it is the coordination of a task between 
distinct state actors with differing political wills and institutional settings that poses the challenge to implementation” 
(129).  
72 Mottershaw and Murray, supra n 5. 
73 Committee of Ministers, supra n 3, para. 1. The Recommendation in turn refers to the previous call by the Parliamentary 
Assembly for States “to improve or, where necessary, to set up domestic mechanisms and procedures – both at the level 
of governments and of parliaments – to secure timely and effective implementation of the Court’s judgments, through co-
ordinated action of all national actors concerned and with the necessary support at the highest political level” 
(Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1764 (2006). Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 24th sitting, 2 October 2006, para. 4). 
74 On the implementation of the Recommendation, cf. Committee of Ministers, Steering Committee for Human Rights 
(CDDH) – e. Guide to good practice on the implementation of Recommendation (2008)2 of the Committee of Ministers 
on efficient domestic capacity for rapid execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 1293rd meeting 
of the Ministers’ Deputies, 15 September 2017, CM(2017)92-add3final.  
75 For instance, Mottershaw and Murray, supra n 5, 645-646, mentions the fact that government agents are already busy 
following the Court’s proceedings and may not pay enough attention to the execution process, and that government agents 
do not always possess the necessary political authority to elicit prompt and full responses from the relevant domestic 
bodies. 
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National human rights institutions (NHRIs) would appear well-suited for both roles, which in 
a way reflect the monitoring and cooperative approaches mentioned above. On these bases, the UN 
has strongly promoted the establishment of NHRIs in its Member States. The history, characteristics, 
roles, and operation of NHRIs will be examined in-depth in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. A general 
definition of their nature and functions is nonetheless given here in order to show their relevance for 
the domestic implementation of international human rights norms and rulings.  
NHRIs are State bodies, independent from their governments and responsible for promoting 
and protecting human rights at the domestic level. At the same time, NHRIs are regulated by 
international standards, which have been endorsed by various UN bodies and are now widely 
recognised, and which explicitly provide for multiple forms of cooperation between NHRIs and 
international and regional organisations.76 It is thus frequently said that NHRIs are “at the crossroads” 
between the national and international levels, or “bridge” these two planes.77  
The perceived added value brought by NHRIs to the implementation of international human 
rights norms lies in the national character of these institutions, which are expected to provide more 
detailed and well-founded information than that otherwise available to distant international 
monitoring bodies, and to direct international assistance where it is most needed. But the contribution 
by NHRIs to the implementation of international human rights standards is not limited to cooperating 
with international organisations in the above-mentioned ways.  
NHRIs undertake a wide range of activities for the promotion and protection of human rights 
domestically – from advising their governments and parliaments on proposed or existing legislation 
and practice to providing education and professional training on human rights, from initiating cases 
before courts to handling human rights complaints themselves. Through all of these activities, NHRIs 
can and do mainstream international human rights standards into domestic legal, social, and cultural 
                                                        
76 These are the so-called Paris Principles, officially the “Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions”, which 
were drafted during the first International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, held in Paris between 7 and 9 October 1991, and were subsequently endorsed, among others, by the UN General 
Assembly. 
77 Cf. the literature mentioned in Section 3.1 of this dissertation. 
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systems. The said characteristics and functions of NHRIs and their increasing engagement with 
international bodies and procedures have led to the observation that NHRIs could provide a “new 
answer” to the “old question” of effective domestic implementation of international human rights 
law.78 
In the context of the domestic implementation of international law, the full and timely execution 
of international judgments is critical for the effectiveness and credibility of the legal order to which 
they pertain. Indeed, as put it by a report of the CoE Steering Committee for Human Rights which is 
frequently cited, “the acid test of any judicial system is how promptly and effectively judgments are 
implemented”.79 The prompt and effective execution of ECtHR judgments is also essential for 
relieving the pressure from the Court, overwhelmed with repetitive cases, and thus for ensuring the 
very survival of the system. This dissertation examines the potentialities in this respect of NHRIs, as 
peculiar bodies conceived exactly to work as traits d’union between the national and international 
levels of human rights promotion and protection and to facilitate the conformity of domestic legal 
orders with international norms and rulings. 
 
1.3. Research aims and questions 
This dissertation has two primary aims – a theoretical one and a practical one. From a theoretical 
perspective, the dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature on both NHRIs and the ECHR system, 
with particular regard to the execution of ECtHR judgments. These strands of scholarly production 
have seldom been brought together; this appears to be an increasingly significant gap, considering 
the multiplying interactions between NHRIs and CoE bodies.  
The dissertation focuses on the execution of ECtHR judgments as the potentially most fertile 
ground for this relationship, for three main reasons. Firstly, because the prompt and full execution of 
ECtHR judgments has come to the forefront of the reform process of the ECHR system. Secondly, 
                                                        
78 Richard Carver, “A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights Institutions and the Domestication of 
International Law”, Human Rights Law Review 10, no. 1 (2010): 1-32.  
79 Committee of Ministers/Steering Committee for Human Rights, supra n 28, Section C, para. 1. 
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because the increasingly complex measures needed for the execution of judgments require the 
coordination of a wide range of national authorities and the constant interaction between these actors 
and international supervisors, and NHRIs should, in light of their inherent characteristics and 
functions, be particularly suited to play a support role in these processes. And thirdly, because definite 
mechanisms exist for the participation of NHRIs in the promotion and supervision of the execution 
of ECtHR judgments – mechanisms whose functioning and impact can be specifically assessed.  
These considerations highlight the practical aim of the dissertation: i.e., testing existing but 
apparently underdeveloped instruments by means of which NHRIs can promote the execution of 
ECtHR judgments. These instruments include both tools traditionally in the hands of NHRIs at the 
domestic level, which can also be used to facilitate the execution of ECtHR judgments, and 
procedures that have been specifically devised at the CoE level. The dissertation analyses, for the 
first time systematically, the use that NHRIs have made of these instruments and their effects (if any) 
on the execution of ECtHR judgments. In doing so, it offers empirical data to stakeholders (NHRIs 
themselves, CoE bodies, States, and NGOs) for assessing the performance of these instruments and 
considering possible adjustments.  
In light of the above-mentioned aims, the following research questions are investigated:  
 
Q1: To what extent have NHRIs contributed to promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments?  
a) Which NHRIs have interacted with the Committee of Ministers and the Department 
for the Execution of Judgments to this end?  
b) In relation to which cases have NHRIs interacted with these bodies?  
c) How have NHRIs interacted with these bodies? 
d) What have been the effects of these interactions? 
e) What activities have NHRIs carried out at the domestic level to promote the execution 
of ECtHR judgments? 
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Q2: Can the current contribution by NHRIs to promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments 
be strengthened? 
i) Are there obstacles that prevent greater engagement by NHRIs and, if so, how can they 
be removed?  
ii) Are there obstacles that prevent greater impact by NHRIs and, if so, how can they be 
removed? 
 
1.4. Research methods 
This dissertation fits in the empirical or evidence-based strand of legal research.80 If we define 
empirical legal research as “involving the systematic collection of information (‘data’) and its 
analysis according to some generally accepted method”,81 this dissertation systematically collects 
data on the activities carried out by NHRIs to promote the execution of ECtHR judgments through 
generally accepted methods – i.e., qualitative methods including document analysis and interviewing. 
The dissertation displays further features that are commonly associated with empirical legal 
research, such as special attention towards “law in action” versus “law in the books”,82 and a focus 
on the behaviour and beliefs of legal actors and on the functioning of legal institutions rather than on 
                                                        
80 As opposed to the so-called doctrinal strand; the meaning of the words “empirical” and “doctrinal” as applied to legal 
research or science is anyway far from settled. On the distinction between “empirical” and “doctrinal”, cf. Mike 
McConville and Wing Hong Chui, “Introduction and Overview”, in Research Methods for Law, eds. Mike McConville 
and Wing Hong Chui (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 3-6; as well as Robert M. Lawless, Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, and Thomas S. Ulen, Empirical Methods in Law (Austin: Wolters Kluwer, 2010), 10 et seqq. 
Much has been written on the “empirical turn” in legal research and on the growing use of the methods employed by the 
social sciences for the study of law (including international law and human rights law): cf., among others, Anthony 
Bradney, “Law as a Parasitic Discipline”, Journal of Law and Society 25, no. 1 (1998): 71–84; Peter Cane and Herbert 
M. Kritzer, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Gregory 
Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, “The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship”, American Journal of International 
Law 106, no. 1 (2012): 1-46; Adam Chilton and Dustin Tingley, “Why the Study of International Law Needs 
Experiments”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 52, no. 1 (2013): 173-237; Alexandra Huneeus, “Human Rights 
between Jurisprudence and Social Science”, Leiden Journal of International Law 28, no. 2 (2015): 255–266; and Jakob 
V.H. Holtermann and Mikael Rask Madsen, “Toleration, Synthesis or Replacement? The ‘Empirical Turn’ and its 
Consequences for the Science of International Law”, Leiden Journal of International Law 29, no. 4 (2016): 1001-1019.   
The use of these new methods by legal academics has not come without problems, as evidenced in the extensive review 
conducted in Lee Epstein and Gary King, “The Rules of Inference”, University of Chicago Law Review 69, no. 1 (2002): 
1-133.  
81 Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer, “Introduction”, in Cane and Kritzer, supra n 80, 4.  
82 See already Roscoe Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action”, American Law Review 44 (1910): 12-37. 
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rules (only).83 In other words, the dissertation is less concerned with the “authoritative 
interpretation”84 of rules than with the ascertainment of how some rules and rule-based mechanisms 
work in practice, as implemented by their addressees.  
A couple of caveats are warranted at this point. First, the choice for an empirical approach for 
this dissertation does not imply the rejection of the so-called doctrinal approach as a scientific 
method; rather, the kind of research problems and questions with which this dissertation is concerned 
could be answered more appropriately by an empirical approach. It is in any case believed that vast 
areas of legal research, including human rights research, would benefit from a more extensive use of 
empirical methods and outward-looking approaches which do not take the worthiness and 
effectiveness of human rights norms and institutions for granted.  
Second, while the dissertation’s main contribution consists in offering empirical findings of a 
descriptive nature, this work does not forego evaluations of the mechanisms and activities under 
scrutiny. This choice, which might be in contrast with some conceptions of empirical legal research 
as purely descriptive,85 is in accordance with the opinion of other empirical legal scholars, who also 
include evaluative and even normative considerations in their work.86  
                                                        
83 Cf., among others, Frans L. Leeuw with Hans Schmeets, Empirical Legal Research: A Guidance Book for Lawyers, 
Legislators and Regulators (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Massachusetts: Elgar, 2016), 5; David P. Forsythe, “Human 
Rights Studies: On the Dangers of Legalistic Assumptions”, in Methods of Human Rights Research, eds. Fons Coomans, 
Fred Grünfeld, and Menno T. Kamminga (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009), 62 (“many human rights lawyers are often too 
uncritical about international human rights law, too focused on treaty language and court cases, and not appreciative 
enough about soft law and extra-legal factors that affect policy and behavior related to human rights”); Eric A. Posner, 
The Twilight of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 143 (“lawyers mainly read and discuss judicial 
opinions – which hardly affect anyone at all – while ignoring the actual behavior of governments, NGOs, and 
individuals”); Jakob H. Holtermann and Mikael Rask Madsen, “What is Empirical in Empirical Studies of Law? A 
European New Legal Realist Conception”, Retfærd 39, no. 4 (2016): 11-16 (on the “axiological validity of law perceived 
by legal agents” being “one of the key objects of empirical inquiry”, emphasis in the text); and Tom Ginsburg and 
Gregory Shaffer, “How Does International Law Work?”, in Cane and Kritzer, supra n 80, 755 (which maintains that, for 
the empirical research of international law, “a central question becomes the conditions under which international law is 
produced and has effects, as well as the actors and mechanisms involved” (emphasis in the text) and highlights the 
“importance of qualitative research, particularly for uncovering the mechanisms and key actors involved”). 
84 Mark Van Hoecke, “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?”, in Methodologies of Legal 
Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline?, ed. Mark Van Hoecke (Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2011), 1.  
85 Cf., among others, Holtermann and Madsen, supra n 83, 3-21, as well as previous works by the same authors mentioned 
therein.  
86 Leeuw, supra n 83, 6, even states that “doing [empirical legal research] often implies asking and answering evaluative 
questions”. Cf. further the same work, at 44 et seqq., where various typologies of empirical research questions, drawn up 
by different authors, are illustrated. 
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This is not the place for a thorough examination, from an epistemological point of view, of the 
issue of the fact–value gap (also known as is–ought dichotomy) within legal research, which has long 
been recognised by some scholars and solved (or not) in various ways.87 Nonetheless, this dissertation 
at least partially overcomes this conundrum, and the risk of unfounded evaluations, by assessing 
norms and mechanisms not in light of subjective notions of how the law ought to be and how best to 
advance the cause of human rights, but in light of the concrete purposes attributed to the norms by 
their authors and of the goals pursued by their addressees. Thus, the dissertation does not offer 
conclusive normative statements88 but, on the basis of empirical findings, essentially “address[es] the 
way in which legal arrangements are implemented and what difficulties are experienced during this 
process”89 and puts forward possible solutions to overcome these difficulties.90  
I believe that, in this way, the dissertation remains within the boundaries of empirical legal 
research. I also maintain that both approaches – descriptive and evaluative – can coexist in the same 
research, as they address different kinds of questions.91 Therefore, while the first research question 
and related sub-questions are essentially descriptive, in that they map the current practice, the second 
question and its sub-questions are predominantly evaluative, as far as they test the implementation of 
rules by the bodies concerned against the stated (or implicit) aims of those rules and mandates of 
those bodies.  
 
                                                        
87  Cf. various contributions in Van Hoecke, supra n 84, including the chapter by the editor mentioned in the same 
footnote; Jaap Hage, “The Method of a Truly Normative Legal Science”, 19-44; and Anne Ruth Mackor, “Explanatory 
Non-Normative Legal Doctrine. Taking the Distinction between Theoretical and Practical Reason Seriously”, 45-70. Cf. 
also Leeuw, supra n 83, 225 et seqq.; and Holtermann and Madsen, supra n 83, 6 et seqq.  
88 However, there are admittedly different opinions on how the kind of evaluations included in this dissertation are to be 
categorised; for some, they would arguably amount to normative statements. It is submitted here that evaluations differ 
from both descriptions and normative conclusions: cf. supra n 86, as well as Malcolm Langford, “Interdisciplinarity and 
Multimethod Research”, in Research Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook, eds. Bård A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto Sano, 
and Siobhán McInerney-Lankford (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Massachusetts: Elgar, 2017), 173-174, which, 
however, calls what I would term “descriptive” approaches “empirical”. 
89 Leeuw, supra n 83, which defines this kind of evaluations as “process evaluations”. While evaluations included in this 
dissertation could predominantly be classified in this way, “impact or effectiveness evaluations” (i.e., “studies … on the 
effects, consequences or impacts of legal arrangements and interventions on the behavior of persons and organizations”, 
ibid.) might also be present. It is mainly a question of perspectives and there often is a fine line between the two categories.  
90 Cf. the “design [research] questions” included in Van Thiel’s typology, mentioned in Leeuw, supra n 83, 45. 
91 Robert Cryer, Tamara Hervey, and Bal Sokhi-Bulley, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Oxford 
and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2011), 9-10. 
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While some quantitative data are collected and referred to,92 this dissertation essentially 
employs qualitative methods to answer the above-mentioned research questions. Qualitative methods 
of research, as opposed to quantitative methods, are often understood as consisting in the thick 
analysis of non-numerical data derived from a relatively small number of observations.93 More 
specifically, the dissertation relies on two main kinds of primary sources of data: documents and 
interviews.  
Documents include, first of all, the communications sent by NHRIs to the Committee of 
Ministers in relation to the execution of ECtHR judgments. These communications, which have rarely 
been even considered by scholars, are comprehensively analysed together with the replies from the 
CoE Member States concerned and the relevant decisions by the Committee of Ministers and 
assessments by the Department for the Execution of Judgments (Chapter 4 of the dissertation). 
Documents also include the annual and thematic reports, advisory opinions, decisions, training tools, 
press releases, and other records drafted by NHRIs in the exercise of their mandates (these materials 
are mainly examined in Chapter 5). Finally, the legal texts that have marked the evolution of the 
ECHR system, particularly as far as the machinery for the supervision of the execution of ECtHR 
judgments is concerned (Chapter 2), as well as the range of rules that govern the status, characteristics, 
functions and operation of NHRIs (Chapter 3), are considered.   
The dissertation further relies on another kind of primary data – i.e., interviews with 
stakeholders. In-depth semi-structured interviews94 were carried out with representatives from nine 
European NHRIs. Interviewees include representatives from institutions that have interacted with the 
                                                        
92 For instance, concerning the number of NHRIs that submitted communications to the Committee of Ministers, the 
frequency of these communications, and the rate of replies to these communications by States and of references by CoE 
bodies (cf. Chapter 4 of the dissertation). 
93  David Collier, Jason Seawright, and Henry E. Brady, “Qualitative versus Quantitative: What Might This Distinction 
Mean?”, Qualitative Methods. Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Qualitative 
Methods 1, no. 1 (2003): 4-8, which nonetheless problematises the distinction. Derived from the social sciences, 
qualitative methods of research have been usefully applied in empirical legal studies: Lisa Webley, “Qualitative 
Approaches to Empirical Legal Research”, in Cane and Kritzer, supra n 80, 926-950.  
94 For a definition of this kind of interviews, cf. the entries “In-Depth Interview” and “Semi-Structured Interview” in Lisa 
M. Given, ed., The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods, Volumes 1 & 2 (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2008), 
422-423 and 810-811. 
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Committee of Ministers and the Department for Execution in monitoring the execution of ECtHR 
judgments as well as from institutions that have not done so thus far but might have carried out other 
activities for assisting in the execution process in their own countries. Respondents belong to 
geographically diverse institutions, institutions with different model mandates (consultative 
commissions, commissions with a protection mandate, human rights ombudsmen, and classical 
ombudsmen; on this classification, cf. infra Chapter 3), and institutions that have been accredited 
with different international statuses (on which also cf. infra Chapter 3). Interviewees were normally 
indicated by their respective home institutions as the most competent in relation to the institutions’ 
activities in the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
Interviews were based on two sets of mainly open-ended questions – one for NHRIs that have 
interacted with the relevant CoE bodies and another one for NHRIs that have not to date participated 
in the procedure. While the initial sets of questions were relatively homogeneous, interviewees were 
given considerable freedom to elaborate their responses and highlight the aspects that they believed 
to be more significant. Follow-up questions (probes) were thus asked that vary from one interview to 
another. Depending on geographical accessibility and the preferences expressed by respondents, in-
person, phone, Skype or email interviews were carried out.  
While interviews have been conceived as supplementary to the primarily documentary analysis, 
they are nonetheless critical to shed light on aspects that would hardly emerge from documents – such 
as the reasons behind the decision of an NHRI to intervene or not to intervene in a case, the usefulness 
and effectiveness of the procedures as perceived by NHRIs, and any obstacles that these institutions 
have found in participating in the procedures. In addition to the above-mentioned primary sources, 
an array of secondary sources (i.e., scholarly works) have been relied on, especially as far as the 
general features of the ECHR system and of NHRIs are concerned. 
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1.5. Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 1 has provided the necessary preliminary information on the relevance of the full and 
prompt execution of ECtHR judgments for the sustainability of the ECHR system and, in turn, on the 
(potential) relevance of NHRIs for the execution of ECtHR judgments. The chapter has also 
illustrated what are the broad theoretical and practical aims that guide this dissertation, the specific 
questions that the dissertation sets out to answer and how it intends to provide such answers.    
Chapters 2 and 3 fill the background outlined in Chapter 1 and lay the foundations for the 
subsequent essentially empirical chapters. Chapter 2 describes the evolution of the CoE machinery 
for the supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments – an area which has attracted less scholarly 
attention than the adoption of Protocols to the ECHR and the much-publicised High-level 
Conferences for the future of the Convention, but which has a considerable impact on the day-to-day 
practice of the execution of judgments and its oversight. This machinery, which is centred around the 
intergovernmental Committee of Ministers, has undergone significant changes in the direction of 
enhanced transparency and greater participation of actors other than States Parties and the Committee. 
In this context, the adoption in 2006 of a specific rule allowing for the submission of communications 
by NHRIs, as well as by NGOs, in relation to the execution of ECtHR judgments is particularly 
noteworthy for the purposes of this dissertation.  
Complementarily, Chapter 3 examines in depth the composition, functions, and operation of 
NHRIs, as well as the relationship between these institutions and international organisations, with 
which NHRIs are expected to cooperate especially with a view to promoting the domestic 
implementation of international standards and decisions. The chapter shows how NHRIs have 
developed strong ties with multiple UN human rights bodies, which have gradually acknowledged a 
more prominent role for NHRIs within their procedures. The interactions between NHRIs and the 
CoE have not yet reached comparable proportions but are growing; nonetheless, they have rarely 
been institutionalised, with the significant exception of the role that has now been assigned to NHRIs 
in relation to the execution of ECtHR judgments.    
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Chapters 4 and 5 systematically collect and analyse data on the activities carried out by NHRIs 
to promote the execution of ECtHR judgments. Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive examination of 
all thirty-three communications submitted so far by NHRIs to the Committee of Ministers with 
respect to the execution of ECtHR judgments delivered against their home countries. The chapter 
identifies and analyses the authors, rate, content, and impact of these communications. Chapter 5, on 
the other hand, systematises the activities that NHRIs have undertaken and can undertake at the 
domestic level, within their well-established national competences, to further the execution of 
judgments. Due to their extensiveness and to issues of accessibility, these activities are examined 
systematically but not comprehensively,95 and examples derived from the practice of different NHRIs 
are given for each activity.  
Chapter 6 evaluates the empirical data presented in Chapters 4 and 5 and draws conclusions on 
the current level of engagement by NHRIs in the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments, 
on the untapped potential of this engagement, and on the factors that currently hinder greater 
participation and influence by NHRIs in the process. 
                                                        
95 That is, while Chapter 4 examines all (available) communications submitted by NHRIs to the Committee of Ministers 
(comprehensive analysis), Chapter 5 does not (and could not) report on all the activities ever undertaken by all European 
NHRIs in the area of the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments. Instead, the chapter offers a systematic 
typology of these activities and give concrete examples for each of the types identified. A comprehensive examination of 
all national activities of NHRIs in the area would not be feasible, inter alia, in light of time and linguistic constraints; for 
further considerations on this point, cf. Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 2. SUPERVISING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIPLE ACTORS AT WORK 
 
It has long been maintained by both CoE bodies and scholars that States almost invariably and 
rather promptly comply with the judgments delivered against them by the ECtHR and that the system 
of supervision of the execution, centred around the Committee of Ministers, is thus efficient and does 
not need to be substantially reformed.1 This is notwithstanding the apparent paradox that the 
execution of judgments by the respondent States is monitored by the representatives from other States 
which have been reprimanded, and will likely be reprimanded again, by the Court for violations of 
the Convention.2 Indeed, Protocol no. 11, which considerably innovated the Convention’s system, 
left untouched the primary responsibility of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the 
                                                        
1 Cf., among institutional actors, CoE Steering Committee for Human Rights, Opinion of the CDDH concerning 
Recommendation 1477 (2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly on the execution of judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 52nd meeting, 9 November 2001, CDDH (2001) 35, Appendix IV; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe – Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Execution of judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights – Report, 12 July 2000, Doc. 8808, Appendix II, “Letter of 28 March 2000 from the Mr Luzius Wildhaber, 
President of the European Court of Human Rights, to Mr Gunnar Jansson, Chairperson of the Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights”; Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, “From the point of view of the Court: its role in the implementation of 
its judgments, powers and limits”, in Dialogue between judges. Proceedings of the Seminar 31 January 2014: 
“Implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: a shared judicial responsibility?”, ed. 
CoE/ECtHR (Strasbourg: ECtHR, 2014), 18. 
In the literature, among others, Rolv Ryssdal,  “European Court of Human Rights: The Enforcement System set up under 
the European Convention on Human Rights”, in Compliance with Judgments of International Courts: Proceedings of the 
Symposium Organized in Honour of Professor Henry G. Schermers by Mordenate College and the Department of 
International Public Law of Leiden University, eds. Mielle Karen Bulterman and Martin Kuijer (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1996), 55 and 67; Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication”, Yale Law Journal 107, no. 2 (1997-1998): 296; and, more recently, Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, The 
execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Human Rights Files no. 19, 2nd ed. (Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe Publishing, 2008), 64 et seqq. and 71 et seqq. For the opposing view: Christian Tomuschat, “Quo Vadis, 
Argentoratum? The Success Story of the European Convention on Human Rights – and a Few Dark Stains”, Human 
Rights Law Journal 13, nos. 11-12 (1992): 401-406. 
2 Basak Çalı and Anne Koch, “Foxes Guarding the Foxes? The Peer Review of Human Rights Judgments by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe”, Human Rights Law Review 14 (2014): 301-325. Cf. also Peter 
Leuprecht, “The Protection of Human Rights by Political Bodies – The Example of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe”, in Fortschritt im Bewußtsein der Grund- und Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Felix Ermacora, eds. 
Manfred Nowak, Dorothea Steurer, and Hannes Tretter (Kehl am Rhein: Engel, 1988), which, while critical over various 
aspects of the Committee of Ministers’ activities, affirms that “although the task of supervision under Article 54 [now 
Article 46(2) ECHR] is legal in character, there is some logic in its being entrusted to the supreme political authority of 
the Council of Europe which under the Statute also has the power to suspend or expel a member State from the 
Organisation” (105-106).  
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execution of ECtHR judgments (whereas it eliminated the quasi-judicial competence of the 
Committee under former Article 32 ECHR).  
The narrative about the effectiveness of the supervision system has, however, started to change 
more recently, in the face of an increasing number of cases of delayed execution and even open refusal 
by CoE Member States to give effect to ECtHR judgments. While radical proposals to renovate the 
backbone of the supervision system have been rejected, the ongoing debate on the reform of the 
Convention’s system has brought about considerable changes, even though these were often not 
included in Protocols and were thus paid relatively little attention. 
Broadly speaking, these modifications can be categorised into two groups: amendments to the 
procedures and practice of the Committee of Ministers; and increasing participation by CoE actors 
other than the Committee in the supervision of the execution of judgments, coupled with enhanced 
cooperation with domestic authorities such as national parliaments and courts. These innovations are 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing, as they share the aim to strengthen the supervision process by 
making it more transparent, independent, participatory, and thus – ultimately – more effective. Some 
of the efforts in this direction remained declarations or recommendations; few of them took the form 
of amendments to the Convention; while many more arose from the practice of CoE bodies and were 
at times crystallised in the bodies’ rules of procedures or working methods.  
After framing the challenges posed by the growing delays and failures in the execution of 
ECtHR judgments, this chapter analyses the changes undergone by the supervision system to remedy 
these phenomena. Particular attention is paid to the role that has been undertaken by actors other than 
the Committee of Ministers in the oversight of execution, thereby setting the framework in which 
NHRIs could operate to monitor and facilitate the execution of judgments.  
 
2.1. Non-execution and delayed execution of judgments: challenges and proposed remedies 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned prevailing view that the supervision system performed 
its task most suitably, CoE bodies such as the Parliamentary Assembly and the Commissioner for 
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Human Rights highlighted on several occasions their concerns regarding the unsatisfactory execution 
of ECtHR judgments and the consequent risks for the tenability of the ECHR system.  
In a well-known report issued in 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly identified seven reasons 
that might prevent the full and prompt execution of ECtHR judgments, including political reasons, 
the breadth of the domestic reforms required, difficulties with national procedures, budgetary reasons, 
the opposition of the public opinion, lack of clarity on the part of the ECtHR, and conflicts with other 
obligations (particularly those deriving from membership in the EU).3 Since then, the Assembly has 
published various reports focusing on those cases that are taking longer to be executed or otherwise 
raise important issues.4 
 Interestingly, while the 2000 report found that instances of non-execution caused by political 
reasons were “the least frequent type”,5 in 2017 the Rapporteur for the Assembly put emphasis on his 
intention, unlike his predecessors, to also deal with instances of non-execution of judgments due to 
political opposition, thus signalling their growth over the years.6  
Moreover, the Commissioner for Human Rights has recently sounded the alarm with regard to 
the tendency of some countries to more fundamentally put into question the authority of the Court 
and their obligation to align their legal orders with the Court’s judgments.7 The Commissioner 
mentioned, as examples of this category, a law passed in the Russian Federation allowing the 
Constitutional Court to declare ECtHR judgments unconstitutional and therefore inapplicable; a 
similar proposal in Azerbaijan; an envisaged referendum in Switzerland on the basis of which national 
law would take precedence over international law, including ECtHR judgments; and the proposal to 
repeal the Human Rights Act in the United Kingdom.8 The cross-party attacks in Denmark on the 
                                                        
3 Parliamentary Assembly, supra n 1, Section III.C.2. 
4 Cf. Section 2.4 of this dissertation infra. 
5 Parliamentary Assembly, supra n 1, Section III, para. 39. 
6 Parliamentary Assembly – Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (Rapporteur: Mr Pierre-Yves Le Borgn’), 
The implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – Report, 12 June 2017, Doc. 14340, paras. 26 
et seqq. in particular.  
7 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, “Non-implementation of the Court’s judgments: our shared responsibility”, 




ECtHR case-law concerning the expulsion of migrants could also be added to this list;9 moreover, 
from a different perspective, some national supreme courts have shown at times a certain reluctance 
to conform to the rulings adopted by the ECtHR in the event of a potential conflict with the provisions 
of national constitutions.10  
The fact remains that most of these threats have been displaced and that instances of outright 
rejection of ECtHR judgments are a minority (although on the rise);11 however, delayed execution 
due to the technical, financial, and political complexity of the national reforms needed is a cause for 
great concern, as it results in the Committee of Ministers being unable to swiftly process cases, the 
Court being meanwhile overwhelmed with repetitive applications stemming from the failure to solve 
the domestic issues raised by previous judgments, and the credibility of both these bodies being 
threatened.  
Increasing awareness of these problems has been shown by other CoE bodies, including the 
Committee of Ministers itself, which however rejected the most substantial proposals for reform 
which were put forward, such as the introduction of fines for delays in the execution of judgments 
and the addition of a quasi-judicial or otherwise independent expert body supporting the Committee 
of Ministers in its monitoring tasks.12  
                                                        
9 Jacques Hartmann, “A Danish Crusade for the Reform of the European Court of Human Rights”, EJIL: Talk!, 14 
November 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-danish-crusade-for-the-reform-of-the-european-
court-of-human-rights/. 
10 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, “Réflexions sur le renforcement de l’obligation d’exécution des arrêts de la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’Homme”, in La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Une confiance necessaire pour une 
autorité renforcée, ed. Sébastien Touzé (Paris: Pedone 2016), 217-218, refers to the German, Russian, and Italian 
Constitutional Courts in particular. For an examination of the legal underpinnings and consequences of the principle of 
“conditional execution” (i.e., of the primacy of national constitutions over ECtHR judgments), Sébastien Touzé, “Regard 
critique sur l’exécution conditionnelle des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, in Reciprocité et 
universalité: sources et régimes du droit international des droits de l’homme. Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur 
Emmanuel Decaux (Paris: Pedone, 2017), 761-777. For a thorough comparative study of the criticism levelled at the 
ECtHR by politicians, judges, academics, and media from several CoE Member States, cf. Patricia Popelier, Sarah 
Lambrecht, and Koen Lemmens, eds., Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights. Shifting the Convention System: 
Counter-Dynamics at the National and EU Level (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2016).  
11 Jean-François Flauss, “L’effectivité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme: Du politique au juridique 
ou vice-versa”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 77 (2009): 28, according to which “certes, statistiquement, le 
nombre des hypotheses d’inexécution augmente. Pour autant, si la situation est devenue préoccupante, elle n’est pas 
encore alarmante. A vrai dire, l’effectivité des arrêts est surtout fragilisée par les retards d’exécution. Or ceux-ci sont loin 
d’être tous imputables à une inertie déliberée des Etats défendeurs”. Cf. also Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 1. 
12 On the proposals mentioned, cf. below in this chapter for more details. Cf. also Committee of Ministers, Execution of 
the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Reply to Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1477 (2000), 
779th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 9 January 2002, where the Committee both declared that it “attaches very great 
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At first sight, the only momentous change undergone by the supervision system is the 
prerogative, introduced by Protocol no. 14, of the Committee of Ministers to refer cases back to the 
Court in the case of persistent non-execution of judgments by States Parties or difficulties in the 
execution due to interpretive issues. As it will be shown in Section 2.3 infra, however, these 
instruments have been very seldom used, so that they have not been decisive to date.  
All latest High-level Conferences on the reform of the Convention’s system (starting from the 
Interlaken Conference), and the lack therein of any ground-breaking innovation concerning the 
system of supervision of the execution of judgments, show that States Parties do not intend to make 
any profound change to the monitoring system, at least in the short term. The Brighton Declaration 
merely invited the Committee of Ministers “to consider whether more effective measures are needed 
in respect of States that fail to implement judgments of the Court in a timely manner”, without any 
further specification.13 No mention was made of financial sanctions. As regards the possibility to 
introduce some form of technical assistance, the Brussels Declaration even explicitly “reaffirm[ed] 
the intergovernmental nature of the process”,14 so that any delegation of powers to a quasi-judicial 
body was excluded. More generally, the Committee of Ministers was invited to “continue to use, in 
a graduated manner, all the tools at its disposal”,15 without thus providing it with new instruments.  
Is this evidence of a reckless disregard by CoE Member States for the phenomenon of non-
execution of ECtHR judgments? Some observations are in order. Firstly, as mentioned, 
                                                        
importance to full and diligent execution of Court judgments in performing its functions” and essentially opposed all of 
the most innovative proposals made by the Parliamentary Assembly. It should be noted that the Committee of Ministers 
relied, in doing so, on an opinion by the Steering Committee for Human Rights, supra n 1, and that the Evaluation Group, 
composed of the President of the Court, the Deputy Secretary General of the CoE and the Permanent Representative of 
Ireland, did not endorse these proposals either (CoE/Evaluation Group, Report of the Evaluation Group to the Committee 
of Ministers on the European Court of Human Rights, 27 September 2001, EG Court (2001)1, paras. 48 et seqq.).  
A growing literature has also been focusing on the problems relating to the execution of judgments: cf., among others, 
Marinella Marmo, “The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – A Political Battle”, Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 15, no. 2 (2008): 235-258; and Ed Bates, “Supervising the Execution of 
Judgments Delivered by the European Court of Human Rights: The Challenges Facing the Committee of Ministers”, in 
European Court of Human Rights Remedies and Execution of Judgments, eds. Theodora Christou and Juan Pablo 
Raymond (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2005), 49-106.  
13 High-level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, 20 April 2012, 
para. 29.d). 
14 High-level Conference on the “Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared 
responsibility”, Brussels Declaration, 27 March 2015, para. C.1.d). 
15 Ibid., para. C.1.a). 
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notwithstanding the worrying growth of cases of prolonged non-execution, the execution rate of 
ECtHR judgments remains satisfactory. Secondly, again as noted, the majority of cases of non-
compliance appear to have hitherto arisen from the complexity and cost of the measures required to 
fully put the violations right, and not from the open refusal by the respondent States to execute the 
judgments; in these instances, a cooperative approach might be preferable.16 Thirdly, less-heralded 
but significant amendments have been made to the supervision system over the years, which have 
begun to transform the control exercised over the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
Indeed, in the system set up by the Convention, the supervision of the execution of judgments 
delivered by the Court is assigned to the Committee of Ministers – i.e., to the intergovernmental 
decision-making body of the CoE. Article 46(2) of the Convention reads: “The final judgment of the 
Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution”.17 
Notwithstanding the apparently clear-cut wording of this provision, the practice has evolved so that 
                                                        
16 Cf. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Implementation of the 
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 53rd plenary session, 18 December 2002, Opinion No. 209/2002, 
CDL-AD (2002) 34, para. 82. The Commission noted that “while [the penalty-imposing system] might be useful in those 
cases where the State in question has not abided by a judgment out of either a clear political decision or lack of political 
will, or possibly in cases where reasons of public opinion block the State’s execution, it is more questionable whether the 
Committee of Ministers would have recourse to it in those cases, which are by far more numerous, where the non-
enforcement depends on other factors, such as problems or delays relating to the internal democratic processes and 
procedures, or in cases where a beginning of execution has taken place but it is doubtful whether it is adequate or 
sufficient, or in cases where the delay is caused by the lack of financial means”. This objection had also been raised, in 
similar terms, by the Steering Committee for Human Rights, supra n 1, para. 9, and by the Evaluation Group, supra n 12, 
para. 49. 
Other reasons that led the Venice Commission to reject the proposal for astreintes include the increasing workload for 
the Court (para. 84 of the Opinion) and the fact that the measure “would introduce a notion of ‘punishment’ which does 
not, at present, exist in the Convention system” (para. 80). Cf. also Luzius Wildhaber, “A Constitutional Future for the 
European Court of Human Rights?”, Human Rights Law Journal 23 (2002): 164, according to which, as regards 
execution, “the emphasis [should be] not only on the pressure to be exerted on the respondent State, but also where 
appropriate the necessary assistance to deal with the problem raised by the judgment”. 
17 This provision marks the difference between the European human rights system and the Inter-American one: in the 
absence of a body specifically tasked, under the American Convention on Human Rights, with overseeing the execution 
of judgments delivered by the Inter-American Court, the Court itself has taken over the role of supervisor. Cf. on the 
point Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, “Compliance with judgments and decisions – The experience of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: a reassessment”, in CoE/ECtHR, supra n 1, 10-17; and Dinah Shelton, “Enforcement 
of Judgments”, in Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 380-
388. Cf. also, on the progressive convergence of the two systems towards a mixed (judicial and political) model: Elisabeth 
Lambert Abdelgawad, “L’exécution des décisions des juridictions internationales des droits de l’homme: vers une 
harmonisation des systèmes régionaux”, Anuario Colombiano de Derecho Internacional 3 Especial (2010): 9-55. 
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it is now widely recognised and accepted that other actors as well play a role in the supervision 
process.18 
First of all, the Court is involved in the execution of its own judgments, insofar as it increasingly 
recommends or prescribes the adoption of specific individual and general measures to the respondent 
States. While initially questioned, this practice is by now well-established and its legal basis has been 
strengthened. Additionally, Protocol no. 14 to the ECHR vested the Court with new powers in the 
post-judgment phase: on referral by the Committee of Ministers, the Court can clarify the 
interpretation of a final judgment that it previously gave, or rule whether a State Party has failed to 
abide by a final judgment. 
Furthermore, as mentioned, the Parliamentary Assembly has sought to participate to a greater 
extent in the supervision process, particularly where structural issues and significant delays are 
concerned. Thereby a layer of political (and more democratic) control has been added. Additionally, 
other CoE actors have gradually gained a more prominent role in the supervision of execution process: 
this is the case for the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights and, especially, for the Department for 
the Execution of Judgments of the ECtHR.  
Therefore, while the Committee of Ministers retains, in accordance with the Convention, the 
primary responsibility for overseeing the execution of the Court’s judgments, a multiplicity of CoE 
bodies currently support the Committee in carrying out this task. They do so, inter alia, by 
increasingly interacting with relevant national actors. It is argued here that this shift has had an impact 
on (and was in turn influenced by) the procedures on the basis of which the Committee of Ministers 
                                                        
18 Cf., among the various commentators that highlighted this general trend: Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, “The 
Execution of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: Towards a Non-coercive and Participatory Model 
of Accountability”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) 69 (2009): 471-491; and 
Fredrik Sundberg, “Le contrôle de l’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, in Libertés, 
justice, tolerance. Mélanges en hommage du Doyen Gérard Cohen-Jonathan, vol. II, ed. Georges Wiederkehr (Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, 2004), 1519 et seqq. For a critical appraisal, see Flauss, supra n 11, 27-72, which warns against the risks of 
overlapping competences among CoE bodies and calls for greater clarity in the allocation of roles in the supervision of 
execution process (72 in particular).  
The finding that the Committee of Ministers does not retain the sole prerogative to oversee the execution of the Court’s 
judgments is shared by the Committee itself: as it will be shown, the Committee has explicitly recognised the role of both 
the Court and the Parliamentary Assembly in this area, and so have done all the latest High-level Conferences on the 
reform of the ECHR system (cf. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 infra for details).  
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itself performs its supervisory duties – procedures whose transparency and, to a certain degree, 
independence have been strengthened. The following sections analyse in detail how the Committee 
of Ministers has reshaped its approach in the supervision of the execution of judgments and how other 
actors have come to complement the actions of the Committee in this area.  
 
2.2. States supervising States: the role of the Committee of Ministers 
The Committee of Ministers is composed of the ministers for foreign affairs or the permanent 
diplomatic representatives of all CoE Member States. In fact, the day-to-day business of the 
Committee is performed by the permanent representatives, whereas the ministers only meet twice a 
year.19 The Committee is broadly mandated under the CoE Statute to “consider the action required to 
further the aim of the Council of Europe”, and it does so through a range of instruments.20 In addition 
to this overarching role, the Committee has been vested with specific functions within the 
Convention’s system.  
Until the entry into force on 1 November 1998 of Protocol no. 11, which removed the filter of 
the European Commission of Human Rights and made the jurisdiction of the Court obligatory for all 
States Parties to the Convention, the Committee of Ministers used to receive reports from the 
Commission including the latter’s opinion on whether a violation of the rights protected by the ECHR 
had taken place.  
If the case was not referred to the Court (because the Commission had decided not to do so, or 
because the respondent State had not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court nor consented 
to be subject to it on an ad hoc basis), the Committee would decide by a two-thirds majority21 on the 
                                                        
19 Caroline Ravaud, “The Committee of Ministers”, in The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, eds. 
Ronald St. John Macdonald, Franz Matscher, and Herbert Petzold (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 648. 
20 CoE, Statute of the Council of Europe, 5 May 1949, European Treaty Series No. 1, Article 15. For an overview of the 
composition, functions, and procedures of the Committee, cf. Ravaud, supra n 19, 645-656; and Yvonne S. Klerk, 
“Supervision of the Execution of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: The Committee of Ministers’ 
role under Article 54 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, Netherlands International Law Review 45 (1998): 
66-68. 
21 The required majority has not always been reached by the Committee, giving rise to worrisome instances of “non-
decision”. Various solutions were sought, such as the amendment of the Rules for the application of Article 32 and the 
drafting of Protocol no. 10, which would have introduced a simple majority rule. The issue was overcome by the entry 
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occurrence of a Convention’s breach and, if a breach was found, it would “prescribe a period during 
which the Contracting Party concerned must take the measures required by the decision” (Article 32 
of the original version of the Convention).  
The Committee of Ministers thus performed a function comparable to that of the Court by 
deciding with binding effects on the existence of a Convention’s violation, even though the 
Committee mostly endorsed the decisions by the Commission22 and for a long time refused to award 
just satisfaction to applicants.23 At any rate, this power of the Committee ceased to exist following 
the entry into force of Protocol no. 11, according to which all individuals have the right to petition 
the Court directly and to obtain from it a final judgment with biding effects (if their applications 
comply with the admissibility requirements set forth in the Convention).  
On the contrary, the prerogatives of the Committee of Ministers as regards the supervision of 
the execution of judgments of the Court have been maintained unchanged. These powers were 
originally enshrined in Article 54 of the 1950 version of the Convention and were replicated almost 
identically in the new Article 46(2), according to which “the final judgment of the Court shall be 
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution”.24  
The Convention being particularly concise if not obscure on the scope and implications of this 
supervisory activity,25 the Committee of Ministers has developed its own practice and over time 
drawn up and amended its rules of procedure for the application of Article 46 (and, before, of Article 
                                                        
into force of Protocol no. 11, which removed the competences of the Committee of Ministers under Article 32. Cf. 
Ravaud, supra n 19, 652-653, and Leuprecht, supra n 2, 102-103. 
22 J. G. Merrills and A. H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
4th ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 293-295; and Adam Tomkins, “The Committee of Ministers: 
Its Roles under the European Convention on Human Rights”, European Human Rights Law Review (1995): 49-62.   
23 The Committee even adopted a rule by which it recognised that, when a violation was found, it could only “give advice 
or make suggestions or recommendations to the State concerned” and that “such advice, suggestions or recommendations 
… would not be binding on the government to which they are addressed” (Rule 5 of the Rules adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers for the application of Article 32). Cf. Leuprecht, “The Execution of Judgments and Decisions”, in St. John 
Macdonald, Matscher, and Petzold, supra n 19, 795-796. 
24 Article 54 of the 1950 version of the Convention read: “The judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee 
of Ministers which shall supervise its execution”. 
25 Or, as put by one scholar, “surprisingly succinct”: Hans-Jürgen Bartsch, “The supervisory functions of the Committee 
of Ministers under Article 54 – a postscript to Luedicke-Belkacem-Koç”, in Protecting human rights: the European 
dimension – Studies in honour of Gérard J. Wiarda, eds. Franz Matscher, Herbert Petzold, and Gérard J. Wiarda (Köln: 
Heymanns, 1988), 47. 
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54). The latest Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments 
and of the terms of friendly settlements date back to 2006 (although they have subsequently been 
amended), and while their most innovative aspects will be analysed further below, it is worth 
sketching here the general characteristics of the supervision process as it emerges from these Rules.  
All judgments by the Court establishing violations of the Convention’s obligations by States 
Parties, as well as all decisions striking cases out of the Court’s list because friendly settlements have 
been reached, are transmitted to the Committee of Ministers and put on the agenda of its special 
Human Rights meetings, which normally take place every three months (that is, four times per year).26 
For their part, respondent governments are under the obligation to communicate to the Committee 
any measures that they have already adopted or plan to adopt with a view to giving effect to the 
Court’s judgments, as well as “to inform it on the execution of the terms of the friendly 
settlement[s]”.27  
While in the case of friendly settlements the Committee of Ministers confines itself to verifying 
the actual implementation of the terms of the settlements, its role with respect to judgments finding 
violations is more extensive and has grown over the years. Indeed, the Committee – which, it should 
be reminded, is composed of government representatives – was initially reluctant to interfere in the 
execution process as conducted by the respondent States, and it resolved to simply “[take] note of the 
information” provided by the governments concerned.28  
                                                        
26 Committee of Ministers, Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of 
the terms of friendly settlements, 964th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 10 May 2006, Rules 2 and 3. For a list of the 
Human Rights meetings of the Committee and the related documents, cf. “The Committee of Ministers’ Human Rights 
meetings”, CoE/Department for the Execution of Judgments, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/committee-of-ministers-human-rights-meetings.  
27 Committee of Ministers, supra n 26, Rules 6 and 12. 
28 Rule 3 of the Rules concerning the application of Article 54 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The text of 
the Rules can be found in Committee of Ministers, Committee of Experts on Human Rights. 44th Meeting (Rome, 10-14 
November 1975). Report, 12 January 1976, CM(76)12, Appendix I; the Rules were adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
in February 1976 (Committee of Ministers, Conclusions of the 254th Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies Held in 
Strasbourg from 9 to 18 February 1976, CM/Del/Concl(76)254. Cf. also Bartsch, supra n 25, 49-50, and Klerk, supra n 
20, 73-80. Nonetheless, there have been notable exceptions to this general attitude: cf. Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç v. 
Germany, nos. 6210/73, 6877/75, and 7132/75, 28 November 1978, and the subsequent judgment on just satisfaction, 10 
March 1980, analysed in Bartsch, supra n 25, 50 et seqq. In that instance, the Committee of Ministers explicitly based its 
resolution closing the case on the legislation adopted by the German Government, even though the Government had not 
referred to it. 
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However, it was soon clear that such a control would be essentially useless if interpreted in the 
sense that the Committee of Ministers could not in any way examine the appropriateness of the 
measures proposed or taken by States to remedy violations. Therefore, even before the Rules were 
amended to remove the above-mentioned wording,29 the Committee started to exercise an 
increasingly effective scrutiny over the measures put forward by States,30 while maintaining that the 
obligation to abide by a final judgment of the Court is an obligation of result, and States therefore 
enjoy a certain discretion as to the means to execute the judgments.31  
This practice has been consolidated in the current Rules, which describe in greater detail the 
prerogatives of the Committee of Ministers in overseeing the execution of judgments. In essence, the 
Committee shall not only verify (when relevant) that the respondent State has paid the damages 
awarded by the Court, but also examine whether additional individual or general measures have been 
adopted by the State that are able to put an end to the violation ascertained, reinstate the injured party 
in her previous situation as far as possible (the so-called restitutio in integrum), and prevent future 
similar violations (Rule 6). 
These three obligations are widely recognised as flowing from any internationally wrongful act 
committed by a State.32 In the ECHR system, the undertaking of the States Parties to “secure to 
                                                        
29 By means of the Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers for the application of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 736th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 10 January 2001. 
30 Cf. Flauss, supra n 11, 31 et seqq. Cf. also Jean-François Flauss, “La pratique du Comité des Ministres du Conseil de 
l'Europe au titre de l'article 54 de la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme (1985-1988)”, Annuaire français de 
droit international 34 (1988): 419-420, which underlines the control exercised by the Directorate General Human Rights 
and Rule of Law. 
31 ECtHR, Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Article 50), no. 14556/89, 31 October 1995, para 34: “This 
discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attaching to the primary obligation 
of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed (Article 1)”.  
32 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1. While they were never transposed into a treaty, the majority 
of these provisions are considered to reflect international customary law. The Articles state that internationally wrongful 
acts entail the international responsibility of States which commit them (Article 1), and that this responsibility has legal 
consequences. These consequences include the obligations to “cease that act, if it is continuing” (Article 30); “offer 
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require” (Article 30); and “make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act” (Article 31).  
The ECtHR clearly has this model in mind when it states, using a recurring formula, that “a judgment in which the Court 
finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its 
consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach” (Papamichalopoulos 
and others v. Greece, supra n 31, para. 34). In the literature, cf. Jörg Polakiewicz, “The Execution of Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights”, in Fundamental Rights in Europe: The European Convention on Human Rights and 
its Member States, 1950-2000, eds. Robert Blackburn and Jörg Polakiewicz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 55-
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everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” enshrined in the Convention is explicitly 
laid down in Article 1 of the Convention itself and triggers the States’ international responsibility in 
case of violation of the said rights and freedoms. It is therefore natural that a meaningful supervision 
of the execution of judgments establishing the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts should imply the actual examination of the measures adopted by the States concerned in light of 
this tripartite duty.  
It could therefore be argued that the importance of the evolution, within the Committee of 
Ministers, from “taking note of” to “examining” States’ measures should not be overestimated – also 
considering that the Committee mainly bases its evaluations on the information provided by 
governments, that these evaluations are not immune from political considerations (even though the 
supervisory activity of the Committee should be legal in nature),33 and that considerable discretion is 
allowed to States in the choice of means to comply with the ECtHR judgments. Nonetheless, the 
current situation represents a significant step forward from the original model of supervision, 
especially since the 2006 Rules and the ever-evolving practice of the Committee introduced other 
considerable changes. 
 
The innovations brought in the last decade to the supervision of execution process are numerous 
and varied.34 With a view to simplifying and identifying some common threads running through these 
reforms, I would argue that changes have been effected along three main lines: a closer scrutiny by 
the Committee of Ministers over the measures adopted by States and the erosion of States’ freedom 
in the choice of means; an increasing publicity and openness of the proceedings before the 
                                                        
65; Valerio Colandrea, “On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-monetary Measures: 
Some Remarks in Light of the Assanidze, Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases”, Human Rights Law Review 7, no. 2 (2007): 
396-411; and Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 1, 10-12. 
33 Cf. in this sense Bartsch, supra n 25, 54; Leuprecht, supra n 2, 105-106; and Philip Leach, “On Reform of the European 
Court of Human Rights”, European Human Rights Law Review, no. 6 (2009): 732. For a different view, cf. Flauss, supra 
n 11, 29 et seqq. 
34 For an overview of several of these innovations, but only up to the end of 2008, cf. various contributions in Philippe 
Boillat et al., Les mutations de l'activité du Comité des ministres (Bruxelles: Nemesis, 2012).  
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Committee; and the participation of other CoE actors in the supervision process, in addition to greater 
cooperation with domestic bodies such as national parliaments and courts.  
Reserving the following sections of this chapter for the last point, the two other developments 
are analysed here. First, as regards the degree of scrutiny exercised by the Committee of Ministers, 
not only does the Committee now actually assess the appropriateness of States’ measures for giving 
effect to the Court’s judgments, but it also increasingly recommends measures that, in its view, States 
should adopt in order to comply with their obligations. This approach applies in particular to those 
judgments that are put under “enhanced supervision”, as opposed to “standard supervision”, 
according to a distinction introduced by the Working Methods that entered into force in January 
2011.35  
The “enhanced supervision”, which concerns categories of rulings including pilot judgments 
and other judgments “disclosing major structural and/or complex problems”, ensures that the most 
significant cases are continuously and more closely followed by the Committee of Ministers, which 
can adopt a range of instruments – such as decisions and interim resolutions – to urge or direct the 
execution of judgments; this kind of supervision should also entail greater cooperation between the 
respondent States and the Department for the Execution of Judgments.36 
Interim resolutions are designed to “provide information on the state of progress of the 
execution or, where appropriate, to express concern and/or to make suggestions with respect to the 
execution” (Rule 16 of the 2006 Rules). While these resolutions might be confined to the provision 
of information on the state of execution, they frequently suggest measures to be taken by States in 
                                                        
35 Committee of Ministers/Department for the Execution of Judgments, Supervision of the execution of the judgments and 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: implementation of the Interlaken Action Plan – Outstanding issues 
concerning the practical modalities of implementation of the new twin track supervision system, Information documents, 
7 December 2010, CM/lnf/DH(2010)45final. The decision by the Committee of Ministers to give effect to the new 
procedure was taken at the 1110th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies: Committee of Ministers, “Measures to improve the 
execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: Proposals for the implementation of the Interlaken 
Declaration and Action Plan”, Decisions adopted at the meeting. Item e, 6 December 2010, CM/Del/Dec(2010)1100. By 
this decision, the Deputies approved the proposals put forward by the Secretariat in two documents (CM/Inf/DH(2010)45 
and CM/Inf/DH(2010)37), and “decided to implement the new, twin-track supervision system with effect from 1 January 
2011”. 
36 Committee of Ministers/Department for Execution, supra n 35, paras. 16-17. 
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order to fully abide by judgments. These indications can then be accompanied either by praise for the 
progress achieved by the respondent State or (more rarely) by condemnation and “threats” for the 
persistent inaction of the State.37 Through interim resolutions, the Committee of Ministers aims to 
put pressure on the State concerned, or anyway to remind the State that it is following the execution 
process closely, as well as to direct the government in the adoption of the most appropriate measures. 
Nonetheless, the efficacy of these resolutions has been put into question.38  
As it will be shown in Section 2.4, the Department for the Execution of Judgments, which 
supports the Committee of Ministers in its supervisory task, through its memoranda also provides 
information on the state of execution of judgments and increasingly suggests measures with a view 
to guiding the States concerned, especially when structural reforms are at issue. Furthermore, the 
Department for Execution develops bilateral contacts with the governments concerned and organises 
thematic meetings on execution issues with representatives from all States Parties.39  
Since the Committee of Ministers is careful not to impinge upon States’ prerogatives in the 
choice of measures, these practices do not appear to have been openly opposed by governments. What 
has been the subject of more controversy is the parallel propensity of the Court to also recommend 
or even prescribe the measures that a State should/must take to remedy its violations, even though the 
Court lacks an explicit supervisory function under the Convention (except for the new circumscribed 
powers conferred on the Court by Protocol no. 14). This practice will be examined further in Section 
2.3.  
                                                        
37 Lambert Abdelgawad uses the terms résolutions d’encouragement and résolutions menaces respectively: cf. Elisabeth 
Lambert Abdelgawad, “L’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (2006)”, Revue trimestrielle 
des droits de l’homme 71 (2007): 673 et seqq. On interim resolutions, cf. also Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 18, 501-
503. 
38 Cf. Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, “L’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (2009)”, 
Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 84 (2010): 804-805; and, from the same author, “L’exécution des arrêts de la 
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (2010)”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 88 (2011): 951. In both works 
the author points to the apparent ineffectiveness of these resolutions, which have often remained a dead letter. 
39 To give an example, the Department organised, on 5 and 6 October 2015, a “Round Table on the Reopening of 
proceedings following a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights”, which gathered representatives from almost 
all CoE Member States. For a list of the conferences held by the Department, including those concerning issues of 
execution, cf. “Conferences”, Department for the Execution of Judgments, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/conferences.  
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More broadly, the Committee of Ministers has been placing greater emphasis on the adoption 
of appropriate individual and general measures, thus going beyond its previous focus on the award of 
just satisfaction and embracing a more comprehensive concept of “execution”. While general 
measures might consist in reforms of the legislation or changes to the case-law or administrative 
practice, individual measures specifically address the applicants by putting an end to the violations 
suffered by them and ensuring appropriate reparation. Individual measures are considerably varied 
and may range from the reopening of domestic judicial proceedings to the release of detained 
applicants, from the granting of resident permits to aliens illegally expelled to the opportunity for 
parties or religious groups to apply again to domestic authorities for registration.40  
Moreover, the Committee of Ministers now usually adopts resolutions closing cases only when 
all measures deemed necessary have been enacted, and not simply put forward or promised by 
governments. It thus takes more for the Committee to “conclud[e] that its functions … have been 
exercised”.41 Since the enactment of the required general measures might take long, pending the 
realisation of complex reforms States are increasingly asked by the Committee to adopt provisional 
measures with a view to immediately putting a stop to continuing violations and preventing new 
similar violations from happening.42   
Other instruments developed by the Committee of Ministers in order to be thoroughly and 
regularly informed on States’ progress are action plans and action reports. These documents are 
drawn up by States and set forth the measures that States respectively intend to adopt or have already 
                                                        
40 Examples of both general and individual measures recommended by the Committee can be found in all annual reviews 
compiled by Lambert Abdelgawad in Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (e.g., supra nn 37 and 38). Cf. also 
Fredrik G.E. Sundberg, “Control of Execution of Decisions under the European Convention on Human Rights – A 
Perspective on Democratic Security, Inter-governmental Cooperation, Unification and Individual Justice in Europe”, in 
International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms – Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, eds. Gudmundur 
Alfredsson et al., 2nd rev. ed. (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 473-480; and Leo Zwaak, “The Supervisory Task 
of the Committee of Ministers”, in Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, eds. Pieter Van 
Dijk et al., 4th ed. (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006), 301-317. 
41 CoE Steering Committee for Human Rights, Committee of Experts for the Improvement of Procedures for the 
Protection of Human Rights – Report, 47th meeting, 12-14 April 2000, DH-PR (2000)006, para. 29. Cf. also Flauss, supra 
n 30, 420-421, according to which this shift in the practice of the Committee began to take place in the second half of the 
1980s. 
42 Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 37, 680.   
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adopted to give full execution to judgments. An action plan or report must be submitted by the 
government concerned ahead of the first meeting of the Committee of Ministers where the case is 
going to be discussed; further plans and reports are filed with the Committee until the latter is satisfied 
that the State has taken all the necessary measures and the supervision of the case can be closed.  
The requirement to submit action plans and reports, which was introduced by the 2004 Working 
Methods of the Committee of Ministers43 and subsequently reinforced through the clarification of its 
binding nature,44 compels governments to clearly set out the actions that they intend to take and the 
timetable that they intend to follow, thus allowing the Committee of Ministers to ascertain the 
effective execution of judgments more easily and more objectively. These provisions add to the rules 
on “control intervals” (i.e., on the intervals at which a case and its relating measures are examined), 
which have been tightened over time.45 
Finally, Protocol no. 14 has conferred upon the Committee of Ministers the potentially 
significant power to refer a case back to the Court, when it considers that a problem of interpretation 
or the respondent State’s refusal impede the execution of a judgment (cf. new paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 
of Article 46 ECHR). These provisions, which also clearly extend the competences of the Court with 
regard to the control over the execution of its own judgments (and will therefore be examined in 
                                                        
43 Committee of Ministers, Human rights working methods – Improved effectiveness of the Committee of Ministers’ 
supervision of execution of judgments. Information document prepared under the responsibility of the Norwegian 
Delegation, 7 April 2004, CM/Inf(2004)8-Final, Appendixes 2 and 3. 
44 Cf. Committee of Ministers/Department for Execution, supra n 35, para. 14: “the standard supervision procedure is 
based on the principle that member states provide an action plan or action report as soon as possible and in any case at 
the latest within six months from the date upon which the judgment became final”. 
45 According to the 1976 Rules, as updated, “if the state concerned informs the Committee of Ministers that it is not yet 
in a position to inform it of the measures taken, the case shall be automatically inscribed on the agenda of a meeting of 
the Committee taking place not more than six months later, unless the Committee of Ministers decides otherwise”. With 
the entry into force of the 2001 Rules, this provision only applies to general measures while, regarding just satisfaction 
and individual measures, it is established that “[u]ntil the State concerned has provided information on the payment of 
the just satisfaction awarded by the Court or concerning possible individual measures, the case shall be placed on the 
agenda of each human rights meeting of the Committee of Ministers, unless the Committee decides otherwise” (Rule 
4(a), substantially replicated as Rule 7(1) in the current 2006 Rules). Committee of Ministers/Department for Execution, 
supra n 35, para. 4, has interpreted this Rule in the following terms: “as from [1 January 2011], all cases will be placed 
on the agenda of each DH meeting of the Deputies until the supervision of their execution is closed, unless the Committee 
were to decide otherwise in the light of the development of the execution process”. 
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greater detail in the following section), give the Committee of Ministers a further means for exerting 
pressure on recalcitrant States.46  
Overall, it can be argued that the Committee of Ministers has gradually intensified its scrutiny 
over the execution measures adopted by States: it now asks respondent governments for detailed plans 
of action including appropriate individual and general measures, follows the execution process 
closely, urges governments to take action when the implementation of measures is lagging behind, 
even strongly condemns States that appear unwilling to execute judgments, and recommends the 
adoption of specific measures. This is a considerable progress compared to the previous mere “taking 
note” of the measures presented by States.  
This trend can be contrasted with the emphasis that has recently been placed on the principle 
of subsidiarity, starting from the Interlaken Conference (2010) and especially by means of the 
Brighton Declaration (2012);47 reference to this concept and to States’ margin of appreciation in 
implementing the ECHR rights will also be introduced in the preamble of the Convention by 
forthcoming Protocol no. 15, with the clear intention to reaffirm States’ room for manoeuvre.48 
However, it does not seem that the accent put on subsidiarity has had a significant impact on the 
supervision of execution process, in the sense of a relaxation of the control performed by the 
Committee of Ministers.49 
 
A second general innovation to the supervision system, which is of particular significance in 
relation to the participation by NHRIs in the process, is the recent trend of rendering the proceedings 
                                                        
46 CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, 13 May 2004, Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 19, 
paras. 98-100. 
47 Brighton Declaration, supra n 13. For further details on the principle of subsidiarity, cf. Section 1.1 of this dissertation, 
nn 39 and 49 in particular. 
48 CoE, Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 24 
June 2013, Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 213. Cf. also the Explanatory Report to this Protocol.  
49 These concerns had been raised, among others, by Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, “L’exécution des arrêts de la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme (2011)”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 92 (2012): 885-886. 
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before the Committee of Ministers more open in a twofold sense. First of all, the publicity of the 
supervision process has been strengthened considerably.50  
The 2001 Rules of Procedure already established that the agenda of the Committee’s Human 
Rights meetings shall be public (Rule 1; Rule 2 in the current version of the Rules).51 Those Rules 
also introduced an important provision concerning access to information, which essentially reversed 
the previous confidentiality rule by establishing that “information provided by the State to the 
Committee of Ministers in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention and the documents relating 
thereto shall be accessible to the public, unless the Committee decides otherwise in order to protect 
legitimate public or private interests” (Rule 5). The provision has essentially been retained in the new 
2006 Rules (as Rule 8) and extended to the information provided by the injured party as well as by 
the other actors who are now allowed to submit information (see infra). It has also been explicitly 
extended to friendly settlements (Rule 15). 
The 2006 Rules, currently in force, have pursued this path of publicity further by stipulating 
that the Committee of Ministers shall publish an annual report regarding its supervisory activities 
(Rule 5), as well as the annotated agenda (including information on progress in the execution of 
judgments) and decisions of its Human Rights meetings (“unless the Committee decides otherwise”: 
Rule 8(4)). 
Accordingly, the website of the Department for the Execution of Judgments now displays, in a 
user-friendly manner, a large number of documents relating to the execution process – from action 
plans and reports by States Parties to submissions by non-State actors, from memoranda by the 
Department itself to decisions and resolutions by the Committee of Ministers.52 Additionally, a new 
search engine for documents regarding the execution of judgments has been created in order to make 
                                                        
50 Cf., on the greater publicity of the Committee’s proceedings, Bates, supra n 12, 60 et seqq.; and Agnieszka Szklanna, 
“The Standing of Applicants and NGOs in the Process of Supervision of ECtHR judgments by the Committee of 
Ministers”, European Yearbook on Human Rights (2012): 269-280. 
51 For the 2001 Rules, cf. supra n 29.  
52 Visit http://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/home, accessed 4 January 2019. 
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access to information even simpler.53 As it is evident from its own name, HUDOC-EXEC, the new 
tool is based on the successful search engine for judgments and decisions of the Court (HUDOC). 
The proceedings before the Committee of Ministers have also become more open in another 
respect – namely, by allowing the submission of information by actors other than States. The injured 
party has long been allowed in practice to submit to the Committee of Ministers information 
concerning the payment of just satisfaction; this practice was codified in the 1970s and subsequently 
extended to the adoption of other individual measures.54 While the Committee of Ministers was 
initially merely “entitled” to consider this kind of communications, under the current Rules the 
Committee “shall consider” them – i.e., it is now compelled to examine any communications lodged 
by the applicants in the Court’s cases (Rules 9(1) and 15(1) for friendly settlements).  
Moreover, the current Rules introduced the opportunity for non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and NHRIs to also submit information, which the Committee of Ministers “shall be entitled 
to consider” (Rules 9(2) and 15(2)).55 More recently, the same prerogative has been recognised to 
human rights international intergovernmental organisations, the CoE Commissioner for Human 
Rights, and third-party interveners before the Court (for the latter, the opportunity to submit 
information is limited to those cases in relation to which they were allowed to intervene by the 
Court).56  
In the absence of any further specification, it is to be understood that NGOs, NHRIs, and the 
newcomers can present information relating to any kind of measures to be taken in order to execute 
                                                        
53 The search engine can be found at: http://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng#{"EXECDocumentTypeCollection":["CEC"]}, 
accessed 4 January 2019. The service has been available since January 2017. 
54 Again, initially in practice (since the 1990s) and subsequently through the amendment of the Rules of the Committee 
of Ministers (Rule 6 of the 2001 Rules): cf. Mikhail Lobov, “L’accès des personnes privées – requérant et ONG – au 
Comité des ministres”, in Boillat et al., supra n 34, 97-100. 
55 As reminded in Sundberg, supra n 18, 1522-1523, before this opportunity was explicitly introduced in the Rules of the 
Committee of Ministers, NGOs and entities other than the injured party would in practice submit information to the 
Department for Execution, which would examine it and decide whether to communicate it to the government concerned 
and to the Committee of Ministers. Under the new Rule 9(2), the Department is obliged to bring submissions by these 
entities to the attention of the State and of the Committee; the latter is free to consider them or not.  
56 Cf. new Rules 9(3) and 9(4), as amended by Committee of Ministers, “Securing the long-term effectiveness of the 
system of the European Convention on Human Rights − Implementation of the Brussels Declaration. Amendments to 
Rule 9 of the Ministers’ Deputies’ Rules for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly 
settlements”, Decisions, 1275th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 18 January 2017, CM/Del/Dec(2017)1275/4.1.  
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the Court’s judgments, including general measures, in contrast with the injured party. Indeed, while 
nothing prevents those entities from submitting communications in relation to the individual situation 
of the applicants, it is clear that their added value lies in their knowledge of the wider framework – 
what national laws and practices govern a certain aspect, how many people might be affected by the 
violations established by the Court, what possible solutions exist and what kind of reforms could be 
advanced to put the violations right.  
Therefore, while the right of the injured party to intervene in the process can be regarded as a 
way to protect her personal interest in seeing her rights to restitution and compensation enforced, the 
injection of different sources of information under Rule 9(2) rather relates to the general interest of 
the community of the State concerned (and of the communities of other Member States) in the 
effective execution of the Court’s judgment in all of its implications.  
The potential of the provision of reliable information by third parties in an otherwise 
intergovernmental process of supervision is clear. This should be particularly true in the case of 
NHRIs, which are not only independent from governments, but do not have any vested interest57 and 
possess a thorough knowledge of the internal legal order and of the domestic human rights situation. 
The extent to which NHRIs have actually made use of this instrument and the extent to which their 
submissions have been considered by the Committee of Ministers when deciding on a case lie at the 
heart of this dissertation and will be investigated in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                        
57 That is, compared to NGOs. Cf. Antoine Buyse, “The Court’s Ears and Arms: National Human Rights Institutions and 
the European Court of Human Rights”, in National Human Rights Institutions in Europe: Comparative, European and 
International perspectives, eds. Jan Wouters and Katrien Meuwissen (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013), 173-186, which 
focuses in particular on third-party interventions by NHRIs before the ECtHR; and Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Role and Responsibilities, Professional 
Training Series No. 4 Rev. 1 (New York and Geneva: UN, 2010), 20.  
As it will be explained further in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, the fact that NHRIs are created and funded by governments, 
while being at the same time independent from them, should give these institutions more legitimacy and authority 
compared to NGOs and allow them easier access to governmental information. On the point, cf. Anne Smith, “The Unique 
Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?”, Human Rights Quarterly 28 (2006): 909. 
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2.3. The role of the Court 
Apart from awarding just satisfaction to the applicants (when it is deemed appropriate), the 
ECtHR rulings are essentially declaratory in nature: i.e., they cannot quash judicial or administrative 
decisions, nor can they repeal national legislation directly. The Court itself has long reiterated this 
concept and, on this basis, refused to grant any consequential order asked by the applicants, 
highlighting the freedom of the respondent States in the choice of means to remedy the violations 
found.58 This approach has, however, gradually changed.59  
The right to property was selected by the Court as the most appropriate starting point for its 
new case-law. The Court initially suggested, in a judgment delivered in July 1995, that “the best form 
of redress would in principle be for the state to return the land”.60 A few months later, in another case, 
the ECtHR went forward by ordering, in the operative part of the judgment, that the respondent State 
either return the land to the applicants or pay them the amount of money indicated.61 While an 
alternative was left to the State, its margin of manoeuvre was thus restricted.  
                                                        
58 ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, para. 58: “the decision cannot of itself annul or repeal these 
provisions: the Court’s judgment is essentially declaratory and leaves to the State the choice of the means to be utilised 
in its domestic legal system for performance of its obligation under Article 53 [current Article 46.1]”. For other examples 
of judgments where the Court refused to order States the adoption of certain measures: Ryssdal, supra n 1, 51-53; and 
Colandrea, supra n 32, 397 n 4.   
59 A considerable body of literature has dealt with the growing propensity of the Court to indicate the measures that States 
should adopt in order to comply with their obligations under Article 46. Cf., among others: Alastair Mowbray, “An 
Examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ Indication of Remedial Measures”, Human Rights Law Review 17, 
no. 3 (2017): 451–478; Corneliu Bîrsan, “Les aspects nouveaux de l’application des articles 41 et 46 de la Convention 
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’homme”, in Trente ans de droit européen des droits de 
l'homme: études à la memoire de Wolfgang Strasser, ed. Hanno Hartig (Bruxelles: Nemesis and Bruylant, 2007); Lucius 
Caflisch, “New Practice Regarding the Implementation of the Judgments of the Strasbourg Court”, Italian Yearbook of 
International Law 15, no.1 (2005): 3-23; Colandrea, supra n 32; Philip Leach, “Beyond the Bug River – A New Dawn 
for Redress Before the European Court of Human Rights”, European Human Rights Law Review, no. 2 (2005): 148-164; 
Luzius Wildhaber, “The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: Recent Developments”, in 
Völkerrecht als Wertordnung: Festschrift für Christian Tomuschat, eds. Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. (Kehl am Rhein: N.P. 
Engel, 2006), 671-680; Hans-Joachim Cremer, “Prescriptive Orders in the Operative Provisions of Judgments by the 
European Court of Human Rights”, in Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – Effects and Implementation, 
eds. Anja Seibert-Fohr and Mark E. Villiger (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 39-59; Flauss, supra n 11, 58 et seqq.; Loukis 
G. Loucaides, “Reparation for violations of human rights under the European Convention and restitutio in integrum”, 
European Human Rights Law Review, no. 2 (2008) 182-192; and Sergio Bartole, Pasquale De Sena, and Vladimiro 
Zagrebelsky, Commentario breve alla Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell'uomo e delle libertà 
fondamentali (Padova: Cedam, 2012), 744-765. 
60 ECtHR, Hentrich v. France (Article 50), no. 13616/88, 3 July 1995, para. 10. 
61 ECtHR, Papamichalopoulos and others, supra n 31, operative part. A similar stance was taken by the Court in other 
cases concerning the right to property: e.g., ECtHR, Brumărescu v. Romania (just satisfaction), no. 28342/95, 23 January 
2001, operative part. 
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In the following years, the Court both detailed increasingly the individual measures 
recommended to States and even prescribed the adoption of specific ones. One of the most renowned 
cases in this respect is Assanidze v. Georgia, concerning the persistent illegal detention of the 
applicant; on that occasion, the Court held that “by its very nature, the violation found in the instant 
case does not leave any real choice as to the measures required to remedy it”, and that “having regard 
to the particular circumstances of the case and the urgent need to put an end to the violation … the 
respondent State must secure the applicant’s release at the earliest possible date”.62 
The Assanidze case also shows that the indication of specific individual measures has not been 
limited to the violation of the right to property, but it has been extended over time to various other 
rights protected by the Convention – from the right to life63 to the right to respect for private and 
family life64 and the right to a fair trial. With regard to the latter, the Court has increasingly 
recommended the reopening of domestic proceedings, upon request of the applicants, when this 
possibility is provided for in the national systems; on the other hand, the Court has refused to order 
States to introduce such an avenue in the legislation if not already present.65 Nonetheless, provisions 
                                                        
62 ECtHR, Assanidze v. Georgia, no. 71503/01, 8 April 2004, paras. 202-203. For a thorough analysis of the Assanidze 
case, cf. Colandrea, supra n 32. A similar conclusion was reached by the ECtHR in Ilaşcu and others v. Russia and 
Moldova, no. 48787/99, 8 July 2004; in addition to awarding damages, the Court held that “the respondent States must 
take every measure to put an end to the arbitrary detention of the applicants still detained and to secure their immediate 
release” (para. 490). 
63 In ECtHR, Abuyeva and others v. Russia, no. 27065/05, 2 December 2010, concerning the killing of civilians in 
Chechnya, the Court acknowledged that it had “so far refused to give any specific indications to a Government that they 
should, in response to a finding of a procedural breach of Article 2, hold a new investigation” but, in light of the particular 
circumstances of the case, it asserted that it considered “it inevitable that a new, independent, investigation should take 
place” (paras. 240-243). 
64 In ECtHR, Mužević v. Croatia, no. 39299/02, 16 November 2006, the Court ordered, in the operative part of the 
judgment, that the respondent State secure the enforcement of an in-court settlement and of a judgment concerning the 
division of assets of a divorced couple. Cf. similarly ECtHR, V.A.M. v. Serbia, no. 39177/05, 13 March 2007, where the 
Court ordered (this time, under the headings “Damage”) that the respondent State enforce a previous interim judicial 
order that granted the applicant’s access to her daughter (para. 166). 
65 For cases where the reopening of domestic proceedings was recommended cf., among others, ECtHR, Gençel v. Turkey, 
no. 53431/99, 23 October 2003, para. 27 (available in French only); Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, 12 May 2005, 
para. 210; and Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, 1 March 2006, para. 126. 
For a case where the Court refused to order the reopening of the proceedings, cf. Hostein v. France, no. 76450/01, 18 
July 2006, where the Court held: “En ce qui concerne la demande du requérant relative à l’introduction en droit interne 
d’un mécanisme de révision en matière civile, la Cour rappelle qu’un tel droit n’est pas garanti en tant que tel par la 
Convention” (para. 49 of the judgment, available in French only). 
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of the kind are now in place in almost all States Parties, also in light of Recommendation (2000) 2 of 
the Committee of Ministers.66   
A similar evolution of the Court’s case-law can be traced as regards general measures as well; 
in this area, the development of so-called pilot judgments has added a layer of complexity. The 
practice of pilot judgments was initiated by the ECtHR at the instigation of the Committee of 
Ministers which, by means of Resolution (2004) 3, invited the Court “to identify … what it considers 
to be an underlying systemic problem and the source of this problem … so as to assist States in finding 
the appropriate solution and the Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of judgments”.67 
In essence, faced with a case arising from a structural deficiency of the national system, the Court 
may issue a judgment by means of which it not only declares a violation of the Convention, but also 
pinpoints the underlying deficiency and, according to a now well-established practice, indicates the 
measures whose enactment could help solve the problem.68  
Since the adoption of the first pilot-judgment in Broniowski v. Poland in June 2004, the Court 
has consolidated its practice69 and adopted a new detailed rule of procedure on the matter, Rule 61, 
                                                        
66 Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the re-
examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgements of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 694th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 19 January 2000. 
67 Committee of Ministers, Resolution Res(2004)3 on judgments revealing an underlying systemic problem, 114th session, 
12 May 2004. In fact, the pilot-judgment procedure had been proposed initially by the Court itself within the debate on 
the drafting of Protocol no. 14: Steering Committee for Human Rights, Position paper of the European Court of Human 
Rights on proposals for reform of the European Convention on Human Rights and other measures as set out in the report 
of the Steering Committee for Human Rights of 4 April 2003 (CDDH(2003)006 final), 26 September 2003, CDDH-
GDR(2003)024, paras. 43-46. While the proposal was not included in the Protocol, the Committee of Ministers adopted 
the above-mentioned resolution and thus legitimised the practice of pilot judgments; on the point, cf. Markus Fyrnys, 
“Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human 
Rights”, German Law Journal 12, no. 5 (2011): 1239 et seqq. in particular. On the origins of the procedure, cf. also Philip 
Leach et al., Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations: An Analysis of Pilot Judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights and Their Impact at National Level (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010), 9-13.  
68 The first pilot judgment issued, in ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, is already illustrative in 
this respect: “with a view to assisting the respondent State in fulfilling its obligations under Article 46, the Court has 
sought to indicate the type of measure that might be taken by the Polish State in order to put an end to the systemic 
situation identified in the present case” (para. 194). 
69 For an analysis of the practice developed by the Court as regards pilot judgments, cf. among others: Leach et al., supra 
n 67; Antoine Buyse, “The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: Possibilities and 
Challenges”, Nomiko Vima 57, no. 8 (2009): 78-90; Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, “La Cour européenne au secours du 
Comité des ministres pour une meilleure exécution des arrêts pilotes”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 61 
(2005): 203-224; Fyrnys, supra n 67; Erik Fribergh, “Pilot judgments from the Court’s perspective”, in Towards stronger 
implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights at national level: Colloquy organised under the Swedish 
chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Stockholm, 9-10 June 2008. Proceedings, ed. 
CoE/Directorate General of Human Rights (Strasbourg: CoE, 2008), 86-93; Luzius Wildhaber, “Pilot Judgments in Cases 
of Structural or Systemic Problems on the National Level”, in The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by 
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in order to provide pilot judgments with a more solid legal basis. This new provision first of all 
clarifies that “the Court shall in its pilot judgment identify … the type of remedial measures which 
the Contracting Party concerned is required to take at the domestic level by virtue of the operative 
provisions of the judgment” (emphases added), and that “the Court may direct in the operative 
provisions of the pilot judgment that the remedial measures … be adopted within a specified time”. 
Moreover, Rule 61 sets out a peculiar – although optional – characteristic of the pilot-judgment 
procedure: the so-called freezing of similar applications. This means that the Court may stay its 
examination of applications arising from the same structural shortcoming, pending the adoption by 
the respondent State of the measures indicated in the pilot judgment, with a view to “returning” cases 
to the national level once appropriate remedial measures have been put in place by the State.70 Ideally, 
this mechanism should contribute to reducing the workload of the Court, which is flooded with 
repetitive cases. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the pilot-judgment procedure is now on firm ground, its use has 
been criticised from various viewpoints. The two main reservations concern, on the one hand, the 
restriction of States’ discretion in the choice of means and the partial overlapping of competences 
between the Committee of Ministers and the Court, in the sense that the latter would enter the realm 
of the supervision of execution;71 on the other, the long delays that similarly situated applicants might 
face in the event of freezing of comparable applications.72 At any rate, the legal basis of the procedure 
                                                        
Applications: The Problems and Possible Solutions, eds. Rudiger Wolfrum and Ulrike Deutsch (Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer-Verlag, 2009), 69-75; and Laurent Sermet, “L’obscure clarté de la notion pretorienne d’arrêt pilote”, Revue 
générale de droit international public 111, no. 4 (2007): 863-878.   
70 For instance, in Broniowski v. Poland, supra n 68, it was decided that “pending the implementation of the relevant 
general measures, which should be adopted within a reasonable time, the Court will adjourn its consideration of 
applications deriving from the same general cause” (para. 198).  
71 Concerns in relation to the alleged encroachment of the Court on the prerogatives of the Committee of Ministers were 
voiced by Judge Zagrebelsky in his partly dissenting opinion in ECtHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, 
19 June 2006: “I consider that judgments such as the present one undermine the relationship between the two pillars of 
the Convention system – the Court and the Committee of Ministers – and entrust the Court with duties outside its own 
sphere of competence”. Cf. also, on the delicate balance between the Court’s and the Committee’s competences, as well 
as between the Court’s powers and States’ margin of appreciation, Fyrnys, supra n 67, 1247-1251. 
72 Cf. Lambert Abdelgawad, “L’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (2009)”, supra n 38, 
806-807. Additionally, the Parliamentary Assembly noted “with some concern that this procedure has been conducted in 
respect of certain complex systemic problems on the basis of a single case which may not reveal the different aspects of 
the systemic problem involved” (Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1516 (2006). Implementation of judgments of the 
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is now solid, and it does not seem that either the Court or States Parties are planning to curtail or 
modify the current practice,73 even though the need is felt to overcome the persistent subjectivity in 
the selection of cases to which the pilot-judgment procedure is applied.74      
At times the Court issues judgments that, in a way or another, do not present all characteristics 
of pilot judgments (for instance, they do not indicate the measures to be taken by the State in the 
operative part of the judgment or do not adjourn similar cases) but share with pilot judgments essential 
features such as the identification of a systemic problem and the recommendation to take general 
measures to remedy the violation (without specifying them). These judgments are known as semi- or 
quasi-pilot judgments.75 In addition and conversely, the Court has increasingly recommended the 
adoption of general measures regardless of the existence of structural deficiencies,76 with varying 
degrees of specificity in the indication of the measures.77  
                                                        
European Court of Human Rights, 24th sitting, 2 October 2006, para. 21). For an overview of the various concerns raised 
with respect to pilot judgments, see Leach et al., supra n 67, 28-31, and Buyse, supra n 69, 86-89.  
73 By means of the Interlaken Declaration, the Court was encouraged to “pursue its policy of identifying priorities for 
dealing with cases and continue to identify in its judgments any structural problem capable of generating a significant 
number of repetitive applications” (High-level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Interlaken Declaration, 19 February 2010, para. 10.b of the Action Plan). More recently, the Declarations concluding the 
High-level conferences of Brighton (2012) and Brussels (2015) respectively “welcome[d] the continued use by the Court 
of proactive measures, particularly pilot judgments” (Brighton Declaration, supra n 13, para. 20.c), and “support[ed] 
further exploration and use of efficient case-management practices by the Court in particular its prioritisation categories 
for the examination of cases … and its pilot-judgment procedure” (Brussels Declaration, supra n 14, para. A.2.a).   
74 Leach et al., supra n 67, 34-39. 
75 These qualifications are used by several scholars, even though there is no unanimous agreement on what exactly 
constitutes a pilot judgment and, consequently, a quasi-pilot judgment. The Rules of the Court have at least partially 
clarified the issue, but judgments remain rather varied and often display only some of the features typically associated 
with pilot judgments. Leach et al., supra n 67, 13-28, distinguishes between pilot judgments, quasi-pilot judgments, and 
other judgments addressing systemic issues. Wildhaber, supra n 69, identifies, on the basis of the Broniowski judgment, 
eight constitutive elements of pilot judgments, while admitting that the subsequent practice gave rise to “several variants”; 
Fribergh, supra n 69, 90-92, also refers to “variations of the original [pilot judgment procedure] template”. Buyse, supra 
n 69, 84, conceives “the range of pilot-like judgments as a continuum”. Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, “The Involvement 
of the European Court of Human Rights in the Implementation of its Judgments: Recent Development under Article 46 
ECHR”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 32, no. 3 (2014): 240, concludes that “the clearest difference between 
pilot and quasi-pilot judgments seems to be of a procedural rather than of a substantive nature, namely that parties are 
invited to comment upon the application of the pilot judgment procedure according to Rule 61 para. 2 of the Rules of 
Court”. 
76 Sicilianos, supra n 75, 241, speaks of “ordinary judgments”. 
77 Ibid., 244: with regard to both individual and general measures, the author identifies a “continuum”, “a broad spectrum 
of indications ranging from pure recommendations … to real injunctions”. Numerous examples of this variety of 
indications from the Court can be found in this article, as well as in the annual reviews of the execution of ECtHR 
judgments compiled by Lambert Abdelgawad (supra nn 37, 38 and 49). See also, for a collection of Court’s judgments 
prescribing individual or general measures between January 2013 and December 2014: Open Society Justice Initiative, 
Case Digest – Recent Remedies Decisions from the European Court of Human Rights (New York: Open Society 
Foundations, June 2015), accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/case-
digests-echr-remedies-2013-2014-20150708.pdf. 
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At this point, it should be highlighted that all these kinds of judgments – from judgments simply 
suggesting the measures to be adopted to complex pilot-judgments recommending legislative changes 
and judgments prescribing specific individual measures – currently coexist, and that in most cases 
the Court still avoids to spell out precisely the actions to be undertaken, even though it not 
infrequently reminds States of their obligation to adopt all necessary individual and general measures 
under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers.78 At any rate, there is a clear trend towards more 
detailed indications from the Court as far as implementation measures are concerned; in other words, 
towards a “judicialisation” of the execution process.79 While initially contested by some States 
Parties,80 the legitimacy of this practice of the Court is not seriously put into question any more, even 
though few recalcitrant States from time to time raise specific objections.81  
According to the Court’s Priority Policy, “applications raising questions capable of having an 
impact on the effectiveness of the Convention system”, including those to be decided by way of the 
                                                        
78 ECtHR, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, 13 July 2000, para. 249: “a judgment in which the 
Court finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded 
by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, 
if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order”. 
79 Helen Keller and Cedric Marti, “Reconceptualizing Implementation: The Judicialization of the Execution of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments”, European Journal of International Law 26, no. 4 (2015): 829–850. The 
authors show how the phenomenon of “judicialisation” is wide-ranging and is not limited to the judgment phase (through 
the issuing of pilot judgments or the indication of general and individual measures), but it also extends to the pre-judgment 
phase (through the adoption of interim measures by the Court) as well as to the post-judgment one. Cf. also Flauss, supra 
n 11, 58 et seqq. 
80 In the Sejdovic case, supra n 65, the Italian Government “stated that they were not opposed in principle to the Court's 
giving fairly detailed indications of the general measures to be taken. However, the new practice pursued by the Court 
ran the risk of nullifying the principle that States were free to choose the means of executing judgments. It also ran counter 
to the spirit of the Convention and lacked a clear legal basis” (para. 115). The Government also contended that the 
Committee of Ministers was the only body competent to assess the general measures adopted or envisaged by States and 
that such a division of labour between the Committee and the Court was confirmed by new Article 46 as amended by 
Protocol no. 14 (paras. 116-117). The Government concluded that “in any event, if the practice of indicating general 
measures were to be continued, it should at least become institutionalised in the Rules of Court or in the questions which 
the Court put to the parties, so that the parties could submit observations on whether a violation was ‘systemic’” (para. 
118). As shown, the latter requests have subsequently been met by the Court.   
81 The Ukrainian Government, for instance, opposed the application of the pilot-judgment procedure in ECtHR, Yuriy 
Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, by arguing that “the measures aimed at resolving the 
problems of prolonged non-enforcement had already been determined by the Committee of Ministers in its Interim 
Resolution” and that “the application of such a procedure in the present case would amount to the performance of a 
supervisory function by the Court” (para. 77). The Court rejected this interpretation.  
Sicilianos, supra n 75, 249 et seqq., argues that the legal bases for the increasing involvement of the Court in the execution 
of its judgments are now clear and solid and include: Article 46 ECHR, as interpreted in light of Article 1; Articles 19 
and 32 ECHR; various resolutions and recommendations by the Committee of Ministers, starting from Res(2004)3 on 
judgments revealing an underlying systemic problem; and the practice of the Court, largely uncontested by States.   
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pilot-judgment procedure or anyway highlighting structural problems, are dealt with by the Court as 
a matter of priority.82 
Incidentally, it should be noted that the adoption of pilot judgments is not only relevant to the 
role of the Court in the supervision of the execution of its judgments, but it can also be read in the 
context of the debate, increasingly popular since the entry into force of Protocol no. 11, over the 
“individual justice-constitutional justice” dichotomy – a debate which is not confined to the academic 
arena but has directly involved CoE stakeholders as well.83 
It has been claimed by some authoritative voices that the ECtHR is at a crossroads: given the 
practical impossibility for the Court to deal with all cases submitted to it, either it confines itself to 
deciding upon “constitutional cases” or it will perish.84 By allowing the Court to focus on “decisions 
of ‘principle’, decisions which create jurisprudence”,85 it is argued, the efficiency of the system would 
considerably improve and a higher number of people would eventually be reached and benefit from 
Strasbourg’s judgments.  
Along these lines, specific proposals for reform have been made, such as the establishment of 
a Supreme European Court of Human Rights above the current Court,86 the attribution of 
                                                        
82 These applications are included in category II, together with “applications raising an important question of general 
interest (in particular a serious question capable of having major implications for domestic legal systems or for the 
European system)”: cf. ECtHR, The Court’s Priority Policy, June 2009 as amended with effect from 22 May 2017, 
accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Priority_policy_ENG.pdf. 
83 Cf., among others, Wildhaber (former President of the ECtHR), supra n 16, 161-165; and Robert Harmsen, “The 
European Court of Human Rights as a ‘Constitutional Court’: Definitional Debates and the Dynamics of Reform” in 
Judges, Transition, and Human Rights, eds. John Morison, Kieran McEvoy, and Gordon Anthony (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 33-53.  
Some have proposed to overcome this dichotomy, often by referring to the concept of “pluralism”: Nico Krisch, “The 
Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law”, The Modern Law Review 71, no. 2 (March 2008): 183-216; 
Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, “Constitutional v International? When Unified Reformatory Rationales Mismatch the 
Plural Paths of Legitimacy of ECHR Law”, in The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics, eds. 
Jonas Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144-163; and, in the same 
volume, Jonas Christoffersen, “Individual and Constitutional Justice: Can the Power Balance of Adjudication Be 
Reversed?”, 181-203. More recently, Steven Greer and Luzius Wildhaber put forward a fourth model of “constitutional 
pluralism” in “Revisiting the debate about ‘constitutionalizing’ the European Court of Human Rights”, Human Rights 
Law Review 12, no. 4 (2012): 655-687. 
84 Greer and Wildhaber, supra n 83, 4. 
85 Luzius Wildhaber, “The Role of the European Court of Human Rights: An Evaluation”, Mediterranean Journal of 
Human Rights 8, no. 1 (2004): 9-31. 
86 Paul Mahoney (former ECtHR Registrar and Judge) and Jonathan Sharpe (former member of the ECtHR Registry), 
“The Legacy of Carlo Russo: Creation of a Supreme European Court of Human Rights”, in I diritti umani di fronte al 
giudice internazionale – Atti della giornata di studio in memoria di Carlo Russo, eds. Tullio Scovazzi, Irini 
Papanicolopulu, and Sabrina Urbinati (Milano: Giuffrè, 2009). 
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unmeritorious applications to “subordinate judges” (i.e., rapporteurs from the Registry),87 the 
establishment of a European Fair Trial Commission,88 or the discretion of the Court in selecting those 
cases to be adjudicated on the merits.89 
However, none of these proposals have been embraced by States Parties, which have reiterated, 
on all occasions, “their strong attachment to the right of individual application to the European Court 
of Human Rights … as a cornerstone of the system for protecting the rights and freedoms set forth in 
the Convention”, at least in principle.90 Nor have other stakeholders proved to be more receptive: 
NGOs and NHRIs have repeatedly proclaimed the need to preserve the right to individual 
application,91 and the Court has never backed radical proposals such as that giving it the discretionary 
power to choose the cases to rule upon.92 Thus, a “constitutionalisation” of the Court’s role, beyond 
the adoption of pilot judgments and the above-mentioned prioritisation of cases highlighting systemic 
deficiencies, does not appear likely. 
                                                        
87 Paul Mahoney et al., Case-Overload at the European Court of Human Rights (Vienna: European Law Institute, 2012), 
26-28. In Helen Keller, Andreas Fischer, and Daniela Kühn, “Debating the Future of the European Court of Human Rights 
after the Interlaken Conference: Two Innovative Proposals”, European Journal of International Law 21, no. 4 (2011): 
1035-1037, other proposals for an additional judicial or non-judicial filtering mechanism are examined which have been 
put forward by CoE organs and States after the adoption of Protocol no.14; none of them was followed up. 
88 Based on the model of the Venice Commission or of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture: Steven 
Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 282-289. 
89 Mahoney et al., supra n 87, 32-35. 
90 High-level Conference, Copenhagen Declaration, 13 April 2018, para. 1. Paragraphs have been dedicated to the “right 
of individual petition” in the Declarations concluding all previous High-level Conferences.  
91 For the position of NGOs, cf. among others: AIRE Centre et al., Joint Response to Proposals to Ensure the Future 
Effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights, 28 March 2003, paras. 2 and 3, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/108000/ior610082003en.pdf; Amnesty International et al., Human 
rights in Europe: Decision time on the European Court of Human Rights (Joint NGO appeal), 11 December 2009, 2, 
accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR61/009/2009/en; and, more recently, AIRE Centre 
et al., Joint NGO Response to the Draft Copenhagen Declaration, 13 February 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.amnesty.eu/news/joint-ngo-response-to-the-draft-copenhagen-declaration/.  
For the position of NHRIs, cf. the latest Submission of the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions on 
draft Declaration of Copenhagen, 1 March 2018, 1, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://ennhri.org/IMG/pdf/ennhri_submission_on_draft_copenhagen_declaration.pdf; cf. also the position expressed by 
the then European Coordinating Group of NHRIs on the occasion of the drafting of Protocol no. 14, mentioned in Philip 
Leach, “Access to the European Court of Human Rights – From a Legal Entitlement to a Lottery?”, Human Rights Law 
Journal 27 (2006): 21. 
92 The divisions of the Court on the point and the strong opposition by some of the judges to further restrictions on the 
right of individual application are reported in Leach, supra n 91, 21-22. Various academics too objected to the limitations 
on the right of individual application that have been proposed or implemented: e.g., Leach, supra n 91, 11-25; Nikos 
Vogiatzis, “The Admissibility Criterion under Article 35(3)(B) ECHR: A ‘Significant Disadvantage’ to Human Rights 
Protection?”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2016): 185-211; and Lambert Abdelgawad, 
“L’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (2009)”, supra n 38, 806-807, which holds that the 
inappropriate use of the pilot-judgment procedure risks undermining the right to individual application.  
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The role of the Court in the execution of its judgments has been further strengthened by Protocol 
no. 14, which introduced the so-called interpretation proceedings and infringement proceedings. 
According to new paragraph 3 of Article 46 ECHR, if a problem of interpretation of a final ECtHR 
judgment arises during the supervision of its execution, the Committee of Ministers can ask the Court 
to resolve the interpretive issue. As clarified by the Explanatory Report to Protocol no. 14, the aim of 
this new provision is “to enable the Court to give an interpretation of a judgment, not to pronounce 
on the measures taken by a High Contracting Party to comply with that judgment”.93 
New paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 46, for their part, regulate the so-called infringement 
proceedings, which are initiated by the Committee of Ministers in the event of refusal by a State Party 
to comply with a final judgment of the Court. After formal notice to the respondent State, the case is 
submitted to the Grand Chamber, which rules on whether the State concerned has failed to abide by 
its obligations under Article 46(1) ECHR.  
During the drafting of Protocol no. 14, the possibility was discussed to impose fines on those 
States recognised as non-compliant; the Parliamentary Assembly had put forward since 2000 a system 
of astreintes, defined as “daily fines for a delay in performance of a legal obligation”,94 while the 
Steering Committee of Human Rights proposed to allow the Court, invested with infringement 
proceedings, to impose a “financial penalty (in the form of a lump sum) payable to the Council of 
Europe”.95 Ultimately, all proposals to introduce the payment of fines were rejected, in the belief that 
                                                        
93 CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14, supra n 46, para. 97. 
94 Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1226 (2000) – Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 
30th sitting, 28 September 2000, para. 11.1.2; and Recommendation 1477 (2000) – Execution of judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 30th sitting, 28 September 2000, para. 2. 
95 The proposal was included in Committee of Ministers/Steering Committee for Human Rights, Guaranteeing the long-
term effectiveness of the control system of the European Convention on Human Rights. Addendum to the final report 
containing CDDH proposals (long version), 14 April 2003, CM(2003)55-Add 2, Proposal C. 4. This formulation was 
subsequently embraced by the Parliamentary Assembly in its Opinion 251 (2004) – Draft Protocol No 14 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the 
Convention, 13th sitting, 28 April 2004, para. 14.9. However, the Steering Committee had already abandoned the idea and 
declared itself “in favour of eliminating the financial penalty clause”, considering infringement proceedings and the 
finding of the Court against the respondent State sufficiently persuasive (Steering Committee for Human Rights, 
Guaranteeing the long-term effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights – Implementation of the Declaration 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its 112th Session (14-15 May 2003): Interim Activity Report, 26 November 
2003, CDDH(2003)026 Addendum I Final, para. 44).  
Admittedly, the Steering Committee for Human Rights has been rather erratic on the point: in 2001, requested to give its 
opinion on the system of astreintes put forward by the Assembly, it concluded that it was “not convinced that the 
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“the political pressure exerted by proceedings for noncompliance in the Grand Chamber and by the 
latter’s judgment should suffice to secure execution of the Court initial judgment by the state 
concerned”.96   
Such an assumption has been tested to date only once, when infringement proceedings were 
initiated by the Committee of Ministers against Azerbaijan for its failure to implement the ECtHR 
judgment in the Ilgar Mammadov case. An interim resolution was adopted by the Committee on 25 
October 2017, by means of which the Azerbaijani Government was given until 29 November to 
execute the judgment (in particular, by releasing the applicant), failing which a further interim 
resolution would be adopted to refer the case back to the Court.97 On 5 December 2017 such a 
resolution was adopted and Article 46(4) applied for the first time, the Committee of Ministers being 
unsatisfied with the explanations provided by the Azerbaijani Government.98 The adoption of the 
latter resolution appears to have had the desired effect, as the Azerbaijani Government communicated 
                                                        
introduction of a system of monetary fines would bring about any important improvement” (Opinion of the CDDH 
concerning Recommendation 1477 (2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly, supra n 1, para. 9); more recently, its 
Committee of Experts on the Reform of the Court (DH-GDR) invoked, in a draft contribution to the Brighton Conference, 
“greater application of pressure, including in the form of sanctions, on States that do not execute judgments”, but then 
deleted any reference to sanctions at the request of Turkey (Steering Committee of Human Rights/Committee of Experts 
on the Reform of the Court, Report – 1st meeting, 17-20 January 2012, 27 January 2012, DH-GDR(2012)R1, Appendix 
VI, para. 13). 
96 CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14, supra n 46, para. 99. In the following paragraph, it is also stated that “the 
procedure’s mere existence, and the threat of using it, should act as an effective new incentive to execute the Court’s 
judgments”. Other bolder suggestions, such as the imposition of punitive damages by the Court, do not appear to have 
even been considered: cf. Yonko Grozev, “How Human Rights Protection Has Evolved. A Critical Analysis of Ten Years 
of Case-Law”, in ECtHR, Ten Years of the “New” European Court of Human Rights 1998-2008: Situation and Outlook. 
Proceedings of the Seminar, 13 October 2008, Strasbourg (Strasbourg: ECtHR, 2009), 38.  
Infringement proceedings as regulated by Protocol no. 14 thus differ considerably from their EU equivalent: Article 260 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates that “if the Court [of Justice of the European Union] 
finds that the Member State concerned has not complied with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment 
on it”. For a comparison between the infringement proceedings as introduced by Protocol no. 14 to the ECHR and those 
established within the EU context, cf. Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, “L'exécution des décisions des juridictions 
européennes (Cour de justice des Communautés européennes et Cour européenne des droits de l'homme)”, Annuaire 
français de droit international 52, no. 1 (2006): 677-724. 
97 Committee of Ministers, “Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2017)379. Execution of the judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights: Ilgar Mammadov against Azerbaijan”, Resolutions, 1298th meeting, 25 October 2017, 
CM/ResDH(2017)379. 
98 Committee of Ministers, “Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2017)429. Execution of the judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights: Ilgar Mammadov against Azerbaijan”, Resolutions, 1302nd meeting, 5 December 2017, 
CM/ResDH(2017)429. 
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that the applicant had been finally released, even though conditionally, in August 2018, following 
further proceedings before domestic courts.99 
However, the fact that infringements proceedings were employed only once and interpretation 
proceedings never used several years after the entry into force of Protocol no. 14, even though major 
cases of persistent non-compliance certainly took place, raises questions about their usefulness.100 
Thus, a call to “de-dramatise” these sets of proceedings has been made, with a view to rendering 
recourse to them less exceptional.101  
It should be added that the use of these new tools might also help alleviate the issue of fresh 
complaints submitted by successful applicants alleging that the respondent State failed to execute the 
judgments in their favour.102 On these occasions, the Court usually rejects the applications as 
inadmissible, declaring its incompetence ratione materiae; however, it has accepted to examine 
applications raising “a new issue”, even though what constitutes “a new issue” is not always clearly 
discernible.103 It also seems that the circumstance that the case is still under examination by the 
                                                        
99 Secretariat General/Committee of Ministers, 1324 meeting (September 2018) (DH), Case of Ilgar Mammadov v. 
Azerbaijan (Application No. 15172/13), 5 September 2018, DH-DD(2018)816. 
100 Even considering that the Committee of Ministers only is competent to trigger the two sets of proceedings by a two-
thirds majority and that the Explanatory Report expressly refers to the “sparing” use of the interpretation proceedings and 
to the “exceptional” use of the infringement proceedings (cf. paras. 96 and 100). For an analysis of the reasons preventing 
a wider use of the two instruments, cf. Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, “L’exècution des jugements: les requêtes en 
manquement et en interprétation”, in La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme après le protocole 14, ed. Samantha 
Besson (Zürich: Schulthess, 2011), 93-113 
101 Lambert Abdelgawad, “L’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (2010)”, supra n 38, 949: 
“Assurément, le recourse en manquement d’Etat au niveau du Conseil de l’Europe mériterait d’être dédramatisé à la 
lumière de ce qui s’est fait au niveau de l’Union européenne”. Cf. also Pinto de Albuquerque, supra n 10, 226; and 
Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 2079 (2015). Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 33rd sitting, 30 September 2015, para. 1.1, whereby the Assembly called on the Committee to make use of the new 
tools introduced by Protocol no. 14 in case of persistent failure of the respondent States to execute the judgments.  
102 Cf. Ryssdal, supra n 1, 56-60; and Sibrand Karel Martens, “Commentary”, in Bulterman and Kuijer, supra n 1, 71-79. 
103 In ECtHR, Verein Gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VGT) v Switzerland (No. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, the 
Court stated: “it cannot be said that the powers assigned to the Committee of Ministers by Article 46 are being encroached 
on where the Court has to deal with relevant new information in the context of a fresh application” (para. 67). In that 
specific case, the Committee had closed its supervision of the case without examining a judgment by the Swiss Federal 
Court that refused to reopen the relevant domestic proceedings. According to the Court, “the refusal in issue constitutes 
a new fact. If the Court were unable to examine it, it would escape all scrutiny under the Convention” (ibid.). For a critical 
appraisal of the VGT 2 case, cf. Maya Hertig Randall and Xavier-Baptiste Ruedin, “‘Judicial activism’ et exécution des 
arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 82 (2010): 421-443. 
However, in ECtHR, Lyons and others v. the UK (dec.), no. 15227/03, 8 July 2003, the Court did not accept the applicants’ 
argument that the refusal by the domestic court to quash their convictions or to order a retrial constituted “new facts” and 
thus a new violation of Article 6: “it must be observed that the reference proceedings did not give rise to a determination 
of a new ‘criminal charge’ against the applicants. In so far as it can be said that Article 6 is applicable to those proceedings, 
the point of departure must be the applicants’ original trial and convictions … On that account, the Court does not accept 
the applicants’ argument that the reference proceedings gave rise to a new breach of Article 6 of the Convention”. 
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Committee of Ministers does not prevent the Court from deciding on the new application.104 The 
approach of the Court in these instances is far from straightforward, and the use of interpretation and 
– especially – infringement proceedings should contribute to clarify the “division of labour” between 
the Court and the Committee, even though doubts have been raised on the suitability of the new 
instruments.105  
At any rate, new Article 46 does not solve all uncertainties determined by the increasing powers 
of the Court in the execution phase. The Committee of Ministers and the Court have hitherto 
developed a cooperative relationship and no conflict regarding the allocation of responsibilities has 
arisen.106 Nonetheless, a clarification of the respective competences – for instance, by developing 
objective criteria to identify cases where the Court should specify the measures to be adopted by the 
respondent State or apply the pilot-judgment procedure – would be opportune.107  
 
                                                        
Cf. also ECtHR, Emre v. Switerzland (No. 2), no. 5056/10, 11 October 2011, where the Court considered the decision by 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal to reduce the duration of the ban imposed on the applicant as a “new fact” to be examined. In 
that case, as underlined by Keller and Marti, supra n 79, 847, for the first time the Court also found a violation of Article 
46 and not only of the substantive right concerned (whereas in Lyons and others v. UK, the fact that the complaint was 
qualified by the Court as falling under Art. 46 resulted in its inadmissibility). However, the Emre 2 ruling is, to date, an 
isolated case, as the Court usually examines complaints raising “new issues” under the substantive rights whose violation 
is alleged.  
104 While the circumstance appeared to be relevant in the Emre 2 case, supra n 103 (para. 42: “en l’espèce le Comité des 
Ministres n’a pas encore entamé sa procédure de surveillance de l’exécution de l’arrêt de la Cour du 22 mai 2008 par 
l’adoption de mesures concrètes: aucune résolution, même intermédiaire, n’a été adoptée dans cette affaire”), in ECtHR, 
Liu v. Russia (No. 2), no. 29157/09, 26 July 2011, the Court maintained that “it is not prevented from examining the 
applicants’ complaints concerning the new developments which occurred after the Court’s judgment … while that 
judgment is still pending before the Committee of Ministers under Article 46” (para. 65; in this respect the Court made 
reference to the previous Mehemi v. France (no. 2), no. 53470/99, 10 April 2003). The Court added that “the domestic 
re-examination of the case gave rise to new issues under the Convention which, in the absence of any assessment by the 
Court, may not be resolved in the context of the Committee of Ministers’ current supervision. In particular, a new question 
arises as to whether the extended procedural guarantees afforded to the applicants during the fresh examination were 
adequate and sufficient” (para. 67).  
In general, on the issue of the competence of the Court to examine this kind of complaints, cf. Ryssdal, supra n 1, 56-60; 
Martens, supra n 102, 71-79, according to which applicants should be able to raise these complaints under former Article 
53 (current Article 46(1)) in light of the right to individual application; and Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 49, 878-880. 
105 In 2001, the Evaluation Group concluded that the proposal by the Parliamentary Assembly regarding interpretation 
proceedings was liable to “result in a blurring of the respective responsibilities of the Court and the Committee of 
Ministers as assigned by the Convention and draw the Court into an arena outside its purview” (CoE/Evaluation Group, 
supra n 12, para. 49). In the literature, cf. Marmo, supra n 12, 250, which highlights the additional pressure put on an 
already overstretched system and also points to the ambiguity of the term “refusal” referred to in Article 46(4).   
106 Vincenzo Starace, “Modifications Provided by Protocol No. 14 Concerning Proceedings before the European Court 
of Human Rights”, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 5 (2006): 191. 
107 A somewhat different but connected concern is expressed by Flauss, supra n 11, 69-71, according to which the problem 
lies not much in the overlapping of competences between the Committee of Ministers and the Court, but in their divergent 
approaches to certain matters (e.g., the qualification of a case as revealing an “underlying systemic problem”, or the 
reopening of national proceedings). 
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2.4. The role of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Department for the Execution of Judgments  
In addition to the Committee of Ministers and the Court, a number of other CoE bodies are 
increasingly engaged in the supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments. This section identifies 
the following ones as key actors: the Parliamentary Assembly, the Commissioner for Human Rights, 
and the Department for the Execution of Judgments. Their activities in this area arewill thus analysed 
in greater detail.  
It has been suggested that the CoE Secretary General might also play a role under Article 52 
(former Article 57) of the Convention, according to which the Secretary General can ask any State 
Party to “furnish an explanation of the manner in which its internal law ensures the effective 
implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention”. Until now, the Secretary General has 
made use of this provision only to request reports from all States collectively on the implementation 
of some Convention’s rights;108 in 2015, exceptionally, he sought explanations from Azerbaijan 
only.109 At any rate, the Secretary General has never followed up the execution of specific judgments 
on this basis. Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out that s/he might do so in the future, also in light of 
the 2015 Brussels Declaration, which encouraged this kind of intervention.110    
 
The Parliamentary Assembly was created by the CoE Statute as the deliberative body of the 
organisation.111 It is currently composed of three hundred and twenty-four members, drawn from the 
                                                        
108 Cf. Ryssdal, supra n 1, 65-66; and Jeroen Schokkenbroek, “The Supervisory Function of the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe”, in Van Dijk et al., supra n 40, 323-332. 
109 CoE Secretary General, “Azerbaijan human rights inquiry: Secretary General launches inquiry into respect for human 
rights in Azerbaijan”, Press release, 16 December 2015, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.coe.int/en/web/secretary-
general/news.  
110 Brussels Declaration, supra n 14, para. C.3.d, whereby the Conference encourages “the Secretary General to continue, 
on a case-by-case basis, to use his/her authority in order to facilitate the execution of judgments raising complex and/or 
sensitive issues at the national level, including through the exercise of the powers entrusted to him/her under Article 52 
of the Convention”. 
111 CoE, Statute, supra n 20, Article 22. The original name of the body was “Consultative Assembly”; as reported in 
footnote 1 to Article 10 of the Statute, since February 1994 the Committee of Ministers has used the denomination 
“Parliamentary Assembly” in all official documents.  
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representatives of States Parties’ parliaments.112 While broadly mandated to “discuss and make 
recommendations [to the Committee of Ministers] upon any matter within the aim and scope of the 
Council of Europe”,113 the only task explicitly conferred on the Assembly by the ECHR consists in 
the election of the ECtHR judges (Article 22).  
Nonetheless, the Assembly has shown an increasing willingness to be involved in the 
supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments, and its role in this area is by now well-established. 
While a clear trend in this direction is usually traced back to the early 2000s, expressions of interest 
by the Assembly came even before.114 In 1993, the Assembly mandated its Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights “to report to it when problems arise on the situation of human rights in 
member States, including their compliance with judgments by the European Court of Human 
Rights”,115 whereas in 1997 it created an ad hoc Monitoring Committee entrusted with supervising 
compliance by Member States with the undertakings assumed under any CoE treaties, including the 
ECHR.116  
It was, however, only in 2000 that the Assembly resolved to play a more prominent role in 
monitoring the execution of ECtHR judgments. Preceded in 1998 by a Written Question to the 
Committee of Ministers that pointed to a number of problematic cases of non-compliance with 
judgments,117 a Report was released in July 2000 by the Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and 
                                                        
112 Ibid., Articles 25 and 26. 
113 Ibid., Articles 22 and 23.  
114 For an account of the evolution of the Assembly’s engagement with the supervision of the execution, cf. among others: 
Andrew Drzemczewski, “The Parliamentary Assembly’s involvement in the supervision of the judgments of the 
Strasbourg Court”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 28, no. 2 (2010): 164-178; Bates, supra n 12, 57-59; and 
Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 1, 59-63. Cf. also the annual reviews by Lambert Abdelgawad, supra nn 37, 38 and 49.  
115 Parliamentary Assembly, Order 485 (1993) – General policy of the Council of Europe, 25th sitting, 3 February 1993. 
116 By way of Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1115 (1997) – Setting up of an Assembly committee on the honouring 
of obligations and commitments by member states of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), 5th sitting, 29 
January 1997. As highlighted by the Resolution itself, a monitoring procedure already existed within the Assembly and 
was governed by Order 508 (1995). However, there did not exist a special committee specifically entrusted with this 
monitoring function, but “several general committees” (paras. 2 and 3 of the Resolution). For a thorough account of the 
historical evolution of the Assembly’s monitoring activities, cf. Jan Kleijssen, “The Monitoring Procedure of the Council 
of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly”, in Alfredsson et al., supra n 40, 523-528. 
117 Parliamentary Assembly, Execution of certain cases pending before the Committee of Ministers – Written Question 
No. 378 by Mrs Ragnarsdóttir, MM. Clerfayt, Hagård and Jurgens, 10 September 1998, Doc. 8186. More specifically, 
the Written Question made reference to seven “old cases” (that is, cases “pending before the Committee of Ministers for 
more than 3 years without any resolution having been issued explaining what measures have been taken or are envisaged”) 
and three “cases appearing to require special measures for the applicant” (that is, cases “in which mere payment of just 
satisfaction does not appear sufficient to repair fully the damage caused by the violation found”). 
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Human Rights regarding the execution of the Court’s judgments.118 The Report, expressing concern 
for the increasing number of cases of delayed or incomplete execution, analysed the causes of that 
state of affairs and put forward possible solutions addressed at all actors involved – from national 
authorities to the Committee of Ministers and the Court.  
Moreover, the Resolution adopted by the Assembly on the basis of that Report called for a 
stronger role of the Assembly itself in the area. It was envisaged that the Assembly should, inter alia, 
be kept informed on the execution of judgments and devote debates to the issue, address 
recommendations to the Committee of Ministers concerning the most worrisome cases of delayed 
execution or non-execution, encourage the active involvement of national parliamentary delegations 
in execution matters, call the relevant ministers from the respondent States to answer questions before 
the Assembly, open monitoring procedures in case of delayed execution or non-execution, and have 
recourse to increasingly severe sanctions in the event of persistent failure by a State to execute (e.g., 
by challenging the credentials of the recalcitrant State’s parliamentary delegation, or by inviting the 
Committee of Ministers to suspend the State from its rights of representation or, as a last resort, to 
expel it from the CoE).119 While the Report and the Resolution recognised that the supervisory task 
is primarily entrusted to the Committee of Ministers, they portrayed a system where the Court and 
the Parliamentary Assembly also play a significant role.120   
From that moment onwards, the Assembly has regularly contributed to overseeing the execution 
of the Court’s judgments in a variety of ways. Between 2000 and 2017, nine reports were drafted by 
the Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, usually followed by 
                                                        
118 Parliamentary Assembly – Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, supra n 1. 
119 Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1226 (2000), supra n 94.  
120 It is notable that one of the Report’s sections, supra n 1, is titled “Shared responsibility” (paras. 18 et seqq.).  
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resolutions and recommendations by the Assembly regarding the problems facing the execution of 
judgments.121 Among these reports, some focus on the situation of a specific country.122  
Moreover, since 2006, the Assembly has sought to strengthen its scrutiny by “giv[ing] priority 
to the examination of major structural problems”;123 in practice, it has done so through in situ visits 
conducted by its rapporteurs and through written requests for information to the Assembly’s national 
delegations.124 In January 2015, a new sub-committee specifically responsible for the execution of 
the Court’s judgments was established within the Committee on Legal Affairs.  
Other tools employed by the Assembly to intervene in the supervision process include written 
questions to the Committee of Ministers and oral questions to the Chair of the Ministers’ Deputies, 
as well as the inclusion of an agenda item regarding the execution of judgments in one of the 
Assembly’s four annual sessions.125 The Assembly has also actively contributed to the reform process 
of the ECHR system by submitting its views and proposals on the occasion of the drawing up of new 
ECHR Protocols.126  
It is noteworthy that the control exercised by the Parliamentary Assembly on the execution of 
judgments has been welcomed from the outset by both the Court and the Committee of Ministers,127 
                                                        
121 The importance of the role played by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights is underlined in 
Drzemczewski, supra n 114, 169 et seqq.; and in Andrew Drzemczewski, “Quelques observations sur le rôle de la 
Commission des questions juridiques et droits de l’homme de l’Assemblée parlementaire dans l’exécution des arrêts de 
la Cour de Strasbourg”, in Hartig, supra n 59, 55-63. Cf. also Flauss, supra n 11, 54-56. For the references of the last 
report, cf. supra n 6. 
122 Until now, these country-specific reports have concerned Turkey: cf. Parliamentary Assembly – Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights, Implementation of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights by Turkey – Report, 5 
September 2002, Doc. 9537; and Implementation of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights by Turkey, 1 June 
2004, Doc. 10192. 
123 Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1516 (2006), supra n 72, para. 5. At para. 4, it is stated that “the Assembly feels 
duty-bound to further its involvement in the need to resolve the most important problems of compliance with the Court’s 
judgments”. 
124 Ibid., paras. 5 and 6 in particular.  
125 Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 1, 59-60.  
126 Cf. the Explanatory Reports to Protocols nos. 14, 15 and 16. 
127 During an Assembly’s debate in 2000, the then President of the Court Judge Wildhaber stated inter alia: “My 
colleagues and I therefore welcome the initiative taken by the Parliamentary Assembly in [respect of the execution of 
judgments]. I believe that the Assembly has a role to play in encouraging states to comply with their obligations under 
the Convention, particularly as regards the execution of judgments” (cf. the verbatim records of the debate, taking place 
on 28 September 2000 at 10 a.m.). As to the Committee of Ministers, in its Reply to Parliamentary Assembly 
Recommendation 1477 (2000), supra n 12, it “welcome[d] the Assembly’s interest in the execution of Court judgments”. 
Subsequently, in its Declaration “Ensuring the effectiveness of the implementation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights at national and European levels”, 114th session, 12 May 2004, the Committee “pa[id] tribute to the 
significant contribution” of the Assembly to improve the execution process (preamble of the Declaration).  
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commended by various CoE experts and working groups128 and valued by the latest Brighton and 
Brussels Conferences on the reform of the Convention’s system.129 It can therefore be said that the 
Assembly has become a fully-fledged actor in the supervision of execution process; indeed, one of 
the most resolute ones, even though room to boost its impact exists.130 
 
Established in 1999 by means of a resolution by the Committee of Ministers,131 the 
Commissioner for Human Rights can be seen as a “facilitator” and “promoter” of respect for human 
rights in Member States. To this end, the Commissioner advances education in human rights, advises 
States Parties on and assists them in the implementation of human rights standards, cooperates with 
States’ human rights structures, and reports on the status of human rights and on persisting 
shortcomings in the protection of human rights.132  
                                                        
128 The Evaluation Group, supra n 12, noted the wide recognition of the “valuable role” of the Parliamentary Assembly 
in the area of the execution of judgments, welcomed its growing interest in the matter, and concluded that “the supervision 
process may be facilitated and accelerated as a result of contacts made or questions raised in national Parliaments by 
members of the Assembly and the resultant publicity” (para. 52).  
In 2003, the Steering Committee of Human Rights proposed, as a means to improve and accelerate the execution of 
ECtHR judgments, “to associate the Parliamentary Assembly more closely” with overseeing the execution of judgments 
revealing a systemic problem (Committee of Ministers/Steering Committee for Human Rights, Guaranteeing the long-
term effectiveness of the control system of the European Convention on Human Rights, supra n 95, proposal C.2). In a 
subsequent report, the Steering Committee emphasised the need to share information on the execution of judgments 
between all relevant actors, including the Assembly (Steering Committee for Human Rights, Reform of the European 
Convention on Human Rights – Declaration of the Committee of Ministers “Ensuring the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights at national and European levels: Activity Report, 7 April 
2006, CDDH(2006)008, para. 25). 
129 The Brighton Declaration, supra n 13, praised the “important work” by the Assembly in ensuring the well-functioning 
of the Convention’s system (para. 4) and “welcome[d] the Assembly’s constant attention to the execution issue through 
regular reports and debates” (para. 29.e). For its part, the Brussels Declaration, supra n 14, encouraged the Committee to 
“promote the development of enhanced synergies with the other Council of Europe stakeholders”, including the Assembly 
(para. C.1.c), and the Assembly “to continue to produce reports on the execution of judgments, to organise awareness-
raising activities for members of national parliaments on implementation of the Convention and to encourage national 
parliaments to follow in a regular and efficient manner the execution of judgments” (para. C.3.f).   
130 One of the most potentially far-reaching implications of the Assembly’s engagement consists in the consequent 
involvement of national parliaments, which could urge their respective governments to execute the Court’s judgments 
and swiftly adopt the necessary legislative amendments. The then President of the Parliamentary Assembly, Ms Anne 
Brasseur, declared in her opening address at the 2015 Brussels High-level Conference: “the double mandate of 
parliamentarians – as members of the Assembly and of our respective national parliaments – is of fundamental importance 
in ensuring that Convention standards are effectively protected and implemented domestically”. For more on the role of 
national parliaments, cf. Section 2.5 of this chapter infra.  
131 Committee of Ministers, Resolution (99)50 on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 104th session, 
7 May 1999. 
132 Ibid., Article 3. For an overview of the Commissioner’s mandate and activities, cf. Thomas Hammarberg and John 
Dalhuisen, “The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights”, in Alfredsson et al., supra n 40, 515-521. In the 
original proposals, the Commissioner was conceived as an ombudsman-type institution with complaint-handling 
functions complementing those of the ECtHR; for an analysis of the evolution of the body’s configuration, cf. Jeroen 
Schokkenbroek, “The Preventive Role of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe”, in The 
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Gradually, the Commissioner has assumed a significant role within the Convention’s system. 
While it was already possible under Protocol no. 11 that the President of the Court invited the 
Commissioner to intervene as a third party in pending cases, after the entry into force of Protocol no. 
14 the Commissioner is entitled to submit his or her views, without the need for a request to do so 
from the Court.133 Whereas only three interventions were submitted by the Commissioner upon 
invitation by the Court between the establishment of the Commissioner’s office and 1 June 2010, 
following the entry into force of Protocol no. 14 and up until December 2018, observations have been 
submitted in respect of twenty cases.134 On the contrary, the proposal to empower the Commissioner 
to file applications with the ECtHR in cases where a “serious issue of a general nature” is at stake 
was ultimately rejected.135 
As regards the post-judgment phase, the Commissioner is vested with limited formal powers 
but has shown an increasing interest to be involved in the supervisory task. His involvement is in any 
case consistent with the body’s mandate to assist States in the implementation of CoE human rights 
standards (including the ECHR as interpreted by the Court) and to help them remedy any non-
compliance with these standards. With this in view, former Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg 
affirmed the potential of the body’s engagement by highlighting its constant dialogue with national 
authorities, its awareness of the ECtHR case-law, its power to deliver concrete recommendations to 
governments (as opposed to “the sort of constitutional principles set out by the Court”), its ability to 
                                                        
Prevention of Human Rights Violations. Contribution on the occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Marangopoulos 
Foundation for Human Rights, eds. Linos-Alexander Sicilianos and Cristiane Bourloyannis Vrailas (Athens: Ant. N. 
Sakkoulas; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001), 201-213. 
133 Under Article 36(2) as introduced by Protocol 11, the President of the Court could “in the interest of the proper 
administration of justice, invite … any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written comments or take part 
in hearings”. The Commissioner could therefore submit his/her views only upon invitation of the Court, like any other 
“person concerned”. By means of Protocol no. 14, a new para. 3 has been added according to which “in all cases before 
a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights may submit written comments 
and take part in hearings”. As mentioned in the Explanatory Report to Protocol no. 14, supra n 46, the inclusion of this 
provision was backed by both the Commissioner and the Parliamentary Assembly (para. 86).   
134 Cf. the website of the Commissioner at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/third-party-interventions, accessed 
4 January 2019. 
135 Steering Committee for Human Rights, Guaranteeing the long-term effectiveness of the European Court of Human 
Rights, supra n 95, para. 22. 
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go beyond the petitum and the specific circumstances of the case, and – last but not least – its 
cooperation with NHRIs.136  
These characteristics make the action of the Commissioner potentially most significant in those 
instances where systemic deficiencies were highlighted by the ECtHR and cooperation with national 
authorities on wide-ranging reforms is thus needed.137 From another but related viewpoint, the 
Commissioner could guide the Court in identifying these structural shortcomings,138 or – 
preliminarily and proactively – pinpoint these shortcomings and aim to resolve them at the national 
level before they overwhelm the Court.139  
Institutionally, the 2006 Rules of the Committee of Ministers provided for the adoption by the 
Committee of an annual report regarding its supervisory activities, “which shall be made public and 
transmitted to the Court and to the Secretary General, the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Commissioner for Human Rights” (Rule 5). Additionally, the same report by the Steering Committee 
for Human Rights that proposed the adoption of the new Rules also included – among some other 
“practical suggestions” – the set up of a “yearly tripartite meeting” including the Chairman of the 
Committee of Ministers, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights, and the Commissioner, to be held following the publication of the annual 
report.140 The suggestion was accepted by the Committee of Ministers through a declaration; 
however, there is no evidence of these meetings actually taking place.141 
                                                        
136 Thomas Hammarberg, “The Commissioner’s role”, in CoE/Directorate General of Human Rights, supra n 69, 111-
116. More precisely, Hammarberg refers to “National Human Rights Structures”; for the use of this term in the CoE 
context, cf. Section 3.6 of this dissertation infra.  
137 Cf. Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1581 (2007): Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights – stock-
taking and perspectives, 36th sitting, 5 October 2007, para. 13 in particular.   
138 Explanatory Report to Protocol no. 14, supra n 46, para. 87: “The Commissioner’s experience may help enlighten the 
Court on certain questions, particularly in cases which highlight structural or systemic weaknesses in the respondent or 
other High Contracting Parties”. 
139 Committee of Ministers, Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, 979bis meeting, 15 
November 2006, CM(2006)203, para. 113. Both this Report and Resolution 1581 (2007), supra n 137, make reference to 
the close cooperation between the Commissioner and National Human Rights Structures in carrying out these tasks.  
140 Steering Committee for Human Rights, Reform of the European Convention on Human Rights, supra n 128, para. 23.  
141 Cf. Open Society Justice Initiative, From Judgment to Justice: Implementing International and Regional Human 
Rights Decisions (New York: Open Society Foundations, 2010), 51; and Committee of Ministers, Declaration of the 
Committee of Ministers on sustained action to ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights at national and European levels, 116th session, 19 May 2006.  
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More generally, the Brussels Declaration invited the Committee of Ministers to “promote the 
development of enhanced synergies with the other Council of Europe stakeholders”, including the 
Commissioner, in the area of the oversight of execution, and it encouraged the Commissioner “in the 
exercise of his/her functions – and in particular in his/her country visits – to continue to address with 
the States Parties, on a case-by-case basis, issues relating to the execution of judgments”.142  
The Commissioner has therefore been recognised as a component of the ever more complex 
system of supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments, especially in light of the body’s 
consolidated ties with national authorities.143 In order to build such a relationship, the Commissioner 
has traditionally availed himself of the support from NHRIs, with a view to better understanding a 
country’s situation and its difficulties in implementing the Convention or in executing the Court’s 
judgments. 
 
The Department for the Execution of Judgments, which is part of the CoE Directorate General 
Human Rights and Rule of Law, is mandated to support the Committee of Ministers in its supervisory 
task by advising it on the appropriateness of the measures planned or effected by States in order to 
comply with the Court’s judgments. At the same time, the Department assists Member States in 
devising the solutions best suited to executing the judgments.144 In short, the Department acts as an 
independent technical advisor to both the Committee of Ministers and States Parties in the post-
judgment phase by helping them carry out their respective tasks.  
While this supporting role has always been played by the Department for Execution, it has 
notably been enhanced since States have been required to adopt increasingly complex measures to 
                                                        
142 Brussels Declaration, supra n 14, paras. C.1.c and C.3.e in particular. 
143 However, Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 18, 486-487, warns against too an enthusiastic view of the role of the 
Commissioner in the field of supervision of the execution: “it seems to us that the action of the Commissioner will be 
inevitably limited by the high degree of technicality of these issues, the limited means, and the need, in this sensitive 
matter, of synergy with the Court, the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly”. Flauss, supra n 11, 58, 
warns against the risk of a “cacophony” of different viewpoints, considering the increasing number of actors involved in 
the oversight of execution.   
144 Cf., for the mandate of the Department, its website at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/presentation-of-the-
department, accessed 4 January 2019. 
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comply with the Court’s judgments and the Committee of Ministers has strengthened its scrutiny over 
the appropriateness of the measures taken.145 Therefore, the Department currently analyses and 
comments upon governments’ action plans and reports, keeps under assessment the state of execution 
of implementing measures, drafts interim and final resolutions as well as other kinds of decisions 
concerning cases under supervision, proposes to prioritise or debate particular cases, and receives 
information from non-State entities (victims, NHRIs, NGOs, and the other entities authorised more 
recently).146  
The Department for Execution therefore ensures, as far as possible, that the supervisory task 
entrusted to the Committee of Ministers is not (overly) politicised. The reinforcement of the role of 
the Department might explain why the establishment of a quasi-judicial body that would have assisted 
or even substituted the Committee of Ministers in its monitoring functions was rejected (the 
reluctance by Member States to give up even part of their prerogatives is an alternative convincing 
explanation). 
In 2008, the then Registrar of the Court, Erik Fribergh, argued that especially in situations 
where the Court is confronted with cases whose underlying issues have already been dealt with 
repeatedly in previous judgments, it would be more reasonable to refer the new cases directly to the 
Committee of Ministers, since these cases show failure on the part of the respondent States to execute 
previous judgments effectively.147 Fribergh then proposed either to endow the Committee of 
Ministers with the necessary competences and resources to undertake this function or, more radically, 
to assign the task to “a more quasi-judicial organ. This could be a separate body, or one operating 
                                                        
145 Cf., for the already significant role played by the Department in the pre-Protocol 11 system, Flauss, supra n 30, 420; 
and Leuprecht, supra n 2, 106: “if there is reason to doubt whether the measures taken by a State as a consequence of a 
Court judgment are pertinent or sufficient, there is little chance of such doubt being expressed by representatives of other 
States. This uncomfortable task is left to the Directorate of Human Rights”. See also Ravaud, supra n 19, 655, which 
defines support to the Committee of Ministers  as “one of [the] most difficult and thankless tasks” of the Directorate of 
Human Rights, “because it is called on to play the role of a watchdog, that is, to remind the Committee of Ministers, 
whenever necessary, that under the Convention … it must act as a judicial body and not as a political one”.  
146 Cf. the webpage of the Department, supra n 144.  
147 Fribergh, supra n 69, 92-93.  
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under the auspices of the [Committee]”, in the belief that “enforcement issues are becoming more 
and more judicial”.148 
The idea was abandoned, until the Steering Committee for Human Rights suggested in 2012 
that the Brighton High-level Conference could consider “providing the Committee of Ministers with 
the assistance of an independent expert body”.149 However, as Turkey asked to remove the proposal 
from the final version of the document, no mention of it was made in the final declaration of the 
Conference.  
Thus, today, as put it by two scholars, “the delegation of formal and informal powers to the 
Department for the Execution of Judgments … is the pivotal guardian against the politicisation of the 
monitoring of human rights compliance”.150 On these bases, it has been argued that the Department 
for Execution should be endowed with adequate funding151 and encouraged in its contacts with 
NHRIs and civil society with a view to ensuring an effective and unbiased overseeing of the execution 
of judgments by States Parties. 
 
2.5. The involvement of national actors: national parliaments and courts 
At this juncture, the involvement of domestic actors such as national parliaments and courts is 
to be mentioned. As shown in Chapter 1, the recent awareness of the centrality of domestic 
implementation for the sustainability of the Convention’s system has triggered significant efforts on 
the part of the CoE to engage with national bodies. The CoE is thus approaching Member States not 
                                                        
148 Ibid. Specifically, Fribergh proposed the creation of a “Panel of five to seven legal/judicial experts”.  
149 Steering Committee of Human Rights/Committee of Experts on the Reform of the Court, supra n 95, Appendix VI, 
para. 13. 
150 Çalı and Koch, supra n 2, 304. The article identifies the Department for Execution as one of the main “institutional 
constraints” that ensure the effectiveness of the CoE supervisory system.  
151 For instance, the Evaluation Group, supra n 12, para. 73, already called for an “urgent reinforcement” of the 
Department, which was considered seriously understaffed compared to its workload. More recently, in the Brussels 
Declaration, supra n 14, the Committee of Ministers was encouraged to “support an increase in the resources of the 
Department for the Execution of Judgments, in order to allow it to fulfil its primary role, including its advisory functions, 
and to ensure co-operation and bilateral dialogue with the States Parties”, including by increasing the permanent staff and 
seconding national judges or officials (para. C.1.j). 
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only as a whole, through their representatives at the international level (i.e., governments), but also 
in their various branches, thereby “disarticulating” the international unity of States.152  
The topic is complex and has been discussed extensively by both scholars and European and 
national stakeholders.153 Nonetheless, it will only be touched upon here, since it is halfway between 
the supervision of execution and the actual execution of ECtHR judgments. Indeed, national 
parliaments and courts are encouraged to put pressure on their governments and monitor their 
compliance with the Convention and the Court’s rulings; at the same time, whenever possible and 
within the limits of their competences, they are also called upon to implement the Convention and 
the Court’s judgments directly.  
As far as the execution of ECtHR judgments is concerned, national parliaments are asked to 
table and adopt the legislative proposals that are required to bring their domestic legal orders in line 
with the Court’s judgments – even though, admittedly, it will often be the case that a legislative 
provision needs administrative regulations to be effectively implemented as well as funding from the 
government. National courts, for their part, must align their rulings to the Court’s case-law, when 
legislative or regulatory changes are not needed. Indeed, all branches (the legislature, the executive, 
and the judiciary) are bound by the international obligations undertaken by the State and shall give 
effect to these obligations as far as they are concerned. This state of affairs also implies, for the system 
under examination, that there is sometimes a fine line between execution and monitoring of execution.   
 
                                                        
152 Cf. Helfer and Slaughter, supra n 1, 288-289, which regards the “ability to penetrate the surface of the state” as an 
attribution of effective supranational organisations and adjudicatory bodies in particular. Cf. also Wojciech Sadurski, 
“Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and 
East European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments”, Human Rights Law Review 9, no. 3 
(2009): 421, which uses the same paradigm to describe the relationship between the ECtHR and national courts. 
153 Cf. in the literature, among others: Philip Leach and Alice Donald, Parliaments and the European Court of Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Janneke H. Gerards and Joseph Fleuren, Implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and of the Judgments of the ECtHR in National Case Law (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2014). Cf. also, as regards debates between stakeholders: Julia Iliopoulos-Strangas, ed., Cours suprêmes 
nationales et cours européennes: concurrence ou collaboration? (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas; Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007); 
CoE/Directorate General of Human Rights, supra n 69; and the “dialogues” mentioned at n 159 infra. 
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Contacts between the Parliamentary Assembly and the Court on the one hand and their national 
counterparts on the other have multiplied over the years. Since declaring its keen interest in 
overseeing the execution of the Court’s judgments, the Assembly has made clear that such an 
engagement would imply a parallel involvement of national delegations to the Assembly and, by 
extension, of national parliaments.154 National delegations have been repeatedly invited to 
scrupulously monitor the execution of judgments as carried out by their respective governments, and 
national parliaments encouraged to introduce appropriate procedures at the domestic level to ensure 
the effective supervision of the execution process.155  
These recommendations were developed and reinforced in a 2011 Resolution by the 
Parliamentary Assembly, which was specifically devoted to the role that national parliaments could 
play in monitoring the implementation of international norms and judgments and included some 
“basic principles for parliamentary supervision of international human rights standards”.156 As an 
explicit follow-up to this Resolution, a number of training seminars were organised for 
parliamentarians and their staff with a view to boosting their general knowledge of the Convention’s 
system and their engagement in the oversight of the execution of the Court’s judgments.157  
While the role played by the Parliamentary Assembly in the supervision of execution has long 
been recognised at the CoE level, support for a proactive approach by national parliaments in this 
field has been less explicit until recently, when the 2015 Brussels Declaration acknowledged “that 
                                                        
154 In its Resolution 1226 (2000), supra n 94, the Assembly noted that “members of national delegations to the Assembly 
have a role to play” (para. 6) and invited them “to carefully follow the execution of judgments of the Court in which their 
governments are involved in their respective parliaments and to take all necessary measures for their quick and efficient 
execution” (para. 12.2). 
155 Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1516 (2006), supra n 72, para. 22.1. An examination of the existing national 
procedures that allow parliaments to monitor the implementation of the Convention’s standards and of the Court’s 
judgments has recently been carried out: Parliamentary Assembly/Parliamentary Project Support Division, The role of 
parliaments in implementing ECHR standards: overview of existing structures and mechanisms – Background 
memorandum prepared by the Secretariat, 8 September 2015, PPSD (2014) 22 rev. The Memorandum shows that good 
practices exist, but it highlights the need to strengthen and extend them.  
156 Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1823 (2011) – National parliaments: guarantors of human rights in Europe, 25th 
sitting, 23 June 2011. The resolutions and recommendations adopted on the subject are numerous: cf. Resolution 2075 
(2015) – Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 33rd sitting, 30 September 2015, for an 
overview of the relevant legal acts (para. 2 in particular).  
157 Parliamentary Assembly/Parliamentary Project Support Division, The role of Parliaments in implementing the 
European Convention on Human Rights standards – Interparliamentary cooperation activities 2013-2016, 20 April 2016, 
PPSD(2016)11 (updated version of PPSD(2014)07 rev. 4).  
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the execution of the Court’s judgments may require the involvement of the [national] judiciary and 
parliaments” and invited States Parties to “encourage the involvement of national parliaments in the 
judgment execution process”, for instance by submitting reports to them or holding debates.158 
For its part, the Court has long sought a closer interaction with domestic judicial bodies, 
especially with high-ranking ones. This has been realised, first of all, through the setup of “dialogues” 
that take place every year on the day of the official opening of the Court’s judicial year.159 
Additionally, outside the framework of these meetings, other opportunities have been organised with 
a view to sharing opinions and experiences, including conferences and visits of the Court by 
delegations of national judges. On a test basis since 2015 and more firmly since 2017, these 
interactions have been reinforced and formalised through the establishment of the Superior Courts 
Network, which, by means of an intranet site, allows for regular exchanges between the ECtHR and 
national supreme courts regarding the Convention and the Court’s jurisprudence on the one hand and 
domestic laws and case-law on the other.160 
It should also be reminded that a dialogue between the ECtHR and national courts also routinely 
takes place through (ECtHR and national) judgments.161 In this respect, a potentially significant 
innovation has been brought by Protocol no. 16 to the Convention. Entered into force in August 2018 
for the States that ratified it, Protocol no. 16 allows national highest courts to ask for the opinion of 
                                                        
158 Brussels Declaration, supra n 14, preamble and para. B.2.h. Additionally, a more general call was made for enhanced 
awareness-raising of and dialogue with national parliaments (as well as other national actors: cf. paras. B.1.b, B.2.a and 
B.2.j). The Brighton Declaration, supra n 13, already made reference to “the important role of national parliaments in 
scrutinising the effectiveness of implementation measures taken”, but rather incidentally (para. 29.a.3). 
159 The practice has been in place since 2005. In 2014, the dialogue specifically concerned the interaction between the 
ECtHR and national courts in the execution of judgments: CoE/ECtHR, Dialogue between judges, supra n 1. Cf. also the 
2010 Dialogue, titled The Convention is yours (Strasbourg, January 2010) and the 2012 one, even more explicit: How can 
we ensure greater involvement of national courts in the Convention system? (Strasbourg, January 2012). 
160 For an overview of the Network, as well as of its Charter, Operational Rules, and annual reports, cf. the Network’s 
webpage at https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/network, accessed 4 January 2019. 
161 Cf. Lech Garlicki, “Some Observations on Relations between the ECtHR and the Domestic Jurisdictions”, in Julia 
Iliopoulos-Strangas, supra n 153, 305-325; and Michael O’Boyle, “The Role of Dialogue in the Relationship between the 
European Court of Human Rights and National Courts”, in The Realisation of Human Rights: When Theory Meets 
Practice. Studies in Honour of Leo Zwaak, eds. Yves Haeck et al. (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013), 94-96, which more 
generally offers an overview of the various means of interaction between the ECtHR and national courts. For an 
examination of the dialogue, through judgments, between the ECtHR and UK courts, cf. Lord Kerr, “The Need for 
Dialogue between National Courts and the European Court of Human Rights”, in The European Court of Human Rights 
and its Discontents: Turning Criticism into Strength, eds. Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom Zwart, and Julie Fraser (Cheltenham 
and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 104-115. 
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the ECtHR on the interpretation and application of any Convention’s provisions.162 Drawing on the 
EU preliminary ruling procedure, this new tool clearly aims to reinforce the cooperation between the 
Court and its national judicial interlocutors with a view to promoting the domestic application and 
ownership of the Convention as well as reducing the Court’s overload. 
It is worth mentioning that the Court also directly engages in formal and informal dialogues 
with other national actors, including parliaments and governmental representatives, as well as with 
non-governmental organisations.163 
 
2.6. Preliminary conclusions 
   For a long time, the system of supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments centred 
around the Committee of Ministers has run smoothly and has been hailed as a success story. In the 
face of a growing trend of non-execution or delayed execution of judgments by the respondent States, 
calls have been made for the Committee of Ministers to adopt a firmer stance against non-compliant 
States by making use of the instruments introduced by Protocol no. 14 (especially, the infringement 
proceedings) or, in the most extreme cases, of the suspension or expulsion of the non-compliant State 
from the CoE (Article 8 of the CoE Statute).164  
However, the Committee has proved reluctant to activate either interpretation or infringement 
proceedings, let alone the ultimate expulsion of States from the CoE.165 Other proposals to tackle the 
failure by States to execute judgments, such as the imposition of fines on non-compliant States and 
                                                        
162 CoE, Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2 October 
2013, Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 214. Cf. also its related Explanatory Report. 
163 Martin Kuijer, “The Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine and the Strengthening of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the 
Recent Reform Negotiations”, Human Rights Law Journal 36, nos. 7-12 (2016): 346-347. 
164 The Parliamentary Assembly has been particularly vocal in this respect. Initially vague (see, for instance, 
Recommendation 1764 (2006). Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 24th sitting, 2 
October 2006, para. 5), the recommendations to the Committee of Ministers in this respect have become increasingly 
specific by making explicit reference to Article 8 CoE Statute (e.g., Recommendation 1955 (2011) Final version. 
Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 6th sitting, 26 January 2011, para. 1.5) and to new 
Article 46 paras. 3, 4 and 5 (Recommendation 2079 (2015), supra n 101, para. 1.1).  
165 Cf., for instance, Committee of Ministers/Steering Committee for Human Rights, Guaranteeing the long-term 
effectiveness of the control system of the European Convention on Human Rights, supra n 95, proposal C.4, according to 
which “the latter measure [recourse to Article 8] is an extreme one and its application would be counterproductive in most 
instances. In fact, such a State, more than any other, needs to be subjected to the discipline of the Council of Europe, and 
not be excluded from it”. Cf. also Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 1, 40-45; and Bates, supra n 12, 89. 
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the substitution of the Committee of Ministers with a quasi-judicial body, did not meet with more 
enthusiasm and were never followed up. 
Even though no major reform of the Convention has been enacted with a view to changing the 
model of supervision, this chapter has shown that the system has been amended in various respects 
and made more efficient, independent, transparent, and participatory. In practice, the Committee of 
Ministers does not hold a monopoly on the supervision of execution anymore and is constrained by 
a multiplicity of actors which de-politicise its supervisory task. Also thanks to increasingly specific 
indications from the Court, as well as to the information provided by third parties, the examination 
by the Department for Execution of the appropriateness of the measures enacted or envisaged by 
States Parties should be less one-sided. The Parliamentary Assembly and the Commissioner for 
Human Rights are willing to be involved to a greater extent in the monitoring of the execution of 
judgments and can put additional pressure on recalcitrant States.    
The increasing engagement by national actors is also noteworthy with a view to strengthening 
domestic implementation. National parliaments and courts can urge their governments to take action, 
as well as intervene themselves directly in order to give effect to the Court’s judgments. Indeed, the 
coordination of multiple national actors is not infrequently required to give full execution to a 
judgment.166     
What is the place for NHRIs in this picture? This chapter has shown that new paths have been 
opened for the participation by NHRIs, which are now formally entitled to provide independent 
                                                        
166 Cf. Sundberg, supra n 40, 480. Cf. also Lambert Abdelgawad, supra n 18, 487, which also makes reference to 
Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on efficient 
domestic capacity for rapid execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 1017th meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies, 6 February 2008. In this Recommendation, States are invited to “designate a co-ordinator – 
individual or body – of execution of judgments at the national level, with reference contacts in the relevant national 
authorities involved in the execution process” in order to enhance synergies between all national actors involved. As 
shown in the responses by CoE Member States to a questionnaire on the domestic mechanisms for the execution of ECtHR 
judgments, most States have designated the government agents in Strasbourg as their national coordinators: CoE, Round-
table on Recommendation (2008)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on efficient domestic capacity for 
rapid execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Responses to the Questionnaire on the domestic 
mechanisms for rapid execution of the Court’s judgments. 15-16 December 2011, Tirana Hotel International, Albania, 
15 November 2011. For an assessment of this choice and its consequences, cf. Elizabeth Mottershaw and Rachel Murray, 
“National responses to human rights judgments: the need for government co-ordination and implementation”, European 
Human Rights Law Review, no. 6 (2012), 639-653, as well as Section 1.2 of this dissertation.  
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information to the Committee of Ministers regarding the state of execution of ECtHR judgments in 
their respective States and thus potentially contribute to a more accurate and balanced monitoring on 
the part of the Committee. The analysis of the means and effects of this participation will be at the 
core of Chapter 4. Additionally, as Chapter 5 will illustrate, NHRIs can act at the national level – 
before, after or independently from the said supranational intervention – by applying their traditional 
domestic functions to facilitate the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
Nonetheless, before empirically examining all of these activities, it is necessary to clarify why 
NHRIs are believed to be ideally situated to carry out both monitoring and cooperative functions, at 
the international and national levels, in relation to the implementation of international law and rulings, 
and thus in relation to the execution of ECtHR judgments as well. It is time, in other words, to explore 
the “unique position” of NHRIs. 
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CHAPTER 3. PROMOTING AND PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS  
 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) are a rather recent phenomenon. Before the so-
called Paris Principles, i.e., the international non-binding standards governing the composition and 
functions of NHRIs, were adopted in October 1991,1 sixteen of these bodies had been created.2 The 
Paris Principles considerably encouraged the establishment of NHRIs by States: between the end of 
1991 and December 1993, when the Principles were endorsed by the UN General Assembly, fourteen 
other institutions were founded.3 Since the General Assembly’s Resolution, the number of NHRIs at 
least partially compliant with the Paris Principles has risen to one hundred and twelve.4 Additional 
institutions have been created but considered non-compliant with the Principles, while still others 
have not asked for accreditation by the competent body.   
The significant rise in the number of NHRIs indicates a fast-growing interest on the part of 
States to establish these institutions, as well as on the part of international organisations to promote 
their creation.5 The literature has somewhat struggled to keep the pace with the evolution of NHRIs. 
While an increasing body of research examines multiple aspects of NHRIs’ structure, functioning, 
networks, and impact on human rights promotion and protection, the concept of “national human 
rights institution” itself has proved difficult to define and still forms the subject of debate.  
                                                        
1 Officially: “Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions”, drafted during the first International Workshop on 
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, held in Paris between 7 and 9 October 1991. 
2 The number is derived from Jeong-Woo Koo and Francisco Ramirez, “National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: 
Worldwide Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966-2004”, Social Forces 87, no. 3 (2009): 1352-1353. 
The first NHRIs were established right after World War II – e.g., the French Commission nationale consultative des droits 
de l’homme was instituted in 1947.  
3 Ibid. The Principles were endorsed by means of UN General Assembly, Resolution 48/134. National institutions for the 
promotion and protection of human rights, 20 December 1993, A/RES/48/134.  
4 Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), Chart of the Status of National Institutions 
Accredited by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions: Accreditation Status as of 8 August 2018, 1. 
5 The reasons for these trends will be analysed in greater detail in Sections 3.3 and 3.5 of this chapter.   
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Far from being a doctrinal controversy, the issue of which institutions can be identified as 
NHRIs has substantive implications, including for the participation by NHRIs in international fora, 
and it is thus dealt with at the outset of this chapter.   
Subsequently, in order to give further substance to the concept of NHRIs, a typology of these 
institutions is put forward and the dynamics of their proliferation worldwide are sketched. Another 
section is devoted to the system of international accreditation of NHRIs and its evolution over time; 
the extent to which this system manages to take into account the effectiveness of NHRIs is given 
special consideration.  
Finally, the chapter examines the role that NHRIs have played at the UN level, where these 
institutions have long been involved and have been vested with increasing prerogatives, and at the 
CoE one, where participation by NHRIs to date is comparatively less extensive and formalised but 
on the rise. This overview is intended to contextualise the specific role that NHRIs can play at the 
CoE level in respect of the execution of ECtHR judgments, which will be examined in-depth in 
Chapter 4. 
 
3.1. Definitional issues and fundamental characteristics of National Human Rights Institutions  
The Paris Principles, essential point of reference for any existing or future institutions, do not 
define NHRIs. The closest to an official definition of NHRIs was first put forward in a Handbook 
published by the UN Centre for Human Rights in 1995,6 which broadly identifies an NHRI as “a body 
established in the constitution or by law to perform particular functions in the field of human rights”.7 
Some more details were given in a revised edition of the Handbook, according to which NHRIs are 
                                                        
6 The UN Centre for Human Rights was consolidated into the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) in 1997. 
7 UN Centre for Human Rights, National Human Rights Institutions – A Handbook on the Establishment and 
Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Professional Training Series 
No. 4 (New York and Geneva: UN, 1995), 6, para. 38. 
 82 
“State bodies with a constitutional and/or legislative mandate to protect and promote human rights. 
They are part of the State apparatus and are funded by the State”.8  
A few fundamental features of NHRIs emerge from these general definitions. First of all, 
NHRIs are established and funded by States and they must be enshrined in the country’s legislative 
– if not constitutional – framework. The fact that NHRIs are, in essence, State bodies separates them 
from NGOs. At the same time, NHRIs must be independent from the governments that create them; 
in this sense, NHRIs can also be distinguished from other State organs that, in one way or another, 
deal with human rights – such as ad hoc inter-ministerial or parliamentary committees.  
While independence from the rest of the State apparatus is a common feature of NHRIs and the 
judiciary, there remain important differences between the two: indeed, the judiciary does not focus 
on human rights exclusively nor does it have the broad mandate that is conferred upon NHRIs, as it 
is only concerned with applying human rights norms to individual cases (with a wider impact in the 
case of constitutional or supreme courts).9  
Whereas independence is not explicitly reflected in the above-mentioned definitions, it is 
unanimously recognised as a crucial characteristic of NHRIs, as made clear by the Paris Principles. 
This “unique position”10 of NHRIs – as independent State bodies – is what constitutes their added 
value, first of all compared to NGOs: while the independence of NHRIs from the rest of the State 
structures is required to ensure that these latter’s conduct is overseen and abuses are sanctioned, the 
                                                        
8 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), National Human Rights Institutions: 
History, Principles, Role and Responsibilities, Professional Training Series no. 4, rev. 1 (New York and Geneva: UN, 
2010), 13. 
9 C. Raj Kumar, “National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human 
Rights”, American University International Law Review 19, no. 2 (2003-2004): 293-296. Even when the functions of 
NHRIs and the judiciary come closest (for instance, when an NHRI has a quasi-judicial mandate and decides upon 
individual complaints), differences remain, as noted by Raj Kumar: while the judiciary has stronger enforcement 
capacities, NHRIs are often not hindered by rules (e.g. on standing or statute of limitations) which limit their ability to 
deal with human rights violations (295-296 in particular). 
10 The expression is used in Anne Smith, “The Unique Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed 
Blessing?”, Human Rights Quarterly 28 (2006): 904-946; but also in the General Observations by the Global Alliance of 
National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), where the concept is thus summarised: “The character and identity of an 
NHRI serves to distinguish it from both government bodies and civil society. As independent, pluralistic institutions, 
NHRIs can play an important role” (GANHRI, General Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation, 21 February 
2018, G.O. 1.5; for more on GANHRI, cf. infra in this section and chapter). 
In Gérard Fellous, Les Institutions nationales des droits de l'homme: acteurs de troisième type (Paris: La Documentation 
française, 2006), 11, NHRIs are defined as “‘organes de troisième type’, entre l’État et la société civile”. 
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“official status” of NHRIs should give them stronger legitimacy in the eyes of the public, allow them 
to have a more cooperative relationship with other State organs and agencies, and prevent them from 
pursuing any particular agenda.11  
This is not to suggest that NHRIs are in any way “better” than NGOs; as different entities, they 
perform distinct but complementary tasks. Indeed, one of the main functions of NHRIs is precisely 
to bridge the gap12 between civil society on the one hand and the State and international organisations 
on the other by conveying the former’s concerns to the latter, which are not always readily accessible 
to NGOs, especially to smaller local ones.13  
This objective can be attained in various ways. The preferable model, according to the Paris 
Principle, would be a “pluralist representation of the social forces” in the NHRI’s membership: the 
Principles mention representatives from NGOs, “trends in philosophical or religious thought”, 
universities, and parliament as examples.14 Nonetheless, as clarified by the international association 
of NHRIs, the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), and specifically 
by its Sub-Committee on Accreditation, there exist other solutions to ensure the involvement of civil 
society, aside from direct incorporation in the NHRI’s membership: these include participation by 
civil society groups in the appointment procedures, the creation of bodies (such as advisory 
                                                        
11 Various authors have underlined the different contributions that NHRIs and NGOs make to the promotion and 
protection of human rights: cf., among others, Smith, supra n 10, 908-909 especially; and, on the complementarity of 
such contributions, Raj Kumar, supra n 9, 296-298. Brice Dickson, former Chief Commissioner of the Northern Irish 
NHRI, describes the added value of NHRIs compared to NGOs in the following terms: “first, [NHRIs] can influence 
parliamentarians and administrators in a manner which it is hard for NGOs to emulate. Second, they can operate on the 
judicial stage in a uniquely versatile way. Third, they can – or at least should be able to – investigate allegations of human 
rights abuses. Fourth, they can seek to appeal to a broad spectrum of society, making human rights a concept which is 
attractive to all, rather than to a narrow elite or to those who have vested interests” (Brice Dickson, “The contribution of 
human rights commissions to the protection of human rights”, Public Law (Summer 2003): 278). 
12 The “bridge” metaphor, together with the “crossroads” one, frequently recurs in the literature regarding NHRIs: e.g., 
in OHCHR, supra n 8, 13; Smith, supra n 10, 908-909; and Gauthier de Beco, “National Human Rights Institutions in 
Europe”, Human Rights Law Review 7, no. 2 (2007): 361 et seqq. 
13 NHRIs can also act as drivers and venues for activism and mobilisation by civil society: cf. David S. Meyer, “National 
Human Rights Institutions, Opportunities, and Activism”, in Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: 
Assessing National Human Rights Institutions, eds. Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, November 2011), 328-333, which also outlines potential obstacles. 
14 Paris Principles, supra n 3, Section B (“Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism”), para. 1.  
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committees) or fora allowing for effective cooperation between the NHRI and NGOs, or a pluralistic 
staff.15  
The fact remains that, if an NHRI must be independent from the State apparatus, it must also 
be independent from NGOs and any other external influences. This aspect – even though not 
adequately stressed by the Paris Principles nor by the General Observations of GANHRI, which focus 
on the independence of NHRIs from their governments – is crucial, inasmuch as an NHRI must be 
perceived by the public as not having any vested interests as well as retain the trust of State authorities 
in order to cooperate with them.16  
Admittedly, the relationship between NHRIs and NGOs can become complicated for various 
reasons. In authoritarian or semi-authoritarian States, where civil society organisations find it hard to 
operate, governments may establish puppet NHRIs to silence these organisations further. Even 
without going that far, the establishment of NHRIs may take much needed resources (of both national 
and international origin) and thus influence from NGOs. The increasing space reserved to NHRIs 
within the UN system might also go to the detriment of NGOs.17 It is critical for the well-functioning 
and legitimacy of both NHRIs and NGOs that a cooperative relationship, respectful of the different 
roles, is established between them. 
As to the independence of NHRIs from their governments, the Principles partially clarify its 
meaning – own staff and premises and a stable mandate for members – and how to achieve it – 
adequate funding and the indication of the duration of the term of office in an official act. Further 
criteria for assessing the independence of NHRIs have been developed by the GANHRI Sub-
Committee on Accreditation.18  
                                                        
15 GANHRI, supra n 10, G.O. 1.7, “Ensuring pluralism of the NHRI”.  
16 Smith, supra n 10, 910, describes the potential difficulties in the relationship between NHRIs and their main partners 
in the following terms: “if a NHRI is seen as being too close to the government or holding an agenda dictated by 
government departments … then they will be viewed by NGOs and the civil society at large as simply a puppet of the 
government and, therefore, damage their credibility. Conversely, if a NHRI allows NGOs to influence its workings such 
that an overly close relationship develops between the two, a NHRI will simply be seen as another ‘pro-NGO’”. 
17 Gauthier de Beco, “Networks of European National Human Rights Institutions”, European Law Journal 14, no. 6 
(November 2008): 869. 
18 GANHRI, supra n 10, G.O. nos. 1.8, “Selection and appointment of the decision-making body of NHRIs”; 1.9, 
“Political representatives on NHRIs”; 1.10, “Adequate funding of NHRIs”; 2.1, “Guarantee of tenure for members of the 
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If pluralism and independence are inherent in the composition of NHRIs, the promotion and 
protection of human rights are the cornerstone of the functions of these institutions. After specifying 
that NHRIs “shall be given as broad a mandate as possible”,19 the Paris Principles articulate the 
responsibilities of NHRIs in terms of promoting and protecting human rights. These include: advising 
the government, parliament, and any other relevant authorities on human rights matters by examining 
existing laws and practices or bills, by recommending amendments, and more generally by submitting 
opinions; promoting the ratification of international human rights treaties and domestic compliance 
with them; contributing to State reports to international monitoring bodies; cooperating with 
international and regional organisations; researching on human rights; and promoting knowledge of 
human rights in schools and within the public at large.20  
A last function set out in the Principles, although almost en passant, is that of receiving 
individual complaints of human rights violations; placed under the heading “additional principles 
concerning the status of commissions with quasi-jurisdictional competence”, this task is considered 
optional by the Principles, for historical reasons.21 The fact that the complaint-handling function is 
left by the Principles to the discretion of States has been criticised by many and identified as one of 
the main shortcomings of the Principles – and areas for change.22 At any rate, a high number of 
                                                        
NHRI decision-making body”; 2.2, “Full-time members of an NHRI”; and 2.3, “Protection from criminal and civil 
liability for official actions and decisions undertaken in good faith”. GANHRI General Observations marked with number 
1 constitute “essential requirements of the Paris Principles” and are considered “direct interpretations of the Paris 
Principles”, whereas those marked with number 2 are classified as “practices that directly promote Paris Principles 
compliance” and “are drawn from the [Sub-Committee on Accreditation]’s extensive experience in identifying proven 
practices to ensure independent and effective NHRIs” (cf. GANHRI, supra n 10, “Introduction”, para. 9). 
19 Paris Principles, supra n 3, Section A (“Competence and responsibilities”), para. 2. 
20 Ibid., Section A, para. 3. 
21 Ibid., Section D. At the time when the Principles were drafted, not all NHRIs were entrusted with this responsibility; 
for instance, the French commission, one of the most active organisers of the Paris Workshop, was not.  
22 On the importance of the quasi-judicial function of NHRIs and of appropriate investigative powers: Linda C. Reif, 
“Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human 
Rights Protection”, Harvard Human Rights Journal 13 (2000): 24 in particular; Smith, supra n 10, 914 et seqq.; Gauthier 
de Beco and Rachel Murray, A Commentary on the Paris Principles on National Human Rights Institutions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 138. Amnesty International, in its National Human Rights Institutions: Amnesty 
International’s recommendations for effective protection and promotion of human rights, 30 September 2001, urges 
governments to entrust NHRIs with investigative and complaint-handling powers (section 4). In Katerina Linos and Tom 
Pegram, “What Works in Human Rights Institutions?”, American Journal of International Law 111, no. 3 (2017): 628-
688, empirical support is found to the argument that the attribution of complaint-handling powers to NHRIs contributes 
to the effectiveness of these institutions. A different view is expressed in Richard Carver, “National Human Rights 
Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe: The Ombudsman as Agent of International Law”, in Goodman and Pegram, 
supra n 13, 200 et seqq. 
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NHRIs are currently entrusted with this responsibility by their governments and the trend is likely to 
increase in light of the obligation for States which have ratified the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture (OPCAT) to establish National Preventive Mechanisms.23 
In sum, in terms of the competences of NHRIs, the Paris Principles call for a broad mandate, 
which should equally involve promotion and protection functions (whose boundaries are in any case 
often blurred)24 and concern all human rights. For this requirement to be upheld, in principle, only 
one NHRI could exist in each State – as clarified by GANHRI,25 which has only exceptionally 
accredited more than one NHRI in a country, the main example to date being the United Kingdom in 
light of its peculiar devolution regime.26  
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the Principles is that a major part of 
the responsibilities of NHRIs extend to the international level. In other words, not only are NHRIs 
called upon to connect civil society with domestic authorities, but they are also required to bridge the 
                                                        
23 The tendency of States to designate existing or future NHRIs as their National Preventive Mechanisms is analysed in 
greater detail in Section 3.5 infra.  
24 The GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation draws the distinction along the following lines: “The Sub-Committee 
understands ‘promotion’ to include those functions which seek to create a society where human rights are more broadly 
understood and respected. Such functions may include education, training, advising, public outreach and advocacy. 
‘Protection’ functions may be understood as those that address and seek to prevent actual human rights violations. Such 
functions include monitoring, inquiring, investigating and reporting on human rights violations, and may include 
individual complaint handling”. The distinction is not, however, crucial, as long as NHRIs are entrusted with a broad 
mandate including most if not all of the above-mentioned functions. Sonia Cardenas, “Emerging Global Actors: The 
United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions”, Global Governance 9, no. 1 (2003): 25 et seqq., uses a different 
classification, according to which “regulative functions are those focused on eliciting conformance with international 
norms and rules”, whereas “constitutive functions are those intended to transform the identity of state or societal actor”.  
25 Current Rule 6(3) of GANHRI Rules of Procedure (see infra n 56) reads: “Should more than one NHRI from a UN 
Member State seek accreditation by the GANHRI, the conditions precedent for consideration of the application are the 
following: i. Written consent of the Government of the UN Member State. ii. Written agreement between all concerned 
national human rights institutions on the rights and duties as a GANHRI member including the exercise of the one voting 
and the one speaking right. This agreement shall also include arrangements for participation in the international human 
rights system, including the Human Rights Council and the Treaty Bodies”. Previously, GANHRI Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation had more explicitly maintained that it “acknowledges and encourages the trend towards a strong national 
human rights protection system in a State by having one consolidated and comprehensive national human rights 
institution” (ICC/GANHRI, General Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation, May 2013, G.O. 6.6). The 
stance of the Sub-Committee on the matter has not, at any rate, substantially changed, as the coexistence of multiple 
NHRIs in a State is still considered exceptional. 
For an examination of the arguments in favour and against the establishment of either a single or multiple domestic 
institutions tasked with the promotion and protection of human rights, cf. Richard Carver, “One NHRI or Many? How 
Many Institutions Does It Take to Protect Human Rights? – Lessons from the European Experience”, Journal of Human 
Rights Practice 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–24. 
26 The United Kingdom has three NHRIs, which have all been recognised as fully compliant with the Paris Principles: the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain), the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, and the 
Scottish Human Rights Commission (GANHRI, supra n 4, 8). Bulgaria is, currently, the only other State that has more 
than one accredited NHRIs; however, both the Commission for Protection Against Discrimination and the Ombudsman 
have been considered by GANHRI only partially compliant with the Paris Principles (ibid., 10). 
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national and international levels: by promoting the adoption of international instruments by their 
respective governments, harmonising national legislation and practice with these instruments, 
reporting to international and regional bodies, and cooperating more generally with them. This link 
should work as a two-way connection by which NHRIs ensure the local implementation of 
international standards and decisions, while at the same time bringing domestic issues – and solutions 
– to an international audience.  
To conclude, NHRIs can be defined as independent and pluralist State bodies whose mandate 
is to promote and protect human rights. They carry out this mandate in many ways, in cooperation 
with national authorities and civil society as well as with international and regional organisations. 
Before focusing on the supranational dimension of the work of NHRIs and on their relationship with 
international and regional bodies (aspects which are especially relevant to this dissertation), a brief 
outline of the forms that these institutions can take and of the patterns of their spreading is warranted.  
 
3.2. Categories of National Human Rights Institutions 
As mentioned, as far as the composition of NHRIs is concerned, the Paris Principles merely 
require that pluralism and independence of the body be ensured, and they suggest potential categories 
of members. The vagueness of the Principles on this point, as on others, is a deliberate choice.  
The watchword of the 1991 Paris Workshop, where the Principles were drafted, was flexibility, 
in order to allow for States to devise their national institutions in accordance with their own legal and 
cultural traditions, as well as with their own institutional frameworks, thereby respecting sovereignty 
and boosting national ownership over NHRIs.27 Moreover, the national institutions which were 
already in place when the Workshop was held, and which contributed to drafting the Principles, varied 
                                                        
27 This concept is underlined in Resolution 48/134, supra n 3, para. 12: “recognizing that it is the right of each State to 
choose the framework that is best suited to its particular needs at the national level”. Cf. also Raj Kumar, supra n 9, 263: 
“even states that are over-zealous in their sovereignty may favor NHRI formation”. 
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greatly as to their institutional characteristics.28 These two factors mainly explain the wide range of 
structures of current NHRIs.   
While it could be argued that each NHRI is a model on its own, showing a unique mix of formal 
and functional characteristics, an approximate categorisation of NHRIs is possible – and useful to 
some ends. Indeed, various classifications of NHRIs exist in the literature, which usually combine 
institutional features and the main tasks performed. A four-type classification is adopted here 
whereby consultative commissions and human rights ombudsmen are at the two ends of the 
spectrum.29  
Consultative commissions are normally characterised by a large and diversified membership. 
The French Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme, created in 1947 and thus the 
model for this kind of institutions, is composed of sixty-four members; the Greek National 
Commission for Human Rights consists of thirty-one. Consultative commissions can also be found 
in some African States, such as Morocco, Senegal, and Egypt. A substantial number of members 
often corresponds to predominantly advisory functions: that is, the main task of these institutions is 
to submit recommendations and opinions to the government, parliament, and other domestic 
authorities.  
Symmetrically, the human rights ombudsman is a single-headed institution, or anyway one with 
a restricted membership.30 This NHRI type is clearly rooted in the classical Swedish ombudsman of 
the XIX century and its successors – i.e., bodies whose main responsibility is to oversee the public 
                                                        
28 Chris Sidoti, “National Human Rights Institutions and the International Human Rights System”, in Goodman and 
Pegram, supra n 13, 96. On the role of NHRIs themselves in drafting the Paris Principles, and on the importance of this 
contribution to the legitimacy of national institutions, cf. also de Beco and Murray, supra n 22, 3-5.  
A list of the participants in the 1991 Paris Workshop can be found in UN Commission on Human Rights, Further 
promotion and encouragement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the question of the programme and 
methods of work of the Commission: National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights – Note by the 
secretariat, 23 January 1992, E/CN.4/1992/43/Add.1. 
29 A similar categorisation is adopted by Valentin Aichele, National Human Rights Institutions: An Introduction (Berlin: 
German Institute for Human Rights, 2010), 15-16, which refers to consultative commissions as “the committee type”; 
Anna-Elina Pohjolainen, The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions – The Role of the United Nations 
(Denmark: Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2006), 16-20; and Morten Kjærum, “National human rights institutions 
implementing human rights”, in Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden - Essays in Honour of Asbjørn 
Eide, ed. Morten Bergsmo (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), 636-637. 
30 The Austrian Ombudsman Board, for instance, is composed of three members, as is the Institute of Human Rights 
Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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administration and reprimand its illegal or unfair conduct. The new human rights ombudsmen (or 
hybrid ombudsmen) combine this traditional function with a human rights mandate; and while they 
might carry out various activities in the human rights area, including promotional and advisory ones, 
their most prominent task is to receive complaints of human rights violations, in addition to 
complaints of maladministration. The human rights ombudsman model was first adopted in the 
Iberian Peninsula and since spread in Latin America and, after the fall of the Soviet Union, in Eastern 
Europe as well as in the Balkans.31  
Some commentators argue that this model is somewhat neglected in the Paris Principles in 
favour of the consultative commission one; the reference to pluralism (which arguably is not a 
characteristic of ombudsman offices) and the optional nature of the quasi-judicial mandate (which is, 
on the other hand, typically part of the ombudsman’s functions) would suggest so. Nonetheless, even 
though the quasi-judicial mandate remains facultative, GANHRI has devoted a General Observation 
to it32 and at times explicitly encouraged the attribution of complaint-handling functions to NHRIs;33 
moreover, an increasing number of human rights ombudsmen have been created and accredited as 
fully compliant with the Principles, and so have commissions with a protection mandate, which are 
often entrusted with the handling of individual complaints. 
Commissions with a protection mandate might be conceived as a middle ground between the 
two above-mentioned NHRI types: they combine a collective membership (albeit usually not as 
extensive as in the consultative commission’s model) with a predominantly protective mandate, even 
though explicit advisory and promotional functions are increasingly conferred upon them. The British 
                                                        
31 Out of 14 A-status institutions in Latin America, all are human rights ombudsmen (Defensorías or Procuradurías), 
except for the Mexican, Chilean, and the Uruguayan ones (this latter is mixed: Institución Nacional de Derechos Humanos 
y Defensoría del Pueblo). In Eastern Europe and the Balkans, ombudsman-type institutions have been created in Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Ukraine (to name A-status institutions only).   
32 GANHRI, supra n 10, G.O. 2.9, “The quasi-judicial competency of NHRIs (complaints-handling)”, included in the 
“practices that directly promote Paris Principles compliance”.  
33 E.g., in a report regarding the re-accreditation of the German Institute for Human Rights, the Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation underlined “the importance for the [German Institute] to further broaden its mandate to include complaint 
handling functions” (International Coordinating Committee for NHRIs (ICC, as GANHRI was previously called), Report 
and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation. Geneva, 3-6 November 2008 para. 4.3).  
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Equality and Human Rights Commission is an illustration of this model: vested with a wide range of 
monitoring, advisory, educational, and research responsibilities, the Commission has considerably 
engaged in the investigation into human rights complaints, the institution of proceedings in court, and 
the provision of legal assistance to individuals who have applied to court.34 In relation to the conduct 
of investigations, the Commission is given considerable powers in terms of securing evidence and 
ensuring the implementation of its decisions.35 This model is widespread across Commonwealth 
countries.36 
Another model, which cannot be easily accommodated within the above-mentioned categories, 
is that of research institutes, focusing on human rights research and education. The German Institute 
for Human Rights and the Danish Institute for Human Rights are among the best-known examples. 
While these bodies are accepted as NHRIs, there remains the risk that they are considered non-
compliant with the Paris Principles, if they are not entrusted with tasks other than strictly promotional 
and educational ones.37 
 
The significance of this categorisation of NHRIs should not be overestimated; the above-
mentioned distinctions are increasingly blurred, and NHRIs not infrequently develop their mandates 
beyond the letter of their founding instruments. Nonetheless, classifications might be helpful to 
understand proliferation dynamics of NHRIs (States of the same region, or with historical ties, tend 
to adopt a similar NHRI model) and to exclude institutions that should not be considered NHRIs – 
namely, to define the outer boundaries of the concept of NHRI.  
                                                        
34 Parliament of the United Kingdom, Equality Act 2006, ss. 13-32. The functions and powers and of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission are laid down under the headings “General powers” and “Enforcement powers”.  
35 Ibid., ss. 20 et seqq., and Schedule 2 of the same Act, ss. 9 et seqq. 
36 E.g., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Cameroon, Nigeria, Uganda, and 
Rwanda all have commissions with a protection mandate.    
37 Again in relation to the re-accreditation of the German Institute, GANHRI found the protection mandate of the Institute 
“to be somewhat limited” (ICC, Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation 
(SCA). Geneva, 16-20 November 2015, para. 3.1). Similar remarks were made on the occasion of previous re-
accreditations (in November 2008 and November 2013, when re-accreditation was deferred).  
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This dissertation adopts a notion of NHRI which is essentially carved out of the characteristics 
enshrined in the Paris Principles, as interpreted by GANHRI. This notion excludes, among others, 
institutions that do not have a human rights mandate sensu stricto (such as the classical ombudsman), 
have a restricted human rights mandate (e.g., institutions that only deal with non-discrimination, or 
women or children rights), or are not independent from the authorities that create them (e.g., 
parliamentary committees). This is notwithstanding the fact that some of these bodies have been 
included as NHRIs by other authors, who deem it important to highlight their role in the promotion 
and protection of human rights at the domestic level.38  
Nonetheless, I believe that a clearly delimited notion of NHRIs has emerged from the Paris 
Principles as well as from GANHRI General Observations and its body of accreditation decisions. 
To dilute this notion seems unadvisable, at a time when increasing international recognition is given 
to NHRIs and to their accreditation. Moreover, while it is true that other national bodies contribute to 
further the promotion and protection of human rights in a country, certain specificities of NHRIs – 
such as a broad and explicit human rights mandate, institutional cooperation with both State 
authorities and civil society, and strong links with international organisations – justify the separate 
consideration of these institutions.39  
These considerations do not detract from the fact that the scope of the investigation can be 
widened according to the research objectives,40 and that different organisations and bodies might use 
different – and broader – definitions for their particular purposes (e.g., the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child cooperates with, and encourages the establishment of, children ombudsmen or 
commissions). Indeed, as will be shown below in Section 3.6, the CoE has traditionally adopted the 
                                                        
38 The classical ombudsman is included among NHRIs by Koo and Ramirez, supra n 2; Reif, supra n 22; Thomas Pegram, 
“Diffusion Across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National Human Rights Institutions”, Human Rights Quarterly 
32 (2010): 729-760. In Sonia Cardenas, “Adaptive States: The Proliferation of National Human Rights Institutions”, Carr 
Center for Human Rights Policy Working Paper T-01-04 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, November 2004): 
11 et seqq., the following bodies are also categorised as NHRIs, in addition to classical ombudsmen: specialised human 
rights commissions, parliamentary bodies, and national bodies dealing with international humanitarian law.   
39 Cf., in support of this choice, Emmanuel Decaux, “Le dixième anniversaire des principes directeurs des institutions 
nationales des droits de l’homme dits «Principes de Paris»”, Droits fondamentaux 3 (2003): 11-29. 
40 On this point, see Linda C. Reif, “The Shifting Boundaries of NHRI Definition in the International System”, in 
Goodman and Pegram, supra n 13, 71-72.  
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more comprehensive notion of “national human rights structures” to include entities such as classical 
ombudsmen and equality bodies, and these bodies’ interactions with the CoE will also be examined. 
Nonetheless, NHRIs are increasingly considered distinctive institutions in the CoE context as well, 
and as such they will be analysed in this dissertation. 
 
3.3. The proliferation of National Human Rights Institutions: causes and patterns 
While adopting partially different notions and categorisations, almost all accounts of the 
proliferation of NHRIs acknowledge the substantive role played by the UN in this respect.41 The UN-
sponsored 1991 Paris Workshop and its resulting Principles were decisive for the emergence of an 
internationally-shared notion of NHRIs; and the endorsement of the Principles by the UN General 
Assembly in 1993, following the endorsement by the UN Commission of Human Rights in 1992 and 
reference to them in the 1993 Vienna Declaration by the World Conference on Human Rights,42 
definitively legitimised NHRIs, by then perceived by States as a UN-blessed and not too intrusive 
instrument to comply with their international human rights obligations.  
Moreover, the UN has strongly supported the development of NHRIs by devoting a not 
insignificant part of its technical cooperation’s resources to the creation of national institutions in 
developing countries and by recognising an increasingly significant role for NHRIs within the 
procedures of its bodies and agencies. These factors (which constitute the focus of Section 3.5 below) 
were critical in boosting the worldwide spreading of NHRIs, together with broader international 
                                                        
41 Among others: Cardenas, supra n 24 (which details the UN contribution in terms of standard setting, capacity building, 
network facilitating, and membership granting); Raj Kumar, supra n 9; Sidoti, supra n 28; and Katerina Linos and Thomas 
Pegram, “Architects of Their Own Making: National Human Rights Institutions”, Human Rights Quarterly 38, no. 4 
(November 2016): 1109-1134.   
42 UN Commission on Human Rights, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, 3 March 
1992, E/CN.4/RES/1992/54; and UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July 1993, 
A/CONF.157/23, Part I, para. 36. The Declaration further refers to NHRIs in Part II, paras. 83 et seqq. (under the heading 
“Implementation and monitoring methods”). On the relationship between NHRIs and the Vienna World Conference, cf. 
Jennifer Lynch, “Fifteen Years after Vienna: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions”, in Global standards – 
Local action. 15 years Vienna World Conference in Human Rights: Conference Proceedings of the International Expert 
Conference held in Vienna on 28 and 29 August 2008, eds. Wolfgang Benedek et al. (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2009), 156-
160. 
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dynamics including the end of the Cold War and the surge of international human rights norms and 
monitoring mechanisms.43  
Whereas the above-mentioned international pressures undoubtedly contributed to the success 
of NHRIs, the influence of domestic factors should not be overlooked. Governments might be 
compelled to establish NHRIs primarily by strong civil society movements and public opinions; 
changes in government regimes might also boost the creation of NHRIs. Indeed, vigorous national 
input for the establishment of NHRIs is probably most evident in transitional or democratising 
States.44  
Additionally, the local context (in its political, legal, social, and cultural aspects) plays an 
important part in shaping the structure and mandate of the national institution, as well as the concrete 
impact of the NHRI on the country’s human rights situation. NHRIs were not invented by the UN 
from scratch, and various historical national precedents have been identified: the clearest one is the 
classical ombudsman, with respect to the human rights ombudsman; predecessors to the commission 
model can also be found (such as commissions of inquiry or traditional advisory commissions).45  
The local context is also relevant to the extent that any new NHRI has to integrate into an 
existing national framework for the promotion and protection of human rights, so that the 
characteristics and functions of the new institution will inevitably be influenced by those of the bodies 
already in place and ideally allow to avoid problematic overlapping of competences.46 As mentioned, 
                                                        
43 Cardenas, supra n 24, 27-28. On the influence of “world polity” factors, cf. also Koo and Ramirez, supra n 2. Dongwook 
Kim, “International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions”, 
International Organization 67, no. 3 (2013): 505-539, attributes a decisive role to international NGOs. 
44 Sonia Cardenas, “National Human Rights Institutions and State Compliance”, eds. Goodman and Pegram, supra n 13, 
42-43. 
45 On commissions of inquiry: Pegram, supra n 38, 735. Cf. also Sonia Cardenas, Chains of Justice: The Global Rise of 
State Institutions for Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 19 et seqq., which deals with 
the “institutional precursors” of NHRIs.  
46 The establishment of several NHRIs raised issues because of the pre-existence of bodies entrusted with the promotion 
and protection of human rights sensu lato, such as classical ombudsmen and/or equality bodies. Cf., for instance, the 
debate surrounding the creation of the Equality and Human Rights Commission in Great Britain: Sarah Spencer, “Equality 
and Human Rights Commission: A Decade in the Making”, Political Quarterly 79, no. 1 (2008): 6-16; and Colm 
O’Cinneide, “The Commission for Equality and Human Rights: A New Institution for New and Uncertain Times”, 
Industrial Law Journal 36, no. 2 (2007): 141-162. As a further example, cf. the absorption of the Dutch Equal Treatment 
Commission into the new Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, as described in Yvonne Donders and Marjolijn Olde 
Monnikhof, “The Newly Established Netherlands Institute for Human Rights: Integrating Human Rights and Equal 
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the Paris Principles leave a wide margin of discretion as to the form that NHRIs can assume, with the 
deliberate intention to make the domestic context matter.  
Finally, at an intermediate level, the regional dimension should be considered when examining 
the patterns of establishment of NHRIs. First of all, regional organisations – in a similar way to 
international ones – have promoted the creation of NHRIs in their member States and strengthened 
cooperation with these institutions over time.47  
In addition, and from a different perspective, a mimetic process has led to the establishment of 
similar NHRIs in the same region.48 Accordingly, almost all Latin American States opted for the 
human rights ombudsman type, while commissions with a protection mandate prevail in 
Commonwealth States and consultative commissions have been created mostly in francophone 
countries. In Europe, a greater variety of models can be found, but similarities within sub-regions are 
not infrequent: the ombudsman model characterises Central and Eastern Europe States, in addition to 
Spain and Portugal, whereas the commissions in the United Kingdom and in Ireland have been given 
strong protective mandates.  
Thus, a mix of domestic, regional, and international factors explain the establishment of NHRIs 
and affect their shape and ability to deliver results. National pressures might play a greater role in 
some instances (e.g., in respect of transitional States), whereas international influence might be more 
evident in other ones (e.g., in the context of internationally-driven peace processes).49 It is often the 
case that national and international pressures are mutually reinforcing: international 
                                                        
Treatment”, in National Human Rights Institutions in Europe: Comparative, European and International Perspectives, 
eds. Jan Wouters and Katrien Meuwissen (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013), 83-103. 
Additionally and more generally, the very need for NHRIs in democratic countries with independent judicial systems and 
lively civil societies has been put into question: Richard Carver, Performance & Legitimacy: National human rights 
institutions, 2nd ed. (Versoix: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2004), 64-67; and Gauthier de Beco, Non-
Judicial Mechanisms for the Implementation of Human Rights in European States (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2010), 81-90. 
47 All major regional organisations – the African Union, the Organization of American States, the CoE, the European 
Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – have done so. Cf. Section 3.6 below on 
the CoE and Section 6.4 for a brief account of the experiences of other regional organisations.  
48 Linos and Pegram, supra n 41, 1116 and 1120; and Pegram, supra n 38, 737-739. An analysis of NHRIs by region is 
offered in Reif, supra n 22, 30 et seqq. 
49 Reif, supra n 22, 13-16, mentions the peace agreements concerning El Salvador, Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Northern Ireland as examples. Cf. also, on NHRIs and peace agreements: Michelle 
Parlevliet, National Human Rights Institutions and Peace Agreements: Establishing National Institutions in Divided 
Societies (Versoix: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2006). 
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recommendations to institute an NHRI might be taken up at the national level by local human rights 
activists, whereas domestic demands for the advancement of human rights might be channelled by 
international organisations in the form of support for the establishment of an NHRI. At any rate, all 
of these levels matter, and the creation of each NHRI is the result of a unique combination of these 
factors.     
 
As strong as the above-mentioned pressures might be, the deeper question remains why States 
would establish a body whose primary function is to monitor the human rights situation in the country 
and report on it at the international level. Whether they mainly advise national authorities, receive 
individual complaints, or conduct research, NHRIs limit the discretion of governments and make their 
human rights violations known.  
There is indeed evidence that some States, particularly those with repressive regimes, created 
NHRIs to ingratiate themselves with the international community and international monitoring bodies 
or to satisfy national demands while keeping in fact control over these institutions.50 There have been 
examples of NHRIs shielding their governments from international reprimand or attacking NGOs,51 
and many more of weak or “toothless” institutions – inadequately funded or insufficiently 
independent to properly carry out their tasks.52 As long as NHRIs are established by governments, 
the risk exists that such cases occur. 
This dissertation does not ignore this reality nor other shortcomings that NHRIs indeed display. 
Nonetheless, it should be considered that while it might well be that some States are not genuinely 
                                                        
50 Cf. the extensive report Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders: Government Human Rights Commissions in 
Africa, 1 January 2001, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/01/01/protectors-or-
pretenders/government-human-rights-commissions-africa. Cf. also, with a focus on Asian States: Cardenas, supra n 38, 
28 et seqq. 
51 For instance, the Rwandan Commission harshly criticised NGOs before both the African Commission and the UN 
Commission on Human Rights: Rachel Murray, The Role of National Human Rights Institutions at the International and 
Regional Levels: The Experience of Africa (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 24. 
52 Cf. Human Rights Watch, supra n 50, for various examples in Africa; for an example in Asia, cf. Li-Ann Thio, 
“Panacea, Placebo, or Pawn? The Teething Problems of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (Suhakam)”, George 
Washington International Law Review 40, no. 4 (2008-2009): 1271-1342. Cf. also the allegations of lack of independence 
levelled at the Mexican NHRI, reported in Richard Carver, “A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights 
Institutions and the Domestication of International Law”, Human Rights Law Review 10, no. 1 (2010): 1-32. 
 96 
committed to establish strong and independent NHRIs, in the same way that they are not genuinely 
committed to respect the human rights treaties which they ratify, once an NHRI has been created 
there is no guarantee that it will not advance human rights by developing powers that are not explicitly 
conferred upon it by its founding legislation, by mobilising civil society, or by otherwise gaining the 
public confidence. Various NHRIs demonstrably overcame their authentic weaknesses (or “tainted 
origins”, as they have been called)53 and developed into strong institutions. These might be long-term 
changes, but notable ones.  
Furthermore, GANHRI should accredit – and consequently allow into the international human 
rights machinery – only those institutions that prove to be independent and effective in their operation. 
While room for improvement exists, the accreditation process carried out by GANHRI has been 
enhanced over time with a view to ensuring that worthy institutions only receive international support 
and legitimacy (while exerting pressure on the governments of those institutions that do not qualify).54  
At any rate, when examining the contents and effects of the participation by NHRIs in the 
promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments, it is not taken for granted that the information 
provided and the actions undertaken by NHRIs are always relevant, unbiased, and helpful to the 
execution process. The fact remains that all of the national human rights structures that have 
intervened to date before the Committee of Ministers are either A-status institutions or institutions 
that have established themselves as credible and independent, as is the case for many other structures 
that exist today in CoE Member States, even though with different degrees of effectiveness. 
 
                                                        
53 Peter Rosenblum, “Tainted Origins and Uncertain Outcomes: Evaluating NHRIs”, in Goodman and Pegram, supra n 
13, 297-323. Cf. also, on the ability of NHRIs to make an impact despite the circumstances of their establishment, various 
contributions in the same book: Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram, “Introduction”, 19 et seqq., and references therein. 
Even the above-mentioned critical report by Human Rights Watch, supra n 50, concedes that “even in the most repressive 
regimes, the establishment of an official state body devoted to human rights may, on occasion, create an official space 
for a human rights discourse and may foster greater, even if limited, activism and awareness” (Summary). 
54 On GANHRI accreditation process, cf. Section 3.4 below.  
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3.4. The accreditation of National Human Rights Institutions 
As mentioned, the international association of NHRIs, GANHRI (or International Coordinating 
Committee for NHRIs, ICC, until recently),55 accredits NHRIs on the basis of their compliance with 
the Paris Principles: A status for NHRIs that are fully compliant with the Principles, B status for 
institutions that only partially comply with the Principles, and C status for non-compliant institutions. 
ICC/GANHRI began its activities in 1993 and was subsequently formally established as a 
private-law association under Swiss law in 2008. The accreditation procedure, which is governed by 
a complex set of norms including the GANHRI Statute, Rules of Procedures, and some Practice 
Notes,56 was carried out for the first time in 1999, but the Sub-Committee on Accreditation was only 
created as a permanent body in 2004. 
The accreditation process gives substance to one of the main statutory functions of GANHRI – 
i.e., that “to promote the establishment and strengthening of NHRIs in conformity with the Paris 
Principles”.57 The assessment of the compliance of individual institutions with the internationally-
agreed standards for NHRIs serves many purposes: it puts pressure on governments, which are 
responsible for the implementation of many requirements of the Principles and are therefore called 
upon (although indirectly) to carry out the necessary changes; it makes NHRIs accountable by 
pointing to improvements that they can effect themselves and by encouraging them to lobby their 
governments;58 and it enhances the legitimacy of NHRIs at both the domestic and international levels. 
                                                        
55 The decision to change the name was adopted at the General Meeting of the Association on 22 March 2016. The 
documents produced by the Association will thus appear under one or the other name depending on the date on which the 
documents were published. 
56 GANHRI, Rules of Procedure for the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation, as amended on 22 February 2018; 
and GANHRI, Statute, as amended on 22 February 2018. During the same session, revised General Observations of the 
Sub-Committee of Accreditation were adopted (cf. supra n 10; General Observations were adopted for the first time in 
2006 and have subsequently been amended various times), whereas four Practice Notes were issued between 2016 and 
2017. Other relevant instruments include the Sub-Committee on Accreditation’s Working Methods and the Guidelines for 
Accreditation Applications (both last updated in 2009).  
57 GANHRI, Statute, supra n 56, Article 7(1)(b). 
58 It is somewhat paradoxical that the Paris Principles are mainly addressed to governments, whereas it is NHRIs that are 
under scrutiny in the accreditation process and receive recommendations by the Sub-Committee on Accreditation; cf., on 
this point, de Beco and Murray, supra n 22, 24-25 and 136-138. 
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Indeed, the exercise of such a control has become critical also in light of the increasing 
significance of the role played by NHRIs in international fora, particularly within the UN system; it 
is deemed essential that independent and effective institutions only are entrusted with the new, 
considerable prerogatives conferred upon accredited NHRIs. That is also why the accreditation 
procedure has been revised in many respects with a view to enhancing transparency, objectivity, and 
participation.  
Some commentators maintain that the role of GANHRI in promoting the establishment and 
reinforcement of NHRIs is inconsistent with its (supposedly impartial) accreditation role.59 While 
this consideration has some substance, it should be noted that it is in the interest of NHRIs (and 
GANHRI) that A status is reserved to credible institutions only; and that the alternatives to the current 
peer-review process might be riskier. At any rate, as will be shown below, GANHRI is making 
increasing efforts to strengthen the accreditation process. 
Before examining the accreditation procedure, it is worth mentioning that the other main 
statutory function of GANHRI is that to “coordinate at an international level the activities of NHRIs 
established in conformity with the Paris Principles”.60 In this respect, GANHRI promotes the 
exchange of information and best practices among NHRIs, fosters their cooperation, develops 
guidelines and policies, and organises conferences and workshops.  
Increasingly, these activities revolve around – even though they are not limited to – the 
participation of NHRIs in the UN system and, more generally, in international fora. Training and 
information on the subject are continuously provided,61 frequently in collaboration with the OHCHR, 
as well as in partnership with the four regional networks of NHRIs: i.e., the Network of African 
                                                        
59 According to Rosenblum, supra n 53, 300-301, “the ICC has improved its grading system for accrediting NHRIs, but 
as a body whose stated purpose is to ‘promote and strengthen’ NHRIs, it can only go so far”. Cf. also, in the same 
contribution, 314 et seqq. 
60 GANHRI, Statute, supra n 56, Article 7(1)(a). On the variety of functions that are performed by GANHRI, cf. Anne-
Marie Garrido and Birgitte Kofod Olsen, “Coordination of the Work of NHRIs – From Liaison to Joint Achievements”, 
in Implementing Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Morten Kjaerum, eds. Rikke Frank JJørgensen and Klaus Slavensky 
(Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2001), 190-203. 
61 Cf., for instance, the activities mentioned in GANHRI, 2017 Annual Report: Advancing human rights with National 
Human Rights Institutions and our partners (Geneva: GANHRI, 2018), 18-19; and GANHRI, 2018 Annual Report: 25 
years, Advancing human rights with National Human Rights Institutions and our partners (Geneva: GANHRI, 2019), 31. 
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National Human Rights Institutions, the Network of National Human Rights Institutions of the 
Americas, the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, and the European Network 
of National Human Rights Institutions.  
These networks not only represent NHRIs from their respective regions within GANHRI 
(regional distribution is relevant, inter alia, for the designation of members of the GANHRI Bureau 
and Sub-Committee on Accreditation), but they also provide support to their member NHRIs in a 
number of ways, such as through capacity-building, training, and exchanges of information (in a 
manner similar to GANHRI). Moreover, both regional networks and GANHRI take part in the 
activities of various UN bodies and mechanisms, in place of or in addition to their member NHRIs.   
 
In short, the GANHRI accreditation process can be outlined as follows. The GANHRI 
Secretariat – i.e., a unit in the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – 
receives the application and the relevant documentation by the interested NHRI.62 The Secretariat 
reviews the information and prepares a report, which is forwarded to the Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation, composed of four representatives from A-status institutions. The Sub-Committee then 
issues its recommendation on the status to be attributed to the applicant NHRI – A, B or C. The final 
decision on the accreditation status is taken by the GANHRI Bureau, which is composed of 
representatives from sixteen A-status NHRIs, evenly distributed among the four regional groupings 
(Africa, Americas, Asia-Pacific, and Europe). More specifically, the recommendation by the Sub-
Committee is considered to be accepted by the Bureau unless a member of the latter raises an 
objection (at the instigation of the applicant NHRI), and that objection is supported by at least four 
Bureau members in total coming from at least two different regions.63 
                                                        
62 The accreditation procedure as described below is mainly laid down in GANHRI, Rules of Procedure, supra n 56, Rules 
from 6 to 10. For a detailed description of the accreditation procedure, cf. also GANHRI/Canadian Human Rights 
Commission, A Practical Guide to the Work of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), December 2017 – updated 
November 2018. 
63 GANHRI, Statute, supra n 56, Article 12(1). 
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Over time, the accreditation procedure succinctly described above has undergone various 
amendments. First of all, as an additional due process guarantee, the Secretariat’s report and any 
third-party submissions are forwarded to the applicant NHRI, which can comment on them.64 Also, 
the applicant institution can challenge the recommendation issued by the Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation within twenty-eight days; the challenge is brought to the attention of the GANHRI 
Bureau, whose members might decide to support the challenge in the manner mentioned above.65  
The quantity and quality of the information received by the Sub-Committee has also been 
upgraded: all applicant NHRIs have to submit a “Statement of Compliance with the Paris Principles” 
in accordance with a template, together with other documentation regarding their organisational 
structure, mandate, activities, and budget.66 Third-party submissions are now provided for and 
encouraged during the accreditation procedure,67 and the Sub-Committee is required to consider the 
relevant recommendations or observations made by UN bodies and mechanisms (including treaty 
bodies, Special Procedures, and the Universal Periodic Review).68 
Reasons for the determinations by the Sub-Committee are outlined in greater detail and the 
recommendations by the Sub-Committee for further improvements have become much more focused 
and specific with a view to facilitating both remedial actions by NHRIs and governments and 
submissions by third parties. The re-accreditation procedure also benefits from such a practice, which 
allows to scrutinise more effectively the implementation of previous recommendations.  
Re-accreditation itself is one of the most significant innovations introduced. Every five years, 
A-status and B-status NHRIs have to seek confirmation of their status through a process of re-
accreditation which is essentially analogous to the accreditation of new institutions, with the 
                                                        
64 GANHRI, Rules of Procedure, supra n 56, Rules 6(7) and 7. 
65 GANHRI, Statute, supra n 56, Article 12(1). 
66 Ibid., Article 10; and GANHRI, Rules of Procedure, supra n 56, Rule 6(1). The “Template of the Statement of 
Compliance” can be found in the Compilation of the Rules and Working Methods of the SCA (2010), section 5.  
67 GANHRI, Rules of Procedure, supra n 56, Rule 6(7). On the potential of NGOs in this respect and for some examples 
of actual engagement, cf. Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, “National Human Rights Institutions and Civil Society 
Organizations: New Dynamics of Engagement at Domestic, Regional, and International Levels”, Global Governance 18, 
no. 3 (2012): 308 et seqq. 
68 GANHRI, Rules of Procedure, supra n 56, Rule 8(1). 
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additional requirement that (re-)applicant NHRIs need to “provide information to show how they 
have addressed recommendations made by the [Sub-Committee on Accreditation] in the previous 
accreditation review”.69 If an NHRI fails to re-apply for accreditation, its status is suspended; if it still 
has not lodged the application one year after the suspension, the status will lapse.70 Moreover, if the 
(re-)applicant NHRI cannot show concrete progress in relation to past recommendations, “the [Sub-
Committee] may, depending on the seriousness of the issues previously raised, interpret such lack of 
progress as an indication of non-compliance with the Paris Principles”.71 
Amendments to GANHRI Statute and Rules of Procedure also introduced a “special review”: 
“where the circumstances of any NHRI change in any way that may affect its continued compliance 
with the Paris Principles”, the NHRI concerned has to notify GANHRI, and a review of its status 
takes place;72 such a review can also be initiated by the GANHRI Chairperson or any member of the 
Sub-Committee.73 If the continued conformity of the NHRI under review with the Paris Principles is 
not demonstrated, the status of the NHRI will lapse.74  
Additional measures have been adopted to respond to rapid changes in the circumstances or 
uncertain situations, which include the power of the GANHRI Bureau to immediately suspend 
accreditation in exceptional circumstances (Statute, Article 18(2)), criteria to examine applications 
from NHRIs “in volatile contexts” (Rules of Procedure, Rule 8(4)), and a Practice Note on “NHRIs 
in transition”.75 
                                                        
69 Ibid., Rule 6(1). 
70 GANHRI, Statute, supra n 56, Articles 19 and 20. 
71 GANHRI, Rules of Procedure, supra n 56, Rule 8(3). 
72 GANHRI, Statute, supra n 56, Article 16(1). 
73 GANHRI, Statute, supra n 56, Article 16(2). A Practice Note on the issue has recently been adopted by GANHRI: 
Practice Note 2: Special Reviews, adopted at the GANHRI Bureau Meeting held in Geneva on 6 March 2017. 
74 GANHRI, Statute, supra n 56, Article 20. 
75 GANHRI, Practice Note 4: NHRIs in Transition, adopted at the GANHRI Bureau Meeting held in Geneva, 6 March 
2017.  
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Finally, the dissemination of the recommendations by the Sub-Committee has been enhanced, 
as they are now circulated widely among NHRIs and other stakeholders and published on the 
GANHRI website.76  
 
The Sub-Committee on Accreditation has therefore developed over time a stronger 
accreditation procedure, which is open to the contribution by external actors (civil society and UN 
bodies in particular), more transparent to both stakeholders and applicant NHRIs themselves, and 
based on stricter and continuous scrutiny.77 That the accreditation procedure has become more 
rigorous is reflected in the increasing number of NHRIs which are downgraded or suspended,78 even 
though GANHRI still abides by an essentially cooperative approach whereby NHRIs are given time 
to solve issues and comply with the Principles.79  
Increasingly, the Sub-Committee seeks to carry out an examination which is not only concerned 
with the formal adherence by the founding statutes of NHRIs to the Paris Principles, but also with the 
performances of the institutions and their results in the promotion and protection of human rights. As 
put it by the amended Rules of Procedure of the Sub-Committee, “the [Sub-Committee] assesses an 
applicant’s compliance with the Paris Principles in both law and practice. In doing so, it considers 
                                                        
76 Reports and recommendations by the Sub-Committee on Accreditation since 2006 can be consulted at the following 
GANHRI webpage: http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/GANHRIAccreditation/Pages/SCA-Reports.aspx (accessed 4 
January 2019). 
77 On the strengthening of the accreditation process, cf. in the literature: Linos and Pegram, supra n 41; Sidoti, supra n 
28; Sulini Sarugaser-Hug, “How a Peer-Review Mechanism Can Influence the Implementation of Human Rights 
Standards: Why the Work of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation of the International Coordinating Committee of 
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Matters”, Australian Journal of Human Rights 
18, no. 2 (2012): 45-68, which also interestingly surveys the actual implementation of the recommendations by the Sub-
Committee on Accreditation. Meg Brodie, “Progressing Norm Socialisation: Why Membership Matters. The Impact of 
the Accreditation Process of the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights”, Nordic Journal of International Law 80 (2011): 143-192, highlights and analyses the shift 
“from a very inclusive membership process to one which regulates and excludes”. 
Cf. also de Beco and Murray, supra n 22, 17, which however notes that “while information from the OHCHR and civil 
society organisations is now permitted, it is still a process of peer review based principally on the documents that the 
NHRI submits to the [Sub-Committee]. The process of analysis of these documents, the extent to which alternative 
information is provided by others and how the [Sub-Committee] questions this information and arrives at its conclusion 
is not publicly available”. 
78 Linos and Pegram, supra n 41, 1125. Further recent examples include the Human Rights Commissioner of Azerbaijan 
and the Human Rights Commission of Mauritania, which were downgraded from A to B status in May 2018 and October 
2018 respectively. 
79 For instance, through the deferral, an NHRI can ask for its re-accreditation review to be postponed; the request must in 
any case be justified (GANHRI, Rules of Procedure, supra n 56, Rules 12(1) and 12(2)). 
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whether … an applicant’s actions demonstrate that it is effectively fulfilling its mandate to promote 
and protect human rights”.80  
Indeed, the issue of effectiveness of NHRIs – i.e., their ability to deliver results in the promotion 
and protection of human rights –81 is increasingly under the spotlight in the literature.82 Moreover, 
the need appears to be felt by NHRIs themselves and their proponents to establish institutions that 
not only are useful in theory, but advance human rights in practice. One of the main criticisms levelled 
at the Paris Principles is that they focus on institutional aspects, while largely ignoring the actual 
impact of the work by NHRIs; the risk is thus to accredit institutions that are formally compliant with 
the Principles regardless of their performances.  
                                                        
80 Ibid., Rule 8(1). 
81 Richard Carver, Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions (Versoix: International Council on 
Human Rights Policy, 2005), 34, makes the following distinction: “performance indicators measure whether the 
institution has actually achieved what it set out to do; impact indicators assess whether those activities effectively changed 
the human rights situation”. A similar distinction can also be found in Julie Mertus, “Evaluating NHRIs: Considering 
Structure, Mandate, and Impact”, eds. Goodman and Pegram, supra n 13, which puts forward various approaches to 
evaluate NHRIs. 
82 Cf., among others, Stephen Livingstone and Rachel Murray, “The Effectiveness of National Human Rights 
Institutions”, in Human Rights Brought Home: Socio-Legal Perspectives on Human Rights in the National Context, eds. 
Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt (Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004): 137-164; Carver, supra n 46; Richard 
Carver, Measuring the Impact and Development Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions. A Proposed 
Framework for Evaluation (Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, 2014); Reif, supra n 22, 23 et seqq.; 
Linos and Pegram, supra n 22; and Steven L. B. Jensen, Lessons from Research on National Human Rights Institutions 
– A Desk Review on Findings Related to NHRI Effectiveness (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2018), for 
a useful overview of the studies conducted on the effectiveness of NHRIs. 
Besides, NHRIs are not the only human rights bodies in relation to which the issues of effectiveness and its assessment 
have been raised: cf., for instance, David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, “Measuring the Impact of Human Rights 
Organizations”, in NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance, ed. Claude E. Welch Jr. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 225-237, referring to NGOs; and Mila Versteeg, “Performance Measures for 
Human Rights Commissions”, Executive Session Papers: Human Rights Commissions and the Criminal Justice System 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2007), regarding civil rights commissions in the United States. 
The new focus on the effectiveness of NHRIs is partially linked to a growing interest for these institutions on the part of 
political and social scientists, who are complementing the work undertaken by legal scholars: cf., in addition to the works 
cited above in this footnote, Pegram, supra n 38; Cardenas, supra n 38; Goodman and Pegram, supra n 13; and, on NHRIs 
in the broader context of international relations theories, Noha Shawki, “A New Actor in Human Rights Politics? 
Transgovernmental Networks of National Human Rights Institutions”, in Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: 
Actors and Issues in Contemporary Human Rights Politics, eds. Michaelene Cox and Noha Shawki (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2009), 41-57.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that multidisciplinary research is being undertaken on NHRIs with a view to studying the 
complex impact that these institutions can have on a variety of issues and processes – e.g. democratic transitions (cf., 
among others, Cardenas, supra n 45, Chapters 6 and 7), good governance (Raj Kumar, supra n 9; and Reif, supra n 22), 
human rights diplomacy (Kirsten Roberts, “National Human Rights Institutions as Diplomacy Actors”, in Human Rights 
Diplomacy: Contemporary Perspectives, eds. Michael O’Flaherty et al. (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), 223-
249), conflict resolution and peace agreements (Michelle Parlevliet, Guy Lamb and Victoria Maloka, eds., Defenders of 
Human Rights, Managers of Conflict, Builders of Peace? National Human Rights Institutions in Africa (Cape Town: 
University of Cape Town, 2005); and the literature mentioned supra n 49), and human rights education (Sonia Cardenas, 
“Constructing Rights? Human Rights Education and the State”, International Political Science Review 26, no. 4 (2005): 
363-379).   
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Accountability is crucial to the well-functioning of any organisation, and especially of a public 
body mandated to promote and protect human rights. While there is thus no doubt that NHRIs should 
be held accountable, particularly in light of the public (and international) funds they receive and of 
the increasingly significant role they play at the national and international levels, the question arises 
as to whom NHRIs should be answerable to, and how.  
Commonly, the following are indicated as entities to which an NHRI should be accountable: 
the government, the parliament, civil society, the public at large, and donors (where different).83 But 
how are NHRIs to answer to this multiplicity of stakeholders while maintaining their independence? 
The relationship with the government is especially delicate, and that is why it has been recommended 
that parliaments – instead of executives – receive the reports by NHRIs and oversee their 
performances.84 In general terms, it can be said that it is once again a question of striking a fair balance 
between two potentially conflicting principles – accountability and independence – which are both 
essential to NHRIs: their independence from both their governments and NGOs is pivotal, as is their 
ability to deliver results through a proper management of the resources received.  
 A further problem that arises when assessing the effectiveness of NHRIs has to do with the 
difficulties of establishing a causal link between the actions by the NHRI on the one hand and changes 
in the human rights situation in the country on the other. Progress in a country’s human rights 
conditions can hardly be attributed with certainty to this or that specific actor; the impact of the 
initiatives undertaken by NHRIs, however commendable, depends on a number of external factors, 
including the ability of other actors (primarily domestic authorities and NGOs) to take up these 
initiatives and act on them.85  
                                                        
83 Smith, supra n 10, 937-944, outlines four “layers” of accountability: formal accountability, public/popular 
accountability, broad accountability, and government accountability. The accountability issue is also central in Murray, 
supra n 51, Chapter 6 in particular.   
84 GANHRI, supra n 10, G.O. 1.11, “Annual reports of NHRIs”. Cf. also de Beco and Murray, supra n 22, 141-143.  
85 Goodman and Pegram, supra n 53, 14-15. Cf. also Meyer, supra n 13, 328 et seqq.; and Livingstone and Murray, supra 
n 82, 140. 
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Nonetheless, solutions are being put forward from various quarters: criteria have been 
developed by UN agencies and research centres with a view to enabling NHRIs to carry out a self-
assessment of their effectiveness;86 and at least some NHRIs are subject to thorough reporting and 
audit procedures at the national level.87 At the same time, the GANHRI Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation has sought to specify and give more substance to the requirements in the Paris 
Principles as well as to encourage the provision of external information. Moreover, a Practice Note 
on Assessing the Performance of NHRIs has recently been adopted, although it appears that much 
remains to do in this respect, in the absence of clear benchmarks and indicators to measure the 
effectiveness of NHRIs. Greater attention to the concrete performance of NHRIs appears critical for 
GANHRI to perform its gatekeeper function effectively88 and for NHRIs to maintain their legitimacy 
and credibility at both the national and international levels.  
The almost complete silence of the Paris Principles on the issues of effectiveness and 
accountability of NHRIs has been noted89 and identified as one of the main reasons justifying the 
amendment, if not the overcoming, of the Principles. The Principles have also been accused of being 
too vague on various crucial requirements, such as independence,90 and not bold enough when they 
consider quasi-judicial functions optional,91 but too ambitious when they depict ideal institutions 
(independent, pluralistic, with an array of competences and powers) with the risk of raising 
exaggerated social expectations.92  
                                                        
86 Carver, supra n 81; and Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, the UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional 
Centre, and OHCHR, Capacity Assessment Manual for National Human Rights Institutions, rev. (August 2014). More 
recently, the following document has been produced: GANHRI, OHCHR, and UNDP, Global Principles for the Capacity 
Assessment of National Human Rights Institutions (New York: UNDP, 2016), which indicates awareness on the part of 
GANHRI of the need to promote and assess the effectiveness of NHRIs. 
87 In Europe, the UK commissions are probably the most advanced in this respect, with clear obligations in terms of 
activity and financial reporting; they normally have an internal audit committee and are also subject to external audit.   
88 GANHRI is characterised as the Paris Principles’ “gatekeeper” in Reif, supra n 40, 72; Sidoti, supra n 28, 97-98; and 
Linos and Pegram, supra n 41, 1122 et seqq. 
89 De Beco and Murray, supra n 22, 20 and 26. 
90 Raj Kumar, supra n 9, 271-272. On the vagueness of the Principles on several substantial issues, see also Linos and 
Pegram, supra n 41, 1119. 
91 On the criticism levelled at the optional nature of quasi-judicial functions, cf. the literature mentioned supra n 22. 
92 As summarised in Carver, supra n 46, 2: “On the one hand [the Paris Principles] lay down a maximum programme that 
is met by hardly any national institution in the world … On the other hand, the Paris Principles do not even take it as 
given that a national institution will deal with individual complaints”. On the risk of too high expectations surrounding 
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The suitableness of the Paris Principles as the touchstone for NHRIs, more than twenty years 
after their drafting, has thus been questioned by some authors.93 It is undeniable that the Principles 
have flows; inter alia, this has to do with the fact that, at the time of their issuance, there were not 
many NHRIs in place; the role of NHRIs at the national and international levels was less significant; 
and the Principles were the result of an inclusive process, whereby various kinds of national human 
rights bodies were involved.  
Nonetheless, there a number of factors that militate against a revision of the Principles: the 
Principles are the constant point of reference for the establishment and strengthening of NHRIs as 
recommended in all relevant international and regional documents and as implemented by States; 
there is no request for their amendment by stakeholders – not by governments, nor by NGOs or 
NHRIs themselves; the Principles are only minimum standards;94 and GANHRI General 
Observations, which interpret the Principles and form the basis for the international accreditation of 
NHRIs, are gradually filling the gaps that emerge. Moreover, to review the Principles could incur the 
risk of greater governmental interference; indeed, one of the most significant advantages of the Paris 
Principles is that they have been drafted mainly by NHRIs themselves.95 This and a peer-review 
process of accreditation protect NHRIs from unduly State encroachment and add to their legitimacy 
and credibility.  
 
                                                        
NHRIs: Meyer, supra n 13, 325 et seqq., which nonetheless maintains that this risk extends to virtually all institutions; 
Raj Kumar, supra n 9, 275 et seqq.; and Cardenas, supra n 24, 38. 
93 For instance, Raj Kumar, supra n 9, 275, argues that “the Paris Principles are, at best, a good starting point for 
discussions relating to the formation of NHRIs, but it is not in the human rights movement’s best interest to give them 
more importance than they deserve in light of their weaknesses and limited nature”. Parlevliet, supra n 49, 7, holds a 
more nuanced view and concludes that especially in post-conflict settings, but also more generally, “while it is important 
to assess institutions in light of the Paris Principles, compliance with these formal requirements alone does not translate 
into effectiveness; other factors must also be considered. In particular, the difficult conditions within which national 
institutions often work must be recognised …”. 
94 Brian Burdekin, “National Human Rights Institutions”, in International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays 
in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, eds. Gudmundur Alfredsson et al., 2nd ed. (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 663. 
95 Mertus, supra n 81, 89; and Sidoti, supra n 28, 96-98. 
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3.5. National Human Rights Institutions and the United Nations 
NHRIs carry out their mandate to promote and protect human rights in many ways, but an 
important component of it consists in “localising” and “appropriating” international human rights 
standards and decisions. In other words, they help fill the notorious “implementation gap” that affects 
international human rights law, by which norms risk resulting in statements of principle that are not 
followed by actual implementation.96 In this respect, NHRIs are not only expected to monitor and 
encourage compliance by States with their international obligations, but also to entrench the substance 
of these obligations in the domestic legal, social, and cultural contexts.  
NHRIs also respond to other needs, such as that to address human rights violations which do 
not otherwise ring an international bell, also because of the difficulties for victims to have access to 
international fora;97 or that to promote human rights norms and cultures that are, as far as possible, 
coherent with local values, traditions, and laws. Again, these functions are not exhausted at the 
national level; ideally, NHRIs should bring local issues and concerns, as well as denounce local 
violations, to the international level, so that the latter is not completely detached from national 
realities. 
 The significance of the international dimension of NHRIs was clear from their origins. While 
it is only with the 1991 Paris Principles that a precise notion of NHRI emerged, its roots lie in the 
early years of the UN history.98 In the context of the establishment of the Commission on Human 
Rights in 1946, the UN Economic and Social Council invited Member States “to consider the 
desirability of establishing information groups or local human rights committees within their 
respective countries to collaborate with them in furthering the work of the Commission on Human 
                                                        
96 On the point, cf. Section 1.2 of this dissertation. 
97 Burdekin, supra n 94, 660; and Raj Kumar, supra n 9, 263. 
98 A detailed account of the historical development of NHRIs and of their relationship with the UN system can be found 
in Decaux, supra n 39, 13 et seqq.; Pohjolainen, supra n 29; and Fellous, supra n 10, 51 et seqq. Cf. also Mutaz M. 
Qafisheh, “The International Status of National Human Rights Institutions: A comparison with NGOs”, Nordic Journal 
of Human Rights 31, no. 1 (2013): 60 et seqq; and Birgit Lindsnaes, Lone Lindholt, and Kristine Yigen, eds., National 
Human Rights Institutions: Articles and Working Papers (Copenhagen: Danish Centre for Human Rights, 2000), Section 
1.2, 5 et seqq. 
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Rights”.99 These “local committees” were never created, and the idea of national bodies collaborating 
with the UN in the promotion and protection of human rights was seemingly abandoned for several 
years.100  
A renewed interest resulted in the 1978 Guidelines for the structure and functioning of national 
institutions, which were adopted at a seminar organised by the UN Commission on Human Rights 
and subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly.101 While the Guidelines themselves did not 
boost the establishment of NHRIs, they did create a fertile ground for further reflection on NHRIs at 
the UN level and served as a model for the Paris Principles.102  
A growing interest on the part of the UN, coupled with acceptance on the part of States (for 
which NHRIs arguably represented a less intrusive and more adaptable monitoring mechanism), led 
to the first International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, held in Paris from 7 to 9 October 1991. The Workshop was attended among others 
by various UN agencies103 and organised with the decisive contribution of the UN Centre for Human 
Rights. Thereafter, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, successor 
to the UN Centre for Human Rights) would become one of the strongest proponents of the 
development of NHRIs through its technical and financial assistance programmes.104 The role that 
the OHCHR plays to support GANHRI and its accreditation procedure is also considerable.105  
                                                        
99 UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 2/9. Commission on Human Rights, 21 June 1946, para. 5 (“Information 
groups”). 
100 With the exception of UNESCO “national cooperating bodies” (UNESCO, Constitution, Article VII). In the period 
between the 1946 Resolution by the Economic and Social Council and the 1978 Guidelines, on which see infra, very few 
UN documents and initiatives referred to the establishment of NHRIs or similar bodies; for the reasons of such a trend, 
cf. Pohjolainen, supra n 29, 32 et seqq.  
101 UN Secretariat, Seminar on national and local institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, 15 
November 1978, ST/HR/SER.A/2 (the text of the Guidelines can be found under Chapter V, paras. 184 et seqq.). The 
Guidelines were endorsed by UN General Assembly, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human 
rights, 14 December 1978, A/RES/33/46.   
102 Decaux, supra n 39, 15-16; and Pohjolainen, supra n 29, 43-47. 
103 The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), UNESCO and ILO. 
104 On the active role played by the OHCHR in promoting NHRIs, cf. Pohjolainen, supra n 29, 67-74; Cardenas, supra n 
24, 30-32; OHCHR, supra n 8, 8-10; Roberts, supra n 82; and Gianni Magazzeni, “The Role of OHCHR in Promoting 
National Human Rights Institutions”, in Benedek et al., supra n 42, 169-176. Cf. also, in witness of the engagement by 
the OHCHR with NHRIs, the UNDP-OHCHR Toolkit for collaboration with National Human Rights Institutions (New 
York; Geneva: UNDP and OHCHR, December 2010); and Francesca Jessup and Koffi Kounte, Evaluation of OHCHR 
Support to National Human Rights Institutions – Final Report, October 2015. For a criticism of the allegedly 
unconditional support provided by the OHCHR to NHRIs, cf. Rosenblum, supra n 53, 302 et seqq. 
105 Cf. Section 3.4 above. 
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While current NHRIs do not mirror the Economic and Social Council’s notions of “local 
committees” or “information groups” (which would have basically been UN focal points within 
Member States), the importance of the collaboration by NHRIs with international and regional 
organisations is clearly spelled out in the Paris Principles.106 Moreover, since the adoption of the 
Principles, the international activities of NHRIs have increased, and so have their international 
recognition and status, as the remainder of this section will show.  
 
Given the significance of the international dimension of NHRIs in the Paris Principles, it is 
unsurprising that international organisations have been the main sponsors for NHRIs. The 
promotional efforts by the UN are particularly noteworthy and have moved in two directions: on the 
one hand, Member States have been increasingly recommended to establish NHRIs in compliance 
with the Paris Principles; on the other, compliant institutions have been vested with a growing number 
of responsibilities and prerogatives within the UN framework.   
The UN Commission on Human Rights and its successor the Human Rights Council (which 
replaced the Commission in 2006) are a case in point. In 1996, the Commission officially welcomed 
the participation by NHRIs in its meetings; at that time, however, NHRIs were allowed to intervene 
as part of the government delegations and only in relation to the Commission’s agenda item that 
specifically concerned NHRIs.107 While the right to speak from a floor separate from that of their 
respective governments was secured by NHRIs a couple of years later,108 it took until 2005 for them 
                                                        
106 As put it by Dickson, supra n 11, 276: “Of the seven responsibilities which the Paris Principles say national human 
rights institutions should perform, no fewer than four relate to international human rights”. Cf. also, on the international 
responsibilities of NHRIs: Carver, supra n 52, 11 et seqq. 
107 UN Commission on Human Rights, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, 19 April 
1996, E/CN.4/RES/1996/50; and UN Commission on Human Rights, National institutions for the promotion and 
protection of human rights, 11 April 1997, E/CN.4/RES/1997/40 (paras. 15-16 of both documents). Cf. also UN 
Commission on Human Rights, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights – Report of the 
Secretary-General submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1996/50, 5 February 1997, 
E/CN.4/1997/41, paras. 40-42. 
108 UN Commission on Human Rights, Effective Functioning of Human Rights Mechanisms: National Institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights – Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Accordance with Commission 
on Human Rights Resolution 1998/55, 3 February 1999, E/CN.4/1999/95, paras. 55-58; and UN Commission on Human 
Rights, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, 28 April 1999, E/CN.4/RES/1999/72, 
paras. 14-15.  
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to obtain the right to speak on all of the Commission’s agenda items.109 It is to be noted that these 
prerogatives were and are reserved to NHRIs that comply with the Paris Principles and have been 
duly accredited by GANHRI; they are also granted to GANHRI and to the four regional networks of 
NHRIs. 
The above-mentioned arrangements have been maintained by the Human Rights Council, so 
that NHRIs are provided with ample opportunities to engage with this body through the submission 
of documents and the issuance of oral and written statements. Nonetheless, the involvement of NHRIs 
in the Council’s sessions is still rather low, although on the rise.110 Engagement by NHRIs with the 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a new mechanism established within the Human Rights Council, 
is, however, a different matter.111  
In short, the UPR – instituted on the occasion of the establishment of the Council – is a process 
of comprehensive review of the human rights situation in UN Member States, whereby each State is 
examined every four and a half years. It is a peer-review process, inasmuch as the examination is 
carried out by the forty-seven States that make up the Council and is open to participation by all other 
Member States. The review is based on several documents including the governmental report, a 
compilation of the information contained in UN documents (e.g., concluding observations by human 
                                                        
109 UN Commission on Human Rights, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, 20 April 
2005, E/CN.4/RES/2005/74, para. 11. On the interactions between NHRIs on the one hand and the Commission on Human 
Rights and the Human Rights Council on the other, cf. the exhaustive accounts in Sidoti, supra n 28, 104 et seqq.; and 
Fellous, supra n 10, 68-76.  
110 OHCHR, Survey on National Human Rights Institutions: Report on the findings and recommendations of a 
questionnaire addressed to NHRIs worldwide (Geneva: OHCHR, July 2009), 45, according to which about 20% of 
respondent NHRIs interacted with the Human Rights Council (data refer to the period 2006-2008; sixty-one NHRIs 
worldwide responded to the questionnaire). Sidoti, supra n 28, 106, also puts into question the quality and usefulness of 
some contributions by NHRIs.  
Yet, it would seem that in more recent years statements by NHRIs to the Human Rights Council have grown in number 
and increasingly concern substantial issues. A list of all submissions by NHRIs to the Council, divided by session, can be 
found at http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/HumanRightsCouncil/Pages/Human-Rights-Council.aspx, accessed 4 January 
2019. Examples of individual and collective statements by NHRIs before the Council (including statements by GANHRI 
and regional networks) are provided in Kirsten Roberts, “The Role and Functioning of the International Coordinating 
Committee of National Human Rights Institutions in International Human Rights Bodies”, in Wouters and Meuwissen, 
supra n 46, 235-236. 
111 Cf., on the UPR, UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 15 March 2006, A/RES/60/251, para. 11; and UN 
Human Rights Council, Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 18 June 2007, 
A/HRC/RES/5/1, Annex, Section I. An important revision of the procedures of the Human Rights Council, including the 
UPR, took place by means of UN Human Rights Council, Review of the work and functioning of the Human Rights 
Council, 25 March 2011, A/HRC/RES/16/21; the revision also affected the participation by NHRIs, in the sense of 
specifying and strengthening it (cf. below in this section for more details).  
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rights treaty bodies, reports by Special Procedures), and information submitted by “other 
stakeholders”. The latter include NGOs, regional organisations (such as the CoE, OSCE, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights), and NHRIs.  
Significantly, a distinction has been introduced in 2011 in relation to NHRIs, so that the 
contributions by A-status institutions are to be enshrined in a “separate section”, whereas 
“information provided by other accredited national human rights institutions will be reflected 
accordingly, as well as information provided by other stakeholders”.112 Additionally, it is the right of 
fully compliant NHRIs only “to intervene immediately after the State under review during the 
adoption of the outcome of the review by the Council plenary”.113  
NHRIs and other relevant stakeholders are also expected to monitor the implementation of the 
recommendations laid down in the outcome of the review and possibly to deliver mid-term reports 
on the subject, as well as to cooperate with governments in furthering the implementation process. 
The apparent ambiguity between the monitoring task and the cooperation one, which also affects the 
reporting phase,114 is even more evident with respect to the interactions between NHRIs and UN 
human rights treaty bodies, and it will thus be illustrated in more detail below.  
Various notes have been issued and workshops organised by both the OHCHR and GANHRI 
with a view to clarifying the potential contribution by NHRIs to the UPR process and encouraging 
                                                        
112 UN Human Rights Council, Review of the work and functioning of the Human Rights Council, supra n 111, Annex, 
para. 9.  
113 Ibid., para. 13.  
114 For instance, during an ICC panel meeting held in March 2014 on the engagement by NHRIs with the UPR, it emerged 
that some NHRIs had consulted with their respective governments in the preparation of their reports or (more often) had 
been involved in the preparation of the governmental reports. Cf., for a summary of the panel meeting, UPR Info, “NHRIs 
share best practices on UPR engagement”, News, 17 March 2014, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.upr-
info.org/en/news/nhris-share-best-practices-on-upr-engagement.  
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their participation therein.115 On the other hand, studies on the extent of the involvement by NHRIs 
in the process and especially on the effects of such an involvement are surprisingly lacking.116  
For the limited purposes of this dissertation, namely to draw a comparison between the 
participation by NHRIs in the UN procedures and their participation at the CoE level, the summaries 
of stakeholders’ information compiled on the occasion of the UPR first and second cycles of CoE 
Member States have been reviewed with a view to measuring – from a purely quantitative perspective 
– the extent of the participation by European NHRIs within the UPR mechanism.  
During the first cycle (2008-2011), twelve out of sixteen A-status NHRIs117 and four out of 
nine B-status NHRIs118 submitted information to the UPR Working Group. At times, other national 
human rights structures lodged submissions and were put under the same heading “National Human 
Rights Institution”, as is the case for various ombudsmen, both from States that had a compliant NHRI 
(e.g., Croatia and Ireland) and from States that did not have such an institution (Czech Republic).  
During the second cycle (2012-2016), the trend of participation by fully compliant institutions 
consolidated, possibly because of greater familiarity with the mechanism, considerable efforts on the 
part of the OHCHR to involve NHRIs through guidelines and technical support, and the 2011 reform 
                                                        
115 The OHCHR issues practical instructions for participation before every UPR sessions; for the most recent ones, cf. 
OHCHR, Universal Periodic Review (Third Cycle): Information and guidelines for relevant stakeholders’ written 
submissions, published at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/NgosNhris.aspx (accessed 4 January 2019). 
As for meetings and workshops, cf. the ICC panel meeting mentioned supra n 114, as well as the panels organised within 
the May 2011 ICC General Meeting (a summary of the discussion has been made available at UPR Info, “International 
Coordinating Committee on NHRIs holds a discussion on treaty bodies and UPR follow-up”, News, 2 June 2011, accessed 
4 January 2019, https://www.upr-info.org/en/news/international-coordinating-committee-nhris-holds-discussion-treaty-
bodies-and-upr-follow).    
116 Reports by the UN Secretary-General on NHRIs contain some figures: among the most recent documents is UN 
General Assembly, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. Report of the Secretary-
General, 3 August 2017, A/72/277, paras. 78-80 and Annex II. Other figures, which are not limited to the submission of 
information by NHRIs as stakeholders, can be found in OHCHR, supra n 110, 43-44, highlighting that the UPR 
mechanism is the privileged venue for engagement by NHRIs within the UN system.  
117 NHRIs from Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom (i.e., the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission) submitted 
information; whereas NHRIs from Albania, Armenia, Poland, and Portugal did not. The Northern Ireland Commission 
was considered an A-status institution by the OHCHR, even though formally still accredited with B status (as the 
ICC/GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation had recognised its compliance with the Paris Principles already in 2006, 
even though the upgrade from B to A status was sanctioned officially in May 2011 only). In general, the accreditation 
status which is being considered for participation in the UPR is that retained by the NHRI at the time when its home State 
underwent the review. 
118 NHRIs from Austria, Moldova, Norway, and Slovenia submitted independent reports, contrary to NHRIs from 
Belgium, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and the Russian Federation. 
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by which information submitted by A-status NHRIs is presented at the outset, separately from 
information from all other stakeholders (in a section titled “Information provided by the national 
human rights institution of the State under review accredited in full compliance with the Paris 
Principles”). 
Nineteen out of twenty-three A-status institutions submitted information;119 the increase was 
determined by newly accredited institutions which immediately took part in the review process (the 
Latvian Ombudsman, the Scottish Human Rights Commission, the British Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, the Hungarian Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, and the Ukrainian 
Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights) as well as by a long-time A-status NHRI which had not 
participated in the previous cycle (the Armenian Human Rights Defender). Additionally, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, which had not participated in the 
previous cycle as a B-status institution, submitted information as an A-status NHRI during the second 
cycle.  
As to B-status institutions, the increase is less marked, as five out of nine institutions took part 
in the UPR second cycle by filing independent submissions.120 At any rate, it would seem that the 
emphasis put on the contribution by A-status NHRIs and the intense lobbying by both the OHCHR 
and GANHRI have led to considerable involvement by NHRIs (particularly, of fully compliant ones) 
within this UN mechanism, where dialogue with the government under review is key.121 
                                                        
119 A-status institutions that participated in the procedure include institutions from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Russian 
Federation, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom (all three NHRIs). NHRIs from Albania, Poland, Portugal, and 
Serbia (whose NHRI was accredited by GANHRI for the first time in March 2010, with A status) did not participate.  
120 B-status NHRIs from Austria, North Macedonia, Moldova, the Netherlands, and Norway lodged submissions. The two 
B-status institutions from Bulgaria, as well as NHRIs from Slovenia and Sweden, did not participate.  
121 It therefore seems difficult to share the opinion expressed in Qafisheh, supra n 98, 67-68, according to which “despite 
the efforts to open the door for their involvement in the [UPR] process, there has been little participation by NHRIs”, 
especially compared to NGOs. Indeed, as recognised by the author himself, the quantitative difference is mainly explained 
by the fact that only one NHRI is allowed for each State, save for exceptional cases (cf. supra n 25), and that NHRIs 
would typically comment on the records of their respective States only (on which their knowledge and expertise focus). 
These are inherent characteristics of NHRIs; moreover, the fact that not all States have established NHRIs to date should 
not weigh in the assessment of participation by existing NHRIs.    
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UN Special Procedures too operate within the Human Rights Council and, before, operated 
within the Commission on Human Rights. They are independent experts mandated to report and 
advise either on specific human rights issues (such as arbitrary detention or discrimination against 
women) at a global scale or on specific countries.122 As of December 2018, forty-four thematic 
mandates and twelve country mandates are in place, which are entrusted to individual experts (so-
called Special Rapporteurs) or groups of them (Working Groups).  
In relation to Special Procedures, NHRIs are encouraged to provide them with relevant 
information before their country visits, meet and assist them during such visits, contribute to the 
formulation of recommendations following the visits, and follow up on the implementation of these 
recommendations.123 More generally, NHRIs can act as information channels for Special Procedures.  
In an effort to enhance the role of NHRIs in this mechanism, A-status institutions have recently 
been vested with additional prerogatives, including the right to nominate candidates as Special 
Rapporteurs or members of Working Groups and the right to intervene immediately after the State 
concerned during the so-called interactive dialogue (which follows the presentation of a country 
mission report by the Special Rapporteur/Working Group).124  
Conversely, Special Procedures have at times recommended that specific States establish or 
strengthen NHRIs;125 recommendations of the kind have also frequently been included in UPR 
                                                        
122 Cf. the resolutions by the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council mentioned supra n 111. For more details 
on the history, characteristics, and activities of the Special Procedures, cf. the dedicated webpage of the OHCHR: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx (accessed 4 January 2019).  
123 Cf. OHCHR, Discussion Paper on Interaction Between National Human Rights Institutions and Special Procedures, 
May 2007; and OHCHR, Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (Geneva: UN, 
2008).  
In the literature, cf. Minerva Martinez Garza, “National Human Rights Institutions and Their Collaboration with the 
Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council”, in The Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council: A Brief Look 
from the Inside and Perspectives from Outside, ed. Humberto Cantu Rivera (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2015). Dickson, 
supra n 11, 277, speaks of meetings between the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and various UN Special 
Rapporteurs; other examples of interaction can be found in Qafisheh, supra n 98, 66-67. 
124 UN Human Rights Council, Review of the work and functioning of the Human Rights Council, supra n 111, Annex, 
paras. 22(a) and 28. Figures on the engagement by NHRIs with Special Procedures are scant: one of the few sources is 
OHCHR, supra n 110, 44-45, according to which “generally, less than 35% of respondents had provided information to 
a [Special Procedure Mandate Holder] or met with them during a country visit, although this percentage was over 50% 
in the Asia Pacific region. Follow up to the country missions of [Special Procedure Mandate Holders] was even lower, 
with less that 20% publicizing mission reports, monitoring recommendations and reporting on their implementation, on 
average”.  
125 As an example, cf. the concerns expressed in Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns. Addendum: Mission to Turkey, 18 March 2013, 
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outcomes, and they have normally been accepted by the governments concerned (even though not 
always implemented promptly).126 Finally, the Human Rights Council routinely issues resolutions 
supporting the role of NHRIs, whereby it invites States to establish these institutions or improve 
existing ones.127 
 
NHRIs also interact, in several ways, with UN human rights treaty bodies.128 This expression 
refers to a wide range of committees that are composed of independent experts and mandated to 
monitor the implementation of UN-negotiated human rights treaties; most of these committees are 
also tasked with receiving complaints by individuals who allege violations of the rights enshrined in 
the treaties. 
Nonetheless, it is in relation to the monitoring functions of these committees that NHRIs have 
come to play a most significant role by submitting information on the status of implementation of the 
various treaties and on the most serious issues that their respective governments should deal with. 
                                                        
A/HRC/23/47/Add.2, paras. 82-84. The OHCHR has explicitly encouraged Special Procedures to include this type of 
recommendations into their reports: OHCHR, Discussion paper, supra n 123, para. 7. 
126 In the Outcome Report of Italy’s UPR 2nd cycle, no less than twenty-three recommendations concerned the creation of 
an NHRI in compliance with the Paris Principles (Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review. Italy, 10 December 2014, A/HRC/28/4, paras. 145.26-145.48). While Italy accepted these 
recommendations, it had already done so during the 1st cycle, without much concrete progress. Sweden, which currently 
has a B-status NHRI, was encouraged to establish a fully-compliant institution during its UPR 2nd cycle (Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. Sweden, 13 April 2015, A/HRC/29/13, paras. 
146.14-146.25).  
127 Among the latest ones: UN Human Rights Council, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human 
rights, 29 September 2016, A/HRC/RES/33/15; and UN Human Rights Council, National human rights institutions, 28 
September 2018, A/HRC/RES/39/17. 
128 On the relationship between NHRIs and UN treaty bodies, cf. OHCHR, Information Note: National Human Rights 
Institutions interaction with the UN Treaty Body System, 5 April 2011; and GANHRI, National Human Rights Institutions 
and United Nations Treaty Bodies. GANHRI Background Paper, May 2016, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/TreatyBodies/Annual%20Meeting%20of%20Chairpersons%20of%20Human%20Rights
%20Tre/GANHRI%20background%20paper%20FINAL.pdf. For some figures on this interaction, cf. OHCHR, supra n 
110, 42-43. 
In the literature, cf. Carver, supra n 52, 19-29; Sidoti, supra n 28, 116-120; Qafisheh, supra n 98, 73-81; Ineke Boerefijn, 
“Partnership between National Human Rights Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Bodies in the Implementation of 
Concluding Observations”, in The Realisation of Human Rights: When Theory Meets Practice, eds. Yves Haeck et al. 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013), 437-459; and Katrien Meuwissen, “NHRI Participation to United Nations Human Rights 
Procedures: International Promotion Versus Institutional Consolidation?”, in Wouters and Meuwissen, supra n 46, 271 
et seqq. Cf. also the following detailed handbook: Amrei Müller and Frauke Seidensticker, The Role of National Human 
Rights Institutions in the United Nations Treaty Body Process (Berlin: German Institute for Human Rights, December 
2007). 
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This information appears to be taken into consideration by the treaty bodies, whose concluding 
observations not infrequently reflect the remarks by the NHRIs that have intervened.  
Additionally, the concluding observations of these bodies often include a recommendation to 
the government concerned to institute or strengthen the State’s NHRI.129 Finally, NHRIs are also 
involved at the follow-up stage, as they are encouraged to closely monitor the implementation of the 
concluding observations and report on it.130 The idea behind these multiple interactions between 
NHRIs and treaty bodies is that the proximity of NHRIs to the domestic level, coupled with their 
independence from governments, should make them an ideal source of information both in the 
preparatory phase and in the implementation one.  
Treaty bodies have sought both to clarify the role that NHRIs can play in the advancement of 
the rights protected in the conventions and to formalise the relationship between themselves and 
NHRIs to a varying degree of detail. As the results are divergent, the need for a clearer and more 
consistent approach by treaty bodies in these respects has been invoked from various quarters.131  
In March 1993, when the Paris Principles had already been adopted but not yet endorsed by the 
UN General Assembly, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issued a General 
Recommendation whereby it called upon States to establish NHRIs in compliance with the Principles 
and illustrated their potential contribution to the implementation of the Convention. In terms of the 
interaction between the Committee and NHRIs, the General Recommendation indicated that NHRIs 
“should be associated with the preparation of reports and possibly included in government delegations 
                                                        
129 As reported by Brodie, supra n 77, 152, UN treaty bodies issued a total number of 356 recommendations to States 
with regard to the creation or strengthening of NHRIs in the period 2000-2007. 
130 An example of sustained engagement in the follow-up of concluding observations is illustrated in Frauke Seidensticker, 
Examination of State Reporting by Human Rights Treaty Bodies: An Example of Follow-Up at the National Level by 
National Human Rights Institutions (Berlin: German Institute for Human Rights, April 2005). 
131 NHRIs and treaty bodies themselves have highlighted this need. Cf., for instance, GANHRI, supra n 128, 16: 
“Notwithstanding treaty bodies’ specificities in terms of their mandates, GANHRI – and treaty bodies themselves – have 
continuously encouraged the harmonisation of treaty body working methods with respect to NHRIs, as also encouraged 
in the draft harmonised approach adopted in Berlin, Germany, in 2006, and in the Marrakech Statement, adopted in 
Marrakech, Morocco, in 2010”. Cf. also UN General Assembly, Implementation of human rights instruments – Note by 
the Secretary-General. Report of the Chairs of the human rights treaty bodies on their 29th meeting, 20 July 2017, 
A/72/177, paras. 45 et seqq. (“Common approach to engagement with national human rights institutions”); and UN 
Human Rights Council, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, supra n 127, para. 22. 
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in order to intensify the dialogue between the Committee and the State party concerned”.132 Thus, 
NHRIs were and still are (at least formally) conceived by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination essentially as part of the State apparatus, even though their expertise on human rights 
and independence arguably make them a promising “ally” in the furtherance of the Committee’s 
objectives.  
Other human rights treaty bodies have highlighted the importance of the establishment and 
proper functioning of NHRIs for the promotion and protection of the rights contained in their 
respective conventions. That is the case for the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
whose General Comment on “the role of national human rights institutions in the protection of 
economic, social and cultural rights” illustrates the functions that NHRIs can perform in the area.133 
The Comment, however, does not specify the relationship between the Committee and NHRIs.  
More recently, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women adopted a 
Decision recognising the role of NHRIs for the implementation of its Convention.134 The relationship 
between the Committee and NHRIs is also touched upon in the Decision, but in terms that leave the 
door open both to the contribution by NHRIs to State reports and to alternative reports by NHRIs 
along the lines of the so-called shadow reports by NGOs (“national human rights institutions may 
provide comments and suggestions on a State party’s reports in any way they see fit”).135 The 
Committee Against Torture and the Committee on Migrant Workers only mention NHRIs in their 
                                                        
132 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 17: The establishment of national 
institutions to facilitate the implementation of the Convention, 19 March 1993. 
133 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 10: The role of national human rights 
institutions in the protection of economic, social and cultural rights, 10 December 1998, E/C.12/1998/25. The General 
Comment states, inter alia, that “national institutions have a potentially crucial role to play in promoting and ensuring the 
indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights … It is therefore essential that full attention be given to economic, 
social and cultural rights in all of the relevant activities of these institutions” (para. 3). 
134 Cf. the Statement by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on its relationship with 
national human rights institutions, included as Annex II to UN Commission on the Status of Women, Results of the 
fortieth session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 11 February 2008, 
E/CN.6/2008/CRP.1. Already in 1988, the Committee issued a General Recommendation underlining the importance of 
a national infrastructure to implement international human rights treaties (Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, General recommendation No. 6: Effective national machinery and publicity, 7th session, 
1988). While the instrument does not refer to NHRIs explicitly (as it pre-dates the adoption of the Paris Principles), it can 
be and has been interpreted as including NHRIs too.  
135 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Statement, supra n 134, para. 6. 
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rules of procedure and in equally vague terms, as entities that can (together with UN bodies and 
specialised agencies or NGOs) submit information to the Committees upon invitation by the latter.136 
On the other hand, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has been more specific. Its General 
Comment no. 2 explicitly states that the Committee “considers the establishment of [NHRIs] to fall 
within the commitment made by States parties upon ratification to ensure the implementation of the 
Convention”.137 Moreover, the Comment details the requirements for NHRIs in terms of composition, 
mandate and powers with specific reference to the promotion and protection of children’s rights; inter 
alia, conferring a quasi-judicial mandate on NHRIs is considered essential.138 Finally, the document 
sets out the nature of the partnership between NHRIs and the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
in unequivocal terms: “NHRIs should contribute independently to the reporting process under the 
Convention … and monitor the integrity of government reports”.139 While it is accepted that 
governments might consult with NHRIs with a view to drafting their reports to the Committee, 
governments are warned that they “must respect the independence of [NHRIs] and their independent 
role in providing information to the Committee. It is not appropriate to delegate to NHRIs the drafting 
of reports or to include them in the government delegation when reports are examined by the 
Committee”.140  
A similar approach has seemingly been adopted by the Human Rights Committee, whose recent 
Paper on the subject is, however, couched in somewhat less clear-cut terms.141 In the Paper, the 
Committee “recognizes the value of States parties organizing broad national consultations when 
                                                        
136 Committee against Torture, Rules of Procedure, updated on 1 September 2014, CAT/C/3/Rev.6, Rule 63; and 
Committee on Migrant Workers, Rules of Procedure, updated on 7 May 2004, HRI/GEN/3/Rev.1/Add.1, Rule 28.  
137 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 2: The role of independent national human rights 
institutions in the promotion and protection of the rights of the child, 15 November 2002, CRC/GC/2002/2, para. 1.  
138 Ibid., para. 13: “NHRIs must have the power to consider individual complaints and petitions and carry out 
investigations, including those submitted on behalf of or directly by children”.  
139 Ibid., para. 20. 
140 Ibid., para. 21.  
141 Human Rights Committee, Paper on the relationship of the Human Rights Committee with national human rights 
institutions, adopted by the Committee at its 106th session (15 October–2 November 2012), 13 November 2012, 
CCPR/C/106/3. Before this Paper, the Human Rights Committee had used its General Comment no. 3 (Article 2 
(Implementation at the National Level)) and subsequently its General Comment no. 31 (The nature of the general legal 
obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, adopted in 2004 to replace the former) as the basis to ask States 
Parties to establish or enhance NHRIs. 
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drafting their reports under the Covenant” (read: involving NHRIs), at the same time “welcom[ing] 
the submission of alternative reports and oral presentations” by NHRIs.142 Nevertheless, the Paper 
explicitly acknowledges the independence of NHRIs and thus their “distinct relationship with the 
Committee” compared to States and NGOs;143 additionally, it circumscribes this special relationship 
to NHRIs accredited as fully compliant by GANHRI.144 It is worth noting in this respect that the 
Paper by the Human Rights Committee was issued in 2012, at a time when the ICC/GANHRI 
accreditation procedure had been functioning for years and recently strengthened.145  
This Paper served as a model for a 2014 Document issued by the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances, which emphasises that “the role played by national human rights institutions in 
providing information for the State party’s report should not exclude the possibility of submitting an 
alternative report to the Committee”.146 Aside from reporting, both the Human Rights Committee and 
the Committee on Enforced Disappearances outline the relationship between themselves and NHRIs 
in broad terms by highlighting the potential role for NHRIs in following up the concluding 
observations by the Committees, in assisting in the individual communications’ procedures, and in 
contributing to the general comments drafted by the Committees.  
The position expressed in the documents by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the 
Human Rights Committee, and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances conforms more closely 
to the Paris Principles as interpreted by the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation,147 as the most 
respectful of the independence of NHRIs from their governments and the most aware of their broad 
competences and expertise. While the issue of a common approach by treaty bodies to engagement 
with NHRIs has been discussed by the Chairs of the treaty bodies in the context of the ongoing reform 
                                                        
142 Human Rights Committee, Paper, supra n 141, paras. 11 and 14. 
143 Ibid., para. 7. 
144 Ibid., paras.7-8. 
145 Nonetheless, it might also be the case that treaty bodies do not want to limit their cooperation to A-status NHRIs, but 
extend it to specialised national bodies that, while not in compliance with the Paris Principles, might provide useful inputs: 
for instance, as mentioned, the Committee on the Rights of the Child receives and encourages submissions by children 
ombudsmen. 
146 Committee on Enforced Disappearances, The relationship of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances with national 
human rights institutions, 28 October 2014, CED/C/6, para. 15.  
147 GANHRI, supra n 10, G.O. 1.4, “Interaction with the international human rights system”.  
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of the system, and “the particular value of national human rights institutions accredited with ‘A’ status 
by the Global Alliance in the reporting process” has been acknowledged,148 it does not appear that 
specific uniform rules of engagement have been adopted to date.149 Nor have other proposals been 
endorsed which would facilitate participation by NHRIs in the reporting process, such as the “advance 
notification” of the examination of a State to the respective NHRI, guidelines for the submission of 
independent reports by NHRIs, and the closer involvement of these institutions in the dialogue with 
the State under review.150 On the other hand, progress has been made in other areas of the relationship 
between NHRIs and treaty bodies (i.e., beyond reporting),151 the debate on the reform of the treaty 
bodies’ system continues, and the approaches by treaty bodies appear to increasingly converge in 
practice.152  
 
The spreading of NHRIs worldwide and the strengthening of the relationships between them 
and various UN organs have led to a further innovation in two recent conventions – i.e., the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD).153 The breakthrough lies in the inclusion of national mechanisms with 
                                                        
148 UN General Assembly, supra n 131, para. 46(a). 
149 Ibid., paras. 45 et seqq., while agreeing on some general indications, did not harmonise the rules of procedures and 
working methods which regulate the interactions between NHRIs and the various treaty bodies. Cf. also Boerefijn, supra 
n 128, 342 et seqq., which illustrates in detail not only the array of written rules governing the area, but also the divergent 
“working relations” and concrete ways of interaction which have been developed in practice. 
150 Cf. the “points for consideration” submitted to the Chairs of the treaty bodies in International Human Rights 
Instruments, Common approach to engagement with national human rights institutions. Note by the Secretariat, 9 June 
2017, HRI/MC/2017/3, para. 57(b)-(d) in particular, which were not endorsed in General Assembly, supra n 131. More 
generally, it is interesting to compare the two documents in order to ascertain which proposals have ultimately been 
endorsed by the Chairs of the treaty bodies.  
151 Especially as regards the potential role of NHRIs in the inquiry procedures and in the follow-up of treaty bodies’ 
recommendations, as well as with respect to “other avenues for engagement”: cf. General Assembly, supra n 131, paras. 
46-48. 
152 For instance, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has been receiving independent reports from 
NHRIs, notwithstanding the terms of its General Recommendation mentioned supra n 132. 
153 This latest development has been noted and analysed, among others, by Carver, supra n 52, 25-29. On the relationship 
between NHRIs and OPCAT, cf. Rachel Murray, “National Preventive Mechanisms under the Optional Protocol to the 
UN Convention against Torture: One Size Does Not Fit All”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 26, no. 4 (2008): 
485-516; and University of Bristol/OPCAT Team, The Relationship between Accreditation by the International 
Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions and the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against 
Torture, November 2008, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-
library/sites/law/migrated/documents/iccnhrirelationshipandopcat.pdf. Cf. also Asia Pacific Forum of NHRIs, 
Association for the Prevention of Torture, and OHCHR, Preventing Torture: An Operational Guide for National Human 
Rights Institutions (Sidney; Geneva: APF, APT and OHCHR, May 2010).  
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monitoring and implementation competences within the treaties themselves; and while it is not 
required that the responsibilities of the national mechanisms be entrusted to an existing or future 
NHRI, both treaties provide for States to “take into account” (CRPD) or “give due consideration to” 
(OPCAT) the Paris Principles in the set up of these mechanisms.154  
OPCAT devotes an entire Part (Articles from 17 to 23) to National Preventive Mechanisms 
(NPMs), which shall be composed of independent experts.155 NPMs are generally mandated to 
prevent torture at the national level and they do so by performing a number of functions which are 
typical of NHRIs, such as advising the competent authorities and reporting.156 The most significant 
task of NPMs, at any rate, is to “regularly examine the treatment of the persons deprived of their 
liberty in places of detention”;157 to this end, they must be vested with appropriate powers, including 
those to visit all places of detention, have access to all information concerning the number and 
treatment of detainees, and conduct private interviews with them.158  
The work by NPMs is intended to complement that by the Subcommittee on Prevention (SPT), 
an international body also created by OPCAT (Parts II and III), whose main function is to visit places 
of detention in States Parties and make recommendations to remedy or prevent instances of torture.159 
The liaison between the SPT and NPMs appears central to the implementation of the Protocol.160  
                                                        
On the relationship between NHRIs and the CRPD, cf. Gauthier de Beco, “Article 33(2) of the UN CRPD: Another Role 
for National Human Rights Institutions”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 29, no. 1 (2011): 84-106; and Meredith 
Raley, “The Drafting of Article 33 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Creation of a Novel 
Mechanism”, International Journal of Human Rights 20, no. 1 (2016): 140-142. Cf. also, on the national dimension of 
the CRPD (including the role foreseen for NHRIs), Janet E. Lord and Michael Ashley Stein, “The Domestic Incorporation 
of Human Rights Law and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, Washington Law 
Review 83 (2008): 449-479. 
154 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 9 January 2003, A/RES/57/199, Article 18(4); and UN General Assembly, Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106, Article 33(2). 
155 OPCAT, supra n 154, Article 18. Articles 3, 4, and 35 of OPCAT also deal with NPMs. 
156 Ibid., Articles 19, 22 and 23. 
157 Ibid., Article 19(a). 
158 Ibid., Article 20. 
159 Ibid., Article 11 in particular. 
160 Article 11(b) details a list of tasks that the SPT is to perform with regard to NPMs, which include maintaining direct 
contact with, advising, and training them. From another perspective, the right of NPMs to maintain contact with the SPT 
is also laid down in the Protocol (Article 20(f)). More generally, the SPT and NPMs are entrusted with similar tasks 
(visiting places of detention and making recommendations to governments), which they should carry out in a coordinated 
manner.  
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The approach taken by the CRPD is somewhat more nuanced: while showing greater awareness 
– compared to older human rights treaties – of the pivotal role of national implementation, the 
Convention requires, in general terms, that States Parties “maintain, strengthen, designate or establish 
… a framework, including one or more independent mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect 
and monitor implementation of the present Convention” (Article 33(2)). There is no further 
specification of the mandate or powers of these mechanisms, except for the reference to the Paris 
Principles.  
As mentioned, States Parties to the said treaties are not obliged to confer these additional 
functions on their existing NHRIs, nor are they obliged to create an NHRI as such. But that these 
functions could be performed suitably by NHRIs is reflected in the number of States that designated 
their NHRIs as part of their NPMs and CRPD monitoring frameworks,161 as shown below.  
While older than the CRPD, OPCAT has been ratified by a smaller number of States – 88, 
against 177 States that ratified the CRPD. As far as the forty-seven CoE Member States are 
concerned, thirty-eight of them ratified the Protocol, four States only signed it (Belgium, Iceland, 
Ireland, and Slovakia), and five States did not ratify nor sign the Protocol (Andorra, Latvia, Monaco, 
the Russian Federation, and San Marino).162  
Out of twenty-four A-status NHRIs from States that ratified the Protocol, eleven have been 
chosen by their governments as part of the State’s NPM.163 As regards the remaining States, in one 
                                                        
161 Both treaties explicitly state that national monitoring/implementation mechanisms may be composed of more than one 
body: cf. CRPD, supra n 154, Article 33(2); and OPCAT, supra n 154, Article 17. As specified by the CRPD, in those 
instances, “all mechanisms are required to be independent from the Executive Branch and at least one of these 
mechanisms is required to be compliant with the Paris Principles” (CRPD Committee, Guidelines on Independent 
Monitoring Frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee, 16th session (August-September 2016), 
para. 12; on which cf. infra for more details). 
162 The status of signatures and ratifications has been checked through the dedicated webpage of the UN Treaty Collection: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-9-b&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed 4 January 
2019).  
163 These are the NHRIs from Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, 
and Ukraine. The “OPCAT” Database compiled by the Association for the Prevention of Torture, which contains up-to-
date and complete information on all NPMs designated by their respective governments, has been used as the primary 
source of information. The Database can be consulted at http://apt.ch/en/opcat-database/ (accessed 4 January 2019). A 
database based on the submissions by States Parties is kept by the SPT and is available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/NationalPreventiveMechanisms.aspx (accessed 4 January 2019). 
The status of NHRIs considered here is based on the latest Chart of the Status of NHRIs made available by GANHRI and 
updated on 8 August 2018: cf. GANHRI, supra n 4. 
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case the government has not designated an NPM yet (Bosnia and Herzegovina); in six other cases, 
the existing (classical) ombudsman or a similar institution was appointed;164 and in three cases, an ad 
hoc body was instituted anew.165 Finally, the NPM of the United Kingdom is made up of twenty-one 
bodies, most of which are ombudsman-like institutions; the Scottish Human Rights Commission is 
the only UK NHRI included in the mechanism.166  
Out of nine B-status NHRIs from States that ratified the Protocol, seven are part of their 
countries’ NPMs.167 As for the remaining two, Bulgaria decided to include only its Ombudsman and 
not its Commission for Protection Against Discrimination in the NPM (both bodies are accredited as 
B-status institutions by GANHRI), while Sweden preferred its Parliamentary Ombudsmen over its 
B-status Equality Ombudsman.  
Thus, several GANHRI-accredited NHRIs have been appointed as their countries’ NPMs.168 
This is especially the case for human rights ombudsmen; on the other hand, where the country’s 
NHRI is a consultative commission or research institute, the choice has often fallen upon a pre-
existing classical ombudsman or a new body with specific mandate and powers. This is not surprising 
considering that the inspection mandate and related powers inherent in the NPM are particularly well-
suited for ombudsman-like institutions, which often already enjoy these prerogatives. 
As to the CRPD, all CoE Member States but Liechtenstein ratified it.169 Out of twenty-seven 
A-status NHRIs from States that ratified the Convention, fifteen have been designated as part of the 
                                                        
164 This is the case for Denmark (whose Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman, designated NPM, nonetheless closely 
cooperates with the Danish NHRI in the performance of its NPM functions), Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands (whose NPM is comprised of four bodies, coordinated by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice), and 
Norway. 
165 In France (General Controller of Places of Deprivation of Liberty), Germany (National Agency for the Prevention of 
Torture), and Moldova (Council for the Prevention of Torture). More specifically, the Moldovan Government had initially 
designated the country’s NHRI as its NPM, but more recently decided to establish an ad hoc body, where the NHRI also 
sits. 
166 A complete list of UK NPM bodies is available at https://www.nationalpreventivemechanism.org.uk/members/ 
(accessed 4 January 2019).  
167 NHRIs from Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria (Ombudsman only), Cyprus, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia 
have been designated as NPMs.    
168 Linos and Pegram, supra n 41, 1131, reports that – as of April 2016 – out of fifty-seven designated NPMs around the 
world, thirty-seven are NHRIs. 
169 In the absence of a comprehensive database collecting all designations of national bodies under Article 33(2), the 
following sources have been used: the Concluding observations by the CRPD Committee, together with State reports as 
well as information from NGOs and NHRIs; for EU States, a table compiled by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
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national framework under Article 33(2),170 whereas in three instances no national mechanism has 
been appointed yet by the government,171 and in nine instances national bodies different from NHRIs 
have been designated (either ad hoc bodies created on the occasion of the ratification of the CRPD 
or ombudsmen/non-discrimination commissions already in place).172 As to B-status institutions, the 
Azerbaijani, Belgian, Cypriot, and Montenegrin NHRIs have been formally designated as the national 
mechanisms for the monitoring and implementation of the CRPD; in two States no designation has 
taken place yet,173 whereas four other States created or chose a different body.174  
It is worth mentioning that, even when they have not been formally appointed under Article 
33(2) CRPD, NHRIs might nonetheless contribute to the monitoring and implementation of the 
Convention;175 that in some States where national bodies have not been designated yet, NHRIs are 
being considered as the most appropriate bodies to assume the task;176 and that in some instances 
where a different body has been preferred over the existing NHRI, the CRPD Committee pointed out 
the body’s lack of compliance with the Paris Principles and even expressly suggested the designation 
of the NHRI instead.177  
                                                        
updated on 31 December 2017 and published at https://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-
maps/intobsun-0?mdq1=dataset (accessed 4 January 2019), as well as “DOTCOM” – a database sponsored by the 
European Commission and run by the Academic Network of European Disability Experts, available at 
https://www.disability-europe.net/dotcom (accessed 24 March 2019). Finally, the annual reports of NHRIs as well as their 
websites have been consulted. One of the most complete overviews, which is not confined to Europe, is ICC and Canadian 
Human Rights Commission, Survey of National Human Rights Institutions on Article 33.2 of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, August 2011, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Themes/PersonsDisabilities/DocumentsPage/SurveyReport33.2.pdf. The Survey, however, is 
already a few years old and only 55% of NHRIs ranging from A to C status responded.    
170 States that have included NHRIs in their CRPD national frameworks are Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom (where 
all three NHRIs are part of the national mechanism).  
171 This is the case for Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ukraine. 
172 In Albania, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal, Serbia, and Spain.  
173 Namely in Bulgaria and Sweden.  
174 These are Austria, North Macedonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
175 For instance, the Austrian Ombudsman Board closely cooperates with the designated CRPD Monitoring Committee; 
more generally, NHRIs with quasi-judicial competences routinely receive complaints alleging the violation of the rights 
of the disabled.  
176 This is the case, among others, for Armenia and Bulgaria (with reference to both of its B-status NHRIs).  
177 Cf., for instance, CRPD Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of Lithuania, 11 May 2016, 
CRPD/C/LTU/CO/1, para. 67(b): “The Office of Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson and the Council for the Affairs of 
the Disabled, which have been appointed to function as the State party’s independent monitoring mechanisms, are not in 
full compliance with the [Paris Principles]”. Cf., for similar considerations, the concluding observations issued by the 
CRPD with respect to Croatia and Hungary. In its Concluding observations on the initial report of Serbia, 23 May 2016, 
CRPD/C/SRB/CO/1, para. 67, the CRPD Committee criticised the fact that “the national human rights institution does 
not act as an independent mechanism as outlined in article 33 (2)”. 
 125 
At any rate, it clearly emerges from the concluding observations by the CRPD Committee that 
the compliance by national frameworks with the Paris Principles is thoroughly scrutinised. In this 
respect, the concluding observations also make reference to the recent Guidelines on independent 
monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the CRPD,178 where the significance of 
the Paris Principles for assessing Article 33(2) bodies is stressed and “States Parties are encouraged 
to appoint NHRIs compliant with the Paris Principles as the monitoring framework or as a mechanism 
that forms part of the monitoring framework”.179 The Guidelines also regulate the participation by 
Article 33(2) bodies in the activities of the CRPD Committee,180 along the lines of the approach 
adopted by the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.  
The SPT too adopted a set of Guidelines on national preventive mechanisms;181 these, however, 
differ from those by the CRPD Committee in many respects, primarily because the SPT performs 
peculiar functions compared to other UN treaty bodies. Indeed, the SPT does not receive regular 
reports by States Parties to OPCAT, but – as mentioned – it conducts visits into States Parties’ places 
of detention and makes recommendations on how to strengthen the protection of detainees. 
Furthermore, it advises States on the establishment and strengthening of NPMs as well as NPMs 
themselves on how to carry out their tasks in compliance with OPCAT.  
The relationship between the SPT and NPMs (and NHRIs) is thus inherently different, and the 
Guidelines have another purpose – i.e., integrating the already detailed rules that are included in 
                                                        
178 Cf., for instance, CRPD Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of the Republic of Moldova, 18 May 
2017, CRPD/C/MDA/CO/1, para. 59: “Taking into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and 
their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2016), the Committee 
recommends that the State party designate an independent monitoring mechanism in accordance with the [Paris 
Principles], that it provide adequate funding for its functioning and that organizations of persons with disabilities fully 
participate in the monitoring process”. Cf. also CRPD, supra n 161. 
179  CRPD, supra n 161, para. 15. 
180 Ibid., Chapter 2, paras. 21-31. The Guidelines provide for a wide-ranging involvement of the independent monitoring 
frameworks – from the preparation of reports to the follow-up of the Committee’s recommendations and activities other 
than monitoring (such as assisting in the communication procedure and contributing to the drafting of the Committee’s 
General Comments). As far as the reporting phase is concerned, consultation of the monitoring frameworks in the 
preparation of State reports is permitted, but the submission of an “alternative report” is also encouraged (para. 21(c) and 
(d)). 
181 SPT, Guidelines on national preventive mechanisms, 9 December 2010, CAT/OP/12/5. 
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OPCAT regarding the institutional characteristics and powers of NPMs.182 Additionally, the SPT 
recently adopted an Analytical assessment tool for national preventive mechanisms, conceived as an 
instrument for NPMs and States to carry out self-evaluations.183 
The practice of designating accredited NHRIs as NPMs or CRPD national monitoring 
mechanisms would appear suitable for various reasons, insofar as it confers the significant powers 
and responsibilities deriving from these treaties on independent bodies with human rights expertise, 
and it avoids the multiplication of State bodies with similar tasks (NHRIs routinely deal with disabled 
people’s and detainees’ rights). On the other hand, the appointment of NHRIs under the said treaties 
might give rise to risks: primarily, that NHRIs are not given the necessary financial and staff resources 
to carry out the additional tasks and/or that there is insufficient focus and expertise on the new 
areas.184  
In sum, and notwithstanding some outstanding issues, OPCAT and the CRPD have 
considerably strengthened the role of NHRIs and of the Paris Principles on the international plane; at 
the same time, the UN committees supervising the implementation of other human rights treaties have 
upgraded their relationship with NHRIs and frequently cooperate with them in carrying out their 
monitoring functions. While there arguably is room for development as far as the engagement of 
NHRIs with treaty bodies in the post-examination phase is concerned,185 national institutions 
                                                        
182 The Guidelines, supra n 181, are organised into the following sections: “Basic principles”, “Basic issues regarding the 
establishment of an NPM”, and “Basic issues regarding the operation of an NPM” (divided into “Points for States” and 
“Points for NPMs”).  
183 SPT, Analytical assessment tool for national preventive mechanisms, 25 January 2016, CAT/OP/1/Rev.1.  
184 This complaint is often raised by NHRIs themselves: e.g., the Polish Ombudsman reported, during its re-accreditation 
process in 2012, “that it does not have adequate resources to effectively fulfil its role as NPM, and that it has an insufficient 
number of employees fulfilling this role” (ICC, Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation (SCA), Geneva, 19-23 November 2012, section 3.9, sub-section 6). This pitfall has also been noted by the 
SPT: cf., for instance, SPT, Visit to Ukraine undertaken from 19 to 25 May and from 5 to 9 September 2016: observations 
and recommendations addressed to the State party. Report of the Subcommittee, 18 May 2017, CAT/OP/UKR/3, para. 
19.  
De Beco and Murray, supra n 22, 27-29, points to another interesting issue – namely, the overlap (and potential conflict) 
between the accreditation by GANHRI of an NHRI and the assessment by the SPT or CRPD Committee of the same body 
as NPM or national framework. Other potential problems are highlighted in Carver, supra n 52, 28. On the advantages 
and disadvantages of NHRIs being designated as NPMs, cf. also Association for the Prevention of Torture, National 
Human Rights Institutions as National Preventive Mechanisms: Opportunities and challenges (Geneva: Association for 
the Prevention of Torture, December 2013). 
185 There are, nonetheless, positive examples in this respect: cf. the experience of the German NHRI reported in 
Seidensticker, supra n 130. Cf. also the follow-up reports drafted by the Irish NHRI: Irish Human Rights and Equality 
Commission, Submission to UN Human Rights Committee on Ireland’s One-Year Follow-up Report to its Fourth Periodic 
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increasingly submit their own reports to treaty bodies. The figures provided by the UN Secretary-
General and GANHRI clearly show that the extent of the phenomenon in practice does not currently 
match the extent of its formal regulation and that a straightforward and uniform set of rules for the 
interaction of NHRIs with UN treaty bodies is urgently needed.186  
In closing and in passing, it is worth mentioning that NHRIs are expanding their reach at the 
UN level by undertaking new activities, such as participation in the drafting of UN-negotiated treaties 
and declarations,187 and by building ties with additional UN mechanisms. In the latter respect, a recent 
resolution by the UN General Assembly has sought to strengthen the collaboration between NHRIs 
and UN structures by calling upon “all relevant United Nations mechanisms and processes, in 
accordance with their respective mandates … to further enhance the participation of national human 
rights institutions compliant with the Paris Principles and to allow for their contribution to these 
United Nations mechanisms and processes”.188 
 
                                                        
Review under ICCPR, September 2015, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.ihrec.ie/app/uploads/download/pdf/ihrec_submission_on_irelands_oneyear_followup_fourth_periodic_revi
ew_under_iccpr.pdf; and the joint submission by all three UK NHRIs under the Convention against Torture: Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, and Scottish Human Rights Commission, 
Follow-up regarding Concluding Observations adopted by the Committee Against Torture on the 5th periodic report of 
the UK, September 2014, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-human-rights-
work/monitoring-and-promoting-un-treaties/convention-against-torture-and-other.   
186 GANHRI, Background Paper, supra n 128, 15, contains figures on the participation by NHRIs during the years 2012 
to 2015. The UN Secretary-General has been issuing reports on NHRIs since the 1980s, with increasing frequency in 
recent years; the latest ones also include figures on the participation by NHRIs in the UN system. Cf., for instance, UN 
General Assembly, supra n 116, para. 82, which, inter alia, highlights that, during the period from September 2016 to 
August 2017, “the treaty bodies reviewed 157 States parties, out of which 124 had national human rights institutions. Of 
those institutions, 117 interacted with treaty bodies by submitting reports, providing briefings before the review or 
attending the sessions”. 
187 In addition to OPCAT and the CRPD, NHRIs contributed to the drafting of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration. 
188 UN General Assembly, National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, 17 December 2015, 
A/RES/70/163, para. 16. The Resolution mentions, by way of example, some of the UN mechanisms that are expected to 
step up their cooperation with NHRIs: these are the Commission on the Status of Women, the Conference of States Parties 
to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the 
Open-ended Working Group on Ageing (which granted participation rights to NHRIs in December 2016: GANHRI, 2017 
Annual Report, supra n 61, 14). The General Assembly has long supported the establishment of NHRIs and their greater 
involvement in the UN system by way of resolutions issued on an almost annual basis.   
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3.6. National Human Rights Institutions and the Council of Europe 
Out of the forty-seven CoE Member States, twenty-five established institutions that are 
currently accredited with A status (i.e., institutions in full compliance with the Paris Principles),189 
whereas NHRIs from ten other States are accredited with B status (partially compliant institutions).190 
The Romanian Institute for Human Rights and two Swiss commissions (the Commission fédérale 
pour les questions féminines and the Federal Commission Against Racism) asked for accreditation 
by GANHRI but were considered non-compliant with the Principles and thus given C status. As for 
other CoE Member States, several of them are considering the creation of NHRIs, in addition to 
existing ombudsmen or equality bodies that, in part, exercise functions similar to those of NHRIs.  
Various CoE bodies, including intergovernmental ones, have long advocated for the 
establishment of NHRIs by CoE Member States and for the involvement of NHRIs in the CoE system 
as national partners in the monitoring and implementation of human rights standards. Interest in 
NHRIs sensu lato by the CoE can be traced back to the 1980s, when seminars and roundtables were 
convened to discuss the usefulness of establishing national structures for the promotion and protection 
of human rights in Member States. As has been noted, those first meetings mostly gathered 
representatives from classical ombudsman offices, which at the time were the prevailing model of 
national structures dealing with human rights in the broad sense; Member States were thus 
encouraged to assign explicit competences in the promotion and protection of human rights to these 
institutions.191 The human rights commission model was mentioned in the preparatory documents of 
the meetings, but not in the outcomes.192  
                                                        
189 These are Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom (which, as mentioned, exceptionally has three NHRIs: one 
for Great Britain, one for Northern Ireland and one for Scotland). Cf. GANHRI, supra n 4, 6-8; cf. also Section 3.4 of 
this dissertation for more information on GANHRI and the accreditation of NHRIs. 
190 GANHRI, supra n 4, 10-11. CoE Member States with B-status institutions are Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria 
(with two national institutions: a commission and an ombudsman), Cyprus, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Sweden.  
191 Pohjolainen, supra n 29, 57-58 and 78-80. 
192 For a categorisation of NHRIs, cf. Section 3.2 of this dissertation.  
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In the absence of a clear notion of NHRIs, and of relevant international standards, reliance on 
the familiar ombudsman type is not surprising. It is nonetheless true that, even after the adoption of 
the Paris Principles and their endorsement by the UN General Assembly, the CoE maintained an 
inclusive approach. In a 1997 Recommendation drafted by the Steering Committee for Human Rights 
and adopted by the Committee of Ministers, CoE Member States were asked to “consider, taking 
account of the specific requirements of each member state, the possibility of establishing effective 
national human rights institutions, in particular human rights commissions which are pluralist in their 
membership, ombudsmen or comparable institutions”.193  
On the same day, a Resolution was adopted by the Committee of Ministers regarding the 
cooperation between these national structures and between them and the CoE; inter alia, the 
organisation of regular meetings of national institutions within the CoE framework was provided for 
in order to allow for the exchange of information between national institutions themselves and 
between them and CoE bodies dealing with human rights.194 The Resolution also invited the CoE 
Secretary General to keep national human rights structures updated on relevant activities in the CoE 
context.195  
The 1997 Recommendation and Resolution were indicative of an increasing recognition of the 
role of NHRIs by the CoE, which had already started to sponsor meetings among European NHRIs, 
                                                        
193 Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (97) 14 on the establishment of independent national institutions for 
the promotion and protection of human rights, 602nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 30 September 1997, para. a). 
The Recommendation invites States to “have regard” to the Paris Principles, but also to its own previous Recommendation 
R (85) 13 on the institution of ombudsmen as well as to the experiences of both existing national human rights 
commissions and ombudsmen (para. b) of the Recommendation). Cf. also the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Recommendation in Steering Committee for Human Rights, 42nd meeting, Strasbourg, 3-6 June 1997. List of items 
discussed and decisions taken – Addendum, 17 June 1997, CM(97)105 Addendum. For a criticism of the excessively 
broad notion of “national human rights institutions” as adopted by the Recommendation, cf. Emmanuel Decaux, 
“Evolution and Perspectives for National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Their 
Contribution to the Prevention of Human Rights Violations”, in The Prevention of Human Rights Violations: Contribution 
on the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights, eds. Linos-Alexander 
Sicilianos and Cristiane Bourloyannis Vrailas (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001): 241-
243. 
194 Committee of Ministers, Resolution (97) 11 on cooperation between national human rights institutions of member 
states and between them and the Council of Europe, 602nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 30 September 1997. 
195 Ibid., para. c). 
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in addition to those among European ombudsmen.196 Through the Resolution, the bond between 
NHRIs and the CoE system was strengthened, and biennial meetings of European NHRIs have been 
held since then under the auspices of the CoE.197  
The establishment in 1997 of the European Coordinating Group of NHRIs – subsequently the 
European Network of NHRIs (ENNHRI) – also contributed to the reinforcement of the relationship 
between NHRIs and the CoE by providing the latter with an easily identifiable interlocutor. ENNHRI 
comprises European A- and B-status NHRIs as well as non-accredited institutions, whose rights 
within the organisation vary accordingly; as of December 2018, ENNHRI has forty-two members.198 
While the Network was initially established as a forum rather than a formal body, an increasing 
formalisation led to the adoption of rules of procedure in 2000, the creation of a Legal Working Group 
and of other working groups on various substantive themes over the years, and the establishment of 
a permanent secretariat in 2013 (previously, most of the tasks entrusted to the secretariat were carried 
out by the Chair NHRI and its staff).199  
Even prior to setting up a formal central structure, ENNHRI managed to interact with CoE 
bodies in various ways, especially through its Chair and working groups. Its engagement with the 
ECtHR will be examined further below; here it is worth mentioning that ENNHRI has had observer 
status at the Steering Committee for Human Rights since 2001. This position has enabled ENNHRI 
to participate extensively in the reform process of the Convention and the Court by contributing to 
the drafting of Protocol no. 14200 and forwarding submissions on the occasion of several High-level 
                                                        
196 Pohjolainen, supra n 29, 78. Cf. also, on the evolution of the relationship between NHRIs and the CoE, de Beco, supra 
n 46, 152-159 (which, however, pre-dates and thus does not consider the formalisation of the European Coordinating 
Group of NHRIs into the European Network of NHRIs). 
197 In addition to roundtables on specific themes: cf., for a list of these meetings and roundtables and their outcomes up 
to 2004, Fellous, supra n 10, 181-186. The practice has subsequently continued. 
198 For the updated list of ENNHRI members, cf. the following webpage: http://ennhri.org/List-of-members (accessed 4 
January 2019). The different “categories of members” according to their GANHRI status, and their related prerogatives, 
are listed in ENNHRI, Constitution and Statutes, 20 June 2013, Article 6. 
199 For a detailed account of the European Group/ENNHRI evolution (until 2012), cf. Bruce Adamson, “NHRI and Their 
European Counterparts: Scope for Strengthened Cooperation and Performance towards European Human Rights 
Institutions”, in Wouters and Meuwissen, supra n 46, 125-153. For an updated list of ENNHRI working groups, cf. the 
following webpage: http://ennhri.org/Working-groups (accessed 4 January 2019).  
200 Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, “La «réforme de la réforme» du système de protection de la CEDH”, Annuaire français 
de droit international 49 (2003): 613, footnote 11. 
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Conferences on the future of the Court and of the ECHR system, including the latest ones held in 
Brussels and Copenhagen.201  
These contributions were not limited to outlining the functions of NHRIs and shaping their role 
in the CoE system, but they included a wide range of proposals regarding, inter alia, the relationship 
between national judges and the ECtHR, the independence of the Court, the right to individual 
application, the margin of appreciation and indications from the Court in relation to general measures, 
the role of the Department for the Execution of Judgments, and the use of pressure mechanisms by 
the Committee of Ministers.202 With regard to the draft Copenhagen Declaration, ENNHRI 
highlighted several problematic aspects and was vocal in opposing any attempts to politically 
influence the Court.203 
On its part, the Steering Committee for Human Rights has recently recognised that NHRIs “can 
significantly help meet the challenges relating to national implementation” and announced its plan to 
“conduct a study on the impact of current national legislation, policies and practices on the activities 
of NHRIs with a view to identifying the best examples thereof”.204 Such an analysis was conducted 
throughout 2016 and 2017 and highlighted both good practices and persisting challenges in the 
promotion and protection of the activities of NHRIs, as well as of NGOs and human rights 
defenders.205 Subsequently, a compilation of States’ good practices and of relevant international and 
regional instruments has been prepared with a view to “a draft non-binding instrument of the 
                                                        
201 Cf. the webpage dedicated to ENNHRI Legal Working Group, which represents ENNHRI at the Steering Committee 
for Human Rights: http://ennhri.org/Legal-Working-Group (accessed 4 January 2019). 
202 Cf. especially ENNHRI, Submission of the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI) on 
Brussels Declaration 26-27 March 2015, 26 March 2015, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.ennhri.org/IMG/pdf/ennhri_submission._brussels_declaration.10.2.15.pdf. Cf. also, for a summary of the 
content of ENNHRI contributions to previous High-level Conferences, Adamson, supra n 199, 140-143.   
203 ENNHRI, Submission of the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions on draft Declaration of 
Copenhagen, February 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, http://ennhri.org/ENNHRI-warns-against-the-weakening-of-the-
Convention-system-in-its-submission. Cf., similarly, the opinion by the Commission nationale consultative des droits de 
l’homme, Note de la CNCDH sur le projet de Déclaration de Copenhague, 16 February 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.cncdh.fr/fr/actualite/vives-inquietudes-concernant-levolution-du-systeme-europeen-des-droits-de-lhomme.  
204 Steering Committee for Human Rights, CCDH report on the longer-term future of the system of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 11 December 2015, CDDH(2015)R84 Addendum I, 25-26. 
205 Committee of Ministers, “1293rd meeting, 13 September 2017. 4.7 Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH)”, 
Decisions, 13 September 2017, CM/Del/Dec(2017)1293/4.7.  
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Committee of Ministers and a guide of good practices” to support States in the promotion and 
protection of the above-mentioned actors.206 
A further upgrade in the collaboration between NHRIs and the CoE occurred when the office 
of the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights was created in 1999. Resolution (99) 50, which instituted 
the office of the Commissioner, mentions several times “national human rights structures”– that is, 
NHRIs and similar institutions, such as ombudsmen and equality bodies, in accordance with the broad 
notion adopted by the CoE.  
First of all, in carrying out his/her advisory and information functions, the Commissioner “shall, 
wherever possible, make use of and co-operate with human rights structures in the member States”.207 
It is also stated that, where such institutions do not exist, the Commissioner shall promote their 
creation; finally, the Commissioner is specifically mandated to “facilitate the activities of national 
ombudsmen or similar institutions in the field of human rights”.208  
To fulfil this mandate, the Commissioner has taken up the organisation of meetings and 
roundtables with NHRIs and consult with them on various topics; a constant exchange of information 
between NHRIs and between NHRIs and the Commissioner is ensured by a liaison office operating 
within the office of the Commissioner since 2003. The Commissioner has, on several occasions, 
referred to the role that NHRIs can play at the national level to advance human rights,209 advocated 
for their establishment or strengthening and defended them from attacks from their respective 
                                                        
206 Steering Committee for Human Rights/Drafting Group on Civil Society and National Human Rights Institutions 
(CDDH-INST), [Draft] Overview document on the protection and promotion of the civil-society space, based on the 
compilation of measures and practices in place in the Council of Europe member States and Compilation of measures 
and practices in place in the Council of Europe member States, 24 September 2018, CDDH-INST(2018)R4add, 2. The 
progress of the work by the Drafting Group on Civil Society and National Human Rights Institutions can be followed at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-intergovernmental-cooperation/human-rights-development-cddh/civil-
society-and-human-rights-institutions (accessed 4 January 2019).  
207 Committee of Ministers, Resolution (99) 50 on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 104th session, 
7 May 1999, Article 3(c). 
208 Ibid., Article 3(c) and (d). 
209 E.g., Commissioner for Human Rights, “National Human Rights Structures can help mitigate the effects of austerity 
measures”, Human Rights Comment, 31 May 2012, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-
/national-human-rights-structures-can-help-mitigate-the-effects-of-austerity-measur-1. Cf. also, among others, the 
seminar co-organised by the CoE and ENNHRI on Freedom of Expression – Role and Powers of National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs) and other National Mechanisms, Strasbourg, 15 December 2016.   
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governments,210 and offered technical cooperation for the establishment and strengthening of these 
institutions in Member States. Moreover, the Commissioner commonly meets with national human 
rights structures during his country visits.211    
While the Commissioner for Human Rights and the Steering Committee for Human Rights 
undoubtedly are the CoE bodies that paid the greatest attention to the establishment and reinforcement 
of national human rights structures, and developed the closest ties with these structures, they are not 
the only ones. Several CoE mechanisms, such as the European Commission for Democracy through 
Law (so-called Venice Commission), the European Committee for Social Cohesion, Human Dignity 
and Equality, and the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, have variously considered and encouraged the establishment and strengthening 
of national human rights structures, highlighted their role in furthering the objectives of CoE bodies’ 
mandates, and exchanged views with them.212 A further example of collaboration between the CoE 
                                                        
210 E.g., Commissioner for Human Rights, “Letter to the Prime Minister of Serbia”, 18 May 2015, CommHR/NS/sf 054-
2015, 4 January 2019, https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/country-monitoring/serbia/-
/asset_publisher/mLRlkOZweJs0/content/the-commissioner-urges-serbia-to-shield-the-national-ombudsman-from-
undue-pressure?; Commissioner for Human Rights, “Andorra: sustain progress on children and women’s rights and 
bolster human rights structures”, 12 May 2016, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.coe.int/bs/web/commissioner/-
/andorra-sustain-progress-on-children-and-women-s-rights-and-bolster-human-rights-structures; and Commissioner for 
Human Rights, “Croatian government should reconsider the draft law on the Ombudsman for Children”, Statement, 11 
July 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.coe.int/bs/web/commissioner/-/croatian-government-should-
reconsider-the-draft-law-on-the-ombudsman-for-children. 
211 Former Commissioner Nils Muižnieks met with representatives from NHRIs and ombudsmen in all of his latest country 
visits, such as to Sweden (October 2017), Kosovo (February 2017), Lithuania (December 2016), Ireland (November 
2016), and Croatia (April 2016). The incumbent Commissioner, Dunja Mijatović, has continued this practice in her visits 
to Albania (September 2018) and Greece (June 2018).  
212 Cf., among others: Committee of Ministers, “1246 Meeting, 3 February 2016. 6.3 European Committee for Social 
Cohesion, Human Dignity and Equality (CDDECS) – Abridged report of the 4th meeting (Helsinki, 9-11 December 
2015)”, CM Documents, 17 December 2015, CM(2015)172, on the Conference organised by the CDDECS on “Council 
of Europe, National Human Rights Institutions, Equality Bodies and Ombudsman Offices Promoting Equality and Social 
Inclusion”, held in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 2015, in which several representatives from national human rights 
structures participated.  
The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, in its opinions on the 
status of minorities in States Parties, also examines the role played by NHRIs, ombudsmen, and equality bodies in the 
implementation of the Framework Convention: e.g., Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, Fourth Opinion on Denmark adopted on 20 May 2014, 20 January 2015, 
ACFC/OP/IV(2014)001, especially paras. 34 et seqq.  
The Venice Commission routinely assesses the founding laws of ombudsman institutions in particular, against criteria 
which the Commission itself has developed and which aim to ensure the independence and effectiveness of these 
institutions: cf. the dedicated webpage on the website of the Commission, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_Ombudsmen&lang=EN. Cf. also, among others, Committee of 
Ministers, “881 Meeting, 14 April 2004. 10.1 European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission) 
– b. Annual report of activities for 2003”, CM Documents, 17 March 2004, CM(2004)55, where the opinions of the Venice 
Commission on the establishment and strengthening of ombudsman institutions in Armenia, Bulgaria, and North 
Macedonia are referred to.  
 134 
and NHRIs is the CoE-FRA-ENNHRI-EQUINET Platform on social and economic rights, which 
primarily promotes the national implementation of the European Social Charter and of other 
international instruments on economic and social rights.213 
Additionally and significantly, the latest High-level Conferences on the future of the Court and 
of the Convention have underscored the role that NHRIs have played and can potentially play in the 
ECHR system. At the Interlaken Conference in 2010, the contribution by NHRIs to promoting the 
knowledge of the ECHR standards and their application by national authorities was noted.214  
The 2012 Brighton Declaration referred to the importance of cooperation between State 
authorities and NHRIs (as well as civil society) to ensure the “viability of the Convention 
mechanism”.215 In the context of the implementation of the Convention at the national level, the 
Declaration asked States Parties to “consider the establishment” of independent NHRIs.216  
The invitation was reiterated in the 2015 Brussels Declaration, which specifically focused on 
the national implementation of the Convention and on the execution of the Court’s judgments.217 
Accordingly, the Declaration mentioned NHRIs on various occasions when referring to the “primary 
role” of national actors in ensuring respect for human rights and, in the context of the execution of 
ECtHR judgments, when encouraging enhanced dialogue and cooperation between governments and 
other stakeholders.218  
The latest Copenhagen Declaration, adopted in 2018, also emphasised the importance of the 
national implementation of the Convention and of the execution of ECtHR judgments, even though 
                                                        
213 For more information about the Platform, cf. its website at https://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-
charter/coe-fra-ennhri-equinet (accessed 4 January 2019). 
214 High-level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, 19 February 
2010, para. B.4.a. Cf. also Committee of Ministers, “1159 Meeting, 16 January 2013. 4.3 Steering Committee for Human 
Rights (CDDH): CDDH report on measures taken by the member States to implement relevant parts of the Interlaken and 
Izmir Declarations”, CM Documents, 17 December 2012, CM(2012)167, especially paras. 18-42 and 129-141. 
215 High-level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, 20 April 2012, 
para. 4. 
216 Ibid., para. 9.c.i. 
217 High-level Conference on the “Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared 
responsibility”, Brussels Declaration, 27 March 2015, para. B.1.g.  
218 Ibid., preamble and para. B.2.a. NHRIs are also mentioned at the end of the Declaration, where the Committee of 
Ministers and Member States are generally encouraged “to involve, where appropriate, civil society and National Human 
Rights Institutions in the implementation of the Action Plan” set out in the Declaration.  
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other aspects were also dealt with.219 NHRIs were mentioned among those actors whose engagement 
is needed for the effective implementation of the Convention and their “significant role” in this 
respect was highlighted separately.220 Moreover, Member States were again asked to “consider the 
establishment” of NHRIs.221 It is noteworthy that, for the first time, it was explicitly recommended 
that States adhere to the Paris Principles for the creation of these institutions. Also in light of the fact 
that reference to the Paris Principles and to the accreditation by GANHRI has been made by various 
CoE bodies,222 it appears that a more circumscribed concept of NHRIs is emerging in the CoE context 
as well. 
 
While demonstrating an increasing attention towards the role that NHRIs can play in the 
Convention’s system, the above-mentioned intergovernmental declarations are rather vague and do 
not set out the details of the involvement by NHRIs. On the other hand, more concrete proposals put 
forward by groups of experts were not followed up.223 
The Group of Wise Persons, tasked with submitting new proposals for the effectiveness of the 
ECHR system after the adoption of Protocol no. 14, advocated for a stronger cooperation between 
the CoE Commissioner and “national ombudsmen and similar institutions” with a view to reducing 
the ECtHR caseload. More specifically, the Group envisioned that the Commissioner could identify 
a systemic problem in a State, likely to give rise to a considerable influx of applications to the ECtHR, 
                                                        
219 High-level Conference on the reform of the European Convention on Human Rights system, Copenhagen Declaration, 
13 April 2018.  
220 Ibid., paras. 14 and 18.  
221 Ibid., para. 18. 
222 Multiple references to the Paris Principles and accreditation by GANHRI can be found in Steering Committee for 
Human Rights/CDDH-INST, supra n 206. The Commissioner for Human Rights attaches great importance to the Paris 
Principles and GANHRI accreditation as well: Commissioner for Human Rights, “Paris Principles at 25: Strong National 
Human Rights Institutions Needed More Than Ever”, Human Rights Comment, 18 December 2018, accessed 4 January 
2019, https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/paris-principles-at-25-strong-national-human-rights-institutions-
needed-more-than-ever. To give another example, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance recently 
revised its General Recommendation on the establishment of equality bodies by “building on other standards developed 
in this field, such as the Paris Principles”: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI General Policy 
Recommendation No. 2: Equality Bodies to Combat Racism and Intolerance at National Level, adopted on 7 December 
2017, 27 February 2018, CRI(2018)06, preamble. 
223 For a thorough analysis of the reports by the Group of Wise Persons and Lord Woolf insofar as the involvement of 
ombudsmen is concerned, cf. Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen, “The European Court of Human Rights and the ombudsmen”, 
in JJørgensen and Slavensky, supra n 60, 43-52. 
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and collaborate with national human rights structures to find a solution at the national level.224 There 
is no evidence that such a practice has been undertaken, even though the Commissioner routinely 
draws attention to structural human rights shortcomings in Member States and closely cooperates 
with NHRIs and other national bodies.  
According to the Group, another task that could be entrusted to NHRIs and similar institutions 
is the dissemination of information to the public regarding the right to apply to the ECtHR and its 
conditions of admissibility.225 This activity has been followed up more recently at the CoE level, in 
the context of the ongoing reform of the ECHR system, and it is currently performed by various 
NHRIs and ombudsmen, even though it has not been undertaken systematically by all relevant 
national institutions.226 Also in light of the role foreseen for ombudsmen in its report, the Group 
suggested that the Committee of Ministers recommend entrusting ombudsmen with a human rights 
mandate, where this was still not the case.227  
The proposals laid down in the report by Lord Woolf were even bolder. Lord Woolf was asked, 
shortly after the adoption of Protocol no. 14 and essentially in parallel with the work of the Group of 
Wise Persons, to review the working methods of the ECtHR and make recommendations to the Court 
for the efficient handling of its caseload. The Review put forward a significant role for ombudsmen 
and other domestic institutions with complaint-handling functions and included “increased recourse 
to national ombudsmen and other methods of alternative dispute resolution” among its guiding 
principles.228  
According to the Review, the main task of ombudsmen and similar institutions would be to 
process cases that are inadmissible pursuant to the ECHR requirements as well as admissible cases 
                                                        
224 Committee of Ministers, Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, 979bis meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies, 15 November 2006, CM(2006)203, para. 113. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Cf. CoE Secretary General, “Post-Interlaken Report on providing objective and comprehensive information to 
applicants to the European Court of Human Rights. Report by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe”, 
Information Document, 6 January 2012, SG/Inf(2010)23-Final, Section II.B (which refers to the outcome of a Roundtable 
held between CoE bodies and national human rights structures on 21 and 22 September 2011 in Madrid). For examples 
of NHRIs that perform this task, cf. Section 5.3 of this dissertation infra. 
227 Committee of Ministers, supra n 224, para. 111.  
228 Lord Woolf, Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human Rights, December 2005, 4. 
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under certain circumstances.229 This development was conceived to go hand in hand with the 
establishment of “satellite offices” of the Court Registry in those States Parties with a high number 
of inadmissible applications. It would be for these offices to re-direct prospective applicants to 
national ombudsmen and other alternative methods of dispute resolution. However, these offices have 
never been created, so that the role envisaged in the Woolf Review for NHRIs dealing with individual 
complaints has never materialised. It is therefore nugatory to examine here the objections raised 
against the feasibility of the plan – inter alia, in terms of sustainability of the new workload for 
ombudsmen.230   
In the literature too, proposals have been made to involve NHRIs at an early stage with a view 
to reducing the ECtHR caseload. Along the lines of the proposal by the Group of Wise Persons, 
according to which NHRIs should act as reference points for the dissemination of information on the 
Court, one author argues that prospective applicants could be obligated to seek advice from their 
respective NHRIs regarding the admissibility of their applications to the ECtHR.231 This procedural 
requirement would not in any case prevent the prospective applicant from submitting his/her case to 
the Court, in the event of an adverse opinion from the NHRI.232  
According to another proposal, which at least at a first glance does not appear to reduce the 
ECtHR caseload but instead to increase it, NHRIs would be allowed to submit cases to the ECtHR.233 
While the author of the proposal has convincingly illustrated how the ECtHR docket would benefit 
from this innovation in the long run, especially as long as applications by NHRIs are limited to cases 
                                                        
229 Ibid., 31-34 and 47. 
230 Cf. the objections raised by Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra n 223, which also refers to the apparent contradiction between 
the Woolf Review’s proposals and the ECtHR case-law, which has constantly refused to consider proceedings before 
ombudsmen either a “domestic remedy” under Article 35 or an “effective remedy” under Article 13.  
231 Antoine Buyse, “The Court’s Ears and Arms: National Human Rights Institution and the European Court of Human 
Rights”, in Wouters and Meuwissen, supra n 46, 176-177. 
232 Ibid., 177.  
233 Gauthier de Beco, “La contribution des institutions nationales des droits de l’homme au renforcement de l’efficacité 
de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme 77 (2009): 170 et seqq., which 
explains how this prerogative could help reduce the influx of repetitive cases raising the same issue as the application by 
the NHRI and have a deterrent effect on the State, which would be prompted to remedy the structural shortcoming before 
the NHRI submits its application to the ECtHR. This kind of “actio popularis” by NHRIs is allowed in the Inter-American 
human rights system.   
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highlighting structural deficiencies in Member States, it is doubtful that the States parties to the 
Convention would accept such an extension of potential applicants. The same author has 
acknowledged that the proposal by the Parliamentary Assembly to allow the Commissioner for 
Human Rights to submit applications to the ECtHR was never followed up by Member States,234 and 
there is no reason to think that they would be more enthusiastic about vesting NHRIs with this power.  
Notwithstanding the failure of these proposals, NHRIs and ombudsmen have found other 
avenues for making an impact in the Convention’s system and, in particular, for interacting with the 
Court, at both the judgment phase and the post-judgment one. As illustrated in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, in the post-judgment phase national human rights structures have been empowered to 
submit information to the Committee of Ministers regarding the execution of ECtHR judgments. As 
the only provision that explicitly mentions NHRIs and assigns them a concrete and well-defined role 
in the Convention’s system, this rule deserves close examination. Its use by NHRIs and the effects of 
this use to date form the subject of the in-depth empirical analysis carried out in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. Below, the opportunities for NHRIs in the judgment phase are briefly considered. 
 
Article 36 ECHR, as introduced by Protocol no. 11 and amended by Protocol no. 14, and Rule 
44 of the Rules of Court provide for various kinds of third-party interventions before the ECtHR, 
with different aims.235 In the Convention’s system, the concept of “third party” is used in a broad 
sense, encompassing individuals and entities that have a specific interest in the outcome of the 
proceedings as well as amici curiae (“friends of the court”), who provide assistance to the court by 
clarifying points of law and fact without necessarily taking the side of any party to the proceedings. 
                                                        
234 Cf. further in the current section as well as Section 2.4. of this dissertation.  
235 For a thorough analysis of the system of third-party interventions before the ECtHR and its purposes, cf. Linos-
Alexander Sicilianos, “La tierce intervention devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, in Les tiers à l’instance 
devant les jurisdictions internationales, eds. Hélène Ruiz Fabri and Jean-Marc Sorel (Paris: Pedone, 2005), 123-150. 
According to Sicilianos, the right of intervention by the State of nationality of the applicant is based on the diplomatic 
protection model; interventions upon approval by the President of the Court, as laid down in Article 36(2), are aimed at 
ensuring the “proper administration of justice”; whereas the right of intervention by the Commissioner for Human Rights 
(Article 36(3)) protects the general interest. Cf. also, for an extensive account of the practice of third-party (non-State) 
interventions before the ECtHR: Dinah Shelton, “The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International 
Judicial Proceedings”, American Journal of International Law 88, no.4 (1994), 630 et seqq. 
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None of these actors, notwithstanding the reference to “third party” in the heading of Article 36, is 
considered to be party to the proceedings.236   
As a matter of fact, the opportunity for third-party interventions had already been granted by 
the ECtHR in practice since the end of the 1970s;237 the formalisation by means of a new Rule of 
Court in 1982238 and of Protocol no. 11 subsequently gave greater certainty and legitimacy to the 
procedure and boosted requests for submission by interested parties.  
Article 36 is articulated as follows: the first paragraph allows States Parties whose nationals are 
applicants in a case to intervene. This provision is couched in terms of a right of the States Parties 
concerned to submit comments or participate in the hearings. It has not been used extensively, as it 
is not so frequent that the applicant is a national of a State Party other than the respondent State; 
additionally, States are not always interested in intervening in favour of their nationals. The 2018 
Copenhagen Declaration has sought to encourage the submission of third-party interventions by 
Member States, under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 36, as a way to strengthen their dialogue with 
the Court.239 
While using a slightly different wording, paragraph 3 also enshrines a right to intervene, which 
is conferred upon the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights and extends to all cases before the Court 
(rectius, before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber). This provision was introduced by Protocol no. 14 
and has been taken advantage of by the Commissioner; as mentioned in Chapter 2, whereas only three 
amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the Commissioner before the entry into force of Protocol no. 
                                                        
236 As explicitly provided for in CoE, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby, 11 May 1994, 
European Treaty Series – No. 155, para. 91. In both national and international systems, the distinction between third-
party interveners and amici curiae is not always apparent. For attempts of clarification in the literature, cf. the following 
entries in the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford Public International Law, accessed 23 
December 2018, http://opil.ouplaw.com): Philippe J. Sands and Ruth Mackenzie, “International Courts and Tribunals, 
Amicus Curiae” (last updated: January 2008); and Andreas Zimmermann, “International Courts and Tribunals, 
Intervention in Proceedings” (last updated: August 2006).  
237 William A. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights. A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 788, refers to the Winterwerp case (ECtHR, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, no. 6301/73, 24 October 1979) as the 
first occasion when the ECtHR allowed third-party interventions. Cf. also, on the evolution of the system, Shelton, supra 
n 235.  
238 Former Rule 37(2): cf. Schabas, supra n 237, 789-790.  
239 Copenhagen Declaration, supra n 219, paras. 34, 39 and 40. 
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14 (under paragraph 2 of Article 36, which is analysed below), twenty briefs have been submitted 
since then up to December 2018.240  
It should be noted that, during the drafting process of Protocol no. 14, the proposal was also 
discussed to vest the Commissioner with the power to bring proceedings before the ECtHR on his/her 
own motion, particularly in cases of mass violations of human rights or structural problems. This 
more far-reaching proposal was rejected by States Parties, which in turn accepted the right of the 
Commissioner to intervene as a third party in proceedings before the Court.241  
Paragraph 2 of Article 36 is arguably the most significant component of the third-party 
intervention mechanism before the ECtHR, as the most innovative and widely used. According to 
this provision, “the President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, 
invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned 
who is not the applicant” to intervene in the proceedings (emphasis added). Thus, a wide population 
is potentially concerned by this provision; these individuals and entities, however, are not entitled to 
submit their views, but require a leave from the Court. Moreover, pursuant to Rule 44 of the Rules of 
Court, leave to intervene may be made by the Court conditional upon respect for certain time and 
content limits.242 At any rate, within these limits, the ECtHR has almost always granted authorisations 
to intervene, which are most commonly requested by NGOs.243 Other interveners include States 
Parties, individuals (in rare cases) as well as international organisations, bodies, and agencies.244  
Although to a lesser extent compared to NGOs, NHRIs have also submitted their observations 
to the ECtHR in respect of pending cases. This has been the case for the UK human rights 
                                                        
240 Cf. Section 2.4 of this dissertation. 
241 For the drafting history of Article 36(3) ECHR, cf. Sicilianos, supra n 235, 143 et seqq.  
242 Rule 44(5) reads: “Any invitation or grant of leave … shall be subject to any conditions, including time-limits, set by 
the President of the Chamber. Where such conditions are not complied with, the President may decide not to include the 
comments in the case file or to limit participation in the hearing to the extent that he or she considers appropriate”. 
243 Schabas, supra n 237, 792-793. 
244 Interveners from the latter category have included, among others: the European Commission (in the Bosphorus v. 
Ireland case), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (e.g., in the Saadi v. the UK, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Kurić 
v. Slovenia, and Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy cases), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (in the 
Blečić v. Croatia case), and the Venice Commission (e.g., in the Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rywin v. 
Poland, and Berlusconi v. Italy cases). 
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commissions in particular – a circumstance which is arguably connected to their extensive experience 
in litigating cases at the national level.245 Indeed, the prerogatives of these institutions in the area, 
which have been either laid down in the institutions’ founding laws or recognised by courts and 
regularly exercised, range from direct initiation of legal proceedings to interventions as third parties 
and legal assistance to prospective applicants.246  
Before the ECtHR, the British Equality and Human Rights Commission intervened in twenty-
four cases, of which five were struck out of the list, two were declared inadmissible, and one is still 
pending.247 The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission appears to have addressed the Court as 
a third party in seven cases, including the first case where an amicus curiae brief was submitted by 
an NHRI, in 1993.248  
In the last years, other national human rights structures have started to file amicus curiae briefs 
with the ECtHR: the Irish Human Rights Commission submitted information in three cases between 
                                                        
245 Cf., for similar considerations, de Beco, supra n 233, 184.  
246 Nonetheless, there are differences between the mandates of the various institutions. While the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission of Great Britain is explicitly entrusted with these powers by the Equality Act 2006, the right of the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission to intervene as a third party was established by the House of Lords (House 
of Lords, In Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, 20 June 2002, [2002] UKHL 25). The Scottish Human 
Rights Commission may also intervene in domestic civil proceedings, but it is explicitly forbidden from providing 
assistance to (prospective) parties in legal proceedings and cannot institute proceedings. 
247 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the UK, no. 61498/08, 2 March 2010; Kay and others v. the UK, no. 37341/06, 21 
September 2010; J.M. v. the UK, no. 37060/06, 28 September 2010; Greens and M.T. v. the UK, nos. 60041/08 and 
60054/08, 23 November 2010; Seal v. the UK, no. 50330/07, 7 December 2010; O’Donoghue and others v. the UK, no. 
34848/07, 14 December 2010; Knaggs and Khachik v. the UK (dec.), nos. 46559/06 and 22921/06, 30 August 2011 
(inadmissible); Bah v. the UK, no. 56328/07, 27 September 2011; Fox v. the UK (dec.), no. 61319/09, 20 March 2012 
(inadmissible); Asuquo v. the UK (striking out), no. 61206/11, 10 July 2012; R.P. and others v. the UK, no. 38245/08, 9 
October 2012; Hode and Abdi v. the UK, no. 22341/09, 6 November 2012; Redfearn v. the UK, no. 47335/06, 6 November 
2012; C.N. v. the UK, no. 4239/08, 13 November 2012; Van Colle v. the UK, no. 7678/09, 13 November 2012; Eweida 
and others v. the UK, nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, 15 January 2013; McCaughey and others v. the 
UK, no. 43098/09, 16 July 2013; Kawogo v. the UK (striking out), no. 56921/09, 3 September 2013; O.G.O. v. the UK 
(striking out), no. 13950/12, 18 February 2014; Pritchard v. the UK (striking out), no. 1573/11, 18 March 2014; Armani 
da Silva v. the UK [GC], no. 5878/08, 30 March 2016; Sabure Malik v. the UK (striking out), no. 32968/11, 30 June 2016; 
Big Brother Watch and others v. the UK, nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15, 13 September 2018; and Catt v. the UK, 
no. 43514/15 communicated on 19 May 2016 (pending).  
248 ECtHR, Brannigan and McBride v. the UK, nos. 14553/89 and 14554/89, 25 May 1993. At that time, the institution 
was named Northern Ireland Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, as was in another case: ECtHR, John 
Murray v. the UK [GC], no. 18731/91, 8 February 1996. The other five cases in relation to which the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission submitted comments all concerned the actions of security forces in Northern Ireland between 
the 1980s and the early 1990s. Four of them were delivered on 4 May 2001: Shanaghan v. the UK, no. 37715/97; Kelly 
v. the UK, no. 30054/96; Hugh Jordan v. the UK, no. 24746/94; and McKerr v. the UK, no. 28883/95. The latest one is 
McCaughey and others v. the UK, no. 43098/09, 16 July 2013.  
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2011 and 2012,249 whereas the Défenseur des droits (the French classical ombudsman) intervened in 
five cases between 2014 and 2017.250 While the French NHRI, the Commission nationale consultative 
des droits de l’homme, also began to intervene before the ECtHR rather recently, in 2013, it has 
already submitted briefs in nine cases.251 The Human Rights Defender of Armenia submitted its first 
brief in July 2018 in a case concerning medical assistance in detention252 and the Danish Institute for 
Human Rights did the same in January 2019 in a case concerning family reunification.253 It is also 
possible that other NHRIs were granted leave to intervene, as ECtHR judgments (and especially 
decisions) do not always mention third-party interventions, nor are interventions referred to in relation 
to communicated cases. 
Moreover, reports and recommendations produced by NHRIs in the exercise of their functions 
are increasingly mentioned in ECtHR judgments under the heading “relevant law and practice”; 
reference to these documents is often introduced by applicants.254 While at times this kind of 
                                                        
249 ECtHR, Magee v. Ireland (striking out), no. 53743/09, 20 November 2012; Donohoe v. Ireland, no. 19165/08, 12 
December 2013; and O’Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810/09, 28 January 2014. In all instances, comments were forwarded 
by the Irish Human Rights Commission; the merger of this Commission with the Equality Authority resulted, in 2014, in 
the establishment of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission. Third-party interventions by the Commission are 
published at https://www.ihrec.ie/publications/ (accessed 4 January 2019).  
250 ECtHR, Okitaloshima Okonda Osungu and Selpa Lokongo v. France (dec.), nos. 76860/11 and 51354/13, 8 September 
2015 (inadmissible); R.K. and others v. France, no. 68264/14, 12 July 2016; Charron and Merle-Montet v. France (dec.), 
no 22612/15, 16 January 2018 (inadmissible); A.S. and G.S. v. France, no. 4409/16, 29 January 2019; and Association 
confraternelle de la presse judiciaire v. France and eleven other applications, no. 49526/15, communicated on 26 April 
2017 (pending). For the texts of the briefs submitted by the Défenseur, cf. Défenseur des droits, “L'action du Défenseur 
des droits devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH)”, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://juridique.defenseurdesdroits.fr/index.php?lvl=cmspage&pageid=6&id_rubrique=111.  
251 ECtHR, Yengo v. France, no. 50494/12, 21 May 2015; A.A.A. v. France (striking out), no. 26735/15, 4 July 2017; I.O. 
v. France (striking out), no. 40132/15, 31 May 2016; Khan v. France, no. 12267/16, 28 February 2019; J.M.B. and nine 
other applications v. France, no. 9671/15, communicated on 11 February 2016 (pending); F.R. and three other 
applications v. France, no. 12792/15, communicated on 11 February 2016; Association confraternelle de la presse 
judiciaire v. France, supra n 250; Moustahi v. France, no. 9347/14, communicated on 30 October 2017 (pending); and 
Gjutaj and others v. France, communicated. This list has been derived from Commission nationale consultative des droits 
de l’homme, supra n 203, 1; for more details on the single interventions, cf. the annual reports (rapports d’activité) of the 
CNCDH, starting from CNCDH, Rapport d’Activité 2013. Une année au service de la protection et de la promotion des 
droits de l’homme en France et dans le monde, 20 November 2014, which mentions the first third-party intervention ever 
submitted by the Commission, in the Yengo case. 
252 ECtHR, Hakobyan v. Armenia, no. 11222/12, communicated on 14 September 2015 (pending); the case was referred 
to by Mikayel Khachatryan, Head of the International Cooperation Department at the Human Rights Defender of the 
Republic of Armenia (interview conducted on 15 November 2018, on file with author).  
253 As confirmed by Christoffer Badse, Director of the Monitoring Department at the Danish Institute for Human Rights 
(interview conducted on 21 February 2019, on file with author). The case referred to is ECtHR, M.A. v. Denmark, no. 
6697/18, communicated on 7 September 2018 (pending).  
254 The Greek NHRI keeps an updated list of all ECtHR judgments in which reference is made to its reports, by either the 
applicants or the Court: Greek National Commission for Human Rights, The Greek National Commission for Human 
Rights in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, last updated October 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.nchr.gr/index.php/en (right side of the webpage). According to Αnna Irene Baka, Legal Officer at the Greek 
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documents from NHRIs have been relied on by the Court in its reasoning and have had an impact on 
the outcome of the proceedings, the fact remains that, in these instances, the NHRI is only a “passive” 
participant; additionally, while certain NHRIs have considerable influence on the public debate, so 
that their documents are widely circulated, this is not always the case, and it might be unadvisable to 
rely on the parties to make reference to the positions of NHRIs.  
In addition to the above-mentioned national institutions, ENNHRI has recently initiated a 
practice of submission of its own third-party interventions, relying on the expertise developed by its 
members.255 Interventions are lodged by ENNHRI with respect to cases that raise issues which 
transcend national boundaries and affect several States Parties: this was the case in Gauer v. France 
(on the forced sterilisation of women with a mental disability; the application was declared 
inadmissible for breach of the six-month rule), D.D. v. Lithuania (on involuntary internment in 
psychiatric institutions and guardianship proceedings, Judgment of 14 February 2012), and Big 
Brother Watch and others v. the UK (on mass surveillance, Judgment of 13 September 2018).  
The (potential) added value of submissions by ENNHRI is clear: the Network can collect and 
synthesise the knowledge and practical experience of its members and thus provide the Court with 
thorough and wide-ranging analyses covering several States Parties. Moreover, ENNHRI can replace 
NHRIs that do not have the resources or expertise to intervene on their own;256 for instance, in relation 
to D.D. v. Lithuania, it is noteworthy that the Lithuanian Ombudsmen’s Office was not even a 
member of ENNHRI at the time of submission of the intervention nor was it at the time of judgment. 
                                                        
Commission, the most significant references by the ECtHR to reports and resolutions by the Commission have covered 
matters such as the use of force, detention conditions, the rights of persons with mental disabilities, the rights of people 
living with HIV/AIDS, the right to a fair trial, and same-sex partnerships (interview conducted on 27 July 2018, on file 
with author). According to Baka, the Court appears to be interested not only in the assessments conducted by the 
Commission, but also in the recommendations addressed by the Commission to the Greek authorities. 
255 For an insider’s perspective on the strategic monitoring exercised by ENNHRI in this area, cf. Adamson, supra n 199, 
143-145.  
256 For a different opinion, although with reference to the hypothetical right to application of NHRIs, cf. de Beco, supra 
n 233, 173, footnote 25: “Il ne nous semble cependant pas recommandable d’ouvrir le droit de recours au Groupe européen 
[the precedessor of ENNHRI], car ce Group ne pourrait pas l’utiliser comme menace vis-à-vis des États, comme le 
pourraient les institutions nationales des droits de l’homme. De plus, ceci obligerait ce Group à acquérir des connaissances 
approfondies sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans l’État concerné, ce dont il n’a pas les moyens”. It might be added 
that the European Group (now ENNHRI) has undergone significant changes over the years: its membership has 
considerably increased, a permanent secretariat has been created, and relationships and exchanges between member 
NHRIs have been strengthened.     
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Nonetheless, the human rights issues raised by involuntary admissions to psychiatric institutions are 
certainly of European interest. 
As noted by some authors, an alternative way for NHRIs to bring their views to the ECtHR 
might be to provide information to the Commissioner for Human Rights, who has a right to intervene 
before the Court pursuant to Article 36(3) ECHR.257 Nonetheless, it does not appear that this avenue 
has been systematically pursued, a circumstance that can be explained by the experience developed 
by NHRIs in submitting briefs to the Court as well as by the openness of the Court with respect to 
third-party interventions, which are rarely refused. The fact remains that the Commissioner closely 
collaborates with NHRIs and that s/he might draw on their reports or consult with them for his/her 
submissions.258  
Submissions by NGOs are still much greater in number, but the growing experience of the 
above-mentioned NHRIs and of ENNHRI might encourage more institutions to intervene and guide 
them in the drafting of submissions. A recent meeting of ENNHRI Legal Working Group precisely 
focused on how member NHRIs could usefully lodge third-party submissions with the ECtHR.259 
Third-party interventions before the ECtHR are not the focus of this dissertation; therefore, 
their contents and impact on the decisions of the Court are not analysed here. Nonetheless, a few 
observations are in order. Amicus curiae briefs can be of great assistance to the ECtHR in 
contextualising cases and grounding its decisions on firm bases. Typically, this happens when third 
parties provide the Court with statistical data, information on the laws or practices of individual 
States, or a comparative overview of the laws and practices of multiple States on certain aspects.260 
                                                        
257 Cf. de Beco, supra n 233, 174 et seqq.; and Buyse, supra n 231, 178. 
258 For instance, the Commissioner referred to reports and other information provided by national human rights structures 
in his third-party interventions relating to the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case and the N.D. and N.T. v. Spain case. 
259 ENNHRI, “Legal Working Group discusses third party intervention before the ECtHR, plans future activities”, News, 
23 June 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.ennhri.org/Legal-Working-Group-discusses-third-party-
intervention-before-the-European.  
260 Paul Harvey, “Third Party Interventions before the ECtHR: A Rough Guide”, Strasbourg Observers, 24 February 
2015, accessed 4 January 2019, https://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/02/24/third-party-interventions-before-the-ecthr-
a-rough-guide/. Nonetheless, ideological positions as well have proved to be highly influential on the reasoning of the 
Court: Nicole Bürli, Third-Party Interventions before the European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge: Intersentia, 
2017), 188 et seqq. 
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In this respect, NHRIs, in light of their independence and extensive knowledge of national and 
international law, jurisprudence, and practice, appear well-suited to act as “friends of the court”.261 
While third-party comments are not always mentioned directly by the Court in its reasoning, 
they seem to be relied on not infrequently by the ECtHR in support of its arguments.262 Third-party 
interventions are believed to strengthen the Court’s ability to deliver well-informed and well-reasoned 
judgments as well as its legitimacy more broadly.263  
It should also be underlined that third-party interventions are not unrelated to the execution of 
ECtHR judgments; ideally, NHRIs (and NGOs) could follow the development of a case from its early 
stages before the ECtHR, by submitting an amicus curiae brief, to the full execution of the Court’s 
judgment by the State concerned. In this respect, the French NHRI has resolved to mainly follow up 
at the execution stage those cases in relation to which it previously submitted a third-party 
intervention.264 The involvement by NHRIs could start even earlier, as the case unfolds in national 
courts, before reaching the ECtHR; the NHRI would thus follow the whole “life cycle” of a case. 
 
3.7. Preliminary conclusions 
This chapter has illustrated the main characteristics of NHRIs, how these institutions were born 
and have spread worldwide, and how they have established themselves as key players in the 
promotion and protection of human rights at the national level and as close partners for international 
organisations which monitor States’ human rights records. Indeed, it appears that, in light of their 
                                                        
261 On the added value of NHRIs as third-party interveners, cf. Buyse, supra n 231, 177 et seqq. De Beco, supra n 233, 
180-181, refers to NHRIs as the “amicus curiae idéal” of the Court, as they differ from both the government and NGOs 
and are expected not to take sides in the dispute, but to provide their expert opinion.  
262 Bürli, supra n 260. 
263 Nicole Bürli, “Amicus Curiae as a Means to Reinforce the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights”, in 
The European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents. Turning Criticism into Strength, eds. Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom 
Zwart, and Julie Fraser (Cheltenham; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2013), 135-146. Cf. more generally on the 
usefulness of third-party interventions (by NGOs) before international courts: Shelton, supra n 235, 611-642. 
264 Interview with Thomas Dumortier, Legal Adviser at the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme, 8 
March 2019, on file with author. Cf. also, as examples of third-party interventions by NHRIs in cases that they 
subsequently followed-up at the execution stage, the intervention by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in 
McKerr v. the UK, supra n 248, and the intervention by the Irish Human Rights Commission in O’Keeffe v. Ireland, supra 
n 249. 
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composition and functions, NHRIs can play a potentially critical role in the efforts to embed 
international norms and decisions in domestic contexts.  
On the one hand, the statutory nature of NHRIs allows for a dialogue with their respective 
governments as well as for easier access to governmental information; on the other, their 
independence and expertise enable them to cooperate with civil society and make them a reliable 
source of information for distant international bodies. In other words, their “bridging” role – within 
the national context and between the national and international levels – should represent their added 
value in the face of the implementation challenge. However, the main assets of NHRIs also give rise 
to certain ambiguities.  
Being relatively recent institutions in the human rights scene, NHRIs have inevitably come to 
partially occupy areas which were once of other actors – be they international organisations, State 
organs or NGOs.265 The links developed by NHRIs with multiple actors potentially endanger one of 
the most significant characteristics of these institutions – i.e., their independence.266 While 
institutionally mandated to cooperate with both State organs and NGOs, NHRIs must not be 
influenced by their agendas or yield to their demands. To strike the right balance is not an easy task, 
but a crucial one if NHRIs are to maintain contacts with their main interlocutors. Losing the trust of 
the government would mean losing the ability to have a concrete impact on policy and legislation, 
whereas the trust of NGOs guarantees that NHRIs are not the umpteenth State organ defending 
governmental policies. Moreover, the credibility of NHRIs in the eyes of the public heavily relies on 
their independence from all other actors.  
The difficulties in finding a conceptual space for NHRIs267 and ensuring their actual 
independence have led to the uncertainties at the international level that have been outlined above – 
e.g., regarding the role that NHRIs should play within the reporting procedures before UN treaty 
                                                        
265 Roberts, supra n 82, 228-229. 
266 Cf. the concerns expressed in Human Rights Watch, supra n 50. Cf. also Murray, supra n 51, 5-7, on the difficulty of 
defining “independence” in relation to NHRIs.  
267 Smith, supra n 10, 908 et seqq. Cf. also Dickson, supra n 11, 273, on the difficulty of carving out a conceptual space 
for NHRIs “in the traditional division of state functions”. 
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bodies. While there is growing awareness of the importance of independent participation by NHRIs 
into international and regional monitoring processes, and of the distinctive contribution that they can 
make, there still exist varying rules and practices of engagement – a circumstance which hinders 
greater involvement on the part of NHRIs, deterred by conflicting approaches and procedures. In the 
CoE context, recourse to the wider notion of “national human rights structures” and the paucity of 
formalised rules of engagement with these structures arguably contribute to this lack of clarity.     
Notwithstanding some outstanding issues and room for development, it is undeniable that 
NHRIs are increasingly regarded by all main stakeholders as essential actors for ensuring the 
implementation of international human rights standards and the realisation of human rights more 
generally. Even in the absence of a legal obligation for States to create NHRIs,268 a steady trend of 
establishment of NHRIs is being witnessed; furthermore, NHRIs are strongly promoted by the UN 
and other international organisations and have met with prevalent support by NGOs. It is hard to find 
such a consensus on other instruments for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
Moreover, remedies are being developed to overcome the above-mentioned weaknesses of 
NHRIs. Above all, GANHRI is amending the accreditation system in terms of a more comprehensive 
review, greater transparency, and wider participation, with a view to ensuring that only NHRIs which 
effectively promote and protect human rights are accredited.269 Much remains to be done to actually 
implement these reforms and root them in the accreditation process, but the changes undertaken go 
in the direction of a more thorough and objective review of NHRIs, yet free from improper external 
interference.   
The strengthening of the GANHRI accreditation process has arguably led to greater recognition 
of the role of NHRIs, and especially of A-status NHRIs, by international organisations – first and 
                                                        
268 As mentioned, the CRPD and OPCAT do not prescribe the establishment of NHRIs as such, whereas most of the other 
UN treaty bodies (except for the Committee on the Rights of the Child) simply recommend that States institute NHRIs, 
in the absence of an express reference to these institutions in their respective treaties. At any rate, there is no general 
obligation upon States to create these institutions: de Beco and Murray, supra n 22, 22-23. 
269 See Section 3.4 supra on GANHRI accreditation system. In the literature, corrections to the accreditation procedure 
are proposed in de Beco and Murray, supra n 22, 143-147: e.g., the inclusion of independent experts in the Sub-Committee 
on Accreditation, broader consultations with NGOs, greater focus on the effectiveness of NHRIs, and greater publicity of 
the documentation on which the assessment is based. 
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foremost the UN. National institutions routinely cooperate with treaty bodies, are involved in 
recently-developed mechanisms such as the UPR, and increasingly participate in the drafting of 
treaties negotiated within the UN. Notwithstanding some persistent uncertainties as to the concrete 
means of interaction between NHRIs and UN bodies, especially as far as treaty bodies are concerned, 
a trend is clearly discernible on the ground towards a “special relationship” between the UN and 
NHRIs.  
While somewhat lagging behind, the CoE has also increasingly involved NHRIs in its activities 
and, even though intermittently, is formalising this relationship and attributing greater importance to 
the Paris Principles and the accreditation process carried out by GANHRI. The fact that this trend is 
less clear-cut than the involvement of NHRIs in the UN context arguably explains why the literature 
on the subject is sorely lacking.270 Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation aim to fill this gap by providing 
an empirical analysis of the extent to which NHRIs have contributed to the promotion of the execution 
of ECtHR judgments by acting at both the international and national levels. 
 
                                                        
270 Exceptions include the works mentioned in Section 3.6 supra; and Steven Greer, The European Convention on Human 
Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 289 et seqq. 
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CHAPTER 4. PROMOTING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 
AT THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE LEVEL 
 
This chapter focuses on the activities carried out at the CoE level by NHRIs to promote the 
execution of ECtHR judgments. As highlighted in Chapter 1, there is widespread recognition that 
delays and failures in the execution of ECtHR judgments have led to the overburdening of the Court 
and of the Committee of Ministers as well as, more generally, to the weakening of the ECHR system. 
On the other hand, in the last fifteen to twenty years, the process of supervision of the execution of 
ECtHR judgments has gradually become more transparent and objective by opening up to the 
participation of actors other than the Committee of Ministers and the respondent Member States 
(Chapter 2). 
An analysis is thus opportune of the role that NHRIs are currently playing and can potentially 
play in this area as bodies that, due to their particular features, including their position at the 
crossroads between the national and international levels of human rights promotion and protection 
(Chapter 3), would appear to be ideally suited for aligning national systems with international 
standards and decisions.  
In practice, at the CoE level, the execution of ECtHR judgments is mainly promoted by NHRIs 
through the submission of communications to the Committee of Ministers under Rule 9(2) of the 
Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms 
of friendly settlements.1 This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the authors, content, and impact 
                                                        
1 Another possible means would seem to be the participation in briefings with representatives from the Committee of 
Ministers, the Department for the Execution of Judgments, and NGOs. Since this kind of interaction is not given much 
publicity and could only be ascertained by this author in relation to a single NHRI in a single case (i.e., the Serbian 
Protector of Citizens in the Zorica Jovanović case), it is not considered in this chapter. It is also possible that further 
informal contacts have taken place between NHRIs and the Department for the Execution of Judgments in particular; 
these exchanges are, however, inherently inaccessible to the public and thus do not lend themselves to systematic research. 
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of the communications lodged with the Committee of Ministers by NHRIs, thus drawing for the first 
time a comprehensive portrayal of the interactions between NHRIs and the Committee of Ministers 
(and the Department for the Execution of Judgments, which supports the Committee) for the full 
execution of ECtHR judgments. By way of this analysis, the current level and means of engagement 
by NHRIs, at the CoE level, in the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments are mapped, thus 
providing answers to the following research question and sub-questions: 
 
Q1: To what extent have NHRIs contributed to promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments? 
a) Which NHRIs have interacted with the Committee of Ministers and the Department for the 
Execution of Judgments to this end?  
b) In relation to which cases have NHRIs interacted with these bodies?  
c) How have NHRIs interacted with these bodies? 
d) What have been the effects of these interactions? 
 
Chapter 5 will examine the activities that NHRIs have performed at the national level with a 
view to promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
 
4.1. Communications to the Committee of Ministers from National Human Rights Institutions 
(Rule 9(2) communications) 
In a context of mostly informal relations between NHRIs and CoE bodies, the 
institutionalisation of a role for NHRIs in promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments is significant. 
As mentioned, the 2006 Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of 
judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements provide for the opportunity for NHRIs, as well as 
NGOs, to submit to the Committee of Ministers “any communication … with regard to the execution 
of judgments under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention” (Rule 9(2)).  
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On the basis of this provision, read in the context of the CoE system for the supervision of the 
execution of ECtHR judgments (illustrated in Chapter 2) and in light of the characteristics of NHRIs 
(outlined in Chapter 3), a few elements emerge and some hypotheses can be posited. Firstly, the Rule 
in question is addressed to “national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights”; 
in line with the comprehensive approach that has traditionally been adopted by the CoE in this regard,2 
it is expected that the expression would be interpreted by the Committee of Ministers as referring to 
a wide range of national public bodies sensu lato promoting and protecting human rights, including 
classical ombudsmen and equality bodies.  
Secondly, while communications under Rule 9(1) from the injured party (i.e., the applicant 
before the ECtHR) can only refer to the “payment of the just satisfaction or the taking of individual 
measures”, there is no limit as regards the content of communications from NHRIs and NGOs. 
Indeed, these entities are expected to chiefly submit information in respect of general measures. More 
specifically, communications from NHRIs, in view of these institutions’ “official status” and 
thorough knowledge of the national legal system, can be expected to fulfil one or more of these aims: 
providing reliable and independent information to the Committee of Ministers, mainly about the state 
of legislation, administrative regulation and practice, and jurisprudence in the State concerned; 
putting forward proposals for reform with a view to aligning the conduct of States to the Court’s 
judgments; and verifying that States are implementing their action plans and complying with their 
action reports, as well as respecting any interim resolutions or other indications by the Committee of 
Ministers.3  
Thirdly and conversely, it is to be underlined that the Committee of Ministers is “entitled to 
consider” Rule 9(2) communications, but it is not compelled to do so; this is contrary to what happens 
with communications from the injured party under Rule 9(1), which the Committee “shall consider”. 
In the absence of an obligation for the Committee of Ministers to consider and for States to reply to 
                                                        
2 Cf. Section 3.6 of this dissertation. 
3 For more information regarding action plans and reports, as well as interim resolutions and other instruments at the 
disposal of the Committee of Ministers, cf. Section 2.2 of this dissertation. 
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submissions by NHRIs and NGOs, a relatively low response rate could be envisaged; nonetheless, 
the institutional relationship between NHRIs and State bodies and the fact that NHRIs would probably 
adopt a less “adversarial” approach towards governments could prompt the latter to interact with 
NHRIs more frequently and willingly than with NGOs. 
The following sections map the current level of engagement by NHRIs with the Committee of 
Ministers with a view to promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments, by testing the above-
mentioned hypotheses and others in relation to the authors, content, and impact of Rule 9(2) 
communications. To this end, Section 4.2 first of all identifies the institutions that have taken part so 
far in the procedure laid down in Rule 9(2), what kind of institutions they are (human rights 
ombudsmen, consultative commissions, commissions with a protection mandate, research institutes, 
or entities other than NHRIs),4 and what their international status is (A-, B- or C-status institutions, 
or non-accredited institutions).5 The rate of their communications is also measured.  
The identification of the participants in the procedure is followed by an analysis of the types of 
judgments that attract the attention of NHRIs (with particular regard to the severity of the violation 
and the legal importance of the case;6 Section 4.3) and an analysis of the content of communications 
from NHRIs in order to ascertain the kind of information and observations that these institutions tend 
to submit to the Committee of Ministers (Section 4.4).  
Finally, the impact of Rule 9(2) communications on the monitoring activity of the Committee 
of Ministers is examined in Section 4.5. To this end, it is first of all ascertained whether 
communications from NHRIs have been replied to by States and/or referred to by the Committee of 
Ministers and/or the Department for the Execution of Judgments in their resolutions and documents 
                                                        
4 A categorisation of models of NHRIs can be found in Section 3.2 of this dissertation. 
5 As shown in Chapter 3, A-status NHRIs are institutions that, on the basis of the assessment by the Global Alliance of 
NHRIs (GANHRI), fully comply with the Paris Principles – i.e., the international standards for NHRIs endorsed by the 
UN. Partially compliant institutions are accredited with B status, whereas institutions that ask for accreditation by 
GANHRI but are considered non-compliant with the Principles are given C status. Cf. Section 3.4 of this dissertation for 
more information on GANHRI and the accreditation of NHRIs; cf. Section 3.6 for the status of European NHRIs. 
6 These two criteria have been put forward and applied by Shai Dothan to identify the types of ECtHR judgments that 
attract the attention of NGOs: Shai Dothan, “A Virtual Wall of Shame: The New Way of Imposing Reputational Sanctions 
on Defiant States”, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 27, no. 2 (2017): 169 et seqq. These criteria are 
tested and, where necessary, adapted to NHRIs in this dissertation – cf. Section 4.3 infra.    
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(what I term “formal recognition”). Thereafter, it is verified whether observations and proposals from 
NHRIs have actually been accepted by States and/or used by the Committee of Ministers and/or the 
Department for Execution as the basis for their recommendations (“substantial recognition”). Some 
preliminary conclusions are drawn in Section 4.6 regarding the activities of NHRIs in the CoE context 
with a view to promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
Where appropriate, throughout the chapter, a comparison is drawn with the communications 
lodged with the Committee of Ministers by NGOs, which are also allowed to intervene under Rule 
9(2). While communications from NGOs are not the focus of this dissertation, some considerations 
are made as regards their number, content, and impact compared to the number, content, and impact 
of communications from NHRIs in order to ascertain whether the role in the procedure of these two 
groups of entities and their consideration by the relevant CoE bodies differ in any respect.  
 
4.2. Who: which institutions have submitted communications and to what extent  
As of December 2018, twelve “national institutions for the promotion and protection of human 
rights” submitted at least one communication to the Committee of Ministers regarding the execution 
of ECtHR judgments. These are the Human Rights Defender of Armenia, the Public Defender of 
Rights of the Czech Republic, the French Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme 
(also known as CNCDH), the French Défenseur des droits (and its predecessor, the Médiateur de la 
République),7 the Public Defender of Georgia, the Greek National Commission for Human Rights, 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain), the Irish Human Rights and Equality 
Commission (and its predecessor, the Irish Human Rights Commission), the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission, the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, the Protector of Citizens of 
Serbia, and the Human Rights Ombudsman of Slovenia.  
                                                        
7 The functions of the Médiateur and of three other institutions were attributed to the Défenseur in 2011.  
 154 
The number of participating institutions is significantly lower than that of all European national 
human rights structures, according to the broad definition adopted by CoE bodies; indeed, almost all 
forty-seven CoE Member States have a classical ombudsman and/or equality bodies in place, in lieu 
of or in addition to an NHRI.8 The number of national structures that have so far participated in the 
Rule 9(2) procedure is also much lower than that of members of the European Network of National 
Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI; forty-two)9 and even of A- and B-status European NHRIs 
(thirty-five).  
Nonetheless, the number of national human rights structures taking part in the Rule 9(2) 
procedure is on the rise as, over the thirteen years during which the procedure has been available, six 
NHRIs submitted their first communications in the last five years, and three of them in the last two 
years (namely, the Armenian Human Rights Defender, the Georgian Public Defender, and the Greek 
National Commission for Human Rights, between the end of 2016 and the end of 2018).10 
According to the categorisation adopted in Chapter 3, two interveners are consultative 
commissions (the French and Greek commissions), three are commissions with a protection mandate 
(commissions from Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and Ireland), five are human rights ombudsmen 
(NHRIs from Armenia, Georgia, Poland, Serbia, and Slovenia), whereas the French Défenseur des 
                                                        
8 It is difficult to calculate the exact number of European ombudsman institutions and equality bodies. According to a 
comprehensive survey of ombudsman institutions in Europe, carried out between September 2005 and October 2007, 
forty-five CoE Member States have national or regional ombudsmen, the exceptions being Monaco and San Marino 
(Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, ed., European Ombudsman-Institutions. A comparative legal analysis regarding the 
multifaceted realisation of an idea (Vienna: Springer, 2008)). Some of these institutions also qualify as A- or B-status 
NHRIs; additionally, many more sector-specific ombudsmen exist. Equinet is a network of forty-six European equality 
bodies, whose members come from EU Member States, Acceding States and Candidate States (thirty-four countries in 
total). Some Equinet members also qualify as NHRIs and/or ombudsmen.  
9 As mentioned in Section 3.6 of this dissertation, ENNHRI membership is not limited to A-status European institutions, 
but it also includes B- and C-status institutions as well as non-accredited institutions (whose prerogatives within the 
organisation, however, differ). 
10 The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission informally forwarded its first communication in the early 2000s, 
before the Rule 9(2) procedure was introduced; it was followed by the CNCDH and the Médiateur, which started to 
submit joint communications in 2009. In 2011, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain), the Irish 
Human Rights Commission and the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland came along. The Public Defender of 
Rights of the Czech Republic and the Protector of Citizens of Serbia submitted their first communications in 2014, the 
Human Rights Ombudsman of Slovenia in 2015, the Public Defender of Georgia at the end of 2016, and the Human 
Rights Defender of Armenia and the Greek National Commission for Human Rights in 2018. If one considers the 
Défenseur separately from the Médiateur, the first communication lodged by the new institution dates back to 2016; at 
any rate, it is clear that the Défenseur built on the experience developed by its predecessor in the submission of 
communications to the Committee of Ministers.  
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droits and the Public Defender of the Czech Republic can be considered classical ombudsmen – and 
thus not NHRIs in the narrow sense. Nonetheless, the Czech Defender is arguably evolving from a 
classical ombudsman into a human rights ombudsman.11  
It is unsurprising that almost all commissions with a protection mandate in Europe have so far 
participated in the procedure; their extensive experience in litigation at the national level has led to 
the submission of various amicus curiae briefs to the ECtHR on their part, and it is not rare for third-
party interveners to also monitor the execution of the respective judgments once delivered (this 
pattern is discernible among NGOs as well).12 Ombudsmen too, especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe, are frequently vested with the power to apply to or intervene before national courts, in 
addition to their complaint-handling functions. It might, however, be more striking that among the 
most active NHRIs to date is the CNCDH, a large consultative commission whose primary role at the 
domestic level is to advise the parliament and government on the compatibility of bills, laws, and 
policies with human rights standards. 
At any rate, the examination of the categories of NHRIs that have intervened to date shows that 
all kinds of NHRIs can participate in the Rule 9(2) procedure; while research institutes have not made 
their contribution so far, it is not their inherent nature that prevents them from doing so. On the 
contrary, the research and reporting competences of these NHRIs could prove useful in terms of 
providing reliable information on the laws and practices of their States regarding a certain human 
rights matter.  
With the exception of the French and Czech ombudsmen, participating entities have been 
accredited by GANHRI as either A-status institutions (NHRIs from Armenia, France, Georgia, 
                                                        
11 While the primary competence of the institution remains to oversee the legitimacy and fairness of the conduct of State 
organs, its mandate has gradually been extended to discrimination cases (also between private individuals or entities); 
moreover, the Defender acts as the NPM and CRPD monitoring body for the Czech Republic. The human rights-oriented 
mandate of the Czech Public Defender has recently been recognised by ENNHRI, which admitted the Defender as a 
member at the end of 2017. For an overview of the Defender’s functions, cf. the “Mandate” section of the institution’s 
website, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ochrance.cz/en/mandate-of-the-public-defender-of-rights/. For more 
details, cf. the “Law on the Public Defender of Rights” section, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.ochrance.cz/en/law-on-the-public-defender-of-rights/.  
12 Dothan, supra n 6, 169 et seqq. 
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Greece, Ireland, Poland, Serbia, Great Britain, and Northern Ireland) or B-status institutions (the 
Ombudsman of Slovenia).  
The data above first of all confirm the inclusive approach adopted by the CoE, including its 
Committee of Ministers, towards national human rights structures; with regard to the execution of 
judgments as well, the Committee of Ministers appears ready to accept communications from both 
compliant and partially compliant NHRIs as well as from entities that do not qualify as NHRIs, such 
as classical ombudsmen. At least as far as the admissibility of communications is concerned (their 
consideration and acceptance will be analysed subsequently in Section 4.5), there is thus no 
difference between the above-mentioned institutions.  
Nonetheless, the analysis also shows that A-status NHRIs are the most active participants in 
the Rule 9(2) procedure – a circumstance that could be explained by their greater expertise and 
financial and staff resources, which allow NHRIs to extend their activities to the international level. 
At the UN level too, A-status institutions have indeed taken the lead as far as reporting to treaty 
bodies and contributing to the Universal Periodic Review are concerned. However, at least in general 
terms, it does not appear that engagement at one level has an effect on engagement at the other, as 
Rule 9(2) interveners and participants in the UN procedures are not the same.13 According to a 
                                                        
13 During the UPR second cycle (2012-2016), nineteen A-status European NHRIs submitted information, and yet this 
number (which is much greater than the nine A-status institutions that submitted communications to the Committee of 
Ministers) does not include NHRIs from Poland and Serbia, which instead intervened at the CoE level. Similar 
considerations apply to B-status institutions: the Slovenian Human Rights Ombudsman, which submitted a 
communication to the Committee of Ministers, did not participate in the UPR second cycle (although it did participate in 
the first cycle), whereas five other B-status NHRIs contributed to the UPR second cycle (cf. Section 3.5. of this 
dissertation). The same goes for non-accredited institutions: the Défenseur has never participated in the UPR, the Czech 
Defender submitted information during the first cycle only, whereas other non-accredited institutions made their 
contribution (between the first and second cycles, various specialised ombudsmen from Croatia, the Netherlands, and 
Norway, the children ombudsmen from Ireland and Sweden, the Finnish Ombudsman for Equality, the Moldovan Council 
on the Prevention and Elimination of Discrimination and Ensuring Equality, and the Swiss Federal Commission against 
Racism intervened).  
It is also noteworthy that among the most active authors of alternative reports to UN treaty bodies, having submitted 
information to five or more different committees, are a number of A-status institutions that have never intervened before 
the Committee of Ministers: these are NHRIs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
The same applies to the B-status Human Rights Commissioner of Azerbaijan, which has long retained A status before 
being downgraded in May 2018. While some of these countries may receive few adverse judgments from the ECtHR, 
others have been condemned by the Court for serious and/or systemic violations, thus making communications from 
NHRIs amply justified and expected.  
Conversely, not all national human rights structures that submitted information to the Committee of Ministers regularly 
interact with UN treaty bodies: the Slovenian Human Rights Ombudsman forwarded a single submission to the CRPD 
Committee, while the Czech Public Defender only engaged with the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
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representative from the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, participation in the two contexts 
entails different preparatory activities on the part of NHRIs, as the periodic reviews at the UN level 
revolve around more general issues, whereas third-party interventions before the ECtHR and 
communications to the Committee of Ministers are more prominently influenced by the concrete 
circumstances of the case.14 At any rate, there does not appear to be a relationship between 
participation in the UN procedures and submission of communications to the Committee of Ministers 
under Rule 9(2), or vice versa. 
On the other hand, the increasing efforts by ENNHRI to strengthen participation by NHRIs in 
the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments are significant, but too recent to explain the 
communications of most institutions to date. In 2016, ENNHRI Legal Working Group published the 
Guidance for National Human Rights Institutions to Support Implementation of Judgments from the 
European Court of Human Rights, which details the actions that can be undertaken by NHRIs at both 
the national and international levels to promote the execution of ECtHR judgments, including the 
submission of communications to the Committee of Ministers under Rule 9(2).15 While ENNHRI 
might not have prompted recourse to the Rule 9(2) procedure by NHRIs from the beginning, its recent 
focus on the issue is likely to be conducive to greater involvement on the part of NHRIs, especially 
of newer ones and of those that are less familiar with CoE procedures.  
Mention should also be made of a 2008 pilot project promoted by the CoE Commissioner for 
Human Rights to boost the engagement of NHRIs with the execution of ECtHR judgments by 
enhancing the collaboration of these institutions with both national authorities and CoE bodies. The 
project involved five national human rights structures: the Austrian Ombudsman Board, the Belgian 
Office of the Federal Ombudsmen, the French Médiateur de la République, the CNCDH, and the 
                                                        
Discrimination. The Défenseur des droits submitted two reports – one to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women and another to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
14 Interview with Anne van Eijndhoven, Policy Adviser at the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, 4 May 2017, on 
file with author.  
15 ENNHRI/Legal Working Group, Guidance for National Human Rights Institutions to Support Implementation of 
Judgments from the European Court of Human Rights (Brussels: ENNHRI, 2016). 
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Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission; six other institutions (mainly human rights and 
classical ombudsmen) were invited as observers.16 While three of the participants are among the most 
active contributors to the Rule 9(2) procedure, the Austrian and Belgian ombudsmen have never 
submitted information to the Committee of Ministers, nor have any of the observers. There are no 
indications that further similar initiatives have been organised by the Commissioner.   
To sum up, it can preliminarily be claimed that while it appears that commissions with a 
protection mandate on the one hand and A-status NHRIs on the other are the main participants in the 
Rule 9(2) procedure, there is no straightforward explanation for why institutions other than 
commissions with a protection mandate and A-status institutions also intervened and why many other 
A-status NHRIs did not.  
A few factors might play a role. First of all, as before the recent document by ENNHRI no 
serious effort had been undertaken to collectively inform NHRIs about Rule 9(2), nor have CoE 
bodies systematically promoted the use of this instrument, an information issue appears to exist.17  
While by now most NHRIs and a good number of ombudsmen should be aware of the existence 
of the procedure (but not necessarily of its concrete functioning),18 the replies from some participating 
                                                        
16 These are the Defensor del Pueblo from Spain (an A-status human rights ombudsman), the Office of the Commissioner 
for Administration from Cyprus (B-status human rights ombudsman), the Dutch Office of the National Ombudsman 
(classical ombudsman), the Office of the Public Defender of Rights from Slovakia (classical ombudsman), and the 
Consultative Commission for Human Rights from Luxembourg (A-status consultative commission). Cf. Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Enhancing the role of National Human Rights Structures in the execution of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ judgments. Pilot project, 31 January – 1 February 2008, Palais de l’Europe, Room 14. Debriefing and 
Follow-up to the Pilot Project Meeting, 7 February 2008, CommDH/NHRS(2008)7.  
17 This was confirmed by Levan Meskhoradze, Team Leader of the EU Project at the Office of the Public Defender of 
Georgia, and by Petr Polák, Head of the Department of Equal Treatment at the Public Defender of Rights of the Czech 
Republic, according to whom it would be appropriate to publicise more widely the procedure among NHRIs and 
ombudsmen (the interviews were conducted on 17 April 2018 and 1 June 2018 respectively and are on file with author). 
Cf. also the more general findings of Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Survey on National 
Human Rights Institutions: Report on the findings and recommendations of a questionnaire addressed to NHRIs 
worldwide (Geneva: OHCHR, July 2009), 42-47 and 57-58, according to which insufficient knowledge of the 
international and regional human rights systems mainly explained the unsatisfactory level of engagement by NHRIs with 
supranational procedures, and training on these aspects should be further pursued.  
18 It was not deemed useful to insist on the point in the interviews with representatives from NHRIs that have not 
participated in the procedure thus far. Besides, also among participating NHRIs, there is not always a clear recollection 
of how the institution became aware of the existence and functioning of the procedure. This is partly due to the fact that 
some interviewees (e.g., representatives from the Equality and Human Rights Commission of Great Britain and from the 
Public Defender of Georgia) joined the institution at a moment when communications to the Committee of Ministers had 
already been submitted and were thus common knowledge within the organisation. However, it arguably also points to 
the fact that NHRIs were not informed of the procedure in a single official way.    
 159 
NHRIs as well as the elements provided above lead to the conclusion that different institutions have 
become aware of the opportunity to get involved in the procedure through different channels, such as 
the pilot project by the Commissioner for Human Rights, guidelines and exchanges within ENNHRI, 
but also contacts with NGOs and the Department for the Execution of Judgments. For instance, the 
Czech Public Defender was made aware of the existence of the procedure by NGOs that had already 
used it (the Open Society Foundations in particular) and was also approached by the Department for 
Execution with specific regard to the case in which the Defender then determined to intervene.19 In 
other instances, it might be the previous involvement of the NHRI in a matter which went all the way 
to Strasbourg that explains the engagement by the NHRI and its awareness of the procedure.  
Furthermore, an issue of resources may be present.20 The lack of resources can consist in 
financial constraints as well as refer to the number and expertise of members of the staff and to the 
priorities set by the institution; as suggested by a representative from the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (Great Britain), NHRIs with a legal focus and large legal teams would probably 
prioritise interventions before national and international courts and follow-up actions with respect to 
judgments, contrary to NHRIs whose main focus is research or policy.21 Even though most NHRIs 
(at least A-status ones) undertake all of these activities, priorities must be established and the budget 
allocated accordingly.  
Additionally, the institution’s remit can limit its ability to intervene: e.g., the Czech Public 
Defender of Rights has a clear mandate to cooperate with European and international organisations 
only as far as equality matters and the protection of the rights of people with disabilities are 
concerned.22 In other areas, the Defender could draw the attention of the international monitoring 
                                                        
19 Interview with Polák, Public Defender of Rights of the Czech Republic, supra n 17. 
20 As has been the case to date for the Croatian Ombudsman: interview with Tatjana Vlašić, Human Rights Promotion, 
Cooperation and Public Relations Advisor to the Croatian Ombudswoman, 31 October 2018, on file with author. In 
OHCHR, supra n 17, 47, several respondent NHRIs from all over the world maintained that the limited resources at their 
disposal were the main obstacle to their further engagement with international and regional procedures.  
21 Interview with Clare Collier, Senior Principal at the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain), 26 
September 2018, on file with author.  
22 Interview with Polák, Public Defender of Rights of the Czech Republic, supra n 17. 
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bodies to the reports that it publishes in the exercise of its national mandate, but it would probably 
refrain from more intensive cooperation.23 
Finally, it should be noted that the participation by at least some NHRIs might not have been 
needed to date. For instance, as pointed out by a representative from the Danish Institute for Human 
Rights, Denmark has seldom been found to violate the Convention;24 as of December 2018, Denmark 
has no cases pending before the Committee of Ministers and awaiting full execution. In the case of 
the Netherlands, a representative from the Dutch NHRI acknowledged that as the Government takes 
ECtHR judgments seriously and is usually willing to implement them, submissions to the Committee 
of Ministers have been unnecessary until now.25  
More generally, as noted by virtually all interviewees from both participating and non-
participating institutions, NHRIs would try to preliminarily engage with the competent national 
authorities at the domestic level, before resorting to submissions to international monitoring bodies.26 
While this course of action does not necessarily apply to all NHRIs, it is in line with the cooperative 
relationship that normally exists between NHRIs and other State bodies, so that only when no 
agreement can be found or the relevant authorities appear to take too much time to fulfil their 
commitments would NHRIs step up their action and address the international level. 
 
                                                        
23 Ibid. 
24 Interview with Christoffer Badse, Director of the Monitoring Department at the Danish Institute for Human Rights, 26 
October 2017, on file with author.  
25 Interview with van Eijndhoven, Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, supra n 14.  
26 Interviews with van Eijndhoven, Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, supra n 14; Meskhoradze, Office of the 
Public Defender of Georgia, supra n 17; Polák, Public Defender of Rights of the Czech Republic, supra n 17; Vlašić, 
Croatian Ombudswoman, supra n 20; Collier, Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain), supra n 21; and 
Badse, Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra n 24. 
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As of December 2018, as far as I was able to determine,27 the twelve above-mentioned NHRIs 
submitted a total of thirty-three communications.28 Due to the limited number of communications and 
participating institutions, it is hardly possible to discern meaningful trends. At most, one could note 
that, since 2013, the number of communications from NHRIs has rather steadily grown and, when 
decreasing or remaining stable, has not fallen below the threshold of four communications per year.  
 
                                                        
27 The documents published under the “Submissions” section of the website of the Department for the Execution of 
Judgments, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/submissions, were first of all consulted, 
together with those published on HUDOC-EXEC, a database that is also run by the Department and collects documents 
on closed cases as well (contrary to the “Submissions” webpage). Additionally, since the Department only started to 
circulate materials in 2011, while NHRIs have been allowed to submit communications since 2006, the websites and 
activity reports of NHRIs have been scrutinised. However, as websites and reports of NHRIs do not always account for 
all of the institutions’ activities in detail, it cannot be excluded that some submissions may have been missed.  
28 In the period between the submission of this dissertation to external examiners (January 2019) and its defence, a further 
Human Rights meeting of the Committee of Ministers was held, in March 2019, where two more communications from 
NHRIs were received: Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1340th meeting (March 2019) (DH). Communication 
from the Human Rights Defender of Armenia (21/01/2019) and reply from the authorities (01/02/2019) in the case of 
Ashot Harutyunyan v. Armenia (Ashot Harutyunyan group) (Application No. 34334/04), 4 February 2019, DH-
DD(2019)120; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1340th meeting (March 2019) (DH). Communication 
from a NHRI (Commissioner for Human Rights) (06/03/2019) in the case of P. and S. v. Poland (Application No. 
57375/08), 15 March 2019, DH-DD(2019)283. These communications have not been analysed in the dissertation. The 
same applies to other documents which were received at the same meeting from both governments and NGOs regarding 
cases that are considered in the dissertation as cases in relation to which NHRIs have intervened – namely the McKerr v. 
the UK group of cases, the P. and S. v. Poland case, and the Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia case.  
Moreover, Thomas Dumortier, Legal Adviser at the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme, referred 
to the imminent submission of a joint communication by the CNCDH and the French National Preventive Mechanism in 
the Yengo case (interview of 8 March 2019, on file with author); the communication, which will be considered at the 
Human Rights meeting of the Committee of Ministers in June 2019, can be found as Committee of Ministers/Secretariat 
General, 1348th meeting (June 2019) (DH). Communication from a NHRI (Commission nationale consultative des droits 
de l'homme (CNCDH) et Contrôleur général des lieux de privation de liberté) (02/04/2019) in the case of Yengo v. France 
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These figures are due to both the continued participation by long-standing interveners, such as 
the CNCDH (which submitted six communications over a nine-year period), and the active 
contribution by relative newcomers to the procedure, such as the Georgian Public Defender (which 
submitted six communications between 2016 and 2018). A detailed overview of the number of 
communications submitted by each institution per year is presented in Table 4.1 below.  
 
Table 4.1: Number of communications from each NHRI per year29 
 
 
The above-mentioned thirty-three communications have been submitted in respect of twenty-
five cases or groups of cases pending before the Committee of Ministers (some ECtHR cases are 
considered jointly for the purposes of the supervision of execution by the Committee). The difference 
between the number of communications and the number of (groups of) cases is due to the fact that 
NHRIs may submit multiple communications in relation to a certain case. Vice versa, it is also 
possible (albeit rarer) that a single submission refers to various cases; the Public Defender of Georgia 
                                                        
29 The first four communications attributed to the CNCDH in the table were actually submitted jointly with the 
Médiateur/Défenseur (see Table 4.2 below).  
          
          





























































































































































































































Before 2006 1 1
2009 2 2 4
2010 1 1
2011 1 1 1 1 4
2012
2013 1 1
2014 1 1 1 3
2015 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
2016 1 1 1 1 4
2017 1 3 4
2018 1 2 1 1 5
Total 1 2 6 1 6 1 3 5 3 2 2 1 33
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recently sent a communication in relation to three groups of cases, all revolving around the lack of 
adequate investigations into the wrongdoing of law-enforcement officials.30  
In most instances, NHRIs submitted a single communication for each case in which they 
intervened; nonetheless, two to three communications were filed by NHRIs in relation to a number 
of cases. Table 4.2 below shows the number of communications lodged by NHRIs with respect to 
each case.  
 
Table 4.2: Number of communications per case31 
NHRI / Ombudsman Case / Group of cases Number of communications 
Human Rights Defender of 
Armenia Muradyan v. Armenia 1 
Public Defender of Rights of the 
Czech Republic D.H. v. the Czech Republic 2 
Commission nationale 
consultative des droits de 
l’homme 
Winterstein and others v. France 1 
Mennesson v. France (group of cases) 1 
Taïs v. France 1 (jointly with the Médiateur) 
Gebremedhin v. France 1 (jointly with the Médiateur) 
Frérot v. France (group of cases) 1 (jointly with the Médiateur) 
Popov v. France (group of cases) 1 (jointly with the Défenseur) 
Défenseur des droits  De Souza Ribeiro v. France 1 
Public Defender of Georgia 
Gharibashvili v. Georgia (group of 
cases) 3 
Identoba and others v. Georgia (group 
of cases) 3
32 
Makharadze and Sikhariulidze v. 
Georgia (group of cases) 1
33 
Merabishvili v. Georgia 1 
                                                        
30 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1310th meeting (March 2018) (DH). Communication from another 
organisation (07/12/2017) and reply from the authorities (14/12/2017) in the cases of Makharadze and Sikharulidze, 
Tsintsabadze, Identoba and Others v. Georgia (Applications No. 35254/07, 35403/06, 73235/12), 20 December 2017, 
DH-DD(2017)1416, 2. The submission consists in a report by the Public Defender, titled “Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against the Employees of the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Penitentiary and State Security 
Service of Georgia on the Basis of Individual Complaints. Outcomes of the Study of the Public Defender of Georgia”.  
31 In the interests of readability, the details of the cases have not been included in the table. They are reported below in 
this chapter as the single cases are considered more closely. Additionally, a complete list can be found in the “List of 
legal documents and official reports” at the end of the dissertation.  
32 As mentioned, the second communication in the Identoba and others group of cases is the same as the third submission 
in the Gharibashvili group of cases and the first one in the Makharadze and Sikhariulidze group of cases: cf. supra n 30. 
33 Cf. supra note 32. 
 164 
Greek National Commission for 
Human Rights Chowdury and others v. Greece 1 
Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (GB) 
Al-Skeini and others v. the UK 1 
Gillan and Quinton v. the UK 1 
Vinter and others v. the UK 1 
Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission 
S. and Marper v. the UK 3 
McKerr v. the UK (group of cases) 2 
Irish Human Rights and Equality 
Commission 
O’Keeffe v. Ireland 2 
McFarlane v. Ireland (group of cases) 1 
Commissioner for Human Rights 
of Poland 
Orchowski and others v. Poland (group 
of cases) 1 
P. and S. v. Poland 1 
Protector of Citizens of Serbia Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia 2 
Human Rights Ombudsman of 
Slovenia Kurić and others v. Slovenia 1 
 
The number of communications required by each case is dependent upon various factors, 
including its complexity. Furthermore, if the respondent State accepts the observations by the NHRI, 
or if the Committee of Ministers uses them as the basis for its own recommendations, the NHRI might 
consider its task to be completed and a single submission sufficient. Conversely, if both the State 
concerned and the Committee ignore the submission by the NHRI, the institution might consider it 
pointless to intervene further. These dynamics are analysed in greater detail in Section 4.5 below.   
A final consideration relates to the apparently striking difference between the number of 
communications from NHRIs and that of communications from NGOs: between January 2011 and 
the end of 2017 only, approximately five-hundred communications were submitted by NGOs.34 This 
comparison might, however, be misleading if it is not taken into account that the number of European 
NHRIs is much smaller than that of NGOs active in CoE Member States; partly for inherent reasons, 
as one NHRI only can be established in a State, and partly for practical reasons, as not all Member 
States have established such an institution yet. Even if we include ombudsmen and equality bodies 
as well (which, however, should not be expected to interact with international bodies to the same 
extent as NHRIs), their number is still more limited than that of NGOs. Moreover, national human 
                                                        
34 Cf. Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights. 11th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers 2017 (Strasbourg: CoE, March 2018), 73. Communications 
from NGOs and NHRIs have been made public since January 2011.  
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rights structures are expected to intervene with regard to judgments delivered against their respective 
countries only, in accordance with the focus of their mandates and expertise.  
If one considers the wealth of NGOs operating in CoE Member States, the fact that a handful 
of organisations have submitted the majority of communications (even though various smaller and 
local ones have also participated), and the fact that the yearly number of submissions has remained 
essentially stable after 2012,35 it would appear that while NGOs have made wider use of the Rule 
9(2) procedure compared to NHRIs, room to grow in this respect exists for them as well.36   
 
4.3. When: the selection of cases  
Before examining the content of Rule 9(2) communications from NHRIs, it is appropriate to 
assess the criteria on the basis of which NHRIs appear to select cases to follow up before the 
Committee of Ministers. The driver behind each decision by an NHRI to intervene might not always 
be clearly discernible, in the absence of direct confirmation by the NHRI concerned, and a mix of 
factors might be at work, some of which are nonetheless easier to verify. 
Various potential selection criteria have been identified by Shai Dothan in relation to the 
promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments by NGOs, and they will be tested here with respect 
to NHRIs to the extent that they are relevant.37 In analysing the types of judgments that are most 
                                                        
35 Ibid. 
36 Remezaite, Legal Consultant at the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (which is among the NGOs that are most 
active in litigating cases before the ECtHR and intervening in the execution phase), maintains that NGOs, NHRIs, and 
legal professionals still have little knowledge of the ways in which they can contribute to the execution of ECtHR 
judgments, and that “civil society engagement with the [Committee of Ministers] remains very low”: Ramute Remezaite, 
“The implementation crisis: PACE’s efforts to enhance compliance with European Court judgments”, European Human 
Rights Advocacy Centre Bulletin 24 (winter 2015): 10. 
It is worth mentioning here the activities of the European Implementation Network, which aims to strengthen the 
involvement of NGOs in the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments including by intensifying their interactions 
with the Committee of Ministers. To this end, it carries out training activities in favour of NGOs and organises meetings 
between NGOs and representatives from the Committee of Ministers to discuss the execution of judgments due to be 
examined by the Committee at its Human Rights meetings. It has also published a manual for NGOs on how to monitor 
the execution of ECtHR judgments: Başak Çalı and Nicola Bruch, Monitoring the Implementation of Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights. A Handbook for Non-Governmental Organisations (London: University College 
London, 2011). The website of the Network can be found at http://www.einnetwork.org/ (accessed 4 January 2019).  
37 Dothan, supra n 6, 141-189. If the literature analysing in depth the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments by 
NHRIs is lacking, the literature on the activities by NGOs in the same area is also limited. The above-mentioned article 
by Dothan appears to be the only thorough study of the submissions by NGOs to the Committee of Ministers. There 
remain important differences between the approach of this dissertation and that of Dothan’s article, which uses 
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frequently followed up at the execution stage by NGOs, Dothan distinguishes two main criteria: the 
“severity of the violation” found by the Court and the “legal importance of the case”. Both can be 
identified on the basis of a number of “proxies” or indicators; the main indicator for the severity of 
the violation is the ECHR right infringed upon by the State concerned.38 Table 4.3 below classifies 
the judgments in respect of which NHRIs submitted information on the basis of the provisions the 
infringement of which was ascertained by the Court.39  
 
Table 4.3: Cases and articles infringed 
Article infringed Cases / Groups of cases 
Article 2 Al-Skeini and others v. the UK, Gharibashvili v. Georgia, Makharadze 
and Sikhariulidze v. Georgia, McKerr v. the UK, Muradyan v. Armenia, 
Taïs v. France 
Article 3 Frérot v. France, Gharibashvili v. Georgia, Identoba and others v. 
Georgia (alone and in conjunction with Article 14), O’Keeffe v. Ireland, 
Orchowski and others v. Poland, P. and S. v. Poland, Popov v. France, 
Vinter and others v. the UK 
Article 4 Chowdury and others v. Greece 
Article 5 Merabishvili v. Georgia (para. 3), P. and S. v. Poland (para. 1), Popov 
v. France (paras. 1 and 4) 
Article 6 McFarlane v. Ireland 
Article 8 Frérot v. France, Gillan and Quinton v. the UK, Kurić and others v. 
Slovenia, Mennesson v. France, P. and S. v. Poland, Popov v. France, 
S. and Marper v. the UK, Winterstein and others v. France, Zorica 
Jovanović v. Serbia 
Article 11 Identoba and others v. Georgia (in conjunction with Article 14) 
Article 13 De Souza Ribeiro v. France (in conjunction with Article 8), Frérot v. 
France, Gebremedhin v. France (in conjunction with Article 3), Kurić 
and others v. Slovenia (in conjunction with Article 8), McFarlane v. 
Ireland, O’Keeffe v. Ireland (in conjunction with Article 3) 
                                                        
quantitative methods to determine the efficacy of reputational sanctions for States’ compliance with their international 
obligations.  
38 Dothan, supra n 6, 151 et seqq. Dothan further considers the granting of just satisfaction to the applicant (and its 
amount) an indicator for the severity of the violation. The author himself however recognises the limits of this indicator, 
as just satisfaction should be awarded by the Court “if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows 
only partial reparation to be made”; just satisfaction is not therefore in itself tied to the severity of the violation. At any 
rate, while NHRIs have often intervened with respect to judgments awarding relatively high sums as just satisfaction 
(10,000 euros or above), they also submitted information in relation to various cases where smaller amounts were awarded 
and even five cases where no just satisfaction at all was awarded.  
39 The table shows the main violations established by the ECtHR in each case (for groups of cases, in each leading case). 
Exceptionally, the Identoba and others group of cases can also be found under Article 14, because of the significance of 
the recognition by the Court of violations of Article 14 and even though the main Articles violated are 3 and 11 (in 
conjunction with Article 14). In the Frérot group of cases, a violation of Article 6 was also found, but was not dealt with 
by the CNCDH and the Médiateur in their communication.   
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Article 14 D.H. v. the Czech Republic (in conjunction with Article 2 Prot. no. 1), 
Identoba and others v. Georgia, Kurić and others v. Slovenia (in 
conjunction with Article 8) 
Article 18 Merabishvili v. Georgia (in conjunction with Article 5(1)) 
 
As can be seen, most communications from NHRIs were submitted in respect of judgments 
establishing a violation of Article 2 (six cases or groups of cases), Article 3 (eight cases), Article 8 
(nine cases), and Article 13 (six cases). Violations of Articles 2 and 3 are commonly considered 
serious per se, as these norms protect rights – the right to life and freedom from torture and ill-
treatment respectively – which are non-derogable even in times of emergency. Applications alleging 
their violation are thus prioritised by the Court, as are applications alleging the violation of the rights 
protected by Articles 4 and 5(1), namely freedom from slavery and forced labour and the right to 
liberty and security, which, while derogable in times of emergency, are also considered “core 
rights”.40 
As for cases involving a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), they can also be 
considered as signalling severe breaches of the Convention; the observation that violations of this 
norm are often alleged by the applicants but rarely recognised by the ECtHR supports the claim that 
infringements of this right are established by the Court in the most serious cases only.41 Analogous 
considerations apply to violations of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), which were found in 
three cases in relation to which NHRIs intervened; and, even more strongly, to violations of Article 
18 (which regulates the restrictions on ECHR rights), as there have been only twelve cases in total 
where the ECtHR found a breach of this Article as of December 2018. 
                                                        
40 Cf. ECtHR, The Court’s Priority Policy, June 2009 as amended with effect from 22 May 2017, accessed 4 January 
2019, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Priority_policy_ENG.pdf. 
41 Dothan, supra n 6, 153, explains: “Applicants often accuse states of violating their rights under Articles 13 or 14 in 
addition to the main violation covered by another article of the Convention. Usually, the ECHR decides that finding an 
additional violation besides the main violated article is unnecessary. But in rare cases when the discrimination of the 
applicants is severe or when the state doesn’t provide any good remedy, the ECHR finds a violation of these articles as 
well. Accordingly, the existence of Article 13 and Article 14 violations can serve as a good proxy for the existence of 
severe and pervasive human rights violations”. 
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Article 8, for its part, protects a wide range of rights connected to the respect for private and 
family life – from parental rights to the protection of personal data, from health rights to the protection 
of the secrecy of correspondence. Cases involving a violation of Article 8 and in respect of which 
NHRIs intervened are all sensitive cases or cases where a serious interference is at stake, as they 
concern the retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints in police databases (S. and Marper v. the 
UK),42 “stop and search” powers of the police (Gillan and Quinton v. the UK),43 the detention of 
aliens (Popov v. France)44 and their expulsion from the territory (De Souza Ribeiro v. France),45 the 
automatic and unannounced deprivation of resident status (Kurić and others v. Slovenia),46 the lack 
of information concerning the fate of newborn babies (Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia),47 the right to 
housing of Travellers (Winterstein and others v. France),48 and access to lawful abortion (P. and S. 
v. Poland).49 It can thus be said that NHRIs, similarly to NGOs, have tended to follow up the 
execution of judgments highlighting violations of core rights or severe violations of other rights 
(notably, the right to respect for private and family life in its various facets). 
 
As to the legal importance of a case, Dothan identifies several indicators, including the HUDOC 
categorisation, the judge’s formation (i.e., the size of the panel), and the presence of concurring or 
dissenting opinions.50 These indicators are used here with respect to communications from NHRIs, 
while noting their limitations and adding other possible indicators.  
                                                        
42 ECtHR, S. and Marper v. the UK [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 2008. 
43 ECtHR, Gillan and Quinton v. the UK, no. 4158/05, 12 January 2010.  
44 ECtHR, Popov v. France, nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, 19 January 2012. For the purposes of the supervision by the 
Committee of Ministers, this judgment has recently been joined with others – all delivered by the Fifth Section on 12 July 
2016: A.B. and others v. France, no. 11593/12; A.M. and others v. France, no. 24587/12; A.M v. France, no. 56324/13; 
R.C. and V.C. v. France, no. 76491/14; R.K. and others v. France, no. 68264/14; and R.M. and others v. France, no. 
33201/11. 
45 ECtHR, De Souza Ribeiro v. France, no. 22689/07, 30 June 2011; and ECtHR, De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no. 
22689/07, 13 December 2012. 
46 Three judgments were delivered in ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, no. 26828/06: on 13 July 2010 (merits), 26 
June 2012 (GC, merits and just satisfaction) and 12 March 2014 (GC, just satisfaction). 
47 ECtHR, Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, no. 21794/08, 26 March 2013. 
48 ECtHR, Winterstein and others v. France (merits), no. 27013/07, 17 October 2013; and ECtHR, Winterstein and others 
v. France (just satisfaction), no. 27013/07, 28 April 2016. 
49 ECtHR, P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375/08, 30 October 2012. 
50 Dothan, supra n 6, 158, considers the classification of a case as “leading” by the Committee of Ministers and the 
issuance of interim resolutions by the Committee as further proxies for the legal importance of a case. However, risks of 
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HUDOC is a database that includes all judgments and decisions by the ECtHR, except for those 
delivered by single judges. Judgments and decisions published in HUDOC are assigned an 
importance level ranging from 1 (high importance) to 3 (low importance), where “importance” refers 
to the significance of the ruling’s “contribution to the development, clarification or modification of 
the Court’s case-law”.51 Of even greater importance than level 1 rulings are so-called case reports or 
key cases – i.e., judgments and decisions selected for publication in the Court’s official Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions and, since 2016, in the online collection of Key Cases.52  
Fourteen out of twenty-five cases or groups of cases in which NHRIs intervened have been 
published as key cases,53 while five have been classified as level 1 cases (Orchowski and others v. 
Poland, McFarlane v. Ireland, Winterstein and others v. France, Frérot v. France, and Taïs v. 
France). Five other cases or groups of cases have been assigned level 2 (Identoba and others v. 
Georgia, Makharadze and Sikhariulidze v. Georgia, Popov v. France, P. and S. v. Poland, and 
Muradyan v. Armenia), while a single group of cases has been assigned level 3 (the Gharibashvili v. 
Georgia group of cases).  
These data show that a substantial majority of the cases that attracted the attention of NHRIs 
were considered by the Court of major legal significance. Nonetheless, NHRIs (which, as has been 
shown, do not frequently intervene) also forwarded communications in relation to cases that were 
attributed a lower level of importance under the HUDOC categorisation. It is submitted here that 
these cases appear legally important from a different perspective – namely, from a domestic one. 
                                                        
reversed causality problems have been highlighted by Dothan himself as regards both indicators, as the classification of 
a case as “leading” and the issuance of interim resolutions could be the consequence of the participation by NGOs (or 
NHRIs), rather than the cause. These remarks are shared here, to the point that neither indicators will be used in this 
dissertation. Moreover, the usefulness of the classification of a case as “leading” can be questioned on additional grounds, 
as shown infra.  
51 Cf. ECtHR, HUDOC User Manual, updated 26 September 2016, 8, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_Manual_2016_ENG.PDF.  
52 The Reports of Judgments and Decisions and Key Cases can be found at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=caselaw/reports&c= (accessed 4 January 2019). 
53 These cases are Chowdury and others v. Greece, McKerr v. the UK, D.H. v. the Czech Republic, S. and Marper v. the 
UK, Gillan and Quinton v. the UK, Al-Skeini and others v. the UK, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, De Souza Ribeiro v. 
France, Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, Vinter and others v. the UK, O’Keeffe v. Ireland, Mennesson v. France, and 
Gebremedhin v. France. With respect to groups of cases, the leading case giving the name to the group has been 
considered.  
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Accordingly, NHRIs followed up judgments dealing with the lack of effective investigations 
into deaths and ill-treatment allegedly caused by law-enforcement officials and military personnel 
(Muradyan v. Armenia, Gharibashvili v. Georgia, and Makharadze and Sikhariulidze v. Georgia)54 
– judgments which do not significantly innovate the Court’s case-law but highlight serious pitfalls in 
the national legislation or practice. Another example is the detention of asylum seekers; as there is 
by now a fairly consolidated ECtHR jurisprudence on the issue, the Popov group of cases would not 
be considered “important” under the HUDOC categorisation.55 Nonetheless, the existence of a group 
of cases in itself points to a wider domestic shortcoming that the CNCDH and the Défenseur des 
droits sought to contextualise and solve. 
Indeed, it appears that there is a difference between what is significant for the Court’s decision 
and what is significant at the execution stage, and this is particularly evident in the case of NHRIs, 
the focus of whose submissions is usually on the state of the domestic legal orders and on the changes 
required to bring them into line with the ECtHR judgments. This hypothesis was confirmed by some 
representatives from participating NHRIs, who pointed to the need for the adoption of general 
measures at the domestic level as the main criterion determining their interventions before the 
Committee of Ministers.56 
As to the judge’s formation (or size of the panel), all twenty-five cases or groups of cases were 
decided by either a Chamber or the Grand Chamber. That is, no judgment in relation to which NHRIs 
submitted communications was issued by a Committee of three judges, which can deliver rulings on 
                                                        
54 Cf. ECtHR, Muradyan v. Armenia, no. 11275/07, 24 November 2016. Cf. also ECtHR, Gharibashvili v. Georgia, no. 
11830/03, 29 July 2008. As the Committee of Ministers closed, in September 2017, its examination of the Gharibashvili 
case, but not of all the related repetitive cases, the group of remaining cases has been renamed after Tsintsabadze v. 
Georgia, no. 35403/06, 15 February 2011. This dissertation, nonetheless, refers to the “Gharibashvili group of cases”, as 
the name by which these cases – currently thirteen – have long been known. Cf., finally, the Makharadze and Sikhariulidze 
v. Georgia group of cases, which includes two cases: ECtHR, Makharadze and Sikhariulidze v. Georgia, no. 35254/07, 
22 November 2011; and ECtHR, Dzebniauri v. Georgia (striking out), no. 67813/11, 9 September 2014.  
55 ECtHR, Popov v. France, supra n 44.  
56 Interviews with Collier, Equality and Human Rights Commission, supra n 21; and with Meskhoradze, Public Defender 
of Georgia, supra n 17. 
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issues that are the subject of a consolidated ECtHR jurisprudence and should hence require a more 
straightforward supervision of execution.57  
As far as the presence of separate opinions is concerned (either dissenting or concurring), out 
of twenty-eight judgments on the merits delivered in the leading cases at issue, fourteen include 
separate opinions.58 This number highlights a propensity by NHRIs to submit observations in relation 
to cases to which separate opinions are attached, as the delivery of separate opinions is rather 
uncommon in the ECtHR practice.59 Nonetheless, it should be considered that, while this indicator 
usually points to legally controversial cases, it does not necessarily characterise legally important 
cases, on which the panel’s judges might all agree. Moreover, separate opinions are more common in 
Grand Chamber’s judgments, also in light of the larger number of judges sitting in the panel, so that 
the relatively high number of Grand Chamber’s judgments in relation to which NHRIs intervened 
might affect the number of judgments with separate opinions that NHRIs followed up. Finally, it 
would be appropriate to distinguish between all kinds of separate opinions (concurring, dissenting, 
partly concurring and partly dissenting) and analyse the number of judges joining a separate 
opinion.60  
Dothan considers the classification of a case as “leading” by the Committee of Ministers a 
further potentially relevant indicator of the legal importance of a case. “Leading cases” are cases that 
have “been identified as revealing new structural and/or systemic problems, either by the Court 
directly in its judgment, or by the Committee of Ministers in the course of its supervision of 
                                                        
57 Even though, as mentioned, the legal significance of a case for the ECtHR might differ from the legal significance of a 
case from the point of view of its domestic implementation. Since single judges may only declare cases inadmissible, 
NHRIs could not follow up their decisions at the execution stage. 
58 Separate opinions can be found in Merabishvili v. Georgia, P. and S. v. Poland, D.H. v. the Czech Republic (in both 
the Chamber’s and Grand Chamber’s judgments), Identoba and others v. Georgia, McFarlane v. Ireland, Al-Skeini and 
others v. the UK, Kurić and others v. Slovenia (only in the Grand Chamber’s judgment on the merits), De Souza Ribeiro 
v. France (in both the Chamber’s and Grand Chamber’s judgments), Vinter and others v. the UK, Winterstein and others 
v. France, O’Keeffe v. Ireland, and Taïs v. France. 
59 In the absence of more recent data, those provided by Dothan, supra n 6, 157, can be referred to: according to them, in 
the period from January 2008 to October 2013, 10.89% of ECtHR judgments included at least one separate opinion. 
Dothan defines the difference between the number of judgments with separate opinions in the general population and the 
number of judgments with separate opinions that were followed up by NGOs as “statistically significant” (ibid.). 
60 For a thorough study of ECtHR separate opinions, cf. Robin C. A. White and Iris Boussiakou, “Separate Opinions in 
the European Court of Human Rights”, Human Rights Law Review 9, no. 1 (2009): 37-60, which also mentions previous 
studies on the issue.  
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execution”, as opposed to “repetitive cases”, which “relat[e] to a structural and/or general problem 
already raised before the Committee in the context of one or several leading cases”.61 A third 
category, that of “isolated cases”, which should apply to cases only requiring individual measures to 
remedy the ECHR violations found, seems to exist only in theory and has apparently not been used 
for any judgment supervised by the Committee of Ministers, at least in recent years.62 
The usefulness of this indicator is doubtful. First of all, both leading and repetitive cases 
highlight national structural shortcomings requiring general measures to be remedied (leading cases 
raise new issues, while repetitive cases show that the issues raised by previous leading cases have not 
been solved yet and have led to fresh violations of the Convention), so that NHRIs can be expected 
to intervene in relation to both leading and repetitive cases. On the other hand, since for the purposes 
of the supervision of execution repetitive cases are grouped with the related leading case, NHRIs 
would intervene in relation to either individual leading cases or groups comprising a leading and one 
or more repetitive cases.63 While submissions by NHRIs would not be expected in relation to “isolated 
cases”, it is currently impossible to verify this assumption for the lack of use of this category in 
practice. NHRIs have not intervened with respect to friendly settlements to date. 
It is clear that the Committee of Ministers increasingly considers some kind of general measures 
necessary to fully implement a judgment. As general measures might be as simple as the 
dissemination of the ECtHR judgment in question among the relevant actors (e.g., judges or law-
enforcement agencies), the kind of general measures required could be a more relevant indicator of 
the legal importance of a case. While the content of communications from NHRIs are analysed in 
greater detail below, participating NHRIs have often recommended the adoption of one or more of 
                                                        
61 Cf. the “Glossary” section on the website of the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Court, at 
https://www.coe.int/hy/web/execution/glossary?desktop=false#{"15005454":[]} (accessed 4 January 2019).  
62 The category of “isolated cases” can be found in the above-mentioned Glossary (ibid.), but not in the HUDOC-EXEC 
database. The only other category existing in this database, in addition to those of leading and repetitive cases, is that of 
friendly settlements.  
63 Considering that NHRIs submit information almost exclusively in relation to general measures, which affect all 
judgments of a group. It should be noted that the termination of the supervision by the Committee of Ministers of the 
leading Gharibashvili case did not prevent the Georgian Public Defender from submitting a further communication in 
relation to the remaining repetitive cases of the group which are still pending (cf. supra n 30); at any rate, the Tsintsabadze 
v. Georgia case has now become the leading case for the group (cf. supra n 54).  
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the following measures: amendments to laws or regulations, changes in the administrative practice, 
and adjustments to the judicial interpretation and application of norms. Therefore, NHRIs, as could 
be expected, intervened when they considered that more complex measures were needed than the 
mere dissemination of the ECtHR judgment in question among competent public bodies. 
Another classification adopted by the Committee of Ministers at the execution stage appears 
more telling, namely the distinction between “enhanced” and “standard” supervision. Following the 
Interlaken Declaration, a “twin track supervision system” has been devised and put into use since 
2011. On the basis of this new working method, certain types of judgments – those requiring urgent 
individual measures, pilot judgments, judgments disclosing major structural and/or complex 
problems (as identified by the Court or the Committee of Ministers), and judgments in inter-State 
cases – are prioritised and subject to closer (“enhanced”) supervision by the Committee of 
Ministers.64 This more thorough process of examination is not limited to the opportunity to debate 
the case at the meetings of the Committee, but it would normally imply stronger cooperation between 
the Member State concerned and the Department for the Execution of Judgments with a view to fully 
implementing the judgment, as well as the adoption of a larger number of interim resolutions and 
decisions by the Committee.65 
The two categories are not, at any rate, strictly separated: a case under enhanced supervision 
may be transferred to standard supervision if sufficient progress in the execution is shown on the part 
of the State concerned; conversely, a case under standard supervision may be moved to enhanced 
supervision, for instance when delays in the implementation of the appropriate measures occur or 
                                                        
64 Cf. Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights: implementation of the Interlaken Action Plan – Modalities for a twin-track supervision system, 6 September 2010, 
CM/Inf/DH(2010)37; and Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of the judgments and decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights: implementation of the Interlaken Action Plan – Outstanding issues concerning the 
practical modalities of implementation of the new twin track supervision system, 7 December 2010, CM/lnf/DH(2010)45 
final. These documents were preceded by Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of the judgments and 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: implementation of the Interlaken Action Plan – elements for a 
roadmap, 24 June 2010, CM/Inf(2010)28-rev. 
65 Cf. the documents referred to in the footnote above. 
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when the measures proposed by the State concerned do not meet the expectations of the Committee 
of Ministers or the Department for Execution.  
The distinction between enhanced and standard supervision appears to be more suitable for our 
purposes than that between leading and repetitive cases, as the examination of a case under enhanced 
supervision should be the exception and apply to judgments the execution of which is particularly 
complex or problematic. Of the twenty-four cases or groups of cases in which NHRIs intervened,66 
eighteen have been placed under enhanced supervision at some point during their consideration by 
the Committee of Ministers. Four of these cases were transferred from enhanced to standard 
supervision, while one underwent the opposite process (the possible impact of submissions by NHRIs 
on these transfers are examined in the following sections of this chapter).67 If one considers that, at 
the end of 2017, leading cases under enhanced supervision were less than a third of leading cases 
under standard supervision,68 the tendency of NHRIs to submit communications with respect to cases 
under enhanced supervision is clear.  
At any rate, as the criteria for this classification leave a certain margin of discretion to the 
Committee of Ministers and the Department for Execution (particularly as far as judgments raising 
“major structural and/or complex problems” are concerned), it may happen that cases requiring even 
articulated general measures are placed under standard supervision; or that some cases prove to need 
more complex measures than anticipated; or that even minor progress prompts the transfer of a case 
from enhanced to standard supervision with a view to encouraging the State concerned. Therefore, 
the distinction itself between enhanced and standard supervision should be taken with a grain of salt.69 
                                                        
66 As the supervision of Taïs v. France was closed before the entry into force of the new working methods, this case has 
not been included.  
67 The former are O’Keeffe v. Ireland, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, Al-Skeini v. the UK, and S. and Marper v. the UK; 
the latter is McFarlane v. Ireland.   
68 Cf. Department for the Execution of Judgments, Pending Cases. Detailed statistics from 2011 to 2017, accessed 4 
January 2019, https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/statistics#{%2234782408%22:[]}.  
69 Notwithstanding the fact that the placement of a case under standard or enhanced supervision is not always based on 
straightforward criteria, it appears that the States concerned and the Committee of Ministers give increasing importance 
to this classification as regards the implementation efforts and the degree of supervision respectively: Başak Çali, 
“Reflections on the 2016 Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers on the Execution of ECtHR Judgments”, EIN 
News, 9 July 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.einnetwork.org/ein-news-past-editions/2017/7/9/reflections-on-
the-cm-2016-annual-report-on-the-execution-of-ecthr-judgments. 
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It can thus be preliminarily concluded that NHRIs tend to intervene with respect to cases 
highlighting serious violations and/or cases of major legal importance, similarly to what was found 
by Dothan with respect to NGOs. As mentioned, however, the “legal importance” of a case should 
be interpreted as covering cases that are legally significant from the perspective of the national legal 
order as well.  
Additionally, it seems that at least another criterion should be taken into consideration when 
analysing the kinds of judgments that attract the attention of NHRIs: namely, the expertise that NHRIs 
have developed on a certain topic before intervening, on the basis of the activities that they have 
undertaken at the national level – e.g., inquiries, recommendations to national authorities, or amicus 
curiae briefs before domestic courts.  
While this aspect was not always underlined by interviewees from participating NHRIs,70 the 
previous examination of a matter at the domestic level and thus the ability to provide first-hand data 
and reasoned analysis appear to be a relevant factor in the decisions by NHRIs to intervene. For 
instance, as noted, various NHRIs followed up judgments related to the conditions of detention and 
ill-treatment by law-enforcement officials: the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland 
highlighted a systemic problem of degrading prison conditions in the country in the Orchowski and 
others group of cases;71 the CNCDH and the Défenseur dealt with the excessive use of force by the 
police and the lack of medical care in detention (Taïs case),72 full body searches of detainees and the 
violation of the privacy of their correspondence (Frérot group of cases),73 and the detention of 
migrant families with minors (Popov group of cases);74 the Public Defender of Georgia reported on 
                                                        
70 Nonentheless, a representative from the CNCDH indicated that the previous development of a “doctrine” by the 
Commission at the national level regarding a certain matter constitutes the main criterion determining third-party 
interventions and Rule 9(2) submissions by the CNCDH (interview with Dumortier, CNCDH, supra n 28). According to 
Dumortier, this previous involvement of the Commission at the domestic level would commonly consist either in the 
examination of bills and laws or in more general warnings and views expressed by the CNCDH. 
71 ECtHR, Orchowski and others v. Poland, no. 17885/04, 22 October 2009. The Orchowski judgment has been a leading 
case for eleven repetitive cases, two of which are still pending before the Committee of Ministers. 
72 ECtHR, Taïs v. France, no. 39922/03, 1 June 2006. 
73 This group of cases includes ECtHR, Frérot v. France, no. 70204/01, 12 June 2007; and ECtHR, Khider v. France, no. 
39364/05, 9 July 2009. 
74 For the references of the Popov group of cases, cf. supra n 44. 
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deaths in custody as a result of inadequate medical assistance (Makharadze and Sikhariulidze group 
of cases),75 on the use of video-surveillance in penitentiaries and the storage of recordings 
(Merabishvili case),76 and on the lack of effective investigations into the ill-treatment allegedly 
perpetrated by law-enforcement officials during arrest or in custody (Gharibashvili group of cases).77 
As mentioned, communications from NHRIs in these instances might be determined by the 
seriousness of the violation; additionally or alternatively, they might be prompted by the domestic 
responsibilities of NHRIs in monitoring detention conditions. Indeed, the Georgian and Polish 
ombudsmen act as the National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs)78 for their countries and therefore 
routinely visit places of detention and issue reports on prison conditions. The French NPM is the 
Contrôleur général des lieux de privation de liberté, created in 2008; nonetheless, its functions were 
previously exercised by the Médiateur (predecessor of the Défenseur) and both the Défenseur and 
the CNCDH collaborate with the Contrôleur and complementarily deal with prison conditions by 
advising the Parliament and Government on criminal and prison reforms (the CNCDH especially)79 
and by carrying out investigative and complaint-handling activities in related fields (the Défenseur, 
which is now competent on children rights, anti-discrimination, and the ethics of law enforcement).  
The communications submitted by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in the 
McKerr group of cases,80 relating to the delays and shortcomings affecting the investigations into the 
killings carried out or covered up by the UK security forces in Northern Ireland between the 1980s 
and the 1990s, are another example of a solid understanding by an NHRI of the issues raised by 
                                                        
75 For the references of the Makharadze and Sikhariulidze group of cases, cf. supra n 54. 
76 ECtHR, Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, 28 November 2017.   
77 For the references of the Gharibashvili group of cases, cf. supra n 54. 
78 NPMs are national bodies entrusted by the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture with the prevention 
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment at the domestic level. This preventive function is chiefly 
discharged by NPMs by way of visits to penitentiaries and other places where people are deprived of their liberty. On the 
role of NHRIs as NPMs, cf. Section 3.5 of this dissertation.  
79 Examples of recommendations (avis) by the CNCDH can be found at http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/avis, accessed 4 January 
2019. The CNCDH also issued reports such as CNCDH, Sanctionner dans le respect des droits de l’homme. Les droits 
de l’homme dans la prison – Volume 1 (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2007). 
80 This group of cases includes the following ECtHR judgments: McKerr v. the UK, no. 28883/95, 4 May 2001; Kelly and 
others v. the UK, no. 30054/96, 4 May 2001; Finucane v. the UK, no. 29178/95, 1 July 2003; McCaughey and others v. 
the UK, no. 43098/09, 16 July 2013; and Collette and Michael Hemsworth v. the UK, no. 58559/09, 16 July 2013. 
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ECtHR judgments. Indeed, the Northern Irish and Irish commissions were both born as post-conflict 
NHRIs and enshrined in the so-called Good Friday agreement; therefore, while the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission has a wide-ranging mandate, the investigation (or monitoring of the 
investigations) into the human rights violations occurred during the lengthy conflict is an important 
component of the institution’s mission of re-building a peaceful society on the basis of justice and 
human rights.81  
The expertise of the CNCDH on the rights of Roma and Travellers has been recognised by the 
ECtHR itself which, in the Winterstein and others judgment, mentioned, under the section “relevant 
domestic law and practice”, a thorough CNCDH report compiled in 2008 on the conditions of Roma 
and Travellers in France and a 2012 recommendation by the same body concerning these minorities, 
including their housing situation.82 Reference to the 2008 report was also made by one of the NGOs 
submitting information to the Committee of Ministers on the same case.83  
Similarly, in the Zorica Jovanović case, the ECtHR mentioned a report by the Serbian Protector 
of Citizens on the “missing babies cases” – i.e., cases of newborns who allegedly died right after birth 
but whose fate remains uncertain in the absence of convincing and complete information from the 
competent authorities.84 The authoritativeness of the report by the Protector is evident in several 
respects, as it contributed to the flexible approach adopted by the Court as regards the six-month 
                                                        
81 Cf. the “About us” section on the Commission’s website, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.nihrc.org/about-us. Cf. 
also, for various references to the particular mandate and powers of the Northern Ireland NHRI, Anne Smith, “The Unique 
Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?”, Human Rights Quarterly 28 (2006): 904-946; and 
Stephen Livingstone and Rachel Murray, Evaluating the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions: The 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission with Comparisons from South Africa (Nuffield Foundation, 2005). 
82 ECtHR, Winterstein and others v. France (merits), supra n 48, paras. 65-67. The two CNCDH documents referred to 
are Étude et propositions sur la situation des Roms et des gens du voyage en France, 7 February 2008; and Avis sur le 
respect des droits des « gens du voyage » et des Roms migrants, 22 March 2012. Cf. also the annual reports by the 
CNCDH on the fight against racism, as well as the two following recommendations: Avis portant sur le projet de loi 
relatif à l'accueil des gens du voyage, 17 June 1999, and Avis sur le droit à l’eau potable et à l’assainissement, 23 June 
2011 (on the right to water and sanitation, including for Travellers). 
83 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1222 meeting (10-12 March 2015) (DH). Communication from a NGO 
(ATD Quart Monde) (20/01/2015) in the case of Winterstein and others against France (Application No. 27013/07) and 
reply from the authorities (28/01/2015), 11 February 2015, DH-DD(2015)167, 3. 
84 The parents suspect that their children were put up for adoption; hundreds of children born between the late 1960s and 
the 1990s are believed to be involved. For the references of the case, cf. supra n 47.  
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rule85 and to the delivery of a pilot judgment. The ECtHR also suggested the adoption of measures 
that appear to be based on those recommended by the Protector.86  
As explained in the report, the Protector was directly involved in the matter as a result of three 
complaints filed by the parents of missing babies; the impossibility for the Protector to formally 
follow up those complaints, since the facts in question preceded the establishment of the institution, 
did not prevent it from writing the report and issuing recommendations to the public authorities 
concerned. Following the ECtHR judgment, the Protector has been highly involved in the domestic 
consultations about the investigations into wrongdoing and about redress for families, and it has 
reported to the Committee of Ministers on national developments.87  
A comparable previous domestic involvement is that of the Slovenian Human Rights 
Ombudsman in the matter of the “erasure” of the resident status of Yugoslavian citizens living in 
Slovenia when the country’s independence was declared in 1991. Since then, the legal status of and 
material consequences for former residents who did not apply for Slovenian citizenship or whose 
applications were rejected have been at the centre of the public debate, leading inter alia to various 
interventions by the legislature, declarations of partial unconstitutionality by the Constitutional court, 
and public apologies by members of the executive.  
The Human Rights Ombudsman was predictably involved in the solution of a problem affecting 
thousands of residents and ex-residents of Slovenia; indeed, since its inception, the institution has 
received complaints on the matter and issued reports and recommendations for the attention of the 
Parliament and Government.88 The Ombudsman was also asked, by some of the applicants in the 
Kurić and others case, to apply for a constitutional review of the most recent acts regulating the status 
                                                        
85 ECtHR, Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, supra n 47, paras. 56-57. 
86 Ibid., para. 92. 
87 Cf., in particular, Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1250 meeting (8-10 March 2016) (DH). Communication 
from the Mediator (Ombudsman) (29/02/2016) and reply from the authorities (04/03/2016) in the case of Zorica 
Jovanović against Serbia (Application No. 21794/08), 4 March 2016, DH-DD(2016)254.  
88 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1250 meeting (8-10 March 2016) (DH). Communication from a national 
institution of human rights (Ombudsman) (10/12/2015) in the case of Kurić and others against Slovenia (Application No. 
26828/06), 17 December 2015, DH-DD(2015)1380, 5-6. 
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of and compensation for the “erased”;89 the communication from the Ombudsman to the Committee 
of Ministers illustrates the grounds for its refusal to do so as well as its opinion on the acts at issue. 
It should be noted, incidentally, that this submission is a testament to the fact that communications 
from NHRIs are not necessarily in favour of the applicants (the issue is dealt with in greater detail in 
the next section). 
From the communication of the Défenseur des droits in the De Souza Ribeiro case, it clearly 
emerges that the Défenseur has long dealt with expulsion procedures against aliens, with particular 
regard to French overseas territories, where a derogatory regime is in place. The Défenseur refers to 
various third-party submissions that it lodged with domestic courts as well as to the general 
recommendations that it addressed to the competent public authorities.90  
The Armenian Human Rights Defender, within which a dedicated Department for Protection 
of Criminal Procedure Rights and Rights of Military Servicemen has operated since 2016 and which 
routinely receives individual complaints from servicemen, intervened in a case concerning the death 
of a member of the armed forces;91 whereas the Greek National Human Rights Commission listed the 
numerous recommendations that it had addressed to the Government in relation to the phenomena of 
human trafficking and forced labour in Greece before the Chowdury and others judgment.92 
Countries whose governments launch wide public consultations on topical issues certainly 
promote the involvement of NHRIs; the United Kingdom is a case in point. The Gillan and Quinton 
case put under scrutiny the power of police officers, under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, to 
                                                        
89 The power of the Slovenian Ombudsman to initiate a constitutional review is provided for in the Slovenian Law on the 
Constitutional Court. The relevant Articles, translated in English, can be found at http://www.varuh-rs.si/legal-
framework/constitution-laws/law-on-the-constitutional-court/?L=6 (accessed 4 January 2019).  
90 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1265 meeting (20-22 September 2016) (DH). Communication from the 
Rights Defender (07/06/2016) and reply from the authorities (15/06/2016) in the case of De Souza Ribeiro against France 
(Application No. 22689/07), 23 June 2016, DH-DD(2016)769, 4-5 and 9-14 (including an amicus curiae brief submitted 
by the Défenseur to the French Council of State). For the references of the De Souza Ribeiro case, cf. supra n 45. 
91 ECtHR, Muradyan v. Armenia, supra n 54. 
92 Cf. ECtHR, Chowdury and others v. Greece, no. 21884/15, 30 March 2017; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat 
General, 1331 meeting (December 2018) (DH). Communication from the Greek National Commission for Human Rights 
(12/10/2018) in the case of Chowdury and others v. Greece (Application No. 21884/15), 6 November 2018, DH-
DD(2018)1074, 8 (footnote 1).  
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“stop and search” people even in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that they are terrorists.93 
Following the ECtHR judgment, the UK Government initiated a review of some counter-terrorism 
measures and the Equality and Human Rights Commission put forward its views;94 the Commission 
also submitted information within the process of parliamentary scrutiny that followed.95 Being 
unsatisfied with the new bill debated in Parliament as well as with the provisional measures adopted 
meanwhile, the Commission addressed the Committee of Ministers and asked to transfer the case 
from standard to enhanced supervision.96  
Similarly, a public consultation was opened by the UK Home Office on the retention of DNA 
and fingerprint data as a consequence of the ECtHR judgment in S. and Marper v. the UK.97 As 
highlighted by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in its first communication to the 
Committee of Ministers, the Northern Ireland Office itself (i.e., the UK Government department 
responsible for Northern Ireland) asked the Commission to participate in the consultation.98 The 
Commission did so and also shared its position with the Committee of Ministers, thus keeping the 
Committee updated on national developments.  
These cases also make clear that it might be the ECtHR judgment that puts a human rights 
breach under the spotlight, thus prompting NHRIs to further investigate at the national level failures 
highlighted at the international one. By way of example, the interest of the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission towards so-called whole-life orders and the possibility of release seems to follow 
the ECtHR judgment in Vinter and others v. the UK;99 in a similar way, the responsibilities of the UK 
                                                        
93 ECtHR, Gillan and Quinton v. the UK, supra n 43. 
94 For the documentation relating to the review process, cf. the following webpage of the UK Government: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-counter-terrorism-and-security-powers (4 January 2019). 
95 The national initiatives of the Equality and Human Rights Commission are described in Committee of 
Ministers/Secretariat General, 1115 DH meeting (June 2011). Communication from National Human Rights Institution 
(NHRI) in the case of Gillan and Quinton against the United Kingdom (Application No. 4158/05) and reply of the 
government, 31 May 2011, DH-DD(2011)419. The Parliamentary submission to the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
is also attached as Annex 1.  
96 Ibid., paras. 1-2 and 15. 
97 ECtHR, S. and Marper v. the UK, supra n 42. 
98 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Response to Home Office Consultation on ‘Keeping the Right People on 
the DNA Database’, July 2009, para. 2. 
99 Cf.  ECtHR, Vinter and others v. the UK [GC], nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013 (relinquishment); and 
Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1214 meeting (2-4 December 2014) (DH). Communication from a national 
institution for the promotion and protection of human rights (Equality and Human Rights Commission) (16/09/2014) in 
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Government for the deaths caused by its armed forces during the Iraqi war drew renewed attention 
after the Al-Skeini and others judgment.100  
In December 2017, the Public Defender of Georgia submitted, in relation to three groups of 
ECtHR cases, a study on the disciplinary proceedings against law-enforcement officials which 
highlighted the widespread failures of the Georgian public authorities to investigate and punish the 
wrongdoing of their officials.101 As mentioned at the beginning of the report, the Public Defender has 
been focusing on this matter at least since 2013, on the basis of the numerous complaints received, 
and issuing recommendations to the bodies concerned as well as a more general one to create “an 
independent investigatory mechanism”.102 By then, various cases raising the same issues had already 
been decided by the ECtHR, including the leading Gharibashvili and Tsintsabadze cases.  
Similarly, the activities of the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights in the area of access to 
abortion procedures, in terms of both investigations and recommendations to public authorities, 
appear to have intensified after some landmark ECtHR judgments against Poland, including the 
Tysiąc and R.R. judgments, which preceded the P. and S. case.103  
Causal relationships are blurred here, but it is not the aim of this dissertation to dissect them; 
the general proposition is that NHRIs tend to intervene at the CoE level in relation to issues of which 
they have already gained a sufficiently solid experience and understanding at the national level, which 
can also come as a result of ECtHR judgments. 
Nonetheless, there can be instances where an NHRI has not developed a long-term and 
consistent experience at the domestic level in a certain matter but considers that it has the ability and 
                                                        
the case of Vinter and others against United Kingdom (Application No. 66069/09) and reply from the authorities 
(24/09/2014), 3 October 2014, DH-DD(2014)1150, 4.  
100 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v. the UK [GC], no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011 (relinquishment). 
101 Cf. supra n 30. 
102 Ibid., 5. 
103 Cf. ECtHR, P. and S. v. Poland, supra n 49; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1324 meeting (September 
2018) (DH). Communication from the Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) (31/08/2018) in the case of P. and 
S. v. Poland (Application No. 57375/08), 31 August 2018, DH-DD(2018)802, 6 et seqq. especially, where the domestic 
activities carried out in the area by the Commissioner are outlined. 
Cf. also ECtHR, Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, 20 March 2007; and ECtHR, R.R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04, 26 May 2011.  
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interest to intervene anyway. In the Mennesson group of cases,104 regarding the status of children 
born from surrogacy abroad, the CNCDH submitted a communication to argue that the status of these 
children was still uncertain in France,105 even though it appears that the CNCDH only touched upon 
the topic of surrogacy in 2011 in relation to the bill on bioethics with a view to supporting the existing 
ban on surrogacy in the country.106 The significance of the legal changes perceived by the NHRI as 
necessary, the existence of other cases decided by or pending before the ECtHR raising the same 
issues, as well as the centrality of the topic in the public debate, arguably prompted the decision of 
the CNCDH to intervene.  
To conclude, it appears that NHRIs are most likely to intervene at the international level in 
matters that they have already dealt with at the domestic one in the exercise of their national mandates. 
This would be the case especially for NHRIs that do not have the resources to initiate studies or 
investigations following each ECtHR judgment which is delivered against their countries. 
Nonetheless, it may be that an ECtHR judgment prompts the NHRI to tackle a certain issue; this 
circumstance arguably increases the likelihood that the NHRI, in addition to undertaking the usual 
domestic activities in relation to human rights violations, would follow up the issue at the 
international level, provided that the institution is aware of the opportunity to submit its views to the 
Committee of Ministers under Rule 9(2).  
It might be objected that these conclusions are obvious, and that it is not a prerogative of NHRIs 
to intervene in cases in relation to which they have developed expertise. While it is accepted here that 
                                                        
104 ECtHR, Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11, 26 June 2014. Three more judgments considered repetitive were joined 
to the Mennesson judgment for the purposes of supervision: these are Labassee v. France, no. 65941/11, 26 June 2014; 
Foulon and Bouvet v. France, nos. 9063/14 and 10410/14, 21 July 2016; and Laborie v. France, no. 44024/13, 19 January 
2017. 
105 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1294 meeting (September 2017) (DH). Communication from the 
“Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme” (11/09/2017) and reply from the authorities (13/09/2017) in 
the case of Mennesson v. France (Application No. 65192/11), 13 September 2017, DH-DD(2017)1001.  
106 CNCDH, Avis sur le projet de loi relatif à la bioéthique, 3 February 2011, which, however, highlighted that some 
members of the CNCDH “s’interrogent sur la possibilité de faire évoluer la législation permettant aux parents de 
reconnaître l’enfant né à l’étranger de gestation pour autrui” (para. 4). In the end, the existing surrogacy regime was not 
amended, even though the issue was debated and was the subject of a comparative study: Sénat/Service des études 
juridiques, Les documents de travail du Sénat. Série Législation compare. La gestation pour autrui, January 2008, 
accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.senat.fr/lc/lc182/lc182_mono.html.  
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this must generally be the case for NGOs too,107 what I would like to emphasise is the relevance of 
the domestic activities of NHRIs for their international ones, as well as the proximity of NHRIs to 
national debates on human rights – a proximity that is at least less pronounced in the case of 
transnational NGOs.  
Moreover, while decisions by NGOs to follow up cases are – naturally and legitimately – guided 
by advocacy aims, or by the interests of their members in the case of membership-based NGOs, the 
selection of cases by NHRIs appears, to a certain degree, more externally-driven. Indeed, in addition 
to the priorities set by and for themselves, NHRIs are to some extent “constrained” by the kind of 
complaints that are lodged with them or by the bills currently under discussion in parliament and on 
which their opinion is requested (again, this is especially the case for institutions with rather limited 
resources).  
Finally, another aspect that is considered by Dothan is the type of States – low-reputation or 
high-reputation ones – which attract submissions by NGOs the most. While the distinction is relevant 
for NGOs, which are often transnational and, in any case, rarely tied to a specific State, NHRIs have 
always intervened, and are expected to continue to do so, with respect to the States that established 
them and in which they operate. National human rights structures, be they NHRIs sensu stricto or 
ombudsmen, are domestic public bodies whose expertise consists in the thorough knowledge of the 
national legal system and human rights situation, and it is this particular knowledge that is valued at 
the international level. NHRIs do not therefore choose cases on the basis of the State involved and of 
its reputation; the fact that the NHRIs from some European States only have participated, as has been 
shown, mainly depends on NHRIs themselves – particularly on their knowledge of the procedure and 
on their resources. 
Nonetheless, States can be a relevant factor as far as their willingness and promptness in the 
execution of judgments is concerned: as highlighted in the previous section, States that swiftly 
                                                        
107 But this aspect is not analysed in Dothan, supra n 6.  
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implement ECtHR judgments make submissions by NHRIs needless. Moreover, as mentioned, the 
relationship between State authorities and NHRIs plays a role: i.e., if there is an ongoing and 
productive dialogue between the government and the NHRI at the national level, the NHRI will not 
need to have recourse to an instrument of international pressure. 
 
4.4. What: the content of communications 
As to the content of communications submitted by NHRIs, I posited a six-pronged 
categorisation on the basis of the characteristics of NHRIs and their expected contribution to the 
procedure, refined it after a preliminary cursory reading of the communications, and finally tested it 
through an exhaustive examination of the communications. Firstly, communications from NHRIs 
may contain different or complementary information compared to that provided by governments – 
e.g., concerning the legislation and its interpretation, or the administrative or judicial practice, as well 
as information in the form of statistical data.  
Secondly, communications may include the views of NHRIs on the suitability of the actions 
proposed or undertaken by governments to give execution to the ECtHR judgments. After the 2010 
reform of the Committee of Minister’s working methods, this kind of submissions should especially 
follow the filing of action plans on the part of governments. In these instances, the submissions by 
NHRIs might also enshrine alternative proposals to remedy the violations ascertained and prevent 
future ones.  
Thirdly, communications from NHRIs can challenge governmental assertions that the measures 
proposed and agreed upon with the Committee of Ministers have been enacted. After the reform, 
these communications should typically respond to the governments’ action reports and object to their 
accuracy.  
Fourthly, while it is expected that most communications from NHRIs would refer to the 
adoption and enactment of general measures, nothing prevents NHRIs from expressing their views 
on the adequacy and actual implementation of individual measures.  
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Fifthly, in view of their pluralistic composition as well as institutional cooperation with a 
variety of national and international actors, NHRIs could use their submissions to convey the views 
of these other actors – be they NGOs with which NHRIs cooperate at the national level or 
international monitoring bodies with which NHRIs interact.  
Sixthly, NHRIs might make (what can be defined as) procedural requests by asking the 
Committee of Ministers to transfer a case from standard to enhanced supervision or vice versa, keep 
it under standard or enhanced supervision, keep it under examination in general (i.e., not close it), or 
refer a case back to the ECtHR in the context of interpretation or infringement proceedings.  
An analysis of all of the communications forwarded by NHRIs to the Committee of Ministers 
shows that these documents frequently consist of a combination of the first three above-mentioned 
elements: namely, NHRIs supply the Committee with new information, or information that contrasts 
with that provided by governments, and on these bases dispute the appropriateness, exhaustiveness 
and/or actual implementation of the measures proposed or taken by the governments. The other 
elements, when present, normally add to the former ones and strengthen or widen the content of the 
submissions.  
 
As to the provision of information, the kind of alternative or additional information brought by 
NHRIs has greatly varied. To start with, it is common for NHRIs – based on their in-depth knowledge 
of the national legislation, administrative practice, and case-law – to contextualise, for the benefit of 
an international audience, internal provisions, administrative measures or judgments by illustrating 
their legal value and practical effects at the domestic level.  
In the McFarlane group of cases, which addresses the issue of delays in criminal proceedings 
and the lack of effective remedies against these delays, the Irish Human Rights Commission gave a 
broad overview of the relationship between the Irish Constitution and the ECHR as interpreted by 
domestic judges, as well as of the unaccountability of Irish judges (and of the Irish State) for the 
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damages caused in the exercise of their functions.108 On the basis of this complementary information, 
the Irish NHRI claimed the unsuitability of the Government’s response, which, by focusing on 
organisational aspects only, did not allow, in the opinion of the NHRI, for the full execution of the 
judgment.  
In the O’Keeffe case,109 the Irish Human Rights Commission objected to the characterisation of 
the action for damages under the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 as a suitable 
remedy for victims of sexual abuses at school. By underlining a number of hurdles that complainants 
would face in putting forward their claims, the Commission disagreed with the Government’s 
assertion that the violation of Article 13 ECHR as established by the Grand Chamber had been 
remedied.110 The difficulties encountered by individuals seeking justice at the domestic level were 
also dealt with in the submission filed by the CNCDH in the Mennesson group of cases, where the 
French NHRI contested the effectiveness of the procedure for the reopening of domestic proceedings 
following an ECtHR judgment.111  
In the Popov group of cases, concerning the detention of migrant families with children, the 
CNCDH and the Défenseur des droits pointed to contradictions in the domestic jurisprudence as 
regards the right of minors to challenge their detention before a judge.112 In the same communication, 
the two institutions also criticised the use of a ministerial circulaire to introduce changes in the 
detention regime of migrant families with minors; while it appeared that the governmental directive 
had mostly been applied, and alternatives to detention had generally been preferred with regard to 
                                                        
108 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1120th DH meeting (13-14 September 2011). Communication from a 
National Human Rights Institution in the case of Mc Farlane against Ireland (Application No. 31333/2006), 4 August 
2011, DH-DD(2011)573E, 5-10. Cf. also ECtHR, McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, 10 September 2010 
(relinquishment). The McFarlane case has been a leading case for five repetitive cases, the supervision of which was 
closed in September 2018. 
109 ECtHR, O’Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810/09, 28 January 2014.   
110 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1243 meeting (8-10 December 2015) (DH). Communication from a 
National Human Rights Institution (Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission) (19/10/2015) in the case of O'Keeffe 
against Ireland (Application No. 35810/09), 29 October 2015, DH-DD(2015)1136, 7-10. 
111 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 105, 3-4. 
112 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1172 meeting (4-6 June 2013) (DH). Communication from national 
institutions for the promotion and protection of Human Rights (Commission nationale Consultative des Droits de 
l’Homme (CNCDH) et le Défenseur des Droits) (06/05/13) in the case of Popov against France (Application No. 
39472/07), 27 May 2013, DH-DD(2013)588, 9-10. 
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this category of migrants, that instrument did not give rise to an enforceable right of the individuals 
concerned not to be placed in detention.113  
The Vinter and others judgment, on its part, established a violation of Article 3 ECHR by the 
UK in light of the uncertainties surrounding the review of whole-life orders, which was exercised, in 
accordance with the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, at the discretion of the Secretary of State on 
compassionate grounds. Following the Grand Chamber’s judgment, the Court of Appeal (England 
and Wales) interpreted the above-mentioned Act as compatible with the ECHR by excluding that 
humanitarian reasons only could justify the review of life-imprisonment sentences.  
The UK Government referred to the judgment by the Court of Appeal to affirm that it had 
executed the ECtHR ruling.114 However, the Equality and Human Rights Commission highlighted 
that a Prison Service Order (a directive of the Secretary of State for Justice) still in force, to be read 
in conjunction with the Crime (Sentences) Act, clearly detailed the medical reasons that could lead 
to the review of an indeterminate sentence on compassionate grounds and did not provide for other 
reasons (such as the legitimate penological grounds referred to by the ECtHR).115 According to the 
Commission, in the absence of an amendment to the Prison Service Order, it would be difficult to 
firmly establish a right of review of life sentences.116  
The data supplied, interpreted or contested by NHRIs might also consist in numerical or 
statistical data. The D.H. case revolves around the discrimination, in the primary schools of the Czech 
Republic, of Roma children, whose social or health disadvantages have been routinely classified as 
“mild mental disabilities”, so that a disproportionate number of Roma children have been placed in 
special schools or classes.117 Presented by the Government with the figures of children from special 
schools or classes who had been re-diagnosed on the basis of new tools, the Public Defender of Rights 
                                                        
113 Ibid., 11-12. 
114 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1208 meeting (23-25 September 2014) (DH). Communication from the 
United Kingdom concerning the case of Vinter and others against the United Kingdom (Application No. 66069/09), 1 
July 2014, DH-DD(2014)857, para. 4. 
115 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 99, 4-5. 
116 Ibid., 5-6. 
117 ECtHR, D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, no. 57325/00, 7 February 2006. The case was subsequently referred 
to the Grand Chamber, which issued its judgment on 13 November 2007. 
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of the Czech Republic maintained that the statistics were not “very revelatory”, as they did not 
account for whether the transfer of children to standard classes actually took place nor for the ethnicity 
of the children who had been re-diagnosed.118  
In a subsequent submission to the Committee of Ministers, the Public Defender again objected 
to the statistical data provided by the Government. Firstly, the Defender criticised the reference to the 
absolute number of Roma children educated in special classes, in place of the share of Roma children 
assigned to these classes.119 By referring to the latter indicator instead, the Public Defender showed 
how, while the overall number of children educated in special classes had indeed decreased (and so 
had the absolute number of Roma children), the share of Roma children still placed in these classes 
had increased.120 Secondly, the Czech Defender pointed to several pitfalls or uncertainties regarding 
the methodology used to collect the data in question.121  
The Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland also provided the Committee of Ministers with 
elements to interpret official statistics differently. In its action plan addressing the Orchowski and 
others judgment, the Polish Government made reference to the data compiled by the Central Prison 
Service Board, according to which Polish prisons were used at around 96% of their capacity.122 
However, the Commissioner argued that, that percentage being an average, it did not reflect the fact 
that various detention facilities were overpopulated.123 Moreover, on the basis of its experience as 
NPM, the Commissioner noted how, in order to avoid (nominal) overcrowding, prison administrators 
                                                        
118 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1201 meeting (3-5 June 2014) (DH). Communications from the Public 
Defender of Rights (14/04/2014) in the case of D.H. against Czech Republic (Application No. 57325/00), 30 April 2014, 
DH-DD(2014)569, 5-6.  
119 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1222 meeting (10-12 March 2015) (DH). Communication from the Public 
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Human Rights Defender in the cases of Orchowski and Sikorski against Poland (Applications No. 17885/04 and 
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not infrequently had recourse to spaces that should not be used as ordinary cells, such as infirmaries, 
recreational areas, and isolation and transit cells.124  
It is not infrequent that the complementary information supplied by NHRIs consists in the 
outcomes of investigations and studies carried out by NHRIs themselves. This is most common for 
classical and human rights ombudsmen, whose investigative and complaint-handling functions are 
central to their mandates, but studies are undertaken and reports drafted by a variety of national human 
rights structures. As shown, the Polish Commissioner based some of its observations regarding the 
Orchowski and others group of cases on its experience as NPM. The Armenian Human Rights 
Defender, on its part, referred to various instances where it had ascertained, following individual 
complaints, the provision of sub-standard medical care to members of the military.125  
In the Gharibashvili group of cases, concerning the inaction of public authorities faced with 
allegations of ill-treatment and violation of the right to life, the Public Defender of Georgia brought 
to the attention of the Committee of Ministers the findings of its inquiries, both prompted by 
individual complaints and undertaken by the Defender ex officio, which pointed to persistent 
shortcomings in the investigations into the wrongdoing of law-enforcement officials.126 Tellingly, out 
of sixty cases submitted by the Public Defender to the Office of the Chief Prosecutor over three years, 
fifty-nine prompted a new investigation, but no case was referred to court.127 The situation was similar 
for the twenty-three cases struck out of the list by the ECtHR following friendly settlements or 
unilateral declarations, on the basis inter alia of the Georgian Government’s commitment to initiate 
new investigations: only one re-opening led to a conviction.128 The Public Defender also highlighted 
                                                        
124 Ibid., 2-3. 
125 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1331 meeting (December 2018) (DH). Reply from the authorities 
(03/10/2018) to a communication from a NGO (25/09/2018) in the case of Muradyan v. Armenia (Application No. 
11275/07), 5 October 2018, DH-DD(2018)961, 6.  
126 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1294 meeting (September 2017) (DH). Communication from a NGO 
(05/09/2017) and reply from the authorities (12/09/2017) in the case of Gharibashvili v. Georgia (Application No. 
11830/03), 13 September 2017, DH-DD(2017)1000, 4-8.  
127 Ibid., 8. 
128 Ibid., 6-7. 
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the lack of transparency in the conduct of investigations, towards both the victims and the Public 
Defender’s Office itself.129  
In a subsequent communication to the Committee of Ministers, in relation not only to the 
Gharibashvili group of cases, but also to the Identoba and others and the Makharadze and 
Sikhariulidze groups of cases, the Public Defender of Georgia enclosed a study that it had conducted 
on the outcomes of disciplinary proceedings initiated against law-enforcement officials following 
individual complaints.130 As a result, the Public Defender had addressed a number of 
recommendations to the general inspectorates of various public authorities in order to remedy the 
shortcomings identified.131  
Similarly, the Serbian Protector of Citizens forwarded to the Committee of Ministers its 2010 
special report on the “missing babies”, which was produced following the complaints from the parents 
of three babies and significantly influenced (together with a parliamentary report) the decision of the 
ECtHR to adopt a pilot-judgment.132 The Protector’s report pointed to several failures in the past and 
current practices of a variety of public authorities involved and it addressed recommendations to 
them.   
As mentioned, it is not only ombudsman offices that conduct inquiries and research and share 
their findings with the Committee of Ministers. The CNCDH evidently relied, for the detailed analysis 
and recommendations in the Winterstein and others case, on its 2008 in-depth study on the conditions 
of Roma and Travellers in France, as well as on subsequent recommendations to public authorities, 
all of which highlighted the widespread discrimination against these minorities and the neglect of 
their needs, including in relation to housing.133 Having constantly followed the national developments 
                                                        
129 Ibid., 7-8. 
130 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 30. For the references of the Gharibashvili and Makharadze and 
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2014; and 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and 4 others v. Georgia, no. 71156/01, 3 May 
2007. 
131 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 30. 
132 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1201 meeting (3-5 June 2014) (DH). Communication from Serbia 
concerning the case of Zorica Jovanović against Serbia (Application No. 21794/08), 20 March 2014, DH-DD(2014)369.  
133 Cf. the documents mentioned supra n 82.  
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in the area, the CNCDH was able to provide a thorough overview of the applicable laws and 
regulations, the administrative practice as well as the judicial interpretation of Travellers’ right to 
housing.134 It is also clear that commissions with a protection mandate, whose powers often include 
the conduct of individual and general inquiries, as well as research institutes could significantly 
contribute with original data and analyses.  
 
At times, the different data or alternative analyses included in NHRIs’ submissions have been 
derived from the work of NGOs, independent national actors (such as the NPM when distinct from 
the NHRI), or international monitoring bodies. In these communications from NHRIs, according to 
the categorisation outlined above in the interests of simplification, the first element (i.e., the provision 
of new or different data) is intertwined with the fifth one (namely, bringing to the Committee of 
Ministers’ attention the findings and observations of other actors).  
This practice by NHRIs is in line with their duty to cooperate – in the exercise of their functions 
at the national and international levels – with a variety of actors, and it is a testament to the fact that 
submissions by NHRIs might be useful not only as they convey the views of an independent national 
body, but also because they can aggregate information from various sources and give voice to 
multiple bodies and organisations that might not have the competence or resources to address the 
Committee of Ministers. Indeed, while NGOs have been allowed to submit communications to the 
Committee of Ministers under Rule 9(2) together with NHRIs, not all NGOs are familiar with this 
opportunity or have the resources or expertise to do so. On the other hand, communications from 
“international intergovernmental organisations” have been admitted under Rule 9(3) since January 
2017 only. Communications from NHRIs can thus act and have acted as a vehicle for additional 
                                                        
134 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1230 meeting (9-11 June 2015) (DH). Communication from a national 
independent body (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'homme (CNCDH)) (01/04/2015) and reply from 
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expert or first-hand information to reach the Committee of Ministers and contribute to a well-
informed decision process by the Committee.  
In the above-mentioned Winterstein and others case, the CNCDH relied not only on its previous 
report and recommendations, but also on the statistics elaborated by ATD Quart Monde, an NGO 
specialised in the fight against poverty which has long dealt with the conditions of Travellers and is 
a member of the CNCDH.135 ATD Quart Monde was an applicant in the ECtHR proceedings136 and 
also submitted its own Rule 9(2) communication in the case, in which it referred to the 2008 report 
by the CNCDH and the recommendations therein.137 In this particular instance, a “division of labour” 
took place by which the NGO mainly focused its attention on the individual measures of execution 
(having assisted the applicants from the beginning, the NGO had a thorough knowledge of the specific 
situation of most of them), and the NHRI on the general measures. The potential complementarity of 
the roles of NGOs and NHRIs is especially clear in this instance, where another NGO (the European 
Roma Rights Centre) explicitly sought to integrate the submission by the CNCDH by providing 
statistical data on the evictions of Roma.138   
Similarly, in the Popov group of cases, the joint communication from the CNCDH and the 
Défenseur des droits coupled the findings of the Défenseur following on-site visits in Mayotte (a 
French overseas territory) with those of Cimade, an NGO which assists migrants and asylum seekers 
and visits centres of detention. Both sources reported the deplorable living conditions of migrants and 
asylum seekers constrained in the island’s detention centre.139 The annual reports issued by Cimade 
jointly with other NGOs about the centres of administrative detention for migrants were also 
                                                        
135 The CNCDH has sixty-four members, more than twenty of which are representatives from NGOs. Other members 
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mentioned in the Défenseur’s communication in the De Souza Ribeiro case; reference was made in 
particular to the number and modalities of the expulsions carried out in overseas detention centres, 
signalling the lack of effective remedies against removal decisions.140  
Cimade is also a member of the CNCDH, a circumstance which certainly makes the exchanges 
of information easier. Similarly, the submission in the Chowdury and others case by the Greek 
National Commission for Human Rights, another large consultative commission whose members 
mainly come from civil society organisations, is explicitly based on the “data arising from two large 
scale participation hearings of relevant national stakeholders” in the fields of forced labour and human 
trafficking.141  
At any rate, NHRIs other than consultative commissions have referred to the data and analyses 
of NGOs: for instance, in the P. and S. case, the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights relied on an 
investigation carried out by the NGO Federation for Women and Family Planning on the actual 
accessibility of abortion procedures in Polish hospitals.142 Indeed, membership is not the only means 
to ensure cooperation and exchange of views between NHRIs and civil society; there exist 
multifarious ways to establish and maintain this relationship, including the involvement of NGOs in 
the appointment of the members of the NHRI and regular meetings and consultations between NGOs 
and the NHRI.143 At any rate, all A-status institutions, as well as many other NHRIs, institutionally 
collaborate with NGOs, while remaining distinct from the latter in terms of nature, functions, aims, 
and powers.144 
Additionally, NGOs are not the only entities with which NHRIs interact and whose data and 
observations are referred to by NHRIs in their submissions to the Committee of Ministers. The 
CNCDH and the Médiateur/Défenseur mentioned on multiple occasions remarks by the Contrôleur 
général des lieux de privation de liberté (the French NPM) and the Commission nationale de 
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143 Cf. Section 3.1 of this dissertation.  
144 Ibid., and Chapter 3 of this dissertation more generally. 
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déontologie et de la sécurité (an independent administrative authority supervising the ethics of law-
enforcement personnel, whose functions have been transferred to the Défenseur since 2011). 
Specifically, the reports by these bodies on resort to full body searches in penitentiaries were referred 
to in the communication submitted by the CNCDH and the Médiateur in the Frérot group of cases,145 
whereas a report by the Contrôleur général following its visit to a detention centre for migrants was 
taken into account in the communication regarding the Popov group of cases.146  
The Polish Commissioner for Human Rights referred to the information provided by the 
National Health Fund and the Patient Rights’ Ombudsman on different aspects of access to lawful 
termination of pregnancy in Poland, including the outcome of the Ombudsman’s investigation into 
access to abortion services in a particular region, where it appeared that no hospital was performing 
abortions.147 
NHRIs might also bring to the Committee of Ministers’ attention the opinion of external 
experts: in the Gillan and Quinton case, the Equality and Human Rights Commission presented the 
views of a counsel and a professor who had already been consulted by the NHRI within the domestic 
process of legislative review of the measures adopted by the UK Government.148 
Furthermore, NHRIs have inserted into their communications the observations from a variety 
of international human rights monitoring bodies, with which NHRIs often maintain a close 
collaboration. This is the case, for instance, for UN treaty bodies, to which numerous NHRIs submit 
their alternative reports to be considered alongside those by governments and NGOs during periodic 
reporting procedures. In the Al-Skeini and others case, where the killings by the British armed forces 
in Iraq were considered and a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 ECHR was found, the 
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Equality and Human Rights Commission noted how it had communicated its concerns regarding the 
promptness, transparency, independence, and effectiveness of the investigations opened as a result of 
the ECtHR judgment to two UN treaty bodies – the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights 
Committee – and how those bodies had shared its concerns.149  
The lists of issues and concluding observations by the same two UN treaty bodies were also 
mentioned in the communication from the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in the 
McKerr group of cases, as both bodies addressed questions and recommendations to the UK 
Government regarding the independence, transparency, and comprehensiveness of the investigations 
into conflict-related deaths in Northern Ireland.150  
The Northern Ireland Commission referred again to the views of a UN treaty body in the S. and 
Marper case. In debating the suitability of the Government’s action plan regarding the retention of 
DNA profiles and fingerprints in police databases, which differentiated inter alia between individuals 
aged under ten and individuals aged ten or over (ten being the age of minimum criminal responsibility 
in the UK), the Northern Ireland Commission took the opportunity to highlight that a General 
Comment of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child states that “a minimum age of criminal 
responsibility below the age of 12 years is considered by the Committee not to be internationally 
acceptable”.151  
In the Frérot group of cases, in addition to the observations by national independent bodies 
supervising detention conditions and the conduct of law-enforcement officials, the CNCDH and the 
Médiateur also reported the conclusions by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which had condemned the excessive resort to 
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full body searches in French penitentiaries following its on-site visit.152 The criticisms from another 
CoE body, the Commissioner for Human Rights, in relation to the detention and expulsion regimes 
and practices in French overseas territories were referred to in the national institutions’ 
communications in the De Souza Ribeiro case and the Popov group of cases.153 
As a final example, the Greek National Commission for Human Rights referred to the reports 
and surveys on forced labour and human trafficking in Greece by various international bodies, 
including the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance, the International Labour Organization, and especially GRETA (the CoE Group of 
Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings).154 
The considerations by other independent national entities and by international monitoring 
bodies strengthen the findings of NHRIs, whose positions appear to be shared by additional 
independent and expert actors. More generally, the injection of data from sources other than NHRIs 
themselves further extends the information at the disposal of the Committee of Ministers, which is 
thus in a better position to assess the governments’ claims. 
 
As mentioned, the provision of data in the communications from NHRIs is frequently 
accompanied by an assessment of the suitability of the measures proposed or adopted by the 
governments concerned. Alternatively or in addition, NHRIs might dispute their governments’ 
assertions that certain measures have been (fully) executed. As far as the communications submitted 
to date are concerned, the former scenario appears more frequent, as NHRIs tend to integrate 
governmental communications by highlighting the need for different or additional measures rather 
than disproving governmental statements as to the implementation of measures.  
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Nonetheless, it is not always easy to clearly discern the two elements in practice; so that it can 
generally be said that, most of the time, in addition to providing new or different information, 
communications from NHRIs point to the inadequacies and deficiencies of the measures proposed or 
enacted by governments, both per se or in light of their unsatisfactory implementation.  
In the same way as State measures can widely range from legislative amendments to changes 
in the administrative regulations and practices and judicial overturning, so do considerations by 
NHRIs. By way of example, NHRIs might object to aspects of legislative reforms (e.g., in the Gillan 
and Quinton case, the Equality and Human Rights Commission detected shortcomings in the 
provisional remedial order as well as in the bill under consideration in the Parliament),155 of 
administrative regulations (e.g., in the Merabishvili case, the Georgian Public Defender asked the 
Minister of Corrections to extend the storage period for video recordings of penitentiaries’ communal 
areas),156 of administrative practices (e.g., in its December 2017 submission regarding three groups 
of cases, the Georgian Public Defender pointed to numerous deficiencies in the investigations into 
disciplinary offences committed by law-enforcement officials),157 of courts’ decisions, or – frequently 
– of a combination of them.  
In the D.H. case, the Czech Public Defender undertook an overall assessment of the measures 
put in place by the Government and found shortcomings in the legislative measures adopted to 
remedy the discrimination suffered by Roma children in schools, as well as in the practical 
implementation of diagnostic tools, in the monitoring of re-diagnosis, and in the collection of 
statistical data.158  
In the Zorica Jovanović case, the Serbian Protector of Citizens highlighted present and past 
failures by a number of public authorities in record-keeping, inspections, and investigation of 
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complaints, and it also asked the Government to intervene by way of legislative amendments to ensure 
that effective investigations are carried out into the fate of “missing children” and satisfactory answers 
are given to their parents.159  
The Greek National Human Rights Commission maintained that while the State’s legislative 
framework for combating human trafficking and forced labour could be considered adequate overall, 
significant shortcomings affected its administrative and judicial implementation – e.g., insufficient 
inspections, problems in identifying the victims and granting them protection, ineffective 
investigations, and extremely low prosecution and conviction rates.160  
The Armenian Human Rights Defender recommended that the Government re-organise the 
hotlines for reporting human rights violations in the military and conduct more thorough medical 
examinations of servicemen; additionally, it asked for the revision of various legislative provisions 
regulating disciplinary proceedings against servicemen.161  
As a final example, the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights challenged the Government’s 
assertion that the existing legislation regulating the termination of pregnancy and the rights of patients 
guarantees the right of access to lawful abortion for women in Poland, and it recommended both 
amendments to those Acts and the adoption of appropriate and effective hospital internal regulations 
with a view to informing women, inter alia, about the grounds for a lawful abortion, the opportunity 
to challenge a physician’s refusal to terminate the pregnancy before the Patient Rights Ombudsman, 
and where else access to the service is provided in the case of conscientious objection by the physician 
consulted.162  
In some instances, NHRIs questioned the adequacy of the type of measures undertaken by 
governments: for example, the CNCDH and the Défenseur maintained that the adoption of a 
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ministerial circular – in lieu of a law – to regulate the detention of migrant families with children did 
not afford enough guarantees.163 Similarly, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 
criticised the use of a regulation instead of a piece of legislation (the former allowing for a more 
limited parliamentary scrutiny) for the regime of retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints.164  
In other instances, where governments argued that the ECtHR judgments at issue had been 
executed following an overturning of the domestic jurisprudence (or, in any case, in light of 
subsequent domestic judgments in compliance with the ECtHR rulings), NHRIs considered the case-
law to be insufficient to ensure the full and lasting implementation of the Court’s judgments.  
In the Popov group of cases, the case-law concerning the judicial review of the detention of 
migrant minors accompanying their parents was defined by the CNCDH and the Défenseur as 
“nuanced and unsettled”.165 Similar arguments have also been raised with respect to common-law 
countries: in the Vinter and others case, the Equality and Human Rights Commission challenged the 
Government’s assertion that the reconciliation, by the Court of Appeal, of the Crime (Sentences) Act 
1997 with the ECHR was sufficient to consider the ECtHR judgment to be executed, failing the 
amendment of the Act itself or of the Prison Service Order, the wording of which clearly confines the 
review of whole-life orders to medical grounds.166  
Other criticisms levelled at governments by NHRIs have referred, inter alia, to budget cuts 
resulting from governmental reforms (e.g., those affecting the investigatory mechanisms for conflict-
related deaths in Northern Ireland)167 and to the lack of interim measures pending a lengthy 
parliamentary debate (on the reform of the system for the retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints 
in police databases).168  
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A characteristic of a not insignificant number of submissions by NHRIs is that of 
contextualising the issues raised by ECtHR judgments within a broader context, thus highlighting 
more fundamental problems of the national legal order or practice failing the resolution of which 
violations of the ECHR would recur. This aim is particularly explicit in some communications from 
NHRIs. In the Chowdury and others case, the Greek National Commission for Human Rights openly 
disputed the Government’s claim that the facts of the case constituted an “isolated incident”, and it 
showed that wider patterns of abuse against migrant workers are detectable in Greece and 
comprehensive remedial measures are needed.169 
In the McFarlane group of cases, while welcoming the intention expressed by the Government 
to re-organise the court system in order to prevent further judicial delays of the kind established by 
the ECtHR judgments, the Irish Human Rights Commission maintained that “the manner in which 
Convention rights can be invoked and remedied in domestic law is … a broad structural issue that 
goes beyond the specific judicial delay found in McFarlane”.170 The NHRI thus provided the 
Committee of Ministers with information regarding the position of the ECHR in the Irish legal system 
as well as the immunity of Irish judges from legal proceedings for any damages caused by their 
delays.171  
In the Gharibashvili group of cases, concerning procedural violations of Articles 2 and 3 
ECHR, the general measures adopted by the Georgian Government mainly focused on the fight 
against ill-treatment on the one hand and on the reform of the public prosecutor’s office on the 
other.172 The Public Defender drew the attention of the Government and of the Committee of 
Ministers on complementary aspects, such as guarantees of institutional independence for the 
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authorities (including ministerial ones) investigating the criminal and disciplinary wrongdoing of 
law-enforcement officials and the effectiveness of these investigations.173  
In the Mennesson group of cases, the CNCDH pointed to persistent gaps in the protection of 
surrogacy children, as French courts have agreed to date to legally recognise only the (biological) 
father-child relationships established abroad and not the (intended) mother-child ones. In the opinion 
of the NHRI, this approach could trigger future violations of the ECHR.174  
After detailing the problems affecting the governmental plans or reports, various NHRIs issued 
specific recommendations to governments as to how the law and the administrative or judicial 
practice could be amended with a view to ensuring compliance with ECtHR judgments. This has been 
the case for the CNCDH and the Défenseur,175 the Greek National Commission for Human Rights,176 
the Armenian Human Rights Defender,177 the Public Defender of Georgia,178 the Polish 
Commissioner for Human Rights,179 and the Serbian Protector of Citizens.180 At any rate, the 
considerations expressed by NHRIs on the measures proposed or adopted by governments are often 
revelatory of the alternative proposals by NHRIs themselves, so that the absence of a clear list of 
recommendations does not appear conclusive. 
It should be underlined at this point that not all submissions by NHRIs claim that the 
governmental action plans or reports are unsuitable or insufficient. While admittedly this has been 
the case in most instances, two communications have been forwarded to date which endorse the 
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measures adopted by the government concerned and conclude that the ECtHR judgments in question 
have been executed.  
In the Taïs case, the CNCDH and the Médiateur maintained that the provisions of the French 
code of criminal procedure governing the reopening of cases where a decision not to prosecute was 
adopted are in compliance with the ECHR and the ECtHR jurisprudence.181 Thus, the fact that the 
request from the applicants to reopen the domestic investigations following the ECtHR judgment in 
Taïs had been refused by the prosecutor, who considered that no new elements had emerged, did not 
mean that the French legal order was not in line with the Convention.  
In the Kurić and others case, the Human Rights Ombudsman of Slovenia rejected the 
applicants’ request that the Ombudsman urge a constitutionality review of two acts adopted by the 
Slovenian Parliament to regulate the legal status of so-called erased residents and compensate 
them.182 The Ombudsman justified its refusal by asserting the legality and fairness of the two acts 
and, implicitly, their compliance with the ECtHR judgments in the case.183     
 
It has already been noted that the opportunity for NHRIs and NGOs to submit communications 
under Rule 9(2) was clearly introduced to allow for additional observations on the general measures 
adopted or proposed by governments to reach the Committee of Ministers. Over the years, both the 
Committee and the Court have shown increasing awareness of the need for broader changes to the 
national legal systems in order to prevent future violations of the Convention. The content of the 
contribution by NHRIs in this respect has been analysed in this section and its impact will be assessed 
in the next one.  
There are nonetheless a few cases where NHRIs also gave their views on the individual 
measures adopted or proposed by governments – i.e., on the measures that a government must enact 
                                                        
181 CNCDH and Médiateur de la République, Communication du Médiateur de la République et de la Commission 
Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme au titre de l’article 9 du Règlement intérieur du Comité des Ministres. 
Affaire TAÏS C/ France, 2009. 
182 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 88. 
183 Ibid., 6-7 in particular. 
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to put the violation(s) right with specific regard to the applicant(s) in the ECtHR case. In the 
Gharibashvili group of cases, the Public Defender of Georgia underlined the lack of concrete progress 
in the investigations into law-enforcement officials’ wrongdoing that were opened as a result of the 
ECtHR judgments in the group of cases and were among the individual measures agreed upon by the 
Georgian Government (in addition to the payment of just satisfaction).184  
In this instance, the attention paid by the Public Defender to the individual measures can be 
explained, on the one hand, by the close link between the individual measures and the general ones, 
which include reforms to guarantee the independence and effectiveness of the investigations into the 
crimes and misconduct of public officials; and, on the other, by the monitoring and complaint-
handling activities carried out at the national level by the Defender, which had long started to receive 
and investigate complaints about the impunity of law-enforcement officials.   
In the Winterstein and others case, the CNCDH briefly referred to the actions that it had 
undertaken at the national level to ascertain the proper implementation of the individual measures to 
which the French Government had committed – essentially, the provision of alternative lodging 
solutions to the applicants.185 The CNCDH conceded that, in accordance with its mandate, its 
activities at both the national and international levels would commonly focus on the general measures 
needed to execute the ECtHR judgments, but it also highlighted the peculiarities of the case and the 
significance of the information received by one of its members, the NGO ATD Quart Monde. As 
mentioned, this NGO followed the individual situation of applicants closely and submitted a detailed 
communication in this respect to the Committee of Ministers.186  
The CNCDH also gave some details on the implementation of the individual measures in the 
Mennesson group of cases by underlining that the applicants were still being denied the transposition 
of their parent-child relationship established abroad into the appropriate French registry.187 Reference 
                                                        
184 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 126, 4. 
185 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 134, para. 4. 
186 Cf. above in this section and n 83.  
187 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 105, paras. 7-11 in particular. 
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to the non-implementation of the individual measures thus served to illustrate the persistent 
shortcomings of the French legal order as regards not only the certification of parent-child 
relationships for surrogacy children born abroad but also the procedure for the re-opening of national 
proceedings following an ECtHR judgment.  
Ultimately, it appears that observations by NHRIs with regard to individual measures are 
relatively rare, limited in extent, and often used as evidence of continuous problems in the 
implementation of the general measures required.  
 
Lastly, while communications from NHRIs often entail per se a request to the Committee of 
Ministers to keep a case under scrutiny, there have been instances where NHRIs explicitly asked the 
Committee to handle cases in a certain way (what I would term “procedural requests”). The British 
Equality and Human Rights Commission called for the Committee of Ministers to keep a case under 
enhanced supervision (Al-Skeini and others)188 and transfer two cases from standard to enhanced 
supervision (Gillan and Quinton and Vinter and others)189. These requests met with mixed results.190  
On the other hand, an NHRI could also ask the Committee of Ministers to close its examination 
of a case on the ground that the government has adopted all the measures required to fully execute 
the judgment. While the CNCDH and the Médiateur did not submit such an explicit request in the 
Taïs case, their argument that no change to the French code of criminal procedure was needed to 
execute the judgment would point in that direction.191  
                                                        
188 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 149, 7. 
189 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 95, paras. 1 and 15; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat 
General, supra n 99, 7. 
190 In the Al-Skeini and others case, the communication from the Commission was essentially late. It was received by the 
Department for Execution on the 4th December 2015 and due to be examined by the Committee of Ministers in its March 
2016 session; the Committee, however, adopted a (pre-drafted) decision to move the case from enhanced to standard 
supervision during its December 2015 session (8-9 December). An early request by the Commission to transfer the Gillan 
and Quinton case under enhanced supervision was never followed up. Finally, in the Vinter and others case, while the 
primary request from the Commission to transfer the case to enhanced supervision was ignored, the case was kept under 
examination by the Committee of Ministers, contrary to the request from the UK Government to close the case and in 
accordance with the alternative request from the Commission, which had asked to wait at least until the ruling by the 
ECtHR in a similar pending case.   
191 However, the documentation relating to this case (including governmental communications and decisions by the 
Committee of Ministers) is not available in HUDOC-EXEC, so that a definitive assessment is not possible.  
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In a couple of cases, NHRIs encouraged the Committee of Ministers to make use of the 
interpretation proceedings under Article 46(3) ECHR. The CNCDH did so in the Mennesson group 
of cases by highlighting a fundamental disagreement with the French Government as regards the 
effects of the ECtHR judgment in question on the recognition in France of the (intended) mother-
child relationships established abroad.192  
Similarly, in its second communication in the O’Keeffe case concerning children sexually 
abused in schools, the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission suggested to obtain interpretive 
clarifications from the ECtHR in the face of the allegedly restrictive notion of “victim” adopted by 
the Irish Government.193 Specifically, the NHRI was critical of the requirement of a prior complaint 
of abuse filed with the school management in order for an individual to be considered a victim and 
receive compensation.194 Neither requests from these NHRIs could overcome the reluctance of the 
Committee of Ministers to put into use the new Article 46(3) instrument.195  
 
In closing, a few words about the content of the communications submitted by NGOs in the 
same cases and groups of cases in relation to which NHRIs intervened. It can be said that the content 
of these communications does not appear to be essentially different: NGOs have also submitted new 
or different information regarding the norms and, frequently, the practice relating to a certain matter, 
and on these bases challenged the appropriateness and effectiveness of the measures that were 
adopted or planned by governments.  
                                                        
192 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 105, para. 22. 
193 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1273 meeting (6-8 December 2016) (DH). Communication from a 
National Human Rights Institution (Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission) (19/10/2015) in the case of O'Keeffe 
against Ireland (Application No. 35810/09), 21 October 2016, DH-DD(2016)1167. The entire communication is 
dedicated to setting out the interpretive issues that should, in the opinion of the Irish Commission, be submitted to the 
ECtHR.  
194 Ibid., paras. 20 et seqq. in particular. This position was shared by an NGO intervening in the case, namely the Child 
Law Clinic at University College Cork, which also urged the Committee of Ministers to address the Court under Article 
46(3) ECHR at the same meeting: Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1273 meeting (6-8 December 2016) (DH).  
Communication from a NGO (The Child Law Clinic - School of Law - University College Cork) (04/11/2016) in the case 
of O’Keeffe against Ireland (Application No. 35810/09), 18 November 2016, DH-DD(2016)1274, para. 18.  
195 Cf. section 2.3 of this dissertation. Since the entry into force of Protocol no. 14 in 2010, the Committee of Ministers 
has never activated interpretation proceedings under Article 46(3) and has only recently initiated its first infringement 
proceedings against Azerbaijan, in October 2017. 
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The information provided by NGOs has often been based on their close contacts with the 
victims of violations and thus on their knowledge of the situation “on the ground”, as well as, in the 
case of membership-based NGOs, on their authority to represent the interests of their members (e.g., 
the European Association of Jehovah’s Christian Witnesses in the Identoba and others group of cases, 
or the Association of the Erased Residents of Slovenia in the Kurić and others case). This also makes 
clear why submissions by NGOs have more frequently addressed individual measures in addition to 
general ones, especially in the case of membership-based NGOs or NGOs which provided legal 
assistance to the applicants before the ECtHR or to other complainants in a similar situation.196 
Nonetheless, in many instances, NGOs forwarded observations on the legislative, 
administrative, and judicial framework of the State concerned very much like NHRIs. Indeed, while 
various intervening NGOs (especially transnational ones) could have provided comparative analyses 
of the matters dealt with in the judgments, their communications under Rule 9(2) focused on the 
national situation, in witness of the distinct nature of the supervision of execution process. For 
instance, the European Roma Rights Centre, which has conducted in-depth research on the situation 
of Roma in many European countries, only referred to France in its Rule 9(2) submissions in the 
Winterstein and others case (contrary to its more general considerations as a third-party intervener in 
the ECtHR proceedings).197 
In the same way as NHRIs, NGOs referred to the findings of other bodies in order to strengthen 
their positions. These include international monitoring bodies,198 but also independent national 
                                                        
196 A case in point are the communications from the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre and Middlesex University, 
which assisted Mr. Merabishvili before the ECtHR: the first two communications from these organisations were filed 
under Rule 9(1), as communications from the injured party, whereas the third one was made under Rules 9(1) and 9(2) 
(and classified by the Department for Execution as a communication under Rules 9(2) and 9(6)). Cf. also the 
communications from most NGOs in the Identoba and others group of cases and in the Kurić and others case, as well as 
the communication from ATD Quart Monde in the Winterstein and others case, supra n 83.  
197 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 138; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1324 
meeting (September 2018) (DH). Communication from a NGO (European Roma Rights Centre) (09/08/2018) in the case 
of Winterstein and Others v. France (27013/07), 24 August 2018, DH-DD(2018)794.  
198 Cf. the ample reference to reports by international monitoring bodies, mainly on the matter of non-discrimination, by 
Atheist Ireland in the O’Keeffe case: Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1236 meeting (22-24 September 2015) 
(DH).  Communication from a NGO (Atheist Ireland) (30/06/2015) in the case of O’Keeffe against Ireland (Application 
No. 35810/09), 11 August 2015, DH-DD(2015)795, 12 et seqq. in particular. Cf. also, among others, Committee of 
Ministers/Secretariat General, 1288th meeting (June 2017) (DH). Communication from a NGO (Coalition for an 
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bodies, first and foremost NHRIs. In addition to the examples of collaboration between NGOs and 
NHRIs given above in this section, it is worth mentioning that the Coalition for an Independent and 
Transparent Judiciary, a group of Georgian NGOs that intervened in the Gharibashvili group of cases, 
repeatedly referred to the observations by the Public Defender and underlined the agreement between 
the Coalition and the Defender on many of the changes proposed.199  
Finally, NGOs have also submitted “procedural requests”: among others, ASTRA, a Serbian 
NGO fighting human trafficking and dealing with missing children, in its first submission urged the 
Committee of Ministers to keep the Zorica Jovanović case under review and adopt an interim 
resolution to avoid further delays in the execution of the judgment.200 After several submissions on 
the part of ASTRA and other NGOs and in the face of the persistent non-execution of the judgment, 
ASTRA and YUCOM – The Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights requested that infringement 
proceedings be initiated against Serbia.201 
To conclude, the content of communications submitted by NGOs under Rule 9(2) does not 
substantially differ from that of communications from NHRIs; what should distinguish the two is the 
source of the information, namely the fact that the information provided by NHRIs should be 
impartial or impartially verified. Whether this feature is actually perceived by the recipients of the 
communications (States, the Committee of Ministers, and the Department for the Execution of 
Judgments) and has a bearing on their determinations is the subject of the next section.     
 
                                                        
Independent and Transparent Judiciary) (07/03/2017) and reply from Georgia (22/03/2017) in the Gharibashvili group 
of cases against Georgia (Application No. 11830/03), 24 March 2017, DH-DD(2017)359, 5 et seqq. in particular.  
199 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1288th meeting (June 2017) (DH), supra n 198, 4 and 7; and Committee 
of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1294 meeting (September 2017) (DH). Communication from a NGO (07/08/2017) and 
reply from the authorities (21/08/2017) in the case of Gharibashvili v. Georgia (Application No. 11830/03), 23 August 
2017, DH-DD(2017)873, 2-4. 
200 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1214 meeting (2-4 December 2014) (DH). Communication from a NGO 
(Astra-Anti Trafficking) (05/11/2014) in the case of Zorica Jovanović against Serbia (Application No. 21794/08) and 
reply from the authorities (12/11/2014), 14 November 2014, DH-DD(2014)1359, para. 12. 
201 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1331st meeting (December 2018) (DH). Communication from NGOs 
(YUCOM and ASTRA) (05/11/2018) in the case of ZORICA JOVANOVIC v. Serbia (Application No. 21794/08), 14 
November 2018, DH-DD(2018)1111, para. 13(c). 
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4.5. How: the impact of communications 
The notion of impact (as well as that of effectiveness) is traditionally subject to different 
definitions and means of measurement in the literature. In the field of human rights, in recent years, 
several authors have been variously approaching the impact that international human rights 
instruments (such as treaties, judgments, and “soft law”) and institutions have on domestic legal 
orders and policy choices;202 more generally, studies indicating “impact” and “effectiveness” as their 
main focus have multiplied. 
This section analyses the impact that communications from NHRIs have had on the action plans 
and reports by governments, on the analyses by the Department for Execution, and on the decisions 
by the Committee of Ministers regarding the execution of ECtHR judgments. While this investigation 
might raise less complex issues than most of the studies mentioned above, some clarifications are 
appropriate on what kind of impact is being assessed and how, in light of the uncertainties that 
surround this concept.  
This section (and this dissertation more generally) does not primarily aim to measure the extent 
to which NHRIs promote, and succeed in promoting, the greatest possible compliance with the 
ECtHR judgments. Indeed, this element would be difficult to evaluate, as States, which bear the 
primary responsibility for the execution of ECtHR judgments, are left considerable freedom by the 
Court and the Committee of Ministers as to the means to employ with a view to executing judgments 
(although, as shown, this margin of manoeuvre is being reduced by both the Court and the 
Committee).203 On the other hand, it appears more significant to assess the concrete ability of NHRIs 
                                                        
202 Cf., among others: Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis Jr, “How Do International Institutions Matter? The 
Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms”, International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1996): 451-478; Christof 
Heyns and Frans Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2002); Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights. 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Sharanbir Grewal and Erik 
Voeten, “Are New Democracies Better Human Rights Compliers?”, International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 497-
518; Jasper Krommendijk, The Domestic Impact and Effectiveness of the Process of State Reporting under UN Human 
Rights Treaties in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland. Paper-pushing or policy prompting? (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2014); and Başak Çalı and Nazila Ghanea, The Domestic Effects of International Human Rights Treaty 
Ratification in the Member States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) (Qatar National 
Research Fund, 2014). 
203 Cf. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this dissertation.  
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to influence – to any extent – the determinations of States regarding the measures planned or adopted 
and the assessment of these measures by the Department for Execution and the Committee of 
Ministers. 
To this end, I introduce a distinction between “formal recognition” and “substantial 
recognition” of the communications submitted by NHRIs.204 Under the former tier, I investigate 
whether consideration was given by the relevant actors – i.e., Member States, the Department for the 
Execution of Judgments, and the Committee of Ministers – to the communications from NHRIs. More 
specifically, I ascertain whether Member States replied to the communications filed by NHRIs, 
whether the Department for Execution mentioned these communications in its memoranda and other 
documents, and whether the Committee of Ministers referred to them explicitly in its interim 
resolutions and decisions.  
Under the latter tier, I analyse the actual acceptance of the information and recommendations 
submitted by NHRIs: namely, whether the content of communications from NHRIs was approved by 
States and shaped their action plans and reports, whether it influenced the dialogue between the 
Department for Execution and the Member States concerned and the Department’s observations to 
the Committee of Ministers, and whether it informed the recommendations by the Committee of 
Ministers and/or the decisions by this body to continue or close the supervision of a case or examine 
a case under a certain procedure. 
Communications from NHRIs can have a further kind of impact – namely, they can mobilise 
other domestic actors and raise the awareness of the public in general, thus initiating or reviving 
national debates, provided that the NHRI is sufficiently influential at the domestic level. This type of 
                                                        
204 To a certain extent, this distinction echoes the one between “impact” and “effectiveness” made in Krommendijk, supra 
n 202, 24-27 and 57 et seqq., in relation to the concluding observations by UN treaty bodies. According to this distinction, 
“impact” is “the way in which domestic actors have used and discussed the reporting process and the [concluding 
observations] at the domestic level” (58), whereas “effectiveness” is “the extent to which policy, legislative or any other 
measures are taken as a result of” the concluding observations (60).  
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impact is not considered here, as it requires very different instruments of analysis and deserves 
separate and in-depth consideration.205   
 
The formal recognition of communications submitted by NHRIs can be an important indicator 
of their substantial recognition, insofar as it demonstrates that the communications from NHRIs have 
in fact been read and considered worthy of reply by States and of mention by the Committee of 
Ministers or the Department for Execution.  
As far as States’ responses are concerned, out of twenty-eight communications from NHRIs in 
relation to which sufficient information is available,206 twenty-one received a reply in the context of 
eighteen cases. Considering that the Ombudsman’s submission in the Kurić and others case would 
not require a reply from the Slovenian Government,207 the communications from NHRIs which were 
not answered to by the governments concerned include one of the three communications submitted 
by the Georgian Public Defender in the Gharibashvili group of cases, the joint submission by the 
CNCDH and the Défenseur in the Popov group of cases, the submission by the Greek National 
Commission for Human Rights in the Chowdury and others case, and all three submissions lodged 
by the Irish NHRI in the McFarlane group of cases and O’Keeffe case.  
The response rate is thus relatively high; moreover, the lack of reply from the Georgian and 
French Governments appears exceptional. On the other hand, the Irish Government would seem to 
systematically refrain from replying to the communications from its A-status NHRI.  
                                                        
205 That communications to the Committee of Ministers from NHRIs can have this effect was underlined by Collier, 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain), supra n 21, who maintained that communications can be useful 
to turn the spotlight on issues at the domestic level and can be taken up by actors such as NGOs, lawyers, and the public 
at large.  
206 The documentation concerning the Frérot group of cases and the Taïs case, as well as part of the documentation 
concerning the S. and Marper case and the McKerr group of cases, cannot be found on the HUDOC-EXEC database, as 
it dates back to before 2011, when the new working methods were adopted. This means, inter alia, that the lodging of 
action plans and reports by governments was not required and that most of the documents relating to the supervision of 
cases were not to be made public. In the Gebremedhin case, the reply from the French Government is not available, but 
it is referred to in the memorandum by the Department for Execution. 
207 On the other hand, the Slovenian Government relied, inter alia, on the refusal by the Ombudsman to initiate a 
constitutionality review in order to support its position: Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1236 meeting (22-
24 September 2015) (DH). Communication from the authorities (17/06/2015) concerning the case of Kurić and Others 
against Slovenia (Application No. 26828/06), 30 June 2015, DH-DD(2015)688, 3. 
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In accordance with new Rule 9(6), submissions by NHRIs are brought to the attention of the 
respondent State by the Department for Execution. The same Rule prescribes that “when the State 
responds within five working days, both the communication and the response shall be brought to the 
attention of the Committee of Ministers and made public. If there has been no response within this 
time limit, the communication shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers but shall not be 
made public. It shall be published ten working days after notification, together with any response 
received within this time limit”. If the State concerned replies to the communication after the second 
deadline, its response is published separately. Almost all submissions by NHRIs received a reply 
within the second deadline and were thus published along with the respective governmental 
responses, the only exceptions being the two submissions by the Czech Public Defender in the D.H. 
case and the submission by the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights in the P. and S. case.208  
It is considered appropriate to compare States’ response rate in relation to communications from 
NHRIs with their response rate in relation to communications from NGOs. By limiting the 
comparison to the cases in which NHRIs intervened as well, NGOs followed up sixteen out of twenty-
two cases on which sufficient information is available.209 In the context of these sixteen cases or 
groups of cases, as of December 2018, NGOs lodged one-hundred and three communications, fifty-
seven of which received a reply from governments.  
States’ response rate in relation to submissions by NGOs is thus lower than their response rate 
in relation to submissions by NHRIs. It should be noted, however, that this difference might be 
determined by the larger number of NGOs’ communications received and the possible reiteration of 
similar criticisms and proposals (in the D.H. case, for instance, nineteen submissions by NGOs were 
                                                        
208 Both replies by the Czech Government were published separately: Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1201 
meeting (3-5 June 2014) (DH). Communication from the authorities (13/05/2014) in reply to document DH-
DD(2014)569. Communication from the Czech Republic concerning the case of D.H. and others against Czech Republic 
(Application No. 57325/00), 14 May 2014, DH-DD(2014)631; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1222 
meeting (11-12 March 2015) (DH). Communication from the authorities (04/03/2015) (in reply to Public Defender of 
Rights – DH-DD(2015)248) concerning the case of D.H. and others against Czech Republic (Application No. 57325/00), 
5 March 2015, DH-DD(2015)261. Cf. also Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1340 meeting (March 2019) 
(DH). Reply from the authorities (02/01/2019) following a communication from the Commissioner for Human Rights of 
the Republic of Poland in the case of P. and S. v. Poland (Application No. 57375/08), 9 January 2019, DH-DD(2019)28. 
209 The Taïs and S. and Marper cases and the Frérot group of cases are excluded for lack of sufficient information.  
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forwarded to the Czech Government, mostly by the same four NGOs).210 Other reasons that can 
explain the lower number of governmental replies include the timing (in the McKerr group of cases, 
three of the four communications from NGOs which did not receive a reply were lodged during the 
period when elections were held in Northern Ireland and a stalemate over the creation of the new 
devolved government occurred), the particular circumstances of the case or the characteristics of the 
communications (in the Mennesson group of cases, three of the five submissions that did not receive 
a response shared the position of the French Government).  
Overall, States’ response rate with respect to submissions by NGOs is satisfactory and there 
does not appear to be a dramatic difference in the approach by governments towards communications 
from NGOs compared to communications from NHRIs. This was confirmed, at least in the case of 
Georgia, by the former Government Agent of Georgia before the ECtHR, who stated that, as agent, 
he only had regard to the substance of the submissions rather than their authors.211 
Nonetheless, in a number of replies, governments emphasised that the observations by NHRIs 
were taken into careful consideration and given special weight; in other words, at least some States, 
at least formally, have appeared to make a distinction between NHRIs and NGOs as regards their 
contribution to the execution of ECtHR judgments.212 In its reply to the Armenian Human Rights 
Defender, the Armenian Government seemed to be particularly open to the suggestions by the 
Defender as regards the execution of the Muradyan judgment. After expressing its “gratitude” for the 
Defender’s recommendations and the high consideration given to them, the Government committed 
                                                        
210 These were Amnesty International, Open Society, COSIV, and the European Roma Rights Centre. 
211 Interview with Meskhoradze, Public Defender of Georgia, supra n 17. Mr. Meskhoradze was formerly Government 
Agent of Georgia before the European Court of Human Rights. 
212 This is the case for all replies by the Georgian Government to the Public Defender (even though, in most cases, no 
specific response to the issues raised by the NHRI is actually given, see infra). The Polish Government stated that “it 
should be emphasized that the Polish authorities analyze with proper caution all the information and recommendations 
received from the representatives of the National Preventive Mechanism, functioning within the Ombudsperson’s Office” 
(Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 123, 5). The Serbian Government stated that the report on “missing 
babies” drafted by the Protector of Citizens “will be taken into account most seriously when deciding on the measures to 
be implemented”, in addition to inviting the Protector to give its views within the new Working group established at the 
national level (Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 132, 2).   
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to cooperate with the Defender to find the most appropriate remedies to the shortcomings identified 
in the judgment.213  
The formal recognition by the Committee of Ministers of communications from NHRIs is more 
difficult to assess. This is because the final resolutions by means of which the Committee closes its 
examination of cases are limited to the ritualistic acknowledgment that all the necessary individual 
and general measures have been adopted by the government concerned, without further details.214 
Moreover, whereas decisions and interim resolutions by the Committee (the latter being decisions 
dealing with more complex cases)215 are increasingly frequent with respect to cases subject to 
enhanced supervision, these documents too are concise. As for the rest, the meetings of the Committee 
of Ministers are not open to the public or any external actors.  
Among the cases examined, NHRIs have been explicitly referred to by three Committee of 
Ministers’ decisions only and in rather vague terms. In the D.H. case and in the Gharibashvili group 
of cases, the Committee of Ministers invited the national authorities concerned to cooperate with 
NHRIs, as well as with NGOs;216 in the Identoba and others case, the Committee asked the Georgian 
Government to “provide their assessment of the impact of the measures taken to date and to provide 
                                                        
213 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 125, 9-10. 
214 Exceptionally, in the final resolution concerning the De Souza Ribeiro judgment, the submissions forwarded by non-
state actors in the course of the supervision of the case were mentioned; however, the submissions were referred to en 
passant, and the practice has not been followed in subsequent final resolutions. Cf. Committee of Ministers, Resolution 
CM/ResDH(2017)135. Execution of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights: De Souza Ribeiro against 
France, 1286th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 10 May 2017.  
215 The “Glossary” section on the website of the Department for Execution defines interim resolutions as a “form of 
decision adopted by the Committee of Ministers aimed at overcoming more complex situations requiring special 
attention” (https://www.coe.int/hy/web/execution/glossary?desktop=false#{%2215005454%22:[]}, accessed 4 January 
2019). Cf. also Section 2.2 of this dissertation. 
216 More specifically, in the D.H. case, the Committee of Ministers “recalled the importance of the role of NGOs and 
national human rights institutions in providing the solution to this complex problem and advised the authorities to continue 
their close co-operation in this context” (Committee of Ministers, “1259 meeting (June 2016) – H46-11. D.H. and others 
v. Czech Republic (Application No. 57325/00)”, Decisions, 9 June 2016, CM/Del/Dec(2016)1259/H46-11, para. 4). In 
the Gharibashvili group of cases, the Committee “in light of the concerns expressed about the effectiveness of 
investigations, including those recently reported to the Committee, invited the authorities to continue the dialogue with 
civil society, the Public Defender of Georgia and national and international expert bodies” (Committee of Ministers, 
“1294th meeting, 19-21 September 2017 (DH) – H46-10. Gharibashvili group v. Georgia (Application No. 11830/03)”, 
Decisions, 22 September 2017, CM/Notes/1294/H46-10, para. 6).  
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information on what measures they still intend to undertake … in the light of … the repeated findings 
and concerns of the Public Defender, and the concerns voiced by civil society”.217  
References to NGOs have not been much more numerous, notwithstanding the larger number 
of their submissions. In addition to the above-mentioned references in conjunction with NHRIs, the 
Committee of Ministers had mentioned the concerns by NGOs as well as the recommendations by 
the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (a CoE body) once before in the Identoba 
and others group of cases.218 In the Zorica Jovanović case, the Committee referred to the “concerns” 
expressed by “civil society” (a term which might actually include the Serbian NHRI as well) and 
asked the Serbian Government to consult with civil society to address those concerns.219 
As far as the Department for Execution is concerned, a development is to be highlighted after 
the entry into force of the new Rules of the Committee of Ministers in 2006.220 While the Department 
for Execution had already strengthened its scrutiny of and cooperation with Member States regarding 
the execution of judgments in the previous years, the publicity of this role came with the new Rules. 
Indeed, not only are the memoranda by the Department increasingly made public, but so are the notes 
on the agenda of the Committee of Minister’s meetings, which include summaries of the measures 
taken and proposed by Member States to execute certain judgments and the assessment of these 
measures by the Department for Execution.  
The notes on the agenda refer, to an increasing extent, to the communications from NHRIs. 
There is, however, no uniform practice of reporting communications from NHRIs in these documents. 
                                                        
217 Committee of Ministers, “1318th meeting, 5-7 June 2018 (DH) – H-46.8. Identoba and Others group v. Georgia 
(Application No. 73235/12)”, Decisions, 7 June 2018, CM/Del/Dec(2018)1318/H46-8.   
218 The Committee “bearing in mind the conclusions of the latest report of the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) on Georgia and the concerns expressed by NGOs, invited the authorities to provide further information 
on the practical impact of these measures and on possible additional measures envisaged, notably in the light of ECRI’s 
recommendations” (Committee of Ministers, “1273rd meeting, 6-8 December 2016 – H46-11. Identoba and others v. 
Georgia (Application No. 73235/12)”, Decisions, 9 December 2016, CM/Del/Dec(2016)1273/H46-11, para. 5).  
219 The Committee “noted with interest that the revised draft law prepared by the Serbian authorities to execute this 
judgment took into consideration… certain concerns raised by civil society…. noted however that the revised draft law 
still leaves various issues outstanding…. encouraged therefore the Serbian authorities to address the outstanding issues 
and concerns of parents of ‘missing babies’ in consultation with civil society” (Committee of Ministers, “1250th meeting, 
8-10 March 2016 – H46-23. Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia (Application No. 21794/08)”, Decisions, 11 March 2016, 
CM/Del/Dec(2016)1250/H46-23, paras. 1-2).  
220 Cf. Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of this dissertation. 
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At times, communications from NHRIs are entirely ignored;221 at other times, the notes merely 
mention the fact that one or more communications have been received;222 at yet other times, the 
content of the communications is summarised.223 Finally, especially in those instances where the 
concerns or observations by NHRIs are shared by the Department and influence its final 
recommendations, the communications appear to have been analysed in greater detail.224 Similar 
considerations apply to submissions by NGOs.225 
In the more elaborate memoranda by the Department, references to the communications from 
NHRIs and NGOs are more frequent, as the memoranda aim to provide in-depth analyses of the cases 
under scrutiny. For instance, in the memorandum concerning the Gebremedhin case, the Department 
                                                        
221 E.g., the communication from the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights in the Orchowski and others group of cases, 
while reported among the “reference texts”, is not mentioned in Committee of Ministers, “Poland. Orchowski Group v. 
Poland”, Annotated order of Business and decisions adopted. 1164th Meeting (DH), 5-7 March 2013, 11 March 2013, 
CM/Del/Dec(2013)1164. The same goes for the first communication from the Serbian Protector of Citizens in the Zorica 
Jovanović case (Committee of Ministers, “Serbia. Zorica Jovanović”, Annotated order of Business and decisions adopted. 
1208th meeting (DH), 23-25 September 2014, 30 September 2014, CM/Del/Dec(2014)1208; and Committee of Ministers, 
“H46-18 Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia (Application No. 21794/08)”, Notes on the Agenda. 1243 Meeting, 8-9 December 
2015, 10 December 2015, CM/Notes/1243/H46-18), as well as for its second one (Committee of Ministers, “H46-25 
Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia (Application No. 21794/08)”, Notes on the Agenda. 1265 Meeting, 20-22 September 2016, 22 
September 2016, CM/Notes/1265/H46-25; and Committee of Ministers, “H46-27 Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia (Application 
No. 21794/08)”, Notes on the Agenda. 1273 Meeting, 6-8 December 2016, 9 December 2016, CM/Notes/1273/H46-27). 
222 Cf. Committee of Ministers, “10 cases against the United Kingdom. S. and Marper”, Annotated Agenda and Decisions, 
Section 4.2. 1078th meeting (DH), 2-4 March 2010, 18 March 2010, CM/Del/OJ/DH(2010)1078; and Committee of 
Ministers, “United Kingdom. S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom”, Annotated order of Business and decisions adopted. 
1150th Meeting (DH), 24-26 September 2012, 28 September 2012, CM/Del/Dec(2012)1150. 
223 Cf. Committee of Ministers, “Czech Republic. D.H. and others”, Annotated order of Business and decisions adopted. 
1201st meeting (DH), 3-5 June 2014, 6 June 2014, CM/Del/Dec(2014)1201; and Committee of Ministers, “Czech 
Republic. D.H. and others”, Annotated order of Business and decisions adopted. 1222nd meeting (DH), 11-12 March 
2015, 13 March 2015, CM/Del/Dec(2015)1222. Cf. also Committee of Ministers, “O’Keeffe v. Ireland (Application No. 
35810/09)”, Notes on the Agenda. 1259 Meeting, 7-9 June 2016, 9 June 2016, CM/Notes/1259/H46-15; and Committee 
of Ministers, “Tsintsabadze group v. Georgia (Application No. 35403/06)”, Notes on the Agenda. 1324th meeting, 18-20 
September 2018 (DH), 20 September 2018, CM/Notes/1324/H46-6.  
224 Cf. Committee of Ministers, “Gharibashvili group v. Georgia (Application No. 11830/03)”, Notes on the Agenda. 
1294th meeting, 19-21 September 2017 (DH), 22 September 2017, CM/Notes/1294/H46-10.  
225 For instance, in the Kurić and others case, some communications from NGOs are mentioned, but in the “reference 
texts” only: cf. Committee of Ministers, “Slovenia. Kurić and others v. Slovenia”, Annotated order of Business and 
decisions adopted. 1172nd Meeting (DH), 4-6 June 2013, 7 June 2013, CM/Del/Dec(2013)1172; and Committee of 
Ministers, “Slovenia. Kurić and others v. Slovenia”, Annotated order of Business and decisions adopted. 1179th Meeting 
(DH), 24-26 September 2013, 27 September 2013, CM/Del/Dec(2013)1179.  
In the Mennesson group of cases, communications from NGOs are mentioned, but no reference is made to their content: 
cf. Committee of Ministers, “H46-9 Mennesson group v. France (Application No. 65192/11)”, Notes on the Agenda. 
1294th meeting, 19-21 September 2017 (DH), 22 September 2017, CM/Notes/1294/H46-9. 
In the McKerr group of cases, the Notes of the meetings dedicated to it present an increasingly detailed analysis of 
submissions by NGOs: cf., inter alia, Committee of Ministers, “United Kingdom. McKerr Group”, Annotated order of 
Business and decisions adopted. 1201st meeting (DH), 3-5 June 2014, 6 June 2014, CM/Del/Dec(2014)1201; Committee 
of Ministers, “McKerr group v. the United Kingdom (Application No. 28883/95)”, Notes on the Agenda. 1243 meeting, 
8-9 December 2015, 10 December 2015, CM/Notes/1243/H46-25; and Committee of Ministers, “McKerr group v. the 
United Kingdom (Application No. 28883/95)”, Notes on the Agenda. 1259 meeting, 7-9 June 2016, 9 June 2016, 
CM/Notes/1259/H46-42.  
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for Execution referred extensively to the observations submitted by the Médiateur and the CNCDH 
with respect to the effectiveness of the new remedy introduced for asylum seekers on the border to 
challenge the refusal of authorities to admit them onto the French territory.226 The concerns expressed 
by the two institutions – regarding the degree of detail required for the applicants’ complaints, the 
tight deadline for lodging the complaints, the insufficient assistance from a legal and linguistic point 
of view – were illustrated in detail by the Department for Execution.227  
Similarly, in the McKerr group of cases, the Department referred in a 2006 memorandum to 
the proposals put forward by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for the better 
implementation of the ECtHR judgment in question.228 Those proposals entailed, inter alia, the 
formalisation into law of a number of practices regarding investigations into the acts of the armed 
forces, changes in the legal aid scheme for the victims’ families, and the expedition of inquest 
proceedings.229  
Nonetheless, memoranda by the Department for Execution are overall rare, as are the exchanges 
of correspondence between the Department and States that are made public. From these exchanges, 
it appears that the Department has explicitly drawn on submissions by NHRIs and NGOs to put 
questions to governments. In the Popov group of cases, the Department referred to the joint 
communication from the CNCDH and the Défenseur to ask the French Government for more 
information about the exceptional regime in force in the overseas territory of Mayotte as far as the 
detention of migrant families with minors is concerned.230 In the De Souza Ribeiro case, the 
                                                        
226 Committee of Ministers, “Gebremedhin (Gaberamadhien) v. France. Assessment of the general measures presented in 
the action report by France. Memorandum prepared by the Department for the execution of judgments and decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights”, Information documents, 26 February 2013, CM/Inf/DH(2013)9-rev. Cf. also 
ECtHR, Gebremedhin v. France, no. 25389/05, 26 April 2007. 
227 Committee of Ministers, supra n 226, paras. 8, 11, 21, and 25 in particular.  
228 Committee of Ministers, “Cases concerning the action of security forces in Northern Ireland – Stocktaking of progress 
in implementing the Court’s judgments. Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat incorporating information received up 
to 26 May 2006”, Information documents, 1 June 2006, CM/Inf/DH(2006)4-rev.  
229 The Northern Irish Commission’s views are reported at ibid., paras. 18-19, 75, 107, 116, 124, 149. The original 
submission by the Commission is not available.  
230 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1243 meeting (8-10 December 2015). Communication from the 
authorities concerning the case of Popov against France (Application No. 39472/07), 30 September 2015, DH-
DD(2015)1100, 6 (question c)).  
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information provided by NGOs – before the intervention by the Défenseur – was used by the 
Department for Execution to ask for clarifications on the expulsion of asylum seekers from 
Mayotte.231 However, the available documents of this kind are so scarce that it is difficult to derive 
general conclusions on the point. In sum, there is no consistency as far as the reference by the 
Department for Execution to the submissions forwarded by NHRIs (and NGOs) is concerned.  
 
The examination of the impact of communications from NHRIs on the positions of States, the 
Committee of Ministers, and the Department for Execution would however be incomplete if it was 
limited to the formal recognition of the communications – i.e., to the explicit reference to these 
documents. Indeed, it is apparent from the outcome of the supervision process of some cases that 
NHRIs were able to influence, to a certain extent, the measures planned by States to execute the 
judgments and/or the recommendations by the Department for Execution and/or the decisions by the 
Committee of Ministers also in the absence of express mention of the communications in question. 
Therefore, while explicit reference to the Rule 9(2) communications can be an indicator of the 
impact that NHRIs have had, the substantial acceptance of communications by States and CoE bodies 
is not always marked by formal recognition; on the other hand, reference in passing to the submissions 
by NHRIs does not necessarily imply that they have had a concrete influence on the approach of 
States or CoE actors. An analysis that goes beyond formal mention of communications from NHRIs 
is thus necessary to detect the relationship between these communications and the results of the 
supervision of execution process.  
As far as States’ replies to communications from NHRIs are concerned, it is admittedly hard to 
find instances where States spontaneously accepted the comments and recommendations by NHRIs 
and modified their action plans and reports accordingly. As mentioned, the reaction by the Armenian 
                                                        
231 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1243 meeting (8-10 December 2015) (DH). Communication from the 
authorities concerning the case of De Souza Ribeiro against France (Application No. 22689/07), 30 September 2015, 
DH-DD(2015)1101, question no. 5. 
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Government might constitute an exception in this respect,232 but as the communication from the 
Human Rights Defender is recent and the Government is yet to submit a new action plan following 
the Defender’s intervention, it is too soon to tell whether the Armenian Government will actually 
follow up the proposals by the Defender.233 Analogous considerations apply to the recent statement 
by the Georgian Government that the recommendation by the Public Defender concerning the 
extension of the storage period for video-surveillance recordings in penitentiaries was “welcomed” 
by the Government in the context of ongoing reforms.234 
Much more often, governments contested the new or different information provided by NHRIs, 
they defended the adequacy and effectiveness of the measures proposed or implemented, and they 
objected to the often more extensive and demanding proposals made by NHRIs. At times, 
governments indicated that the views of their respective NHRIs were taken into serious consideration, 
only to reject them thereafter.235  
However, it is significant that most replies by States duly answered the objections raised by 
NHRIs; while the level of detail varied,236 few governmental replies summarily dismissed claims by 
NHRIs. The replies by the Georgian Government, which frequently referred to previous or 
forthcoming action plans or to the replies provided to NGOs in order to address the issues raised by 
the NHRI,237 would prima facie appear as a way to avoid the specific concerns highlighted by the 
                                                        
232 Cf. above in this section, n 213 in particular. 
233 At any rate, a representative from the Human Rights Defender of Armenia confirmed the cooperative relationship 
between the Defender and the Government as far as the execution of ECtHR judgments is concerned: interview with 
Mikayel Khachatryan, Head of the International Cooperation Department at the Human Rights Defender of the Republic 
of Armenia, 11 April 2019, on file with author. 
234 Cf. Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 156, 9. 
235 Cf. the answer provided by the Polish Government in the Orchowski and others case: Committee of 
Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 123, 5 et seqq. 
236 Among the most thorough replies, cf. those by the Czech Government to the two communications from the Public 
Defender, supra n 208. The responses by the UK Home Office in the Gillan and Quinton case, by the Polish Government 
in the Orchowski and others case, and by the French Government in the Winterstein and others case are also rather 
detailed.  
237 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 30, 18; Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 126, 
19; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, Communication from a NGO (Public Defender of Georgia) 
(18/04/2018) in the case of Identoba and others v. Georgia (Application No. 73235/12), Members of the Gldani 
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and others v. Georgia (Application No. 71156/01), Begheluri and others v. Georgia 
(Application No. 28490/02) and response from the Georgian authorities (26/04/2018), 27 April 2018, DH-DD(2018)444, 
9.  
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Defender. Nonetheless, at least with respect to the Gharibashvili group of cases, various issues raised 
by the Defender were indeed shared by the NGO Coalition for an Independent and Transparent 
Judiciary, to which the Georgian Government replied in detail on two occasions.238  
Therefore, although States might not readily welcome and follow up recommendations by 
NHRIs, the dialogue that is established between States and NHRIs through these exchanges appears 
critical for well-founded analyses by the Department for Execution and more objective decisions by 
the Committee of Ministers. The very fact that information and views alternative to those provided 
by governments are allowed contributes to less one-sided assessments by the relevant CoE bodies. 
Indeed, it is argued here that NHRIs do not expect their governments to embrace their positions, but 
they mainly seek through their submissions to urge the Committee of Ministers and the Department 
for Execution to recommend that governments adopt new or different measures which, in the opinion 
of NHRIs, would ensure better compliance with the ECtHR judgments in question.  
This argument has been confirmed by the representatives from various NHRIs, who declared 
that their institutions would initiate a dialogue with their respective governments at the national level 
first and submit communications to the Committee of Ministers only should that dialogue fail.239 
While not all NHRIs necessarily perceive Rule 9(2) communications as a means of last resort, it is 
clear that by submitting information to the Committee of Ministers NHRIs aim to involve other actors 
in their exchanges with governments – actors which could use different means of pressure to urge 
governments to fully execute ECtHR judgments.  
At any rate, there are a few instances where it appears that governments, while not openly 
subscribing to the views of NHRIs, de facto implemented some of the adjustments proposed by these 
institutions. In the Winterstein and others case, the French Government had long maintained that the 
developments which occurred in the national case-law following the ECtHR judgment exhausted the 
general measures necessary to fully implement the judgment. In spite of that, the Government made 
                                                        
238 Cf. Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 198, 17 et seqq.; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat 
General, supra n 199, 15 et seqq.  
239 Cf. supra n 26. 
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reference, in its second-to-last action plan, to legislative amendments that sought to encourage the 
development of terrains familiaux locatifs with a view to better taking into account the housing needs 
of Travellers.240 Those legislative changes closely mirrored the proposals by the CNCDH,241 even 
though the French Government emphasised that the measures were adopted “independently from the 
execution of the Winterstein judgment”.242  
In the S. and Marper case, the UK Government changed its initial resolution to amend the 
framework governing the retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints through secondary legislation 
and decided to reform it by way of primary legislation. The UK Government had been urged to do so 
by several domestic actors, including the Parliament and the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission.243  
 
The impact of submissions by NHRIs on the analyses by the Department for Execution and on 
the decisions by the Committee of Ministers deserves, at any rate, closer consideration. Several 
examples can be mentioned of the influence that the communications from NHRIs have had on the 
questions put to governments by the Department for Execution and on the observations that the 
Department addressed to the Committee of Ministers regarding the status of execution of ECtHR 
judgments.  
It has been mentioned above that, in relation to the Popov group of cases (detention of migrant 
families with minors), the Department for Execution explicitly referred to the communication 
submitted by the CNCDH and the Défenseur to ask for further details regarding the derogatory regime 
of the overseas territory of Mayotte.244 Moreover, at least two further questions put to the French 
Government by the Department in that group of cases touched upon issues dealt with in the 
                                                        
240 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat, 1288 meeting (June 2017) (DH). Action plan. Communication from France 
concerning the case Winterstein and others v. France (Application No. 27013/07), 27 June 2017, DH-DD(2017)743, 11-
12.  
241 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat, supra n 134, paras. 26 et seqq. 
242 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat, supra n 240, 11. 
243 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1072nd meeting DH (December 2009). Case S. and Marper against 
United Kingdom – Statement by the United Kingdom delegation, 3 December 2009, DD(2009)619E, para. 3. 
244 Cf. supra n 230. 
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submission by the two institutions. A first issue is that of the legal value and stability of the 2012 
ministerial circular limiting the grounds for detention of migrant families.245 A second one concerns 
the violation of Article 5(4) ECHR by France and the actual possibility for minors to address courts 
with a view to challenging their detention. In this respect, the concerns raised by the two institutions 
regarding the uncertainties of the case-law of administrative tribunals and the impossibility for the 
juges des libertés et de la detention, who normally review the prolonged detention of migrant adults, 
to review the situation of minors detained, were referred to by the Department.246  
The Popov group of cases being subject to standard supervision, no decision by the Committee 
of Ministers nor memorandum by the Department for Execution are available. However, the indirect 
impact of the submission by the CNCDH and the Défenseur on the measures adopted by the French 
Government is evident in the most recent action report filed by France. First of all, the provisions that 
make the detention of migrant families with minors exceptional and only possible where appropriate 
facilities are available have been put on a statutory basis, as recommended by the two national 
institutions.247 Moreover, while minors are still not able to directly lodge an appeal against their 
detention, it appears that the judicial guarantees against decisions placing them in detention have been 
strengthened overall.248 At any rate, this group of cases is still pending before the Committee of 
Ministers.249  
The D.H. case, concerning the discrimination of Roma children in the schools of the Czech 
Republic, is also illustrative of the influence that NHRIs can exert on the considerations by the 
Department for Execution. In the notes on the agenda, as well as in a 2015 memorandum, the 
Department for Execution took up several concerns raised by the Czech Public Defender, including 
                                                        
245 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 112, 11-12; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 
supra n 230, 4 et seqq. (question b)). 
246 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 112, 9-10; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra 
n 230, 8. 
247 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1288 meeting (June 2017) (DH). Action report. Communication from 
France concerning the case of Popov v. France (Application No. 39472/07), 20 March 2017, DH-DD(2017)327, 3 et 
seqq. 
248 Ibid., 5-6.  
249 A circumstance which, according to a representative from the CNCDH, is attributable to the intervention by the 
Commission (interview with Dumortier, CNCDH, supra n 28). 
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the circumstance that socially disadvantaged children could still be put in classes for children with 
mild mental disabilities, the high number of children who had not been re-diagnosed according to the 
new tools, the lack of monitoring over the actual transfer of children to standard classes, the lack of 
disaggregated data on Roma children, the conflict of interests related to the provision of information 
by schools, and the limitations on the powers of the forthcoming supervisory body.250 With respect 
to most of these issues, which were highlighted by a number of NGOs as well, the submissions by 
the Public Defender were explicitly referred to in the memorandum.251 The Defender’s observations 
were also incorporated into various decisions by the Committee of Ministers, together with the 
recommendation that the cooperation of the Czech Government with the Defender and NGOs 
continue.252  
Indeed, the D.H. case is exemplary of the twin-track strategy that NHRIs can undertake by 
engaging with the authorities at the national level and interacting with CoE bodies at the same time. 
Further information, particularly in the form of statistics, is being awaited by the Committee of 
Ministers to ascertain the effectiveness of the measures recently introduced by the Czech Parliament 
and Government to fully execute the judgment.  
Analogously, the Serbian Protector has been highly involved in the promotion of the execution 
of the Zorica Jovanović judgment at both the international and national levels. While the first 
submission by the Protector, consisting in a 2010 special report on the phenomenon of “missing 
babies”, was not mentioned explicitly by either the Department for Execution or the Committee of 
Ministers, it had been largely relied on by the ECtHR itself to adopt the pilot-judgment procedure 
and recommend that the Serbian Government establish, by means of a lex specialis, an appropriate 
                                                        
250 Cf. Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 118; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra 
n 119. 
251 Department for the Execution of Judgments, D.H. and others against Czech Republic (No. 57325/00) – General 
measures for the execution of judgment of the European Court. Memorandum prepared by the Department for the 
Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 3 March 2015, H/Exec(2015)8, 6 et seqq.  
252 E.g., Committee of Ministers, “1259 meeting (June 2016) – H46-11. D.H. and others v. Czech Republic (Application 
No. 57325/00)”, supra n 216. 
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mechanism, supervised by an independent body, to provide compensation and answers to the parents 
involved.253  
The findings and recommendations by the Serbian NHRI, which were mostly shared by 
intervening NGOs and parents’ associations, thus influenced the execution process at the national 
level – the Protector was inter alia included in the Working group entrusted with proposing general 
measures to implement the judgment – as well as the supranational supervision. The Committee of 
Ministers and particularly the Department for Execution, which has engaged in close bilateral 
consultations with the Serbian Government, followed up various proposals from the Protector, such 
as the adoption of the necessary measures by law (instead of bylaw) and the extension of the 
categories of potential applicants, and they shared the Protector’s doubts concerning the powers of 
the police units and courts responsible for the “missing babies” cases.254 The Committee of Ministers 
also invited the Serbian Government to more generally address the “concerns of parents of ‘missing 
babies’ and civil society” and cooperate with them.255 The supervision of the case continues as the 
general elections held in Serbia in April 2016 have slowed down the execution process.   
The persistent shortcomings affecting the investigations into possible violations of Articles 2 
and 3 ECHR by law-enforcement officials, as highlighted by the Georgian Public Defender, were 
explicitly mentioned in the notes on the agenda of the December 2016 meeting and led the Committee 
of Ministers to keep the effectiveness of these investigations under review and require further 
information from the Georgian Government.256  
In the notes on the agenda of the September 2017 meeting especially, the concerns expressed 
by the Public Defender (and reiterated by a coalition of NGOs) were referred to in detail, in particular 
                                                        
253 ECtHR, Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, supra n 47, para. 92. 
254 Cf. the submissions forwarded by the Protector of Citizens in the case, supra nn 87 and 132, as well as the Notes on 
the Agenda relating to the case, mentioned supra n 221. 
255 Cf. Committee of Ministers, supra n 219; and Committee of Ministers, “Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia (Application No. 
21794/08)”, Decisions, 1265th meeting – 20-21 September 2016, 22 September 2016, CM/Del/Dec(2016)1265/H46-25, 
para. 3. 
256 Committee of Ministers, “Gharibashvili group v. Georgia (Application No. 11830/03)”, Notes on the Agenda, 1273 
Meeting, 6-8 December 2016, 9 December 2016, CM/Notes/1273/H46-10, as well as the Decision adopted at the same 
meeting, para. 7.  
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as regards the hierarchical ties between the law-enforcement officials accused of violations and those 
in charge of the investigations – i.e., the General Inspection Departments of the same bodies to which 
the accused belong.257 The Department for Execution accordingly noted that “it is important that the 
authorities take into account the relevant recommendations of the Public Defender of Georgia and 
national and international expert bodies” as far as the independence and effectiveness of 
investigations is concerned,258 whereas the Committee of Ministers – by means of a decision adopted 
during the same meeting – “in light of the concerns expressed about the effectiveness of 
investigations, including those recently reported to the Committee, invited the authorities to continue 
the dialogue with civil society, the Public Defender of Georgia and national and international expert 
bodies”.259  
While the supervision of the Gharibashvili judgment has recently been closed, the examination 
of most repetitive cases of the group is ongoing, due to the persistent need for general measures. In 
September 2018, the Committee of Ministers welcomed a number of reforms undertaken, the most 
significant of which – the creation of the State Inspector’s Service as an independent mechanism 
investigating allegations of ill-treatment perpetrated by law-enforcement officials – met a long-
standing request from the Public Defender and the Coalition for an Independent and Transparent 
Judiciary.260 Other developments included the strengthening of victims’ rights of participation in the 
proceedings, which had also been advocated by the Defender.  
At times, the arguments by NHRIs were accepted by the Department for Execution and the 
Committee of Ministers only in part. In the S. and Marper case, criticisms by the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission that the duration of the retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints in 
                                                        
257 Committee of Ministers, supra n 224. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Committee of Ministers, “1294th meeting, 19-21 September 2017 (DH) – H46-10. Gharibashvili group v. Georgia 
(Application No. 11830/03)”, supra n 216. 
260 Committee of Ministers, “1324th meeting, 18-20 September 2018 (DH) – H46-6. Tsintsabadze group v. Georgia 
(Application No. 35403/06)”, Decisions, 20 September 2018, CM/Del/Dec(2018)1324/6, para. 8. Cf. also the action plan 
submitted by the Georgian Government: Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1324th meeting (September 2018) 
(DH). Action plan (13/07/2018). Communication from Georgia concerning the case of Tsintsabadze v. Georgia 
(Application No. 35403/06), 8 August 2018, DH-DD(2018)767, 27-28. Finally, cf. all submissions forwarded by the 
Georgian Public Defender in this group of cases, supra nn 30, 126, and 173. 
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police databases was still excessive and that no distinction had been made on the basis of the age of 
the suspect/convict and of the gravity of the crime mostly reinforced already clear indications 
provided by the ECtHR as to the changes that the UK Government needed to enact.261 The issues of 
application of the planned measures in Northern Ireland and lack of interim measures pending the 
entry into force of the new ECHR-compatible legislation appear to be more closely linked to the 
concerns raised by the Northern Irish NHRI, even though no explicit reference to its submission was 
made.262 On the other hand, the risks connected to the “national security exception” anticipated by 
the Northern Ireland Commission were not taken up by the Department for Execution nor by the 
Committee of Ministers.263 At any rate, the implementation of a number of important amendments to 
the original action plan appears to mostly depend on the installation of the new coalition government 
in May 2010, which proved to be more willing to give full execution to the ECtHR judgment.  
At other times, the views of NHRIs seem to have essentially been rejected by the Department 
for Execution. For instance, in the McKerr group of cases, concerning the actions of the UK security 
forces in Northern Ireland, the Department analysed in great detail the arguments by the Northern 
Ireland Commission, but it mostly accepted the responses by the UK Government on the adequacy 
of various practices and policies relating to the inquests (which the Commission had asked to put on 
a statutory footing), as well as of the new rules compelling witness testimonies.264  
The delays in the conduct of inquest proceedings, possibly due to the lack of sufficient 
resources, were the sole issue on which the Department requested further information from the UK 
Government.265 The same issue formed the subject of a further submission by the Northern Ireland 
Commission to the Committee of Ministers;266 the question remains open, as the Department for 
                                                        
261 ECtHR, S. and Marper v. the UK, supra n 42, para. 119 in particular. 
262 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 168, paras. 4-8.  
263 Ibid., paras. 13-16. 
264 Committee of Ministers, supra n 228. 
265 Ibid., Section J, paras. 144 et seqq.  
266 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 150, 4 et seqq. This second submission also asked for 
clarifications on the competences of the various bodies entrusted with the investigations. 
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Execution and the Committee of Ministers are awaiting for a reform which they have already 
substantially approved but has yet to be implemented.   
In the O’Keeffe case, which highlighted the failure by the Irish authorities to protect children 
from sexual abuses by teachers, the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission objected to the 
allegedly restrictive notion of “victim” adopted by the Irish Government in its action plans, according 
to which compensation by the State would only be granted to victims of abusers who had previously 
been reported to the school management, without any action having been taken against them.267 The 
Irish NHRI even asked, in its second communication, to refer the matter to the ECtHR through the 
interpretation proceedings under Article 46(3) ECHR.268  
However, in light of the Irish Government’s decision to (slightly) extend the categories of 
beneficiaries of ex gratia payments by the State and in light of the promise by the Government to 
adopt a “holistic and flexible approach” when ascertaining whether a prior complaint had been lodged 
against the abuser, the Department for Execution held that “the limits imposed on the settlement 
scheme appear acceptable”.269  
Incidentally, the observation that the requirement of a prior complaint could not be derived 
from the Grand Chamber’s judgment was shared by the Child Law Clinic of the University College 
Cork, an NGO which also intervened in the case, and doubts were also expressed by the Independent 
Assessor, who has been tasked by the Irish State with reviewing applications for ex gratia payments 
rejected by the State Claims Agency.270 Moreover, a new motion by the opposition to further broaden 
the range of beneficiaries has recently been passed by one of the Houses of the Irish Parliament.271 In 
                                                        
267 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 110, 4-7; and Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra 
n 193, paras. 20 et seqq. in particular. 
268 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 193. 
269 Committee of Ministers, “O’Keeffe v. Ireland (Application No. 35810/09)”, supra n 223. 
270 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1318th meeting (June 2018) (DH). Communication from the authorities 
(10/05/2018) concerning the case of O'Keeffe v. Ireland (Application No. 35810/09), 23 May 2018, DH-DD(2018)503. 
Cf. also Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1230 meeting (9-11 June 2015) (DH). Communication from a NGO 
(The Child Law Clinic of the University of Cork) (22/04/2015) in the case of O’Keeffe against Ireland (Application No. 
35810/09), 07 May 2015, DH-DD(2015)499, paras. 12 et seqq. 
271 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1324th meeting (September 2018) (DH). Action plan (27/07/2018). 
Communication from Ireland concerning the case of O’Keeffe v. Ireland (Application No. 35810/09), 2 August 2018, 
DH-DD(2018)755, para. 18. As reported by the Irish Government in the action plan, the motion “calls for access to the 
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general, it can be said that the debate at the national level on how best to compensate victims of sexual 
abuses in schools and implement the O’Keeffe judgment is still ongoing. 
It is clear from the examples above that the assessment of States’ action plans and reports by 
the Department for Execution plays a heavy role in the determinations by the Committee of Ministers. 
Thus, the impact that submissions by NHRIs have on the analyses by the Department is likely to 
reflect on the decisions by the Committee of Ministers. This is not, however, always the case, as the 
Committee of Ministers is not bound to the recommendations issued by the Department.  
In the Gebremedhin case, the Department for Execution took into serious consideration the 
concerns raised by the CNCDH and the Médiateur regarding the new remedy established by France 
to allow for asylum seekers who make their applications at the border to challenge the denial of their 
requests to enter France. In the opinion of the national institutions, even though a legislative 
amendment had introduced an appeal with suspensive effects against this kind of decisions, the 
remedy in question did not appear to be effective in practice.272 Having highlighted several issues 
that potentially threatened the effectiveness of the remedy (including short deadlines, insufficient 
legal and linguistic assistance, and high standards required for the reasoning of the applications), the 
Department for Execution concluded that “it … falls to the Committee of Ministers to decide whether, 
notwithstanding the effectiveness in theory of the measures taken, the aforementioned doubts about 
its effectiveness in practice do not call into question the adequacy of the general measures adopted 
by France”.273 Nevertheless, the Committee of Ministers closed its examination of the case at the 
same meeting.274  
 
                                                        
State’s redress scheme for those citizens who were sexually abused in primary school, whose perpetrators have already 
been identified and convicted, on the same terms as has been afforded to those in residential institutions”. The Government 
made it clear that it considered that the motion “goes beyond the Judgment of the ECtHR in the O’Keeffe case” (ibid.). 
272 CNCDH and Médiateur, supra n 175, 1-9. 
273 Committee of Ministers, supra n 226, para. 28. 
274 Committee of Ministers, Resolution CM/ResDH(2013)56. Gebremedhin (Gaberamadhien) against France: Execution 
of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 1166 meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 27 March 2013.  
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The cases mentioned until now include cases where the Department for Execution or the 
Committee of Ministers explicitly referred to the submissions by NHRIs (to either endorse or discard 
them) as well as cases where the recommendations by these CoE bodies otherwise appeared to draw 
on these submissions, as the only or main sources at the disposal of CoE bodies which mentioned 
certain information or views. In other instances, it is more difficult to discern whether NHRIs played 
a role in the determinations by the CoE bodies; this is especially the case for judgments that are 
subject to standard supervision, which normally implies that no document by the Department for 
Execution is available nor any interim decision by the Committee of Ministers is adopted.      
In its communication to the Committee of Ministers in relation to the Winterstein and others 
case, the CNCDH detailed several general measures that, in its opinion, the French Government ought 
to adopt in order to fully comply with the judgment. As mentioned, the Court itself had recognised 
the expertise of the CNCDH on the challenges faced by Roma and Travellers in France in relation to 
housing.275 The case having been placed under standard supervision, the opinions by the Department 
for Execution and the Committee of Ministers regarding the need for general measures in this case 
cannot be derived from publicly available documents. In a more recent judgment on the same case, 
the Court ruled separately on just satisfaction; but while the Court gave some indications as to the 
individual measures to be adopted by the French Government, it did not deal with general measures 
(and it was not expected to).  
The question remains whether the ongoing supervision of the case by the Committee of 
Ministers is due to the fact that not all individual measures have been adopted yet by the French 
Government or whether it is also motivated by the expectation that general measures would be 
enacted too. Meanwhile, it appears that the French Government has met at least one of the demands 
by the CNCDH.276   
                                                        
275 Cf. supra, n 82. 
276 Cf. above in this section and n 240.  
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In the Vinter and others case, where a violation of Article 3 ECHR was found by the Court 
insofar as the UK legal order did not allow for an adequate review of whole-life orders, the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission argued that the amendment of the relevant prison regulations was 
necessary to bring the national legal order into line with the ECtHR judgment. Failing this 
amendment, the Commission asked the Committee of Ministers to move the case from standard to 
enhanced supervision or, in the alternative, to wait for a forthcoming ECtHR ruling on a similar 
case.277 Notwithstanding the request from the UK Government to close the supervision of the case, 
the case remained under scrutiny by the Committee of Ministers until the Court issued its judgment 
in Hutchinson.278 It is not clear, however, in the absence of public documents by the Department for 
Execution or determinations by the Committee of Ministers, whether the decision to keep the case 
under supervision was in fact influenced by the communication from the NHRI or whether the 
Committee and the Department were already aware of the pending status of the Hutchinson case and 
would have taken the same decision anyway. 
It is doubtful whether the submission by the Public Defender of Georgia in the Merabishvili 
case, concerning the pre-trial detention and questioning of a former Prime Minister of Georgia, was 
taken into consideration by the Department for Execution when it maintained that the general 
measures to be adopted by the Georgian Government to fully execute the judgment should include 
the extension of the period of retention of video footage from penitentiary institutions, so as to allow 
for the corroboration of complaints submitted by inmates.279 The Public Defender had submitted a 
communication focusing on this particular aspect and making relevant recommendations to the 
Georgian Government,280 but the communication was not referred to by the Department for Execution 
                                                        
277 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 99, 7.  
278 ECtHR, Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 57592/08, 17 January 2017. The Court ruled in favour of the 
UK Government, insofar as it considered the decision by the Court of Appeals mentioned in the Government’s action 
report a sufficient guarantee for the review of whole-life orders.  
279 Committee of Ministers, “H46-10 Merabishvili v. Georgia (Application No. 72508/13)”, Notes on the Agenda. 1331st 
meeting, 4-6 December 2018 (DH), 6 December 2018, CM/Notes/1331/H46-10. 
280 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 156. 
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and, having been lodged by the Defender just before the Committee of Ministers’ meeting, it might 
not have been examined by the Department for the purposes of that meeting. 
Neither is clear whether the issues raised by the Irish Human Rights Commission in the 
McFarlane group of cases, with respect to the relationship between the ECHR and the Irish 
Constitution as well as the immunity of judges from claims for damages, have had or will have an 
impact on the execution of the judgments. The recent transfer of the group of cases from standard to 
enhanced supervision might give the Department for Execution and the Committee of Ministers the 
opportunity to examine the arguments by the NHRI more closely and take an explicit position on 
them.281 
The McFarlane group of cases is also illustrative of a possible reason why the views expressed 
by NHRIs might not be (entirely) endorsed by the CoE bodies responsible for the oversight of the 
execution of ECtHR judgments. Insofar as NHRIs tend to raise broader issues, which they believe to 
be connected with the ECtHR rulings even though not directly dealt with by the Court, they might 
take advantage of cases to call for more extensive reforms or anyway advance the protection of human 
rights within their national legal systems. It is not yet clear whether the arguments by the Irish NHRI 
in the McFarlane group of cases will be considered as such by the Committee of Ministers and the 
Department for Execution; after all, the ECtHR appears to have pointed to similar fundamental issues 
in its ruling. At any rate, the Irish Government has until now sought to remedy the violations 
ascertained by the Court essentially by means of a re-organisation of the court system, without 
engaging in a deeper reflection on the kind of issues raised by the NHRI.  
An even clearer example is arguably that of the submission by the Armenian Human Rights 
Defender in the Muradyan case, a case highlighting the lack of effective investigations into the deaths 
and ill-treatment of servicemen and inadequate medical care in the military. The observations by the 
Defender, nonetheless, also addressed the (un)fairness of disciplinary investigations and proceedings 
                                                        
281 Committee of Ministers, “1288th meeting, 6-7 June 2017 (DH) – H46-40. McFarlane group v. Ireland (Application 
No. 31333/06)”, Decisions, 8 June 2017, CM/Del/Dec(2017)1288/H46-40, para. 7. 
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against servicemen – a subject which is arguably well-known to the Defender and perceived as urgent, 
but which does not appear to be immediately related to the violations ascertained by the Court. The 
Armenian Government did not, however, object to the scope of the observations by the Defender and 
declared itself willing to cooperate with the Defender on the wide-ranging reforms proposed, even 
though in general terms.282 
Apparently, the position expressed by the CNCDH in its submission regarding the Mennesson 
group of cases also pushed the implications of the relevant ECtHR judgments to the limits. The rulings 
dealt with the complex issue of the recognition in France of parent-child relationships legally 
established abroad following surrogacy agreements (which are illegal in France). The Court held, by 
means of important and innovative judgments, that France had violated the applicant children’s right 
to respect for their private life by refusing to recognise the relationships of the children with their 
biological fathers.283  
According to the Court, “this analysis [the analysis of the children’s best interests] takes on a 
special dimension where, as in the present case, one of the intended parents is also the child’s 
biological parent”.284 The CNCDH maintained in its submission that the judgments should not be 
interpreted as limiting the obligation of the French Government to recognise child-parent 
relationships to the intended/biological fathers, lest an unacceptable discrimination between men and 
women (namely, between intended fathers and intended mothers) would take place. The French 
Government, on its part, highlighted the specific reference by the Court to the biological relationship 
between the parent and the children, and the Committee of Ministers accepted this argument, which 
has also been shared by some academics and commentators.285 It is indeed understandable that, on 
such sensitive issues, nor the Committee of Ministers nor the Department for Execution are willing 
                                                        
282 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 125, 9-10.  
283 ECtHR, Mennesson v. France, supra n 104, paras. 100-101.  
284 Ibid., para. 100. The Court continues, in the same paragraph: “Having regard to the importance of biological parentage 
as a component of identity … it cannot be said to be in the interests of the child to deprive him or her of a legal relationship 
of this nature where the biological reality of that relationship has been established and the child and parent concerned 
demand full recognition thereof”. 
285 Cf. those mentioned in the reply from the French Government to the CNCDH: Committee of Ministers/Secretariat 
General, supra n 105, 9. 
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to ask from States to go beyond what is explicitly required by the Court, which itself appears to have 
exercised considerable (and deliberate) self-restraint on the matter.  
In sum, notwithstanding the closer scrutiny exercised by the Committee of Ministers in the 
supervision of execution and its growing propensity to impose the adoption of wide-ranging general 
measures, this intergovernmental body would not go as far as asking for more than what appears to 
have been ordered by the Court. Moreover, as reiterated throughout this dissertation, the margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by governments in the choice of the means for the execution of judgments is a 
cardinal principle of the system of supervision. Nonetheless, in October 2018, the Cour de Cassation 
submitted to the ECtHR the same issue raised by the CNCDH, in the first case of recourse to Protocol 
no. 16 by a national court;286 so that the doubts expressed by the CNCDH do not appear ill-founded. 
At any rate, there are instances where the reasons for the Department for Execution and the 
Committee of Ministers to ignore the views of NHRIs appear less clear. In the Gillan and Quinton 
case, where the Court established that the powers of the police to stop and search individuals under 
the Terrorism Act violated Article 8 ECHR, the Equality and Human Rights Commission argued that 
the legislative amendments tabled by the UK Government and then under discussion did not offer 
adequate guarantees for the right to respect for private life. This conclusion would later appear to be 
shared not only by various NGOs, but also by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Nonetheless, the Committee of Ministers 
swiftly closed the examination of the case, which had always remained under standard supervision.287  
In the Orchowski and others group of cases, the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights 
provided the Committee of Ministers and the Department for Execution with data that showed the 
persistence of the problem of overcrowding in Polish penitentiaries.288 Most of the information was 
                                                        
286 European Court of Human Rights, “The French Court of Cassation has submitted to the European Court of Human 
Rights the first request under Protocol No. 16, seeking an advisory opinion on the question of surrogacy”, Press releases, 
23 October 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=press&c=#n1347882722901_pointer. 
287 Committee of Ministers, Resolution CM/ResDH(2013)52, Gillan and Quinton against the United Kingdom. Execution 
of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 1164th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 7 March 2013. 
288 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 123. 
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directly derived from the activity of the Polish Commissioner as NPM; nevertheless, it does not 
appear that this information has been considered by the Committee of Ministers or the Department 
for Execution.289  
The delays in the investigations into the mistreatment and killings allegedly perpetrated by the 
British forces in Iraq were at the core of the communication from the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission in the Al-Skeini and others case.290 The communication also included the concluding 
observations by two UN human rights treaty bodies which had endorsed the arguments by the NHRI 
and made recommendations to the UK Government accordingly.291 In this specific case, the 
submission by the NHRI might have come too late; the decision by the Committee of Ministers to 
move the case from enhanced to standard supervision had already been taken in the previous 
meeting,292 and the examination of the case was closed shortly afterwards. One is left wondering if 
the outcome could have been different had the Commission communicated its concerns before, and 
why it addressed two UN organs before submitting its views to the body specifically responsible for 
the supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
 
4.6. Preliminary conclusions 
This chapter has mapped the experience gained to date by NHRIs in promoting, at the CoE 
level, the execution of ECtHR judgments. Whereas a growing number of national human rights 
structures are submitting communications to the Committee of Ministers, many others have not until 
now sought to take part in the Rule 9(2) procedure. There are various possible explanations for this 
lack of engagement, including financial constraints and insufficient technical expertise, the fact that 
submissions to the Committee of Ministers might not be considered a priority by the institution, the 
fact that some States spontaneously and promptly comply with the ECtHR judgments, and the fact 
                                                        
289 No memorandum was drafted in the case, even though the judgment was placed under enhanced supervision. The only 
decision that was issued after the communication from the Ombudsman did not mention its intervention.  
290 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, supra n 149.  
291 Ibid., 6-7. 
292 Cf., for more details, supra n 190.   
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that NHRIs might be able to convince the relevant authorities without the need to address 
international monitoring bodies.  
However, the absence of any coordinated effort on the part of the CoE bodies involved in the 
supervision of execution to inform NHRIs of this opportunity, let alone to train them on the use of 
this instrument, would point to information problems as to the functioning, if not the very existence, 
of the procedure. The recent focus by ENNHRI on the role that NHRIs can play, at both the national 
and international levels, in encouraging the full execution of ECtHR judgments might pave the way 
for a greater involvement of these institutions.  
By making use of their in-depth knowledge of the legal system and human rights situation of 
their respective countries, NHRIs have submitted information especially on the state of legislation, 
administrative practice, and jurisprudence with a view to integrating, disproving or confirming the 
data provided and views expressed by their governments. On the basis of the additional or different 
information provided, NHRIs have either endorsed the general measures proposed or enacted by 
governments or, more often, claimed their inadequacy to solve all of the issues raised by the ECtHR 
judgments. NHRIs have also used their communications to bring to the attention of the Committee of 
Ministers data and views from other entities with which they regularly interact, including NGOs and 
international monitoring bodies.  
It can thus be said, in general terms, that NHRIs which have participated in the Rule 9(2) 
procedure to date have met the expectations that accompanied the reform of the Rules of the 
Committee of Ministers: namely, extending the sources of information on which the Committee can 
rely in its supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments, especially as far as the conception and 
implementation of general measures are concerned.  
In the case of NHRIs, the submission of new or different information compared to the 
information provided by governments should, theoretically, be given special consideration, in light 
of the independence of NHRIs not only from national authorities but also from any particular agenda 
or advocacy aims (cf. Chapter 3). However, it does not appear that the Committee of Ministers or the 
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Department for Execution treat information provided by NHRIs any differently from information 
provided by NGOs. At times, NHRIs are even mistakenly referred to as “NGOs” or “civil society”,293 
and no difference is made between submissions by NHRIs and submissions by NGOs in the 
Committee of Ministers’ annual reports on the status of the execution of judgments.294 
Therefore, the “unique position” of NHRIs as a bridge between the State and civil society and 
between the national and international levels of human rights protection, which has been emphasised 
in the literature and recognised to a certain extent by several UN bodies, does not appear to be 
reflected in the practice of the supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments. A fortiori, no 
distinction is made between A-status, B-status and non-accredited institutions.  
States, on the other hand, have replied to communications from NHRIs more frequently and 
have at times explicitly acknowledged the peculiar role played by NHRIs and the consequent special 
importance of their views. Nonetheless, as expected, States have seldom acted upon the proposals by 
NHRIs on their own initiative. Indeed, NHRIs tend to address the international level of supervision 
precisely when the dialogue at the national level has not yielded significant results. At that point, it 
is the role of the Department for Execution to collect information and opinions from various sources 
with a view to assessing the measures proposed or enacted by governments, and the role of the 
Committee of Ministers to oversee the execution of judgments also on the basis of the assessments 
provided by the Department.  
Section 4.5 has shown that there are instances where NHRIs succeeded in influencing the 
supervision of execution process by informing the analyses by the Department for Execution and the 
decisions by the Committee of Ministers. However, both these bodies often do not refer to the 
contents of the communications from NHRIs, nor do they acknowledge the very existence of these 
communications. Failing express reference to the communications from NHRIs and – more 
                                                        
293 For instance, two communications from the Public Defender of Georgia were titled “Communication from a NGO”, 
namely the September 2017 communication in the Gharibashvili group of cases (supra n 126) and the April 2018 
communication in the Identoba and others group of cases (supra n 237). As mentioned, in the Zorica Jovanović case, the 
Committee of Ministers appears to include the Serbian Protector of Citizens within “civil society” (supra n 219).   
294 Committee of Ministers, supra n 34. 
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significantly – an analysis of the information and observations enshrined therein, it remains difficult 
to assess the impact of these communications.  
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CHAPTER 5. PROMOTING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 
AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 
 
The submission of communications to the Committee of Ministers (Chapter 4) is not the only 
way in which NHRIs promote the execution of judgments delivered by the ECtHR. Indeed, in the 
exercise of their domestic mandates, NHRIs routinely refer to international human rights norms and 
rulings, one of the main functions of NHRIs being precisely to align national legal orders with the 
international one. This also applies to the ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR. In fact, while from 
the perspective of international cooperation a “special relationship” would appear to exist between 
NHRIs and the UN system, the prominence of the ECHR and the binding force of ECtHR judgments 
in the legal orders of CoE Member States have meant that extensive consideration has been given to 
the European system of human rights protection by NHRIs in the exercise of their domestic mandates. 
The first section of this chapter clarifies what is meant by “domestic mandate” of NHRIs, 
identifies six core functions that make up this mandate, and provides some clarification on the scope 
of this chapter’s investigation. The following sections are each devoted to one of the functions thus 
identified and provide examples of how these functions have been performed to promote the 
execution of ECtHR judgments as well as, more generally, the implementation of the ECHR and of 
the well-established ECtHR case-law. Some preliminary conclusions are drawn in the last section.  
 
5.1. Scope of the investigation 
The “domestic mandate” of NHRIs is defined, for the purposes of this chapter, as all those 
activities which do not imply the direct cooperation of NHRIs with international organisations, but 
which can nonetheless be carried out in light of international standards and decisions. These activities 
vary widely and are directed at both the promotion and the protection of human rights. By relying on 
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a common – albeit not always meaningful and by no means rigid – distinction in human rights theory 
and practice, the Global Alliance of NHRIs (GANHRI) has defined the promotion activities of NHRIs 
as “those functions which seek to create a society where human rights are more broadly understood 
and respected”, whereas protection activities “address and seek to prevent actual human rights 
violations”.1  
This chapter examines six core domestic functions of NHRIs – three of which can be considered 
to fall in the promotion mandate of NHRIs, while the other three can be characterised as protection-
oriented. The former functions include advising the competent national authorities (government and 
parliament in the first place) on human rights matters, giving information to and raising the awareness 
of the public, and providing education and training to stakeholders. The latter functions comprise 
monitoring and reporting, handling individual complaints of human rights violations, and petitioning 
or intervening before national courts. While NHRIs can perform other functions, these have been 
chosen as recurrent in the mandates of almost all NHRIs and thus key,2 as well as illustrative of the 
role that NHRIs can play to facilitate the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
The sections of this chapter each introduce a domestic function of NHRIs and give concrete 
examples of how NHRIs have performed that function with a view to promoting the execution of 
ECtHR judgments. Unlike Chapter 4, which is structured as a comprehensive analysis of all the thirty-
three communications submitted to date by European national human rights structures to the 
Committee of Ministers, this chapter systematically presents the ways in which NHRIs can and do 
contribute to the execution of ECtHR judgments through their core domestic activities and provides 
illustrations of these ways, but it does not purport to examine all national activities carried out by all 
European NHRIs to promote the execution of the Court’s judgments.  
                                                        
1 GANHRI, General Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation, 21 February 2018, G.O. 1.2 (“Human rights 
mandate”). 
2 With the possible exception of the complaint-handling function, which is considered optional by the Paris Principles. 
Nonetheless, the number of NHRIs entrusted with this task is considerable and the handling of individual complaints is 
increasingly recognised as a significant feature of NHRIs; cf., on this point, Section 3.1 of this dissertation. 
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This choice is essentially based on accessibility reasons: first of all, the websites of NHRIs and 
the documents stored therein do not always account for all the activities that the institutions have ever 
undertaken, and to collect information otherwise would by far exceed the resources and time available 
for this research. Moreover, not all documents by European NHRIs (not even all annual reports) have 
been translated in either English or French, a circumstance which limits the understanding of these 
materials by the author of this dissertation. Therefore, the investigation has been confined to 
documents and webpages in English, French, and – to a more limited extent – Spanish. 
A further limitation concerns the “pool” of NHRIs whose practice has been scrutinised to select 
the examples outlined in this chapter. Only A-status institutions have been considered, as these 
institutions are expected to have carried out, and to carry out in the future, the most significant and 
systematic work of promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments, in view of their wide-ranging 
human rights mandate and greater resources. This does not detract from the fact that B-status and 
non-compliant NHRIs as well as classical ombudsmen can also contribute, and have in fact 
contributed, to make their national legal orders comply with the rulings of the Court through their 
domestic activities.3 At any rate, as explained, this chapter does not aim to gather and analyse all 
instances in which national human rights structures intervened at the domestic level to facilitate the 
execution of ECtHR judgments, but to systematise their activities in the area and give examples of 
these. For the same reason, the investigation has been limited to the last ten years.4 
                                                        
3 To give just one example, the Czech Public Defender, in addition to submitting information to the Committee of 
Ministers on the execution of the D.H. case and participating at the domestic level in the implementation of the same 
judgment (cf. Chapter 4), is represented on the national Committee of Experts on the Execution of Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, which gathers stakeholders to discuss the best ways to execute ECtHR judgments in 
the Czech Republic (cf. Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1302nd meeting (December 2017). Action plan 
(31/08/2017). Communication from the Czech Republic concerning the case of Cervenka v. Czech Republic (Application 
No. 62507/12), 25 September 2017, DH-DD(2017)1039, 3). In the context of the execution of the Kummer case, 
concerning the ill-treatment of persons detained in police stations, the Public Defender carried out a training seminar for 
police officers: Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1236 meeting (22-24 September 2015) (DH). Action report 
(13/07/2015). Communication from the Czech Republic concerning the case of Kummer against Czech Republic 
(Application No. 32133/11), 17 August 2015, DH-DD(2015)829, 4. 
4 Information relating to previous years is also harder to find on the websites of NHRIs and various A-status NHRIs 
considered in this chapter did not even exist prior to that time. 
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On the other hand, while the focus of this dissertation remains the promotion of the execution 
of ECtHR judgments issued against the home countries of NHRIs, examples from this chapter also 
include instances where NHRIs more broadly supported the implementation of ECHR provisions and 
of ECtHR judgments issued against other States. This has been done because, during the analysis of 
the practice of NHRIs, it rapidly became clear that these institutions have acted domestically less to 
promote the execution of specific ECtHR judgments against their countries than to ensure that their 
national legal systems are in compliance with the ECHR and the ECtHR case-law as developed also 
through judgments against other countries. As these activities have been frequently carried out by 
NHRIs, they have been considered worthy of mention here as evidence of the multifarious ways in 
which NHRIs can and do take into account the European human rights system, contribute to 
decongesting the ECtHR and the Committee of Ministers, and enhance respect for human rights at 
home.  
Each of the following sections thus briefly portrays the main features of the function considered, 
gives examples of the domestic experiences of NHRIs in promoting the execution of ECtHR 
judgments through that function, and also includes examples of the domestic experiences of NHRIs 
in promoting the implementation of ECHR norms and the ECtHR case-law more generally.  
 
5.2. Advising  
A competence common to all NHRIs consists in advising the relevant national authorities on 
human rights matters. The Paris Principles require that NHRIs be able “to submit to the Government, 
Parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis either at the request of the authorities 
concerned or through the exercise of its power to hear a matter without higher referral, opinions, 
recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters concerning the promotion and protection of 
human rights”.5 As further specified in the Principles, this advisory function would typically concern 
                                                        
5 UN General Assembly, Resolution 48/134. National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, 20 
December 1993, A/RES/48/134, Section A(3)(a).  
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laws, administrative regulations, bills and other proposals, as well as – more generally – the human 
rights situation of the country, including possible violations and how to remedy them.6  
While by definition the advice provided by NHRIs is not binding on their addressees, these 
institutions have developed ways to press the authorities to act, including by publicising their 
recommendations and mobilising other actors.7 In practice, much depends on the relationship between 
the NHRI and the competent public bodies, on the ability of the NHRI to disseminate its 
recommendations, and on its legitimacy and credibility among the public.  
It is clear that NHRIs can, through their advisory functions, promote the alignment of domestic 
legal orders with international norms and rulings by recommending that laws and practices be adopted 
or amended with a view to complying with international standards or by pointing out that a certain 
situation breaches the international obligations of the State.  
Advice to the relevant public bodies is indeed one of the most direct ways through which NHRIs 
can inform the process of execution of ECtHR judgments. At the forefront in this area is the 
experience of the French Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (CNCDH) which, 
since the 2015 Brussels Declaration,8 has been asked by the French Government to comment on the 
action plans that the Government is required to submit to the Committee of Ministers with a view to 
outlining the measures that it intends to take to give effect to the ECtHR judgments concerning 
France.9 In this way, the Commission is able to potentially influence the determinations of the 
Government at an early stage and on a regular basis, whenever ECtHR judgments are delivered 
against France, even though there is of course no guarantee that the Government will modify its action 
plans in accordance with the recommendations by the Commission. In 2017, for instance, the 
                                                        
6 Ibid. 
7 Cf., for a reflection on the ways in which NHRIs could strengthen the compliance of the addressees of their 
recommendations: GANHRI, supra n 1, G.O. 1.6 (“Recommendations by NHRIs”); and Gauthier de Beco, Non-Judicial 
Mechanisms for the Implementation of Human Rights in European States (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2010), 129-130. 
8 High-level Conference on the “Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared 
responsibility”, Brussels Declaration, 27 March 2015. Cf., for more information about the Brussels Declaration and the 
ongoing process of reform of the ECHR system more generally, Chapters 1 and 2 and Section 3.6 of this dissertation. 
9 CNCDH, Rapport d’Activité 2016. Promotion et protection des droits de l'homme, 17 July 2017, 38-39, accessed 4 
January 2019,  http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/rapport_dactivites_2016_de_la_cncdh.pdf. 
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CNCDH made its views known to the French Government on the execution of the ECtHR judgments 
in Laborie (concerning surrogate motherhood) and Aycaguer (retention of DNA profiles in police 
databases).10 When ignored at the domestic level, the CNCDH has been ready to address the 
Committee of Ministers directly, as shown in Chapter 4.11 
The advisory function of NHRIs can be exercised by these institutions proprio motu, upon 
request by the competent authorities or, somewhere in-between, in reply to public consultations.12 
Moreover, this task can be directed at different public bodies. NHRIs might issue recommendations 
concerning existing or draft legislation and thus call primarily on parliaments to act. The Irish Human 
Rights Commission conducted a review of the regulatory framework and practical accessibility of 
lawful termination of pregnancy in the country following the shortcomings identified by the ECtHR 
judgment in A, B and C v. Ireland.13 The Commission then submitted its views on the Protection of 
Life During Pregnancy Bill 2013 under consideration in the Irish Parliament.14  
The Albanian People’s Advocate intervened on several occasions during the legislative process 
aimed at giving effect to the ECtHR judgment in Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, concerning 
the right to property and the enforcement of domestic judgments awarding compensation for 
expropriated lands.15  
                                                        
10 CNCDH, Rapport d’Activité 2017. 70 ans d'expertise au service des droits de l'homme, 7 September 2018, 74, accessed 
4 January 2019, http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/cncdh_rapport_dactivites_2017_vdef.pdf. 
11 As confirmed by Thomas Dumortier, Legal Adviser at the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme, 
the opportunity for the CNCDH to address the Committee of Ministers remains important, also in light of the fact that the 
French Government, while consulting with the CNCDH in the early stages of the drafting of action plans, rarely keeps 
the Commission informed about subsequent developments, including the preparation of action reports (interview of 8 
March 2019, on file with author).  
12 The latter means is typical of NHRIs from the United Kingdom and Ireland, whose Governments often have recourse 
to open consultations. To give just one example, the Scottish Human Rights Commission drafted two responses in relation 
to the Scottish Government’s consultation on the reform of the status of incapacitated adults: Scottish Human Rights 
Commission, Consultation on the Scottish Law Commission Report on Adults with Incapacity, 5 April 2016, and Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 – Proposals for Reform. Response of Scottish Human Rights Commission, 27 April 
2018, both available at http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/policy-publications/ (accessed 4 January 2019). Both 
submissions refer to ECHR norms and the ECtHR jurisprudence. 
13 ECtHR, A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, 16 December 2010. 
14 Irish Human Rights Commission, Observations on the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Bill 2013, July 2013, 
accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ihrec.ie/documents/ihrc-observations-protection-of-life-during-pregna/. 
15 People’s Advocate of the Republic of Albania, Annual Report on the Activity of the People’s Advocate. 1st January – 
31st December Year 2015, February 2016, 111 et seqq.; and Annual Report on the Activity of the People's Advocate. 1 
January – 31 December 2014, February 2015, 14-15 and 34-36. Both documents can be found at 
http://www.avokatipopullit.gov.al/en/reports (accessed 4 January 2019). Cf. also ECtHR, Manushaqe Puto and others v. 
Albania, nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012.  
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Other ways that NHRIs have found to convey their views to parliamentarians include 
“information sessions”, such as that carried out by the Human Rights Centre of Finland on the subject 
of the responsibility of news websites for comments posted by their readers following a landmark 
Grand Chamber’s judgment against Estonia,16 or that carried out by the Croatian Ombudsman on 
national minorities, where multiple references to the Convention and the ECtHR case-law were 
made.17 
The advice by NHRIs is also frequently addressed to the government or some of its ministries. 
For instance, the Parliamentary (Seimas) Ombudsmen of Lithuania expressed their views on the 
execution of the L. v. Lithuania judgment, concerning the status of transsexuals in the country, during 
a meeting with the Ministers of Health and Justice.18  
The Serbian Protector of Citizens submitted recommendations to the Government following 
the ECtHR judgment in Grudić v. Serbia, which established that the Serbian Pensions and Disability 
Insurance Fund unlawfully stopped paying the disability pensions of the applicants residing in 
Kosovo.19 The Serbian Protector, which had itself received numerous complaints regarding the 
suspension of so-called Kosovo pensions, urged the Government to resume the payments in order to 
give effect to the judgment and restore the property rights of the complainants.20 The Serbian 
Protector also intervened regarding the execution of the Ališić and others judgment, which found 
Serbia (and Slovenia) to have violated the rights of property and to an effective remedy of the 
                                                        
16 Human Rights Centre (Finland), Human Rights Centre Annual Report 2015. Summary, 14, 4 January 2019, 
https://www.humanrightscentre.fi/publications/action-plans-and-annual-reports/. The judgment in question is ECtHR, 
Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, 16 June 2015. 
17 Interview with Tatjana Vlašić, Human Rights Promotion, Cooperation and Public Relations Advisor to the Croatian 
Ombudswoman, 31 October 2018, on file with author. 
18 Seimas Ombudsmen’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania, “The Seimas Ombudsmen discussed issues of 
implementation of the ECtHR judgment in the case L. v. Lithuania with the Ministers of Health and Justice”, News, 2 
July 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.lrski.lt/en/news/619-the-seimas-ombudsmen-discussed-issues-of-
implementation-of-the-ecthr-judgment-in-the-case-l-v-lithuania-with-the-ministers-of-health-and-justice.html. Cf. also 
ECtHR, L. v. Lithuania, no. 27527/03, 11 September 2007. 
19 ECtHR, Grudić v. Serbia, no. 31925/08, 17 April 2012.  
20 Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia, Annual Report 2012, 2013, 22 and 176-179, 
https://www.ombudsman.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=11&Itemid=13 
(accessed 4 January 2019).  
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applicants, who had been prevented from withdrawing their foreign-currency savings following the 
dissolution of the Republic of Yugoslavia.21  
The Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland issued recommendations to both the Parliament 
and the Government with a view to implementing ECtHR judgments against Poland on a wide range 
of subjects – from termination of pregnancy22 to compensation for expropriated lands23 and pre-trial 
detention of juveniles.24 The Russian Ombudsman submitted proposals to execute ECtHR judgments 
concerning, inter alia, the confinement of defendants in caged docks25 and the organisation of 
religious events in public,26 while the Greek National Commission for Human Rights intervened 
regarding the execution of the Chowdury and others judgment, which highlighted the issues of forced 
labour and trafficking in the agricultural sector.27   
Furthermore, almost all A-status NHRIs examined can be said to have advised national 
authorities to amend laws and practices in order to comply, more broadly, with ECHR standards and 
the ECtHR jurisprudence. Changes recommended by NHRIs in this light have concerned the forced 
displacement of Roma,28 the expulsion of aliens,29 the collection of data by the security services,30 
                                                        
21 Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia, Annual Report 2014, 2015, 168-169, 
https://www.ombudsman.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=11&Itemid=13 
(accessed 4 January 2019). Cf. also ECtHR, Ališić and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 60642/08, 16 July 2014. 
22 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, Summary of the Report on the Activity of the Ombudsman in Poland in 
2014, 2015, 71, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/report. The judgments at issue are ECtHR, 
Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, 20 March 2007; and ECtHR, R.R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04, 26 May 2011. 
23 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, Summary of the Report on the Activity of the Ombudsman in Poland 2015, 
2016, 59, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/report. Reference is made to the need to execute 
ECtHR, Skibińscy v. Poland, no. 52589/99, 14 November 2006. 
24 Ibid., 34. The judgment referred to is ECtHR, Grabowski v. Poland, no. 57722/12, 30 June 2015. 
25 High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, Report 2015, May 2016, 46-47, accessed 4 January 
2019, http://eng.ombudsmanrf.org/ombudsman/content/annual_reports. The relevant ECtHR judgment is ECtHR, 
Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, 17 July 2014.  
26 High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, Report 2014, May 2015, 90-91, accessed 4 January 
2019, http://eng.ombudsmanrf.org/ombudsman/content/annual_reports. Cf. also ECtHR, Kimlya and others v. Russia, 
nos. 76836/01 and 32782/03, 1 October 2009. 
27 Greek National Commission for Human Rights, “ECtHR, Chowdury and others v. Greece: Recommendations for the 
full compliance of the Greek State”, Press release, 27 August 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.nchr.gr/images/English_Site/TRAFFICKING/GNCHR%20Press%20Release_Compliance%20with%20ECt
HR%20Chowdury.pdf.  
28 People’s Advocate of the Republic of Albania, Annual Report on the activity of the People’s Advocate. 1st January – 
31st December Year 2016, April 2017, 17-18, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.avokatipopullit.gov.al/en/reports.  
29 Danish Institute for Human Rights, Human Rights in Denmark. Status 2014-15: A Summary, 2015, 58-59, accessed 4 
January 2019, https://www.humanrights.dk/publications/status-report-2014-15-human-rights-denmark-summary.  
30 CNCDH, Rapport d’Activité 2015. Les droits de l’homme, droits universels et indivisibles, 28 June 2016, 233 et seqq., 
accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/rapport-dactivites-2015. 
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the rights of individuals with HIV/AIDS,31 the full-face veil,32 and surrogate motherhood and 
anonymous childbirth,33 to name a few.  
 
5.3. Informing and raising awareness 
NHRIs are typically mandated to promote awareness and understanding of human rights by the 
public at large. They carry out this responsibility through a variety of means including in-person 
helpdesk, information webpages, newsletters, and awareness campaigns. By disseminating 
information about ECtHR judgments against their own countries, NHRIs promote the execution of 
these judgments, as they sensitise stakeholders and the public opinion more generally as to the 
violations ascertained by the Court and the need to remedy them. 
On the homepage of the National Commission for Human Rights of Greece the link can be 
found to an updated table (in Greek) of ECtHR judgments delivered against Greece, which indicates 
the ECHR norms violated and provides brief summaries of the cases.34 Similarly, the Ukrainian 
Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights publishes summaries (in Ukrainian) of ECtHR 
judgments against the country and refers to the website of the Department for the Execution of 
Judgments (of which a Russian version exists) for those interested in the functioning of the 
supervision of execution mechanism.35 The French CNCDH also reports the facts of cases lodged 
with the ECtHR against France and the related reasoning and decisions of the Court both in individual 
                                                        
31 Greek National Commission for Human Rights, Protection of the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, 2014, 13-14, 
accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.nchr.gr/images/English_Site/YGEIA/NCHR%20Report%20on%20the%20rights%20of%20people%20livin
g%20with%20HIV%20_2_.pdf.  
32 Commission consultative des Droits de l’Homme du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Avis sur le projet de loi 7179 
portant modification de l’article 563 du Code pénal en créant une infraction de dissimulation du visage dans certains 
lieux publics, Avis 2/2018, 5 et seqq., accessed 4 January 2019, https://ccdh.public.lu/fr/avis.html.  
33 Commission consultative des Droits de l’Homme du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Avis sur le projet de loi 6568 
portant réforme du droit de la filiation, modifiant - le Code civil, - le Nouveau Code de procédure civile, - le Code pénal, 
- la loi du 11-21 germinal an XI relative aux prénoms et changement de noms, - et la loi communale du 13 décembre 
1988 et la proposition de loi 5553 portant réforme du droit de la filiation et instituant l’exercice conjoint de l’autorité 
parentale, Avis 3/2015, 3 et seqq., accessed 4 January 2019, https://ccdh.public.lu/fr/avis.html. 
34 Cf. the right side of the homepage of the institution, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.nchr.gr/index.php.  
35 Cf. the “European Court of Human Rights” section of the Ukrainian Commissioner’s website, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/en/page/applicant/court/. The contents of the various sub-sections are only available in 
Ukrainian.  
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files and in a biennial publication on the observations and decisions by international bodies regarding 
the human rights situation in France.36 The added value of these conduits of information is the use of 
the national language for materials otherwise available in English or French only as well as the 
simplification of the contents of documents that can be rather technical.  
The same aim is pursued through the publication of information on ECtHR judgments as short 
news in the relevant sections of the websites of NHRIs, in their newsletters (e.g., that of the Finnish 
Human Rights Centre),37 in other periodic information bulletins (e.g., the monthly bulletin of the 
Georgian Public Defender’s Office),38 or on social media.39 
NHRIs also typically refer to the ECtHR rulings issued against their home States in their annual 
reports;40 however, as these documents are primarily addressed to the respective parliaments and 
often consist of detailed accounts of the activities carried out by the NHRI during the year, the 
                                                        
36 Among the most recent files are CNCDH, “Arrêt A.B. et autres c. France”, Les arrêts de la Cour europeenne des droits 
de l’homme. Clefs de lecture, 16 September 2016, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/arret-de-
la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-lhomme-ab-et-al-contre-france; and “Arrêt A.M. c. France”, Les arrêts de la Cour 
europeenne des droits de l’homme. Clefs de lecture, 12 July 2016, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/arret-am-contre-france-de-la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-lhomme. Cf. also 
CNCDH, Droits de l’homme en France. Regards portés par les instances internationales: Rapport 2009-2011 (Paris: La 
Documentation française, 2011), 202 et seqq. in particular; on the other hand, the subsequent CNCDH, Droits de l’homme 
en France. Regards portés par les instances internationales: Rapport 2012-2014 (Paris: La Documentation française, 
2014) refers to the content of ECtHR judgments against France throughout its thematic part, on the basis of the judgments’ 
subject-matters.   
37 Human Rights Centre (Finland), supra n 16, 9.  
38 The bulletins of this NHRI, which were also published in English, contained a section devoted to “International Stories 
about Human Rights” where ECtHR judgments against Georgia were also referred to 
(http://www.ombudsman.ge/eng/biuletini, accessed 2 May 2019). The bulletins, however, appear to have been published 
in the course of 2015 only, with the exception of a further single issue published in May 2017. 
39 To give just one example, on 10 October 2017, the Spanish Defensor del Pueblo shared on its Facebook page the 
delivery of an ECtHR judgment regarding the expulsion of migrants who had entered the Melilla enclave. The case 
referred to is ECtHR, N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, 3 October 2017, which has since been referred 
to the Grand Chamber. Among other institutions, the CNCDH is very active on Twitter, which it also uses to disseminate 
information on ECtHR judgments.  
40 The Danish Institute for Human Rights, among others, regularly account for ECtHR judgments issued in respect of 
Denmark, both favourable and adverse, in its annual and status reports: e.g., Danish Institute for Human Rights, Human 
Rights in Denmark. Status 2016-17, 70-71, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.humanrights.dk/publications/status-
report-2016-17-human-rights-denmark. The Finnish Parliamentary Ombudsman also refers in its annual reports to the 
judgments delivered by the ECtHR against Finland and to those supervised by the Committee of Ministers: cf., for 
instance, Summary of the Annual Report 2017, 2018, 138-139; Summary of the Annual Report 2016, 2017, 146-147; and 
Summary of the Annual Report 2014, 2015, 108-111. All reports can be found at 
https://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/en_GB/web/guest/annual-reports (accessed 4 January 2019).  
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information contained in these reports is less accessible to the public. Cooperation with the media 
can thus be key to reach a wider audience.41  
Beforehand, NHRIs can inform the public on the rights protected by the Convention as well as 
on the application procedure before the ECtHR.42 First of all, various NHRIs host on their websites 
translations of the ECHR43 and of the Court’s factsheets44 in the national language. Instructions on 
how to apply to the ECtHR and on the admissibility requirements are also provided, even though at 
times through mere reference to the ECtHR website, which is only available in English and French.45 
On the contrary, simplified guidelines for potential applicants have been made available by the 
Scottish Human Rights Commission,46 the Azerbaijani Human Rights Commissioner,47 and the 
Institute of Human Rights Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina,48 while the Ukrainian Parliament 
Commissioner for Human Rights translated the official instructions by the ECtHR.49  
At times, NHRIs directly inform individuals seeking redress about the opportunity to petition 
the ECtHR, the conditions to fulfil, and the procedure to follow. Indeed, various NHRIs have reported 
that they are often asked for assistance by potential complainants before the ECtHR. The Latvian 
                                                        
41 For instance, at times, the CNCDH comments on ECtHR judgments delivered against France in the press (interview 
with Dumortier, CNCDH, supra n 11).  
42 Cf., on the role that NHRIs can play in this area and the benefits for the workload of the ECtHR: Antoine Buyse, “The 
Court’s Ears and Arms: National Human Rights Institution and the European Court of Human Rights”, in National Human 
Rights Institutions in Europe: Comparative, European and International Perspectives, eds. Jan Wouters and Katrien 
Meuwissen (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013), 176-177. Cf. also, for the initiatives undertaken at the CoE level, Section 3.6 
of this dissertation, n 226 in particular. 
43 Among others, the Human Rights Commissioner of Azerbaijan, the German Institute for Human Rights, the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary, and the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights. 
44 These are the Ukrainian Commissioner (cf. the webpage mentioned supra n 35) and the Greek Commission (cf. supra 
n 34; the translations by the Greek Commission are also available on the ECtHR website). 
45 The website of the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland (section “Who else can help you” on the Polish and 
English homepages) links to the homepage of the ECtHR. The homepage of the Greek Commission links to the “Apply 
to the Court” section of the ECtHR website (https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=applicants&c=, accessed 4 
January 2019). 
46 Scottish Human Rights Commission, Basic Guide for Applicants Taking Their Case to the European Court of Human 
Rights, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/rights-in-practice/human-rights-laws/ (bottom of 
the webpage). 
47 The Azerbaijani Commissioner produced a Guide how to apply to the European Human rights Court in 2003 and 2005 
(cf. the “publications” list available at http://www.ombudsman.gov.az/en/view/pages/32, accessed 4 January 2019). The 
Azerbaijani NHRI was downgraded to B status in May 2018; nonetheless, it is mentioned here as it has been an A-status 
institution for the most part of the period considered.  
48 Institute of Human Rights Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Application before European Court of Human 
Rights – Instruction”, under the section “Useful links”, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://ombudsmen.gov.ba/Default.aspx?id=0&lang=EN. 
49 Cf. Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, supra n 35, sub-section “How to appeal to the ECtHR”.  
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Ombudsman noted that “persons wishing to file an action to the European Court of Human Rights 
seek help of the Ombudsman’s Office on a regular basis, and the number of such applications 
increased”.50 The Russian Commissioner is likewise asked by individuals to provide information on 
the Convention and the Court’s jurisprudence as well as on the procedure to apply to the Court.51 
However, most NHRIs cannot, under their mandates, provide full legal assistance to individuals 
wishing to pursue their cases before the ECtHR, so that preliminary information only is offered to 
prospective applicants. The Armenian Human Rights Defender, for instance, while clarifying that it 
cannot intervene in court proceedings nor can it review judicial decisions, makes complainants aware 
that they can appeal final domestic judgments before the ECtHR and explains the procedure to do 
so.52 Other NHRIs, especially commissions with a protection mandate,53 can play a greater role in 
supporting applicants before courts – i.e., by assisting or acting on behalf of the applicants at the 
national level (cf. infra Section 5.7) and intervening as third parties in the ECtHR proceedings in 
support of the applicants’ claims (cf. supra Section 3.6).  
Finally, NHRIs promote knowledge of the ECHR system by including in their online and 
physical libraries’ collections relevant international and national legal documents and scholarly 
works.54 
 
5.4. Educating and training 
In addition to informing the general public, NHRIs are also often entrusted with the task of 
providing education and training on human rights to more specific groups of persons concerned, 
                                                        
50 Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia, Summary of Annual Report 2017, 21, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.tiesibsargs.lv/en/pages/research-and-publications/annual-reports.  
51 Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, supra n 25, 191, and supra n 26, 30.  
52 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Annual Report on the Activities of the Republic of Armenia Human 
Rights Defender And Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Country During 2009, 2010, 15-16, 
accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.ombuds.am/en/publications/annual_reports.html.  
53 For a categorisation of NHRIs, cf. Section 3.2 of this dissertation.  
54 Human rights library collections are made available by the Commission consultative des droits de l’Homme du Grand-
Duché de Luxembourg (accessed 4 January 2019, https://ccdh.public.lu/fr/bibliotheque.html), the German Institute for 
Human Rights (accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/en/library/), and the Spanish 
Defensor del Pueblo (accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://biblioteca.defensordelpueblo.es/opac/abnetcl.exe/O7055/ID2b3c59ed?ACC=101).  
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including students, lawyers, police officers, social workers, teachers, and the media. Not infrequently, 
in designing education and training programmes, NHRIs introduce references to international norms 
and rulings, as one of the many ways of “bridging the gap” between the international and national 
levels and promoting knowledge and observance of international instruments by stakeholders.  
NHRIs could thus potentially develop training tools that promote the execution of ECtHR 
judgments by drawing the attention of duty-bearers on their obligations deriving from the judgments 
(e.g., the procedures that prison officers are required to follow when searching detainees) or by 
informing interested parties on the opportunities arising from the same judgments (e.g., new avenues 
for lawyers or NGOs involved in the protection of victims of human rights violations).  
In the accessible materials, not many instances could be found of courses and training sessions 
organised by NHRIs and specifically devoted to the execution of ECtHR judgments delivered against 
their home States. The Czech Public Defender of Rights organised training activities for officials 
from the school inspectorates following the D.H. judgment on discrimination of Roma children in 
primary schools.55 In 2015, the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation held 
an “expert meeting” (no further details are available in the English version of the report) on the 
persistent non-execution of the ECtHR judgment against Russia on the voting rights of detainees.56  
On the other hand, numerous examples can be given of training courses, educational materials, 
and codes of conduct where reference to ECHR norms and the ECtHR jurisprudence is made. These 
include a debate with foreign university students promoted by the Lithuanian Ombudsmen’s Office,57 
a visit to the ECtHR for students from secondary schools organised by the Luxembourg 
                                                        
55 Interview with Petr Polák, Head of the Department of Equal Treatment at the Public Defender of Rights of the Czech 
Republic, 1 June 2018, on file with author. Exceptionally, this example from the experience of a classical ombudsman 
has been made in this section, insofar as it is related to a case which has been examined in-depth in this dissertation and 
in consideration of the fact that not many other examples could be found, in the documents of European A-status 
institutions accessible to this author, of training activities concerning the execution of specific ECtHR judgments. 
56 The title of the expert meeting, convened on 30 October 2015, is “Difficulties in Applying Decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights: Dialogue on Voting Rights for Persons in Custody”; cf. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
in the Russian Federation, supra n 25, 189. 
57 The debate concerned human rights and the ECHR in particular: Seimas Ombudsmen’s Office of the Republic of 
Lithuania, “Students from different European countries have discussed human rights at the Seimas Ombudsmen’s Office”, 
News, 23 March 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.lrski.lt/en/news/486-students-from-different-european-
countries-have-discussed-human-rights-at-the-seimas-ombudsmen-s-office.html.  
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Commission,58 the promotion of the teaching of ECHR standards and ECtHR jurisprudence in 
Ukrainian universities,59 resources for human rights education developed by the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission,60 courses for police officers provided by the Danish Institute for Human 
Rights,61 the training for Armenian judges on the international standards (including ECtHR rulings) 
to combat violence against women,62 the Code of Good Administration drafted by the Serbian 
Protector of Citizens (which also relies on the ECtHR case-law),63 and tools for a human rights impact 
assessment made available by the Scottish Human Rights Commission.64  
While admittedly the execution of ECtHR judgments would often require some preliminary 
legislative, administrative or judicial changes, it might be the case that the widespread training of the 
relevant professionals can suffice to change non-compliant practices; more likely, the training can 
maximise the impact of legislative and regulatory innovations. At any rate, the provision of education 
and training on ECHR standards and ECtHR judgments is an important tool in the hands of NHRIs 
to promote a human rights culture in key areas and prevent further violations. 
 
5.5. Monitoring, inquiring and reporting 
This section examines various interrelated activities by NHRIs which are commonly identified 
as falling in the “protection” category. It is a core responsibility of NHRIs to ascertain whether State 
                                                        
58 Commission consultative des Droits de l’Homme du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Rapport d’activités 2012, 69, 
accessed 4 January 2019, https://ccdh.public.lu/fr/publications.html. 
59 Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, “A four-day training on human rights has been completed”, 
News, 15 December 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/en/all-news/pr/a-four-day-training-
on-human-rights-has-been-completed/. 
60 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Inspiring practice: Resources, tools and activities for human rights 
education, 20 October 2008, 84 et seqq. in particular, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.nihrc.org/publication/detail/inspiring-practice-resources-tools-and-activities-for-human-rights-educatio.  
61 The Danish NHRI organised various courses for police officers on human rights and hate crimes, in which references 
to the ECtHR jurisprudence were included: Danish Institute for Human Rights, Annual Report 2011, 34-35, accessed 4 
January 2019, https://www.humanrights.dk/publications/annual-report-2011. 
62 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Annual Communique on the Activities of the Human Rights 
Defender of the Republic of Armenia, and the State of Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms During the Year 2017, 
2018, 19, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.ombuds.am/en/publications/annual_reports.html?page=1. 
63 The Code is mentioned in Protector of Citizens of Serbia, 2010 Regular Annual Report of the Protector of Citizens, 
2011, 99, https://www.ombudsman.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=11&Itemid=13 
(accessed 4 January 2019). 
64 Scottish Human Rights Commission, Equality and Human Rights Impact Assessment, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://eqhria.scottishhumanrights.com/. This tool is specifically designed for public bodies.  
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bodies are breaching their human rights obligations, including those of international origin. This 
monitoring activity is closely connected with the reporting of its findings – in annual reports, other 
official documents, and websites. Moreover, monitoring can at times give rise, when a more in-depth 
examination is deemed necessary, to comprehensive inquiries into specific issues.65 Finally, this 
section also considers a particular kind of monitoring – namely, that carried out by NHRIs acting as 
National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs) and visiting places of deprivation of liberty.66 On the other 
hand, this section does not focus on instances where monitoring is at the root of formal 
recommendations to legislative and administrative bodies, which have been considered under Section 
5.2 as examples of the advisory function of NHRIs.67   
Once again, the traditional domestic functions of NHRIs considered in this section readily apply 
to the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments. Supervising the adjustment of the internal 
legal order as a result of ECtHR judgments and reporting on the related obstacles, delays, and 
inadequacies perfectly fit the monitoring mandate of NHRIs. The Latvian Ombudsman explicitly 
linked a study it undertook on the country’s legal framework and practice concerning the 
transplantations of tissues and organs to a string of ECtHR judgments issued against Latvia for the 
lack of guarantees against the arbitrary removal and use of tissues and organs.68  
The Institute of Human Rights Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina committed to re-visit 
institutions for people with mental disabilities following the ECtHR judgment in Hadžimejlić and 
others.69 The Institute also denounced the persistent non-execution of the well-known Sejdić and 
                                                        
65 On the importance of the inquiries carried out by NHRIs, cf. Meg Brodie, “Uncomfortable Truths: Protecting the 
Independence of National Human Rights Institutions to Inquire”, University of New South Wales Law Journal 38, no. 3 
(2015): 1215-1260 (which focuses on the inquiries carried out by the Australian Human Rights Commission). 
66 NPMs are national bodies entrusted by the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture with the prevention 
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment at the domestic level. This preventive function is chiefly 
discharged by NPMs by way of visits to penitentiaries and other places where people are deprived of their liberty. On the 
role of NHRIs as NPMs, cf. Section 3.5 of this dissertation. 
67 Indeed, there is no rigid distinction between the mentioned activities. More generally, a human rights issue can be dealt 
with by an NHRI from different angles: for instance, an individual complaint could give rise to a wider inquiry, which in 
turn could result in the issuance of recommendations to the public bodies responsible.  
68 Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia, supra n 50, 18-19. 
69 Institute of Human Rights Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016 Annual Report on the Results of the Activities 
of the Institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017, 75-76, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://ombudsmen.gov.ba/Dokumenti.aspx?id=27&tip=1&lang=EN. Cf. also ECtHR, Hadžimejlić and others v. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, nos. 3427/13, 74569/13 and 7157/14, 3 November 2015. 
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Finci judgment, along with the following Zornić judgment, which have required Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to lift the ban on members of minorities wishing to participate in the parliamentary 
elections.70  
The Polish Commissioner for Human Rights has explicitly stated that it “is constantly 
monitoring the jurisprudence”71 of the ECtHR and it undertook several initiatives in the face of non-
execution or incomplete execution of ECtHR judgments. As most of these initiatives resulted in 
recommendations to the legislature and the executive or were originated by individual complaints 
(even though suggestive of more widespread violations), examples from the experience of the Polish 
Commissioner have been mentioned under Section 5.2 and will be further mentioned below under 
Section 5.6.  
As for inquiries, NHRIs from the United Kingdom are renowned for the in-depth investigations 
that they undertake, directed at “issues of public interest relevant to the groups protected by 
discrimination legislation and to human rights”.72 While inquiries specifically prompted by the 
issuance of an ECtHR judgment against the United Kingdom could not be found, NHRIs from this 
country routinely investigate human rights issues in light of ECHR standards and of the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.  
Examples from the Equality and Human Rights Commission (which has jurisdiction over 
England, Wales and Scotland) include the deaths of detainees with mental health conditions73 and 
                                                        
70 Institute of Human Rights Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015 Annual Report on the Results of the Activities 
of the Institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016, 93, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://ombudsmen.gov.ba/Dokumenti.aspx?id=27&tip=1&lang=EN. Cf. also ECtHR, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, 22 December 2009; and ECtHR, Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 
3681/06, 15 July 2014. 
71 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, 
53, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/report. 
72 Parliament of the United Kingdom, Equality Act 2006, 16 February 2006, Section 16. The Northern Ireland Act more 
broadly refers to the “investigations” that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission can undertake to “keep under 
review the adequacy and effectiveness in Northern Ireland of law and practice relating to the protection of human rights” 
(cf. Parliament of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland Act 1998, 19 November 1998, Section 69).  
73 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Preventing Deaths in Detention of Adults with Mental Health Conditions, 23 
February 2015, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/preventing-
deaths-detention-adults-mental-health-conditions-report. 
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home care for older people,74 while the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission referred to the 
Convention and the Court’s jurisprudence when investigating, inter alia, access to justice for 
unrepresented litigants,75 Travellers and their right to housing,76 alternative care for children,77 hate 
crimes,78 and detention at borders.79 
The Serbian Protector of Citizens has also made multiple references to the ECHR and the 
ECtHR case-law in its special reports on the situation of LGBT people in Serbia80 and on domestic 
violence.81 On its part, the Armenian Human Rights Defender, in introducing its ad hoc report on the 
right to a fair trial, stated that the “the Report analyzes the relevant provisions of the European 
convention, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights … the national legislation of the 
Republic of Armenia and law enforcement practice in the country under the light of its conformity to 
the European standards”.82  
As has been shown in Chapter 3, NHRIs are not infrequently designated as the National 
Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs) for their countries under the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture. Moreover, even when they have not been officially designated as NPMs, NHRIs 
                                                        
74 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Close to home: An inquiry into older people and human rights in home care, 
31 October 2011, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/close-home-
inquiry-older-people-and-human-rights-home-care.  
75 Gráinne McKeever et al., Litigants in person in Northern Ireland: barriers to legal participation (Ulster University: 
Belfast, 2018), accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.nihrc.org/publication/detail/full-report-litigants-in-person-in-
northern-ireland-barriers-to-legal-parti.  
76 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Travellers’ Accommodation in Northern 
Ireland. Full Report, 6 March 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.nihrc.org/publication/detail/out-of-sight-out-
of-mind-travellers-accommodation-in-ni-full-report.  
77 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Alternative Care and Children’s Rights in Northern Ireland, 21 August 
2015, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.nihrc.org/publications/alternative-care-and-children.  
78 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Racist Hate Crime: Human Rights and the Criminal Justice System in 
Northern Ireland, 15 October 2013, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.nihrc.org/publication/detail/racist-hate-crime-
human-rights-and-the-criminal-justice-system-in-nort. 
79 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Our Hidden Borders: The UK Border Agency’s Powers of Detention, 18 
April 2009, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.nihrc.org/publication/detail/our-hidden-borders-uk-agency-powers-of-
detention.  
80 Protector of Citizens of Serbia, LGBT Population in Serbia – Situation of Human Rights and Social Status, September 
2011, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.ombudsman.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=75:lgbt-population-in-serbia-
situation-of-human-rights-and-social-status&catid=12:special-reports&Itemid=14.  
81 Protector of Citizens of Serbia, Special Report on the Situation of Domestic Violence against Women in Serbia, June 
2011, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.ombudsman.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=12&Itemid=14&lim
itstart=12.   
82 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Public Ad-Hoc Report: Ensuring Right to a Fair Trial in the 
Republic of Armenia, 2009, 6, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.ombuds.am/en/publications/special_reports.html. 
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might still be vested with powers of inspection of detention facilities and other places of deprivation 
of liberty. In carrying out these duties, NHRIs do not only refer to the standards enshrined in the UN 
Convention against Torture, but also to the ECHR (primarily Articles 3 and 8) and the abundant 
ECtHR case-law on the conditions of detention. 
At times NHRIs have made specific reference to the need to give effect to ECtHR judgments 
issued on the matter against their own countries: the Armenian Ombudsman recalled several 
judgments against Armenia on the overcrowding of cells,83 while the Croatian and Polish 
Ombudsmen highlighted that on various occasions their respective countries had been censured by 
the ECtHR for the inability of the competent authorities to follow up complaints by prisoners that 
they had been mistreated in detention.84  
More often, NHRIs have referred to the Convention and the Court’s jurisprudence in general, 
on aspects such as the right to visits for prisoners on remand,85 personal searches,86 and the rights of 
persons deprived of liberty at borders.87 
 
5.6. Handling individual complaints 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Paris Principles define the handling of individual complaints of 
human rights violations as an optional function for NHRIs.88 Typically, human rights ombudsmen as 
                                                        
83 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Annual Report. The Activity of Human Rights Defender of 
Republic of Armenia in 2016 as National Preventive Mechanism, 2017, 11, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.ombuds.am/en/publications/annual_reports.html. 
84 Ombudsman of Croatia, Report on the Performance of Activities of the National Preventive Mechanism for 2015, 
August 2016, 25-26, and Report on the performance of activities of the National Preventive Mechanism for 2014, 
September 2015, 12, both available at http://ombudsman.hr/en/reports (accessed 4 January 2019). Cf. also Commissioner 
for Human Rights of Poland, Report of the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights on the Activities of the National 
Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture in 2016, 2017, 53-54, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/reports-national-preventive-mechanism. 
85 Public Defender of Georgia, NPM Report 2017, 15. As of May 2019, the Report is accessible at the temporary link 
https://sites.google.com/view/geoombudsman2/reports/national-preventive-mechanism?authuser=0 (accessed 21 May 
2019).  
86 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, Report of the Human Rights Defender on the activities of the National 
Preventive Mechanism in Poland in 2014, 2015, 21, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/reports-
national-preventive-mechanism.  
87 Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the Observance of Human and Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms. Summary 2014, 2014, 38, accessed 4 
January 2019, http://www.theioi.org/ioi-members/europe/ukraine/parliament-commissioner-for-human-rights. 
88 Cf. supra n 2. 
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well as commissions with a protection mandate are vested with this responsibility, which, 
nonetheless, displays notable variations as regards the bodies that are subject to the oversight of the 
NHRI (most commonly, as far as public bodies are concerned, the head of State, parliament, judiciary, 
and armed forces are excluded), the subject-areas on which the review by the NHRI can be exercised 
(e.g., the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights can only examine complaints concerning 
discrimination), the powers conferred on the NHRI to carry out its tasks (e.g., the powers to conduct 
searches or summon witnesses), and the consequences attached to a finding by the NHRI that a 
violation has taken place.  
In the latter respect, NHRIs are often tasked with promoting a mediation between the parties 
and/or issuing recommendations that, as such, are not binding. Nonetheless, at least some NHRIs can, 
in case of non-compliance with their recommendations by the public bodies concerned, publicise the 
findings of their reviews (e.g., the Armenian Human Rights Defender), notify the parliament and/or 
government of the non-compliance (e.g., the Croatian, Portuguese, and Spanish Ombudsmen), or 
even ask the courts to enforce their recommendations, which thus become essentially binding, or to 
otherwise remedy the violations found (e.g., NHRIs from Azerbaijan, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Great Britain). Various NHRIs (such as those from Hungary, Lithuania and Serbia) can 
petition courts or other competent bodies in order to dismiss public officials who have been found by 
NHRIs, during their investigations into individual complaints, to have committed disciplinary or 
criminal offences.  
In dealing with the individual complaints submitted to them, NHRIs can apply the ECHR and 
ECtHR jurisprudence as well as ensure that ECtHR judgments against their countries are given effect 
to. The Polish Commissioner for Human Rights examined complaints and undertook investigations 
ex officio in light of various ECtHR judgments against Poland, including on the excessive length of 
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domestic proceedings89 and on strip searches and the regime for dangerous detainees.90 The 
Commissioner also followed up the interim measures prescribed by the ECtHR to withhold the 
expulsion of a Belarusian asylum seeker to his country of origin.91 
The Albanian People’s Advocate was involved in a case concerning the restitution of 
confiscated land after the complainants had secured an ECtHR judgment in their favour, which, 
however, had not been executed promptly by the Albanian authorities. The Advocate urged the 
competent authorities to give full effect to the ECtHR judgment in question as soon as possible.92  
Further examples can be drawn from the practice of the Spanish Defensor del Pueblo and of 
the Hungarian Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. The former, inter alia, has routinely referred 
to the ECtHR judgment in Moreno Gómez in deciding on complaints about noises and the consequent 
potential breach of the right to respect for private life.93 The latter, approached by an individual 
complaining about the lack of a maximum limit for the consideration of eligibility for parole, 
maintained that the situation in Hungary was not fully in line with a previous ECtHR judgment against 
the country and thus made recommendations to remedy the persistent violation and fully execute the 
judgment.94 On another occasion, the Hungarian Commissioner made reference to an ECtHR 
                                                        
89 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, Summary of the Report on the Activity of the Commissioner for Human 
Rights in 2016 with Comments on the Observance of Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms, 2017, 62, accessed 4 January 
2019, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/report.  
90 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, supra n 23, 29, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/report.   
91 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, “The Commissioner’s inquiry to the Border Guard and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs regarding the foreigner who was refused entry to Poland”, 13 June 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/commissioner%E2%80%99s-inquiry-border-guard-and-ministry-foreign-affairs-
regarding-foreigner-who-was-refused. 
92 Committee of Ministers/Secretariat General, 1294 meeting (September 2017) (DH). Communication from the applicant 
(12/07/2017) in the case of Gjonbocari and Others v. Albania (Application No. 10508/02), 13 July 2017, DH-
DD(2017)810.  
93 Cf., among many others, Defensor del Pueblo, “Planificación de los eventos en la carpa municipal para minimizar las 
molestias por ruido”, Sugerencia, 26 March 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/resultados-busqueda-
resoluciones/?tipo_documento=resoluciones&subtipo=sugerencia. The ECtHR judgment referred to is ECtHR, Moreno 
Gómez v. Spain, no. 4143/02, 16 November 2004. 
94 Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary, Report on the Activities of the Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights and his Deputies 2017, 2018, 31-32, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ajbh.hu/zh/web/ajbh-en/annual-
reports. 
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judgment delivered against Hungary to hold that a prison administration had violated the right of 
detainees to the secrecy of their correspondence.95 
Many other NHRIs have used the ECHR and the ECtHR case-law as the bases to decide on the 
complaints submitted to them on a variety of subjects. The Armenian Human Rights Defender, for 
instance, determined that while the conduct of some police officers in confronting a journalist did not 
amount to criminal conduct, it was nonetheless contrary to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in respect 
of freedom of speech; the Defender thus recommended that the police refrain from a similar behaviour 
in the future.96 The Finnish Parliamentary Ombudsman has repeatedly relied upon the Convention 
and Court’s case-law to handle cases regarding, inter alia, unconsented medical treatment, unlawful 
house searches, the return of seized property, and teachers’ freedom of speech.97 The Russian 
Commissioner for Human Rights applied the ECHR as interpreted by the Court to deal with a 
complaint about insufficient consideration of house arrest as an alternative to detention in the pre-
trial phase and with a complaint about an injunction, imposed on a journalist convicted of “knowingly 
false denunciation” and “insult of the authorities”, to refrain from his journalistic work for two 
years.98  
On its part, the Institute of Human Rights Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina referred to 
the Convention and the Court’s case-law in handling complaints about, inter alia, religious 
discrimination at school,99 unlawful limitations on the right of assembly of LGBT people,100 and 
                                                        
95 Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary, “Privacy in Prison – The Ombudsman's View on Illegal Control of 
a Prisoner's Letter”, Press releases, 2 September 2013, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.ajbh.hu/en/web/ajbh-
en/press-releases/-/content/ujPUErMfB9lw/privacy-in-prison-the-ombudsman-s-view-on-illegal-control-of-a-prisoner-
s-letter. 
96 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Annual Report on the Activities of the RA Human Rights Defender 
and on the Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Country during 2012, 2013, 28-29, accessed 
4 January 2019, http://www.ombuds.am/en/publications/annual_reports.html. 
97 Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland, Summary of the Annual Report 2016, 2017, 125-128, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/en_GB/web/guest/annual-reports. Cf. also Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland, “A 
teacher's freedom of speech was violated by the municipality”, Press releases, 7 July 2015, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/en_GB/-/a-teacher-s-freedom-of-speech-was-violated-by-the-municipality. 
98 Cf., respectively, High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, supra n 26, 56, and supra n 25, 53-
54. 
99 Institute of Human Rights Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017 Annual Report on the Results of the Activities 
of the Institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, March 2018, 89, accessed 4 January 
2019, http://ombudsmen.gov.ba/Dokumenti.aspx?id=27&tip=1&lang=EN. 
100 Ibid., 110-111.  
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infringements on the peaceful enjoyment of property.101 More generally, it appears that the Institute 
regularly applies ECHR standards when deciding on individual cases submitted to it; for instance, 
complaints concerning various aspects of the right to a fair trial are examined in light of Article 6 
ECHR and the relevant ECtHR case-law.102  
 
5.7. Approaching national courts 
In addition to resorting to courts on completion of the examination of individual complaints 
(where applicable), a considerable number of NHRIs are vested with other prerogatives vis-à-vis the 
judicial consideration of instances of human rights violations.  
Most human rights ombudsmen from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, for instance, can petition 
the respective constitutional courts for the review of legislative or regulatory acts. As the ECHR not 
infrequently has constitutional status or is otherwise used as a parameter to establish the 
constitutionality of laws and other acts, NHRIs have referred, in their submissions, to the Convention 
as interpreted by the ECtHR to challenge the constitutional legitimacy of the contested measures.  
Among others, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner challenged the constitutionality and 
ECHR-compliance of a provision of the national code of criminal procedure according to which pre-
trial restrictive measures were automatically prolonged by the judge at the preliminary hearing in the 
absence of a specific request to the contrary from the accused, even when a motivated request of 
                                                        
101 Ibid., 32, concerning the hindrance of the complainant’s access to his house because of the loading and unloading of 
cargo; the case was decided on the basis of Article 1 Protocol 1 to the ECHR. Cf. also Institute of Human Rights 
Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra n 70, 31, concerning the noise produced by the electric chainsaws of a 
business activity; the case was decided on the basis of Article 8 ECHR.  
102 Institute of Human Rights Ombudsmen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annual Report on Results of the Activities by the 
Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2010, 2011, Annex I, 147 et seqq., accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://ombudsmen.gov.ba/Dokumenti.aspx?id=27&tip=1&lang=EN. The table identifies violations of the right to a fair 
trial as violations of Article 6 ECHR. 
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extension from the public prosecutor was lacking.103 The Constitutional Court, in striking the 
provision as unconstitutional, also highlighted that it violated Article 5 ECHR.104  
The Hungarian Commissioner too asked for the Constitutional Court’s intervention in relation 
to the regulation of pre-trial detention, which at that time in Hungary could be indefinite for the most 
serious crimes.105 The right to liberty and security and the presumption of innocence, as enshrined in 
the Fundamental Law of Hungary and as interpreted by a well-established ECtHR jurisprudence, 
were at the heart of the Commissioner’s submission.106  
Pre-trial detention was also the subject of a constitutional petition by the Polish Commissioner 
which, in light of the country’s constitution and of the ECtHR case-law, “challenged the possibility 
of using pre-trial detention on the sole grounds of severity of sanctions for the act committed by the 
suspect, in a situation when there is no risk that he/she will hinder the proceedings”.107 On another 
occasion, the Polish Commissioner petitioned the Constitutional Court with a view to banning 
detention for persons convicted of defamation as contrary to the freedom of expression protected by 
both the Polish Constitution and the ECHR;108 and in yet another instance, the Commissioner asked 
the Constitutional Court to curb the extensive powers conferred on the security services by the new 
Anti-Terrorism Act again by referring, inter alia, to the ECHR.109  
The Spanish and Portuguese Ombudsmen too are vested with the power to initiate constitutional 
complaints, and the latter challenged the possibility that judges be moved and proceedings be 
transferred according to discretionary decisions by the Superior Council of the Judiciary also in light 
                                                        
103 Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, “On the constitutional petition of the Ombudsperson the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine rendered a decision that is important for development of legal system”, News, 24 
November 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/en/all-news/pr/181217-dd-on-the-
constitutional-petition-of-the-ombudsperson-the-constitutional/. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary, Report on the Activities of the Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights and his Deputies 2015, 2016, 36, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ajbh.hu/zh/web/ajbh-en/annual-reports. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, supra n 89, 28-29.   
108 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, Summary of Report on the Activity of the Ombudsman in Poland in 2012 
with Remarks on the Observance of Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms, 2013, 16, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/report. 
109 Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, “The Commissioner for Human Rights challenges the Anti-Terrorism Act 
before the Constitutional Tribunal”, 11 July 2016, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/commissioner-human-rights-challenges-anti-terrorism-act-constitutional-tribunal. 
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of the right to a fair trial enshrined in the Convention.110 As a final example, as a result of recent 
amendments to its founding law, the Armenian Human Rights Defender has developed a close 
relationship with the Constitutional Court, to which the Defender submits petitions and amicus curiae 
briefs on human rights issues, which can include references to the ECHR and the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.111 
NHRIs can also initiate other types of proceedings before domestic courts: the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission of Great Britain, for instance, can institute proceedings “whether for 
judicial review or otherwise” to challenge the lawfulness of decisions or actions by public bodies.112 
The Commission can further request an injunction if it believes “that a person is likely to commit an 
unlawful act”.113 The Ukrainian Commissioner, on its part, is entitled to institute proceedings in the 
public interest or protect the rights and interests of individuals who cannot apply to court 
themselves.114 
Additionally, NHRIs can offer legal assistance and/or representation to victims of human rights 
violations; this is the case, among others, for the Irish and British commissions, as well as for the 
Danish Institute for Human Rights as regards instances of discrimination. In this capacity, the Danish 
Institute recently assisted the complainants in a family reunification case as well as in a case 
concerning the stripping of the right to vote from disabled people subject to guardianship.115 In both 
instances the Institute referred to the relevant ECtHR case-law and both cases are in the process of 
being referred to the ECtHR following adverse judgments by the Danish Supreme Court.116 
                                                        
110 Portuguese Ombudsman, Portuguese Ombudsman – National Human Rights Institution. Report to the Parliament – 
2016, 2017, accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.provedor-jus.pt/?idc=16.  
111 Interview with Mikayel Khachatryan, Head of the International Cooperation Department at the Human Rights 
Defender of the Republic of Armenia, 15 November 2018, on file with author. 
112 Equality Act 2006, supra n 72, Section 30. 
113 Ibid., Section 24. 
114 Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, “Procedural rights of the Commissioner”, accessed 4 January 
2019, http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/en/page/secretariat/pravo-na-sudovij-zaxist/povnovazhennya-upovnovazhenogo-
u-sudovomu-proczesi/. 
115 Danish Institute for Human Rights, Human Rights on the Agenda. Report 2017-18, 2018, 20 and 26, accessed 4 January 
2019, https://www.humanrights.dk/publications/annual-report-danish-parliament-2017-18. 
116 Ibid. The case concerning family reunification has been lodged with the ECtHR as M.A. v. Denmark, no. 6697/18, 
communicated on 7 September 2018. The Danish Institute filed a third-party intervention in this case in January 2019 
(interview with Christoffer Badse, Director of the Monitoring Department at the Danish Institute for Human Rights, 21 
February 2019, on file with author). 
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Another power conferred on some NHRIs vis-à-vis national courts, which has often been used 
to introduce ECHR standards and the ECtHR case-law into domestic proceedings, is the submission 
of third-party interventions or amicus curiae briefs. In essence, in these instances, NHRIs are not 
parties to the proceedings nor do they represent other parties, but they assist the courts by providing 
their expert opinion on issues of fact or law raised by the case.117  
Once again, commissions with a protection mandate are among the most active contributors in 
this area. The Equality and Human Rights Commission of Great Britain made reference to the 
Convention and the Court’s jurisprudence when intervening as a third party in cases concerning, inter 
alia, cuts to the legal aid for prisoners as regards certain kinds of proceedings,118 cuts to social housing 
benefits,119 the right of patients to be consulted on decisions concerning their cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation,120 the right to life of British soldiers deployed abroad and the right of their families to 
thorough investigations into their deaths,121 and the detention of asylum seekers pending examination 
of their claims.122 
The Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission similarly intervened before national courts 
by presenting arguments based on the Convention, as interpreted by the ECtHR, on a variety of 
subjects including the right to private and family life of non-nationals,123 the potential conflict 
                                                        
117 For more on amicus curiae briefs and third-party interventions, cf. Section 3.6 of this dissertation.  
118 Equality and Human Rights Commission, “Prisoners will be able to access legal aid for important hearings”, News, 
accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-work/news/prisoners-will-be-able-access-legal-
aid-important-hearings. Cf. also Court of Appeal (Civil Division), R (Howard League for Penal Reform and The 
Prisoners’ Claimants Advice Service) v. The Lord Chancellor [2017] EWCA Civ 244 (10 April 2017). 
119 Equality and Human Rights Commission, “Bedroom tax: success and failure for disabled people at the Supreme 
Court”, Blog, 30 November 2016, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-
work/blogs/bedroom-tax-success-and-failure-disabled-people-supreme-court. Cf. also UK Supreme Court, R 
(Carmichael and Rourke) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and other appeals [2016] UKSC 58 (9 November 
2016). 
120 Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Tracey v. Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust & Others [2014] 
EWCA Civ 822 (17 June 2014). 
121 Equality and Human Rights Commission, “The Smith Case. Supreme Court decision in Jason Smith Human Rights 
Case”,  30 June 2010, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/legal-casework/smith-case. 
122 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Detention Action v Secretary of State for the Home Department. Skeleton 
Argument on Behalf of the Equality And Human Rights Commission, 2 December 2013, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/legal-casework/human-rights-legal-cases.  
123 Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, Luximon v Minister for Justice and Equality / Balchand v Minister for 
Justice and Equality. Outline Legal Submissions on Behalf of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, 11 July 
2017, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ihrec.ie/documents/luximon-v-minister-justice-equality-balchand-v-
minister-justice-equality-november-2017/.  
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between a finding of contempt of court and freedom of expression,124 the deprivation of liberty of 
people with a mental disability,125 extradition to countries where the respect for fundamental rights 
is at risk,126 and assisted suicide.127 
The Georgian Ombudsman has also submitted amicus curiae briefs referring to European 
human rights standards in proceedings concerning, inter alia, temporary resident permits and 
extradition proceedings.128 
While at times NHRIs have included references to ECtHR judgments delivered against their 
home countries in their submissions to national courts, most interventions refer to the well-established 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR with a view to influencing the interpretation of domestic acts or otherwise 
bringing them in line with the European standards, rather than promoting the execution of specific 
judgments. 
 
5.8. Preliminary conclusions 
NHRIs have demonstrably engaged, through the exercise of their core domestic functions, in 
the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments and of the implementation of the ECHR. Thanks 
to their expertise, links with multiple national actors, and wide-ranging tasks in the promotion and 
                                                        
124 Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, Tracey v. District Judge Aeneas McCarthy. Legal Submissions of the 
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Curiae, 9 December 2014, accessed 4 January 2019, https://www.ihrec.ie/documents/the-attorney-general-v-damache/. 
Cf. also the case of Marques v the Director of Public Prosecutions and Attorney General v Marques, mentioned in Irish 
Human Rights and Equality Commission, Annual Report 2016, 2017, 14, accessed 4 January 2019, 
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128 Public Defender of Georgia, Activity Report 2014 of Public Defender of Georgia, 16 December 2014, 24. As of May 
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reports?authuser=0 (accessed 21 May 2019). Other briefs by the Public Defender, which are not currently available on 
its website, have concerned freedom of expression, discrimination on religious grounds, and discrimination on the basis 
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protection of human rights, NHRIs have helped the relevant European standards seep into different 
areas of domestic law and practice and be absorbed by different domestic institutions and actors.  
Admittedly, the collection of empirical data carried out for this chapter has shown that, while 
most European A-status NHRIs appear well versed in the ECHR standards and ECtHR jurisprudence, 
room for growth exists as far as the direct support by NHRIs to the execution of ECtHR judgments 
delivered against their home countries is concerned. Nonetheless, with regard to the domestic 
mandate of NHRIs, the distinction between the execution of ECtHR judgments on the one hand and 
the implementation of the ECHR as interpreted by the Court on the other is arguably more nuanced. 
This chapter has shown that NHRIs have a solid knowledge of the Convention and of the Court’s 
well-established case-law, pay increasing attention to the judgments delivered by the Court,129 are 
aware of the effects of these judgments on the national plane, and use them as a tool to advance the 
promotion and protection of human rights in their home countries. 
Some NHRIs have been even more forward-looking and have acted to ensure that their States 
comply with new ECtHR judgments delivered against other countries, thereby potentially preventing 
future interventions by the ECtHR against their States. Accordingly, the Finnish Human Rights 
Centre organised an information session for members of the Finnish Parliament about the Delfi v. 
Estonia judgment, regarding the responsibility of news websites for defamatory comments from 
users.130 Similarly, the Danish Institute for Human Rights addressed recommendations to its 
Government following an ECtHR judgment against Belgium concerning the expulsion of seriously 
ill foreigners.131 More generally, in carrying out its advisory functions towards the Parliament and 
Government, and particularly in commenting on bills, the Danish Institute often refers to ECtHR 
                                                        
129 While examples for this chapter have been collected from the whole ten-year span considered, an increasing volume 
of examples could be found in the last years of this period. 
130 Cf. supra Section 5.2. 
131 Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra n 115, 21. The judgment referred to is presumably ECtHR, Paposhvili v. 
Belgium [GC], no. 41738/10, 13 December 2016. 
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judgments delivered against other countries insofar as applicable to Denmark,132 as the judgments 
issued by the Court directly against Denmark are overall rare. 
In sum, NHRIs have a strong record of promoting the alignment of their domestic legal orders 
with international standards, including the ones from Strasbourg. While to date NHRIs cannot be said 
to have systematically followed up the execution of all (or even most) ECtHR judgments directed at 
their countries, they appear to increasingly take the initiative in this respect as well as be involved by 
their governments. The example set by the French Government, which now formally submits its 
action plans to the CNCDH before forwarding them to the Committee of Ministers, might soon be 
followed by others.  
Moreover, in many countries NHRIs constitute the natural point of reference for individuals 
who claim to be the victims of human rights violations. Increasing familiarity of the public with the 
Convention and the Court’s action means that a growing number of people address NHRIs to learn 
about the Convention, how to apply to the ECtHR or how to seek redress following ECtHR 
judgments.  
These domestic driving forces, coupled with the developments at the CoE level, namely the 
strengthened supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments and the greater involvement of 
diverse supranational and national actors including NHRIs,133 are likely to further encourage the 
engagement of NHRIs with the execution process of ECtHR judgments.  
 
                                                        
132 Interview with Badse, Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra n 116, 26 October 2017. 
133 Cf. Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUDING  
 
It has long been recognised that the ECtHR is overwhelmed by an excessive influx of 
applications, which it struggles to keep pace with. After a number of amendments have been 
introduced to add admissibility hurdles and to allow the Court to deal with admissible applications 
more expeditiously, the recent debate on the reform of the Convention’s system has mainly focused 
on the need to strengthen the national implementation of the Convention and ensure the prompt and 
full execution of the Court’s judgments. More sustained action by Member States on these aspects 
would also facilitate the work of the Committee of Ministers, which is responsible for supervising 
the execution of ECtHR judgments and whose overload has also been acknowledged more recently.  
This conceptual shift from the international level to the national one, while proclaimed in the 
context of all the latest High-level Conferences on the future of the Court, does not appear to have 
led to major concrete changes yet. The drafting of Protocol no. 16, which allows the highest courts 
of States Parties to seek the advisory opinion of the ECtHR on the interpretation and application of 
the Convention, is a first step in this direction, but it is too soon to assess its impact.1 As to the 
reference to “subsidiarity” introduced by Protocol no. 15, it has arguably proved more controversial 
than helpful.2 
Nonetheless, it would appear that an existing opportunity to reinforce this shift and contribute 
to the realisation of subsidiarity without giving governments carte blanche has not been fully pursued 
in practice and has been given limited consideration in the literature; reference is here made to the 
potential role of NHRIs. Since 2006, these institutions have been explicitly entitled to provide 
information to the Committee of Ministers regarding the execution of ECtHR judgments. Moreover, 
                                                        
1 The Protocol only entered into force in August 2018 for the ten States which are parties to it. 
2 Cf. Section 1.1 of this dissertation for the notion of “subsidiarity” in the context of the ECHR system and for the debate 
concerning its scope and consequences. 
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in the exercise of their core national functions, NHRIs routinely promote the harmonisation of 
domestic legal orders with international norms and judgments, including ECtHR judgments.  
This dissertation has investigated the extent to which NHRIs have engaged in the above-
mentioned activities and contributed to the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments. More 
specifically, a comprehensive analysis of all communications submitted by NHRIs to the Committee 
of Ministers was undertaken, whereas the domestic activities of NHRIs in the area were systematised 
and illustrated through examples. On the basis of the findings of this empirical analysis, this chapter 
further reflects on whether and how the contribution by NHRIs to the promotion of the execution of 
ECtHR judgments can be strengthened, and what obstacles may need to be removed in order to allow 
for greater engagement on the part of NHRIs and greater impact of their interventions. 
 
6.1. Research findings 
Chapter 2 showed that, over time, a number of adjustments were made to the supranational 
procedure for the supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments with a view to rendering it more 
objective, transparent, and open to the participation of actors other than government representatives. 
In this context, a space was carved out for NHRIs specifically by way of Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 
the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments, which constitutes the 
first formal recognition of a concrete role for NHRIs in the Convention’s system. 
Through this provision, NHRIs (better, “national institutions for the promotion and protection 
of human rights” as broadly interpreted at the CoE level) are expected to provide comprehensive and 
accurate information on the status of execution of judgments, by virtue of their privileged position as 
domestic institutions (thus closer to the situation on the ground than CoE bodies) which are 
independent from other State organs but also distinct from NGOs.  
The “unique position” of NHRIs was analysed in detail in Chapter 3. As State bodies, NHRIs 
may have access to information that is precluded to NGOs and have at their disposal different means 
of putting pressure on the public bodies whose actions they are mandated to oversee. Unlike NGOs, 
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NHRIs should not be guided in the exercise of this monitoring function by advocacy aims or by the 
interests of their members, but only by the general interest in seeing that State bodies comply with 
their human rights obligations.  
In addition, NHRIs that adhere to the Paris Principles3 are institutionally tasked with 
cooperating with international organisations to ensure that international standards and decisions are 
duly implemented by States. The UN has been particularly active in this respect; indeed, the 
establishment itself of NHRIs and their characterisation as “bridges” between the national and 
international levels have long been encouraged by the UN, which has developed a particularly close 
relationship with NHRIs over time. Chapter 3 illustrated how pervasive this relationship has become, 
how it has extended to all main UN bodies and mechanisms that deal with the promotion and 
protection of human rights, how a role for NHRIs has been laid down in human rights treaties 
negotiated at the UN level, and how the UN General Assembly is advocating for a relationship to be 
established between NHRIs and additional UN bodies and programmes.  
It was also shown that a comparable relationship does not currently exist between NHRIs and 
the CoE; before 2006, NHRIs were not given any formal role within the CoE monitoring system and 
were regularly involved almost exclusively by the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights. However, 
arguably in light of the increasing focus on the effective execution of the Court’s judgments and 
implementation of the Convention by States Parties, this state of affairs appears to be changing: 
references to a role for NHRIs have multiplied in the official documents by CoE bodies and found 
their way in the declarations concluding the latest Conferences on the future of the Convention’s 
system.4 It remains the case that a broad notion of “national institutions” is adopted at the CoE level, 
which includes bodies that do not comply with the Paris Principles. 
At any rate, there appears to be a growing interest in the potential of NHRIs and other domestic 
entities such as ombudsmen and equality bodies to provide independent and reliable information to 
                                                        
3 The so-called Paris Principles are the international non-binding standards which regulate the composition and mandate 
of NHRIs; cf. Chapter 3 of this dissertation for more information. 
4 Cf. Section 3.6 of this dissertation. 
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the CoE as well as to act at the national level to further the execution of the Court’s judgments. As a 
matter of fact, the added value of the involvement of these institutions in promoting the execution of 
ECtHR judgments would not only lie in their role as an additional source of information for the 
relevant CoE bodies, but also in their closer relationship with the domestic authorities. This 
relationship allows NHRIs (and, in the view of the CoE, comparable bodies) to cooperate with willing 
State authorities when these are hindered by the complexity of the measures required to fully execute 
ECtHR judgments, and to exert pressure on unwilling authorities. 
The dissertation has thus built on the following established facts. First, a supranational role for 
NHRIs in promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments has been accepted by CoE Member States, 
resulting in the adoption of new Rule 9(2) of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers, and has been 
relied on by the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the ECtHR. Second, most of the core 
domestic activities carried out by NHRIs can be directed at the promotion of the execution of ECtHR 
judgments.  
Accordingly, Chapter 4 investigated the use that has been made of the Rule 9(2) procedure by 
the actors concerned and it assessed whether such use meets the objectives underlying the procedure 
– namely, essentially, the provision of additional or different information to the Committee of 
Ministers and the development of something akin to “adversarial proceedings” between the 
government concerned and other actors when necessary. Complementarily, Chapter 5 investigated 
the extent to which traditional domestic activities of European NHRIs can be and have actually been 
aimed at furthering the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
On the basis of the empirical findings of these investigations, recommendations are made in 
this section in order for these existing mechanisms to effectively achieve the goals set for them as 
well as for the potentialities of the well-established mandates of NHRIs to be fully exploited as 
regards the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments.     
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Chapter 4 analysed the use that NHRIs have made of the opportunity to submit communications 
to the Committee of Ministers regarding the execution of ECtHR judgments, which is the main 
avenue for NHRIs to contribute at the CoE level to the execution of ECtHR judgments. The chapter 
also examined how this use has been received by the main interlocutors of NHRIs in the context of 
the supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments – namely States, the Committee of Ministers, 
and the Department for the Execution of Judgments. More specifically, Chapter 4 sought to answer 
the following research questions: 
 
Q1: To what extent have NHRIs contributed to promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments?  
a) Which NHRIs have interacted with the Committee of Ministers and the Department 
for the Execution of Judgments to this end?  
b) In relation to which cases have NHRIs interacted with these bodies?  
c) How have NHRIs interacted with these bodies? 
d) What have been the effects of these interactions? 
 
The analysis carried out in Chapter 4 showed that twelve national human rights structures have 
filed communications with the Committee of Ministers to date – a small number compared to the 
number of NHRIs, classical ombudsmen, and equality bodies that have been established in CoE 
Member States and are entitled to intervene in the procedure.  
Participants include NHRIs in full compliance with the Paris Principles, partially compliant 
institutions as well as non-accredited bodies such as classical ombudsmen. Participants also differ as 
to their composition and functions, ranging from consultative commissions to commissions with a 
protection mandate, and from classical to human rights ombudsmen. Submissions to the Committee 
of Ministers at the execution stage are thus not a prerogative of A-status NHRIs nor of a particular 
category of national institutions, in line with the traditionally inclusive notion of national human 
rights structures in the CoE context.  
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The number of communications submitted by national human rights structures is also rather 
limited – thirty-three communications in relation to twenty-five cases or groups of cases, in contrast 
with the hundreds of communications forwarded by NGOs.  
NHRIs5 appear to have intervened in relation to cases that entail violations of core ECHR rights 
or severe violations of other ECHR rights as well as cases that can be qualified as legally important, 
from the point of view of either the Court’s jurisprudence or the national legal order. Indeed, NHRIs 
were especially concerned with judgments requiring, in their opinion, the adoption of general 
measures at the domestic level in order to be fully implemented. The expertise already developed by 
NHRIs on the subject in the exercise of their domestic mandates would appear as another relevant 
factor in the decision of the institutions to submit Rule 9(2) communications. 
As to the content of communications, NHRIs have tended to submit communications providing 
the Committee of Ministers with additional information compared to the information provided by 
governments, as well as different information or different interpretations of governmental information 
– even though, in two instances, NHRIs supported the positions of governments. The information 
submitted by NHRIs has commonly referred to the legislation, administrative practice, jurisprudence, 
and institutional arrangements regulating a certain matter at the national level; but it has also consisted 
of numerical and statistical data and their analysis (e.g., data on the prison population, the evictions 
of Travellers, the placement of Roma children in special classes).  
NHRIs have then built on these data to comment on the suitability and exhaustiveness of the 
general measures adopted by governments and on their actual implementation, and to put forward 
additional or alternative measures.  
Not infrequently, NHRIs have incorporated in their communications the data collected or the 
opinions expressed by other actors with which they regularly cooperate – from NGOs to independent 
                                                        
5 From now on, when referring to the “national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights” that have 
taken part in the Rule 9(2) procedure, unless specified otherwise, the term “NHRIs” will be used to avoid too a 
cumbersome terminology (also considering that ten out of twelve intervening institutions are in fact NHRIs sensu stricto). 
It is understood that the concept adopted at the CoE level is broader than that of NHRIs as defined by the UN and the 
majority of scholars, as well as by the author of this dissertation. Cf., for further details, Chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
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domestic bodies and international monitoring mechanisms. Other elements that can be found in 
communications from NHRIs include (rather limited) observations on the individual measures 
proposed or taken by governments, as well as “procedural requests” to the Committee of Ministers to 
examine a case under standard or enhanced supervision or to refer a case back to the ECtHR.  
Chapter 4 further investigated whether the communications submitted to date by NHRIs have 
made a difference – i.e., whether they have succeeded in influencing the positions of the governments 
concerned, the assessments by the Department for the Execution of Judgments or the decisions by 
the Committee of Ministers. It was found that, in a few cases, NHRIs convinced their respective 
States to change their stances; more often, communications from NHRIs had an impact on the 
assessments conducted by the Department for Execution and on the determinations made by the 
Committee of Ministers (even though not all recommendations by the Department for Execution are 
followed by the Committee). However, in several instances, it was hardly possible to establish 
whether the submissions by NHRIs had had an impact at all, as the submissions were not analysed in 
their contents by the Department for Execution and the Committee nor, at times, mentioned at all.  
The situation is similar for NGOs, whose interventions appear to have also influenced the 
supervision of execution process at times, but whose actual contribution is difficult to evaluate in the 
absence of express reference to their communications. At any rate, it does not appear that the relevant 
CoE bodies make a distinction between submissions by NHRIs on the one hand and submissions by 
NGOs on the other as such. As for States, the explicit recognition by some of them of the special 
importance attached to the views of NHRIs has rarely translated in the prompt and spontaneous 
acceptance of the recommendations made by these institutions.  
 
An examination of the role played by NHRIs in promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments 
would have been incomplete if the national activities of NHRIs were not considered. It has emerged 
from Chapter 3 that A-status NHRIs in particular are given a broad mandate to promote and protect 
human rights and that, in accordance with their founding laws, they undertake wide-ranging activities 
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to this end – from advising national authorities to conducting visits in places of detention, from 
providing training and education on human rights to handling individual complaints of human rights 
violations. These activities are likely to intersect the furtherance of the execution of ECtHR 
judgments, as the national and international planes of human rights promotion and protection are 
strictly intertwined, as are the national and international dimensions of the mandates of NHRIs.  
Chapter 5 thus set out to answer the following questions: 
 
Q1: To what extent have NHRIs contributed to promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments? 
… 
e) What activities have NHRIs carried out at the domestic level to promote the execution 
of ECtHR judgments? 
 
Once identified the main activities carried out by NHRIs at the national level for the promotion 
and protection of human rights, Chapter 5 gave examples of instances where A-status NHRIs, which, 
in light of their broad competences and more substantial resources, are especially expected to 
contribute to the execution of ECtHR judgments in a variety of ways, have exercised their domestic 
functions with a view to facilitating the execution of these judgments. While not all activities ever 
undertaken by NHRIs in this respect were considered, essentially because of accessibility reasons and 
resource constraints, the chapter offered a systematic portrayal of the ways in which NHRIs can 
contribute to the execution of ECtHR judgments and illustrated them by means of examples derived 
from the concrete experiences of NHRIs.  
Notwithstanding the limitations of this approach, the extensive analysis of the practice of the 
selected NHRIs allowed to conclude that, while many A-status NHRIs have promoted the execution 
of one or more ECtHR judgments against their countries in the exercise of one or more of their 
domestic functions, these institutions have more often referred to ECHR standards and the ECtHR 
well-established jurisprudence in general rather than systematically following up judgments directed 
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at their countries. On the other hand, NHRIs have at times promoted the execution of new ECtHR 
judgments issued against other States, where they found that similar violations were occurring in their 
jurisdictions, in order to avoid future adverse judgments against their countries.  
In sum, the work of most European A-status NHRIs is guided by a thorough understanding of 
the Convention and of the ECtHR case-law and increasing attention is being paid by these institutions 
to the judgments delivered by the ECtHR against their countries and others. This expertise is 
recognised by both national authorities, which interact with NHRIs on this level, and members of the 
public, who turn to NHRIs to know their rights under the Convention and how to protect them through 
national and international means.   
 
The findings, illustrated above, regarding the ways in which NHRIs have to date contributed to 
promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments lead to the following further research questions:   
 
Q2: Can the current contribution by NHRIs to promoting the execution of ECtHR judgments 
be strengthened? 
i) Are there obstacles that prevent greater engagement by NHRIs and, if so, how can they 
be removed?  
ii) Are there obstacles that prevent greater impact by NHRIs and, if so, how can they be 
removed? 
 
As far as the participation by NHRIs in the Rule 9(2) procedure is concerned, Chapter 4 
outlined, also on the basis of interviews with representatives from NHRIs, various possible reasons 
for the relatively low number of NHRIs submitting communications to the Committee of Ministers. 
A first obstacle to the engagement by NHRIs with the procedure can be the limitations on the 
institutions’ mandates as far as their thematic areas of competence or their cooperation with 
international organisations are concerned; this is mostly the case for classical ombudsmen, equality 
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bodies, and other national human rights structures that have sector-specific responsibilities and do 
not fully comply with the Paris Principles. Indeed, A-status NHRIs should be vested with broad 
human rights mandates and with the ability to routinely interact with international organisations.  
In this respect, at least from the 1980s, the CoE has recommended that its Member States 
establish effective institutions with a mandate to promote and protect human rights or, alternatively, 
attribute this mandate to existing institutions including classical ombudsmen. The most recent 
Declaration on the reform of the ECHR system, the so-called Copenhagen Declaration, specifically 
called upon States to institute NHRIs in compliance with the Paris Principles.6  
A rather straightforward solution to this first obstacle would thus be for States to ensure that 
their independent human rights structures have as broad a human rights mandate as possible and the 
explicit power to interact with international organisations to carry out this mandate. CoE bodies could 
join UN bodies in urging States to create strong independent NHRIs, preferably in compliance with 
the Paris Principles. This “external pressure” on the part of CoE bodies could strategically be directed 
at States that bear primary responsibility for the overloading of the ECtHR.  
Even A-status NHRIs with a broad mandate and the express prerogative to engage with 
international bodies might, however, be inhibited by scarce resources or insufficient expertise on the 
specific functioning of the ECHR system. It goes without saying that endowing NHRIs with 
additional financial resources would widen and strengthen their ability to promote and protect human 
rights, including by facilitating the execution of ECtHR judgments. If the execution of ECtHR 
judgments is considered a priority, NHRIs should be given additional funding that is appropriate to 
carry out the task on a regular basis. The issue of financial resources, in turn, is closely linked to that 
of staff resources – namely, increased funding would first of all guarantee the recruitment of a 
sufficient number of officers who are expert on the Convention’s standards and the Court’s case-law 
and are familiar with the opportunities for NHRIs to intervene in the life cycle of ECtHR cases.  
                                                        
6 High-level Conference, Copenhagen Declaration, 13 April 2018, para. 18.  
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The primary responsibility thus rests once again on governments, which should ensure that 
enough funding is allocated to NHRIs in order for them to effectively engage in the promotion of the 
execution of ECtHR judgments. Moreover, if NHRIs are valued as partners by the Court and the CoE 
bodies involved in the supervision of the execution of judgments, it can also be expected that the CoE 
undertakes capacity-building initiatives in this respect, particularly by supporting NHRIs that have 
limited resources and/or are established in States that have bad records before the Court. The CoE 
has indeed already devised and financed projects which are aimed, inter alia, at strengthening the 
capacities of NHRIs; specific training on how these institutions can contribute to the execution of 
ECtHR judgments could be included.7  
Nonetheless, the decision to allocate an adequate part of financial and staff resources to the 
execution of ECtHR judgments ultimately lies with NHRIs, which should be able to define their 
priorities, structure their departments, and recruit staff in complete independence. It may well be that 
NHRIs legitimately determine that following up the rulings delivered by the ECtHR should not be a 
priority of their mandates. As has been mentioned, smaller NHRIs or NHRIs which do not primarily 
focus on legal aspects might consider it more useful to engage in other activities.   
On the other hand, it has also been shown that all kinds of NHRIs (consultative commissions, 
commissions with a protection mandate, ombudsmen, and research institutes) can submit 
communications to the Committee of Ministers and that these communications need not entail 
complex legal analyses, but they can provide all sorts of data and information. Moreover, in the 
context of the supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments, the focus shifts from the specifics 
of the case before the Court to the wide range of general measures that might be needed to prevent 
future instances of violations. Thus, if the NHRI concerned is familiar with a certain subject-matter 
following its work at the national level, it could submit communications to the Committee of 
Ministers without devoting much additional financial and staff resources.  
                                                        
7 For an overview of these projects, cf. the dedicated CoE webpage, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/national-implementation/thematic-work/ombudsperson-anti-discrimination.   
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For instance, the Greek National Commission for Human Rights forwarded to the Committee 
of Ministers a report that it had drafted following consultations with civil society in the context of its 
domestic work on the issues of human trafficking and forced labour; similarly, the Serbian Protector 
of Citizens submitted its report on “missing children”, as did the Georgian Public Defender with its 
report on the disciplinary proceedings against law-enforcement officials; the French Commission 
followed up before the Committee of Ministers on its previous studies on the conditions of Roma and 
Travellers in France, and so on.8 
Consequently, the observation that the participation by NHRIs in the ECHR system is 
essentially different from their participation in the periodic reporting procedures before UN bodies 
appears true up to a point;9 because when it comes to the execution stage, and especially to the general 
measures of execution, the particularities of the cases before the ECtHR matter much less and NHRIs 
can contribute to the execution process with information that can be very similar to that submitted to 
UN bodies. The activities that NHRIs have already undertaken within their domestic competences, 
or with a view to contributing to the periodic reporting procedures before UN bodies, could be useful 
for the monitoring by the Committee of Ministers as well.   
In consideration of the above, it should also be examined whether an information issue exists, 
namely whether NHRIs might not be aware of the existence of the mechanism or, at least, of the 
concrete arrangements for participation. It was shown that no comprehensive effort has been 
undertaken to date on the part of CoE bodies to inform NHRIs and ombudsmen of the existence and 
functioning of the procedure, the main initiative being a 2008 pilot workshop promoted by the CoE 
Commissioner for Human Rights that involved a relatively small number of national human rights 
structures and does not appear to have been followed up.  
More recently, the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI) issued 
rather detailed guidelines for NHRIs to “support the implementation of judgments” of the ECtHR, at 
                                                        
8 All of these submissions have been analysed in Chapter 4; cf. especially Section 4.3.  
9 The observation was made by Anne van Eijndhoven, Policy Adviser at the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights 
(interview of 4 May 2017, on file with author). 
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both the national and CoE levels.10 While members of ENNHRI should therefore by now be aware 
of the existence of the Rule 9(2) mechanism, further training on its concrete functioning and on the 
most effective ways for NHRIs to contribute to the execution process seems appropriate. The 
importance of specific training for the effective engagement by NHRIs with international procedures 
has been demonstrated in the UN context, where the institutions that had received the most training 
proved to be the most active participants in the relevant procedures.11  
At any rate, it appears that a certain exchange of information between NHRIs that have taken 
part in the procedure and NHRIs that have not done so yet is already taking place within ENNHRI 
Legal Working Group.12 Due to the large membership of ENNHRI, which includes all A-status 
European NHRIs but also partially compliant and non-accredited institutions, its awareness-raising 
and training action has considerable potential.  
The Department for Execution, on its part, has already facilitated the involvement by NHRIs 
by publishing the information relating to the execution of ECtHR judgments on a much more user-
friendly website, but it too could step up its engagement in the area of awareness raising by providing 
training to NHRIs or at least informing individual NHRIs of the opportunity to submit information 
when the Department considers that such information would benefit the supervision of the execution 
of specific judgments.13  
It remains the case that NHRIs might find it sufficient to convey their views to the competent 
national authorities at the domestic level, especially if the latter appear open to the recommendations 
                                                        
10 ENNHRI/Legal Working Group, Guidance for National Human Rights Institutions to Support Implementation of 
Judgments from the European Court of Human Rights (Brussels: ENNHRI, 2016). 
11 Cf. Chris Sidoti, “National Human Rights Institutions and the International Human Rights System”, in Human Rights, 
State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions, eds. Ryan Goodman and Thomas 
Pegram (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, November 2011), 102-103. 
12 Interview with Clare Collier, Senior Principal at the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain), 26 
September 2018, on file with author.  
13 That the Department for Execution or the Committee of Ministers could proactively ask NHRIs to submit information 
was also suggested by Christoffer Badse, Director of the Monitoring Department at the Danish Institute for Human Rights, 
according to whom the Danish Institute and other NHRIs are contacted and invited to provide their views by several 
international monitoring bodies; the latter include various (but not all) UN human rights treaty bodies as well as, among 
others, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(interviews conducted on 26 October 2017 and 21 February 2019, on file with author). 
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by NHRIs and generally willing to abide by ECtHR judgments. Nonetheless, knowledge of the Rule 
9(2) mechanism on the part of NHRIs and their ability to use it would provide them with an additional 
tool to deal with instances of non-compliance or delays in the execution of judgments by States. At 
any rate, as pointed out by the ENNHRI Guidance as well, action at the national level does not exclude 
action at the international one and “the [Rule 9(2)] submission may be equally or more relevant after 
engagement with the national authorities”.14 Indeed, in most instances of Rule 9(2) submissions, 
NHRIs engaged concurrently at the two levels: frequently, they had already raised the relevant issues 
at the national level, then determined to intervene before the Committee of Ministers, and continued 
to work at the national level to solve the issues in cooperation with the domestic stakeholders.15  
While each NHRI has developed its own particular relationship with its government and other 
national authorities, Rule 9(2) submissions should be conceived less as a means of shaming 
governments internationally than a way to share independent data and views with international 
monitoring bodies for a more comprehensive assessment of the issues at stake. This role is no different 
from the provision of information by NHRIs to UN bodies, a practice that – to my knowledge – has 
not been contested by any States. The difference rather appears to lie in the long-standing and close 
relationship between the UN and NHRIs, which entails that NHRIs, especially A-status ones, are used 
to regularly interact with a variety of UN bodies, are familiar with the procedures to do so (also thanks 
to the training and assistance provided by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 
and by the OHCHR),16 and arguably perceive that their contributions are valued by the bodies that 
receive them. 
As regards the engagement by NHRIs with the execution of ECtHR judgments in the exercise 
of their domestic mandates, room for development exists in this respect as well. While most A-status 
NHRIs demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the ECHR norms as interpreted by the Court, many of 
                                                        
14 ENNHRI/Legal Working Group, supra n 10, 3. 
15 Cf. the examples mentioned above in this section of NHRIs submitting to the Committee of Ministers the reports that 
they had drafted in the context of previous domestic activities on the issues at stake, as well as several other examples 
referred to in Chapter 4.  
16 For the role of the Global Alliance (GANHRI), cf. Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
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them do not systematically act to promote the execution of specific ECtHR judgments delivered 
against their countries. Again, financial constraints and staff shortages can prevent greater 
involvement on the part of NHRIs, which might not have the resources to regularly follow up the 
judgments issued by the Court. Additionally, it might be that the early engagement of NHRIs with 
the national authorities concerned and the agreement reached between them on the most appropriate 
measures to adopt make a formal stance by NHRIs unnecessary.  
At a minimum, NHRIs should undertake the regular monitoring of the judgments delivered by 
the Court, especially against their countries but also, usefully, against other countries which might 
have been censured by the Court for violations similar to those occurring in the home countries of 
NHRIs.17 NHRIs could then select cases to follow up more closely in light of the resources available 
and the institutions’ previous experiences in dealing with the issues raised by the cases.  
The execution of ECtHR judgments can be an integral part of the fundamental domestic 
functions of NHRIs, as these judgments originate from violations at the national level and must be 
given effect to by States, often through the adoption of general measures that can considerably amend 
the national legislation, administrative practice, and case-law. In other words, contributing to the 
execution of ECtHR judgments is not a prerogative of the international relations departments of 
NHRIs, but it can potentially be mainstreamed in all major domestic activities undertaken by these 
institutions.  
                                                        
17 As an example of best practice, the Greek National Commission for Human Rights systematically monitors judgments 
and communicated cases against Greece and keeps a database with summaries of the rulings, which is accessible from 
the homepage of the Commission’s website; the Commission also monitors and refers to judgments delivered against 
other States to the extent that they are relevant to the Greek legal order (interview with Anna Irene Baka, Legal Officer 
at the Greek National Commission for Human Rights, 27 July 2018, on file with author). The Office of the Public 
Defender of Georgia also regularly monitors the judgments issued by the ECtHR against its home country and requests 
information from its Government on the measures taken or planned with a view to implementing the judgments (interview 
with Levan Meskhoradze, Team Leader of the EU Project at the Office of the Public Defender of Georgia, 17 April 2018, 
on file with author). For its part, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain) each week checks for ECtHR 
judgments and communicated cases against the United Kingdom as well as Grand Chamber’s judgments against other 
countries (interview with Collier, Equality and Human Rights Commission, supra n 12). Similarly, the French CNCDH 
constantly monitors the ECtHR judgments and communicated cases against France; judgments against other countries 
are also considered insofar as relevant for France, and the CNCDH becomes aware of the latter especially through Twitter 
and the work of university professors (interview with Thomas Dumortier, Legal Adviser at the Commission nationale 
consultative des droits de l’homme, 8 March 2019, on file with author). 
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To this end, the staff members of NHRIs should be familiar with the ECHR standards and 
ECtHR case-law in their own areas and monitor the issuance of relevant new judgments, so as to be 
able to intervene when necessary and possible within their remits.18 The translation of ECtHR 
judgments by NHRIs themselves (if they have the ability to do so) or by competent national 
authorities (e.g., the government agent before the ECtHR, or the Ministry of Justice) can help 
disseminate judgments among all staff members of NHRIs, in addition to other stakeholders and the 
public at large. 
 
Chapter 4 showed that, in certain instances, communications from NHRIs had a demonstrable 
influence on the measures put forward by States, frequently following the mediation of the 
Department for Execution and the Committee of Ministers, which endorsed the observations or 
proposals made by NHRIs. In other instances, communications from NHRIs were essentially 
dismissed, not only by the States concerned (which would hardly embrace more demanding measures 
if not somehow compelled to do so), but also by the CoE bodies.  
These rejections stem from a variety of reasons: it might be that the proposals by NHRIs go 
beyond what is strictly required by the ECtHR judgments, as interpreted by the Committee of 
Ministers; that political considerations prevail (the Committee of Ministers is, after all, a political 
body); or that the Committee of Ministers and the Department for Execution simply find the 
arguments by governments convincing, or anyway satisfactory. It is not argued here that the positions 
expressed by NHRIs, however independent and authoritative, should always be endorsed by States 
or by the competent CoE bodies; and it is to be reiterated that respondent States enjoy a margin of 
appreciation in the choice of means to execute ECtHR judgments.  
                                                        
18 Within the Croatian Ombudsman, for instance, each “advisor” monitors the ECtHR judgments issued in his/her area; 
this task is facilitated by the fact that the government agent before the ECtHR translates the judgments issued against 
Croatia as well as key judgments against other States and by the fact that a representative from the Ombudsman sits as 
observer on an expert committee created by the government agent before the ECtHR to provide input to and monitor the 
execution of ECtHR judgments against Croatia (interview with Tatjana Vlašić, Human Rights Promotion, Cooperation 
and Public Relations Advisor to the Croatian Ombudswoman, 31 October 2018, on file with author). 
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What is more problematic is that submissions by NHRIs are often not even mentioned in the 
documents produced by the Committee of Ministers and the Department for Execution, and they are 
rarely analysed in detail and accepted or rejected in a reasoned way. This practice can be detrimental 
to the well-functioning of the procedure in many respects: States could be discouraged from engaging 
with NHRIs and civil society, if the views of these actors appear to be ignored by CoE bodies; NHRIs 
might consider it useless to intervene, for the same reasons; and the efforts to make the supervision 
of execution process more transparent and objective would be compromised. Notwithstanding the 
above, it is a fact that most States have replied to the communications from NHRIs and rather in 
detail, and that the Department for Execution and the Committee of Ministers have relied on the 
exchanges of views between NHRIs and governments for their assessments. Moreover, most of the 
representatives from intervening NHRIs interviewed for this dissertation expressed their satisfaction 
with the consideration given to their submissions by the Department for Execution. 
Nonetheless, if the participation by NHRIs (and NGOs) in the procedure is considered useful 
for more well-founded and less partial assessments by the Department for Execution and the 
Committee of Ministers, it would appear appropriate for these bodies to make explicit reference to 
the communications received by NHRIs (and NGOs) and to elaborate on why their views and 
proposals have been accepted or not. This approach could elicit stronger participation by NHRIs (and 
NGOs), which would consider that the data and views that they provide are actually taken into 
account; it could stimulate States to consistently interact with these other actors; and it would make 
the dynamics of the supervision of execution more transparent to researchers, NHRIs and NGOs that 
have not participated in the procedure, international organisations, and the public at large. 
In accordance with the same principle, namely that the flow of information from different 
sources benefits the soundness and objectivity of the determinations by the Department for Execution 
and the Committee of Ministers, States should aim to respond to communications from NHRIs and 
NGOs whenever possible and in a meaningful way. At present, governments are only required to 
reply to communications from the injured parties; nonetheless, to date, governments have responded 
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to almost all submissions by NHRIs and to a satisfactory number of submissions by NGOs, even 
though they were not compelled to do so.  
This situation might change as an increasing number of NHRIs and NGOs become aware of 
the procedure and have recourse to it: governments might find it too time-consuming to reply to all 
communications; at the same time, it would be more complicated to impose on them the obligation 
to reply to any communications from NHRIs and NGOs. Furthermore, since January 2017, 
international intergovernmental organisations, the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, and entities 
that intervened as third parties in the ECtHR proceedings have also been given the opportunity to 
submit information to the Committee of Ministers under new Rules 9(3) and 9(4). 
A possible solution would be to impose on governments the obligation to respond to the 
communications from A-status NHRIs only, while encouraging governments to also provide replies 
to the other communications under Rules 9(2), 9(3) and 9(4) to the extent possible. In this way, the 
additional burden on States would be limited and a distinct role would be attributed to those 
institutions that should ensure the highest standards of independence and effectiveness. Such an 
approach would be in line with that adopted in the UN context, where fully compliant NHRIs have 
been given growing privileges and responsibilities, as well as with the developments in the CoE 
context, where a role for NHRIs is being increasingly recognised and greater attention is being paid 
to the Paris Principles and the international accreditation process.19  
It should also be reminded that NHRIs can convey the positions of other actors, including 
NGOs: following broad consultations with civil society, an NHRI can – through its submission – 
forward to the Committee of Ministers information and views from multiple entities, while at the 
same time avoiding overburdening the State concerned and the Department for Execution with an 
excessive number of communications. Even when it does not result in a single submission, this 
                                                        
19 Cf. Section 3.5 of this dissertation for the developments at the UN level and Section 3.6. for the developments at the 
CoE level. 
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coordination activity can lead to complementary submissions which do not reiterate the same 
information and are thus more strategic and effective.20 
At any rate, the amendment of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers in the above-mentioned 
direction is arguably premature, as governments have to date addressed most of the communications 
submitted by NHRIs; nonetheless, it should be considered in the event that communications from 
entities other than governments grow and governments’ response rate decreases. 
 Can NHRIs themselves do more to enhance the impact of their communications under Rule 
9(2)? First of all, NHRIs should strive to submit well-balanced and detailed communications.21 The 
breadth and depth of NHRIs’ knowledge of the domestic legal order and of the human rights situation 
of their countries should make this task feasible.  
More specifically, NHRIs that are considering intervening should monitor the progress of the 
cases of interest which are under supervision and be up to date on all documents submitted by the 
government or NGOs as well as on any decisions by the Committee of Ministers and assessments by 
the Department for Execution, so that communications from NHRIs can be on point and possibly 
address the doubts and concerns expressed by the CoE bodies.22 NHRIs can also get in touch with 
the Department for Execution with a view to drafting communications that are relevant and useful for 
the supervision process.  
NHRIs should also consider that, as the Committee of Ministers’ meetings are prepared in 
advance, they need to allow for sufficient time between the date of submission of the communication 
                                                        
20 An example of how the submissions by NHRIs and NGOs can realise an efficient “division of labour” was mentioned 
in Chapter 4 in relation to the execution of the judgment in Winterstein and others v. France; many other instances where 
communications from NHRIs referred to the data and views of different actors, including NGOs, national independent 
bodies and international organisations, were described in the same chapter.  
Badse, Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra n 13, underlined how NHRIs can facilitate the work of the Committee 
of Ministers and of the Department for Execution by notifying the judgments to the most relevant NGOs and then 
initiating broad debates with national stakeholders on the most appropriate ways to give effect to the judgments (interview 
of 26 October 2017).  
21 Lucja Miara and Victoria Prais, “The Role of Civil Society in the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights”, European Human Rights Law Review, no. 5 (2012): 535. 
22 E.g., Petr Polák, Head of the Department of Equal Treatment at the Public Defender of Rights of the Czech Republic, 
stated that the Public Defender was aware of the issues that the Department for Execution and the Committee of Ministers 
were focusing on (interview conducted on 1 June 2018, on file with author). 
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and the date of the meeting, so that the communication can be considered by the Department for 
Execution and forwarded to the government concerned, which is entitled to a period of time to 
respond. Otherwise, the communication will be considered at the following meeting and might 
become late.23  
A last recommendation for NHRIs would be to continuously monitor the cases in which they 
intervened and consider submitting further communications as the cases progress, in order to keep 
the Department for Execution and the Committee of Ministers informed of the position of the NHRI 
on the subsequent action plans and reports submitted by the government. This is not an invitation to 
reiterate considerations already expressed; but if a case remains under the supervision of the 
Committee and subsequent documents are submitted by the government, it would be appropriate for 
the NHRI to make its views known to the Committee regarding the new measures proposed or enacted 
by the government or even merely the delays that the execution process is encountering.24  
As to the enhancement of the impact of the activities undertaken by NHRIs at the national level, 
reference can be made to other studies that have analysed the effectiveness of NHRIs and identified 
ways in which these institutions can maximise their impact on the human rights situation of their 
countries. Factors such as institutional and procedural guarantees to ensure the independence of 
members, sufficiently strong powers, enforceability of decisions, cooperative relations with public 
authorities, and inclusiveness towards civil society groups have been considered, to a different extent 
by different authors, as contributing to the legitimacy and effectiveness of NHRIs.25  
Similar considerations would apply to NHRIs that are promoting the execution of ECtHR 
judgments in the exercise of their domestic mandates; their success or failure will arguably depend, 
to a large extent, on their powers, their public legitimacy, and the relationship that they have built 
with domestic stakeholders, from the government and parliament to civil society movements.  
                                                        
23 As happened to the submission by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Great Britain) in the Al-Skeini and 
others case: cf. Section 4.4 of this dissertation. 
24 Cf., in support, Miara and Prais, supra n 21, 536. 
25 On the effectiveness of NHRIs and the relevant literature, cf. Section 3.4 of this dissertation.  
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6.2. Limitations of the research 
Accessibility issues have variously affected this dissertation. The fact that it is only since 2011 
that the publication of documents relating to the supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments is 
the rule and not the exception means that some communications from NHRIs might have been 
overlooked, even though the websites of NHRIs were also searched complementarily for 
completeness; it also entails that the possible impact of some of the pre-2011 communications from 
NHRIs on the positions of States and CoE bodies could not be established.  
As regards Chapter 5 and the national activities that NHRIs have undertaken to date to promote 
the execution of ECtHR judgments, language has been the main issue, as only webpages in English, 
French, and Spanish could be consulted for the dissertation. Nonetheless, most A-status NHRIs 
translate into English at least their annual reports and, in various instances, a wealth of other 
documents and webpages; moreover, Chapter 5 did not aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
all instances where NHRIs facilitated the execution of ECtHR judgments in the exercise of their 
domestic mandates. Even with more time and resources and stronger language skills, such an analysis 
would arguably prove impossible, also because of the difficulty to retrieve all documents, especially 
older ones. 
With more time and resources, a larger number of interviews with representatives from NHRIs 
would have been sought; while, as mentioned, interviews were not conceived as the primary source 
of data for this dissertation, they add value to empirical analyses which focus on the concrete use of 
procedures and on the approaches by the actors involved, as this dissertation does. A wider pool of 
interviewees would have ensured greater representativeness, even though, in carrying out the 
research, care was taken to select NHRIs with different mandates, statuses of accreditation, and 
geographical origins, as well as to include both NHRIs that have submitted communications under 
Rule 9(2) and NHRIs that have not.  
Additionally, having more time and resources available, the scope of the research would have 
been broadened in terms of a comparative analysis of all main regional human rights systems (i.e., in 
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addition to the ECHR system, the African and Inter-American ones), and a more in-depth examination 
of the contribution by NGOs would have been carried out. More on these aspects will be said in the 
last section of this chapter, which includes some recommendations for further research.  
  A last limitation that I would like to underline is linked to the difficulties in measuring the 
impact of contributions by NHRIs, at the national and international levels, to the execution of ECtHR 
judgments. While an increasing body of literature is studying the effectiveness of NHRIs and the 
Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions is seeking to take into greater account the 
actual ability of NHRIs to deliver results, it is not easy to agree on the criteria to assess the impact of 
NHRIs.  
For this dissertation, a workable notion of impact has been adopted by which the ability of 
NHRIs to influence the determinations of States and CoE bodies is evaluated, rather than their more 
abstract ability to promote the best possible execution of the ECtHR judgments. Also, considerable 
caution has been exerted when assessing the former kind of impact and conclusions have been drawn 
only when a clear link was found between the observations by NHRIs and the considerations and 
decisions by States and CoE bodies; to the extent possible, potential concurring factors were noted.  
That said, it remains difficult to “isolate” the contribution by NHRIs to changes in decisions 
and practices, as it is for the contribution by other actors as well (such as NGOs or international 
organisations) to any human rights developments.26 As put it by Bürli, who analysed the impact of 
third-party interventions on the reasoning and decisions of the ECtHR, “it is difficult to measure the 
influence of an intervention on the outcome of a case. At best one can find correlations that do not 
necessarily indicate causality”.27  
                                                        
26 On the difficulties of “attribut[ing] improvements in respect for human rights to any particular institutional actor or 
other factor”, cf., among others, Richard Carver, Measuring the Impact and Development Effectiveness of National 
Human Rights Institutions. A Proposed Framework for Evaluation (Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, 
2014), 11 et seqq. 
27 Nicole Bürli, Third-Party Interventions before the European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017), 
189. In commenting upon the impact of the communications from the Czech Public Defender in the D.H. and others case, 
Polák, Public Defender of Rights of the Czech Republic, supra n 22, highlighted the difficulties of evaluating the specific 
impact of the Defender’s intervention in light of the several actors involved in the execution of the judgment (the 
Committee of Ministers, associations of parents, and various NGOs), so that a “synergy effect” arguably took place (even 
though Polák maintained that the Defender was in a privileged position because of its ability to submit accurate evidence). 
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6.3. Contributions to the literature and practice 
The findings of this dissertation contribute to both the literature on NHRIs and the literature on 
the ECHR system by examining aspects that appear to be under-studied in the two fields. Indeed, on 
the one hand, academics interested in the relations of NHRIs with international organisations and in 
the contribution by NHRIs to the development and implementation of international human rights law 
tend to focus on the UN context; and while increasing attention is paid to regional human rights 
systems as well, scholarly works on the engagement by NHRIs with the ECHR system specifically 
are sparing.  
On the other hand, the literature on the Convention and the Court is still predominantly 
concerned with the analysis of the ECHR substantive norms as interpreted by the Court and with the 
proceedings before the ECtHR rather than with the execution stage. Moreover, authors dealing with 
the execution process have rarely assessed the contribution that actors different from governments 
and CoE bodies have made, and separate consideration of the role of NHRIs is simply lacking.  
These gaps in the literature appear serious if one considers that NHRIs should be institutionally 
mandated to promote the implementation of international standards and rulings and to regularly 
cooperate to this end with their governments and international organisations; that the provision 
conferring on NHRIs the most significant role in the CoE context is arguably Rule 9(2) of the Rules 
of the Committee of Ministers, which allows for the submission of information by NHRIs in respect 
of the execution of ECtHR judgments; and that NHRIs are referred to specifically by an increasing 
number of CoE bodies and in the context of the ongoing reform of the Court and of the ECHR system.  
This dissertation has sought to fill these gaps by means of a comprehensive examination of the 
communications submitted to date by NHRIs to the Committee of Ministers in relation to the 
execution of ECtHR judgments and by means of a systematic mapping of the ways in which NHRIs 
have contributed and can contribute to the execution process in the exercise of their domestic 
mandates. The findings of this empirical analysis of the authors, contents, and impact of Rule 9(2) 
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communications from NHRIs, as well as of the national activities by NHRIs in the area, have been 
summarised above, together with their limitations. 
Scholarship on NHRIs can build on these findings when examining a wide range of issues – 
from the role of NHRIs in the implementation of international standards and decisions to their 
interactions with international organisations, from their role in European or otherwise regional 
settings to their effectiveness in general. The dissertation has also shed light on the respective statuses 
of NHRIs and NGOs in international fora by showing the differences that currently exist between the 
UN context, where special prerogatives are often conferred on NHRIs, and the CoE one, where no 
comparable difference in treatment exists, especially as far as the execution of ECtHR judgments is 
concerned. 
The dissertation also provides a stimulus for scholars researching on the ECHR system to give 
greater consideration to the execution of ECtHR judgments in general, to the machinery connected 
to it, and to the role that actors other than governments and the Committee of Ministers can play with 
respect to the outcome of the execution of judgments and its supervision. Separate consideration of 
the role of NHRIs is also sensible, as these institutions are largely considered to be “unique” bodies 
and are increasingly referred to in CoE settings, even though formal declarations have not always 
been reflected in practice. 
More broadly, the dissertation also contributes to the literature on the compliance by States with 
their international obligations and on the role that specific domestic bodies can play in facilitating the 
alignment of national legal orders with international norms and rulings, on the basis of a conception 
of States as multi-layered entities whose different organs variously act to promote the implementation 
of international standards and decisions. 
As to the contribution of the dissertation to practice, the empirical data collected for the research 
could be used by stakeholders to possibly adapt their rules and actions. The research findings show 
that, overall, the Rule 9(2) mechanism is not being used to its full potential, as a relatively low number 
of national human rights structures have submitted communications to date and, while at times the 
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communications had an influence on the execution process and its supervision, in most instances it is 
hard to assess whether this was the case. As to the domestic level, growth margins exist as regards 
the mainstreaming of the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments into the core domestic 
activities undertaken by NHRIs.  
Section 6.1 above thus put forward some suggestions, addressed to NHRIs, governments, the 
Committee of Ministers, and the Department for the Execution of Judgments, with a view to taking 
full advantage of the opportunities offered by existing international and domestic procedures, without 
the need for major reforms to the system.  
 
6.4. Future lines of inquiry 
The extension of the scope of the research to the role of NHRIs in promoting the execution of 
rulings and decisions delivered in the context of the African and Inter-American human rights systems 
would appear as a natural line of further research.28 These two systems share significant legal and 
institutional similarities with the ECHR one, being based on the adjudication of human rights 
complaints with binding effects (even though with some limitations)29 and the implementation of 
decisions by States under the supervision of the supranational organisation.30 Additionally, all three 
                                                        
28 The study of the relationship between NHRIs and other European organisations such as the European Union and OSCE 
should also be pursued; it is, at any rate, a considerably different relationship, as both these organisations are not centred 
around courts and their areas of intervention are not confined to human rights.  
As for the Asian context, notwithstanding the inexistence of a comprehensive human rights system comparable to that of 
other regions, the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions undertakes several activities of human rights 
promotion and protection in cooperation with a plurality of national, regional, and international partners.  
29 In the Inter-American context, individual petitioners do not have direct recourse to the Court, but only indirect through 
the Commission, similarly to what happened in the ECHR system before the entry into force of Protocol no.11. In the 
African context, to date, only eight States Parties to the Protocol on the establishment of the Court have accepted the 
competence of the Court to receive cases from individual petitioners. Both the African and the Inter-American 
Commissions receive individual complaints and issue findings and recommendations, which are widely considered to be 
non-binding per se but whose non-implementation can lead the Commissions to refer the cases to their respective Courts.  
30 Within the Inter-American system, there is no political body tasked with supervising the execution of the Court’s 
judgments and of the Commission’s decisions; absent specific provisions, the Inter-American Court is increasingly taking 
up this function with respect to its rulings. On the other hand, the Council of Ministers of the African Union is entrusted 
with monitoring the execution of judgments by States Parties, on behalf of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (Article 29 of the Protocol on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights); to 
support the Council in this function, the African Court is required to refer to instances of non-compliance in its annual 
reports to the Assembly (Article 31 of the Protocol).  
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systems have encouraged their Member States to establish NHRIs31 and have in place some form of 
cooperation with these institutions.  
In the African context, significantly, NHRIs are mentioned in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, whose Article 26 compels States to “allow the establishment and improvement 
of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and 
freedoms” set forth in the Charter.  
Within the African Union framework, the body that mainly interacts with NHRIs is the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which grants NHRIs “special observer status” provided 
that they fulfil certain requirements, including compliance with the Paris Principles.32 The award of 
this status allow NHRIs to attend the public sessions of the Commission and “participate, without 
voting rights, in deliberations on issues which are of interest to them and … submit proposals which 
may be put to the vote”.33 Additionally and more generally, NHRIs are meant to collaborate with the 
Commission in the promotion and protection of human rights at the national level, for instance by 
conducting awareness-raising campaigns or providing human rights education.34  
At present, African NHRIs do not have direct ties with the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, nor are they specifically tasked with ensuring the implementation of the Court’s 
judgments at the domestic level; nonetheless, in the latest years, they have been strengthening their 
                                                        
31 Cf., for the first recommendations to this end: African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Resolution on the 
Establishment of Committees on Human Rights or Other Similar Organs at National, Regional or Sub-Regional Levels, 
5th ordinary session, 3-14 April 1989, Benghazi (Libya); and Organization of American States/General Assembly, Support 
for international exchanges of experience among ombudsmen, 7th plenary session, 5 June 1997, AG/RES. 1505 (XXVII-
O/97). 
32 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on Granting Observer Status to National Human 
Rights Institutions in Africa with the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 24th ordinary session, 22-31 
October 1998, Banjul (Gambia). However, there is no exact correspondence between the accreditation conducted by 
GANHRI and the granting of special observer status by the African Commission: compare Global Alliance of National 
Human Rights Institutions, Chart of the Status of National Institutions, 8 August 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, 
https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Documents/Status%20Accreditation%20Chart%20%288%20August%202018.pdf; and 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “National Human Rights Institutions”, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.achpr.org/network/nhri/.  
33 Resolution on Granting Observer Status, supra n 32, para. 4. 
34 Ibid. See also “National Human Rights Institutions”, supra n 32. 
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reporting activity to the Commission and their involvement in the process of execution of the 
Commission’s and Court’s decisions.35 
The situation is somewhat symmetrical within the Organization of American States. NHRIs 
from the Americas have less formal relationships with the Organization’s bodies, but they have 
actively engaged with these – arguably more actively than African NHRIs have done with their 
counterparts. Inter alia, NHRIs have promoted the implementation of the American Convention on 
Human Rights and of the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at the national 
level, informed the general public and trained professionals on the functioning of the Inter-American 
human rights system, submitted cases to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on behalf 
of victims, acted as amici curiae and expert witnesses for both the Commission and the Court, and 
helped establish the facts of a case.36 More recently, NHRIs from the Americas have started to 
intervene during compliance proceedings before the Court37 and signed a Declaration of Commitment 
for Technical Cooperation with a view to strengthening their collaboration with the Commission.38  
Notwithstanding the significance of the regional dimension of NHRIs’ activities, in terms both 
of collaboration with fellow NHRIs within regional networks and of interaction with regional 
organisations, few scholars are focusing on these aspects39 and little attention is being paid to the role 
that NHRIs can play in promoting the execution of rulings. Both theory and practice would thus 
                                                        
35 Cf. Network of African National Human Rights Institutions, “Cooperation with Regional Human Rights Mechanisms”, 
accessed 4 January 2019, http://www.nanhri.org/our-work/thematic-areas/cooperation-with-regional-human-rights-
mechanism/. 
36 Tom Pegram and Nataly Herrera Rodriguez, “Bridging the Gap: National Human Rights Institutions and the Inter-
American Human Rights System”, in The Inter-American Human Rights System. Impact Beyond Compliance, eds. Par 
Engstrom et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 171 et seqq. 
37 Ibid., 179. 
38 Organization of American States, “IACHR and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) sign Declaration of 
Commitment for Technical Cooperation”, Press Release, 19 November 2018, accessed 4 January 2019, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/246.asp. 
39 For the Inter-American context, see Juan Méndez and Irene Aguilar, “La Relación entre el Ombudsman y el Derecho 
Internacional de los Derechos Humanos”, in II Congreso Anual de la Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsman: 
Memoria. Toledo, 14 a 16 de abril de 1997, ed. Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsman (Federación Iberoamericana 
del Ombudsman, 1998), 257-276; and Pegram and Herrera Rodriguez, supra n 36, 167-198. As far as the African system 
is concerned, cf. Rachel Murray, The Role of National Human Rights Institutions at the International and Regional Levels: 
The Experience of Africa (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007); and Bonolo R. Dinokopila, “Beyond Paper-Based Affiliate 
Status: National Human Rights Institutions and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, African Human 
Rights Law Journal 10, no. 1 (2010): 26-52. 
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benefit from a closer examination of these dynamics, also considering that the issues of non-
implementation of human rights treaties and non-execution of judgments and decisions also affect 
the African and Inter-American contexts.40 
The relationship between NHRIs and NGOs could also be examined more thoroughly; as the 
literature on NHRIs typically stresses the “uniqueness” of these institutions and the clear differences 
between them and NGOs, it would be interesting to further investigate why, apparently, no distinctive 
role is recognised for NHRIs in the promotion of the execution of ECtHR judgments by CoE bodies 
and States. The investigation could be extended to other areas of the ECHR system where both NGOs 
and NHRIs are active, such as the submission of third-party interventions to the Court.  
Finally, a further line of inquiry could be the in-depth examination of how single NHRIs have 
promoted the execution of ECtHR judgments or, alternatively, how single ECtHR judgments have 
been implemented and how NHRIs and/or other actors contributed to the implementation. In other 
words, case studies of institutions or judgments could be undertaken with a view to shedding more 










                                                        
40 Cf. Fernando Basch et al., “The Effectiveness of the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection: A 
Quantitative Approach to its Functioning and Compliance with Its Decisions”, SUR - International Journal on Human 
Rights 7, no. 12 (2010): 9-35. In the African context, cf. Rachel Murray and Elizabeth Mottershaw, “Mechanisms for the 
Implementation of Decisions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 36, 
no. 2 (2014): 349-372. 
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